





LECTURES

ON

MODERN HISTORY.

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INTRODUCTORY LECTURES
ON
MODERN HISTORY,

DELIVERED IN LENT TERM, MDCCCXLII.

WITH
THE INAUGURAL LECTURE

DELIVERED IN DECEMBER, MDCCCXLI.

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EDITED,

FROM THE SECOND LONDON EDITION,

WITH A PREFACE AND NOTES,

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PREFACE

TO

THE AMERICAN EDITION.

It will be seen from Dr. Arnold's prefatory note, that these Lectures were printed almost exactly as they were delivered; the date of the publication showing too that it was very soon after the delivery of them. The Lectures are altogether of an introductory character, and it was the humble hope of the author, that in succeeding years he would be enabled to devote other courses to the farther examination of modern history—the subject which he regarded as “of all others the most interesting, inasmuch as it includes all questions of the deepest interest, relating not to human things only, but to divine.” The last lecture in this volume appears to have been delivered in the month of February, 1842, and it was upon the 12th of June that Dr. Arnold's sudden death took place. The hope of future labors in modern history was not to be fulfilled, and, in the words of his biographer, “the Introductory Lectures were to be invested with the solemnity of being the last words which he spoke in his beloved university.”

The design of these Lectures cannot be better described than by saying that they were intended to excite a greater interest in the study of history. Dr. Arnold's biographer thus speaks of them:

“The course was purely and in every sense of the word ‘introductory.’ As the design of his first residence in Oxford was not to gain influence over the place so much as to familiarize himself with it after his long absence; so the object of his first lectures was not so much to impart any historical knowledge, as to state his own views of history, and to excite an interest in the study of it. The

Inaugural Lecture was a definition of history in general, and of modern history in particular; the eight following lectures were the natural expansion of this definition; and the statement of such leading difficulties as he conceived a student would meet in the study first of the external life, and then of the internal life of nations. They were also strictly 'lectures;' it is not an author and his readers, but the professor and his hearers, that are brought before us. Throughout the course, but especially in its various digressions, is to be discerned his usual anxiety—in this case almost as with a prophetic foreboding—to deliver his testimony before it was too late, on the subjects next his heart; which often imparts to them at once the defect and the interest of the outpouring of his natural conversation."

Of the spirit in which he should lecture with respect to the feelings of the place, Dr. Arnold remarks, in one of his letters, "The best rule, it seems to me, is to lecture exactly as I should write for the world at large; to lecture, that is, neither hostilely nor cautiously, not seeking occasions of shocking men's favorite opinions, yet neither in any way humouring them, or declining to speak the truth, however opposed it may be to them."

While the text of these Lectures is with scrupulous fidelity preserved exactly as they were uttered and printed, it has seemed to me that their interest and value might be increased by the introduction of some illustrative notes. There would indeed have been little need of any thing of the kind, had Arnold's life been prolonged till his professorial labors were completed; but considering that these Lectures have been left to us as introductory to unaccomplished after-courses, and that a lecturer is always under the necessity of bringing his subject in each lecture within narrow limits of time, I have thought that it was an occasion on which the addition of editorial notes would not be inappropriate. This thought was perhaps first suggested to my mind by the knowledge that Dr Arnold's other works furnished passages which might be brought into fit connection with the Lectures, and the belief that on farther examination with this special object in view, I should be able to find more. My first and chief aim, therefore, in the notes I have introduced in this edition, has been to collect such parallel passages as would explain and illustrate the opinions and feelings which are

presented, either by direct statement or brief intimation, in the Lectures.

I have not however confined the notes to selections from Dr Arnold's writings, but have brought them from various sources, as far as I thought they would contribute to historical knowledge and truth, without encumbering the volume. It will readily be understood, that in lectures as copious as these are in historical and biographical allusions, the process of annotation might be carried on to an almost indefinite extent, but I have endeavored to limit the notes in a great measure to such as are of that *suggestive* character for which the Lectures themselves are distinguished—such as might encourage a love for the study of history and prompt to historical reading. In no department of literature has there been greater advance than in historical science during about the last twenty years, and it is a branch of education well deserving attention, as one of the means of chastening that narrow and spurious nationality which is no more than unsubstantial national vanity—the substitute of ignorance and arrogance for genuine and rational and dutiful patriotism.

In preparing this edition, I have had in view its use, not only for the general reader, but also as a text-book in education, especially in our college courses of study. It might be thought that this last purpose would require the introduction of many notes of an explanatory kind for the information of young students; but from such annotation I have in a great measure forborne, and purposely, for two reasons—because it must have become too copious in a work so full of historical allusions, and because the volume can be an appropriate text-book only for advanced students, who have completed an elementary course of history. Besides, it is my belief that many a text-book is now-a-days overloaded with notes, to the positive injury of education: such books seem to be prepared upon a presumption that they are to be taught by men who are either ignorant or indolent, or both, and thus it is that the spirit of oral instruction is deadened by the practice of anticipating much that should be supplied by the teacher. The active intercourse between the mind that teaches and the minds that are taught, which is essential to all true instruction, is often rendered dull by the use of books of such description. I have therefore endeavored to make the notes in this

volume chiefly suggestive, and only incidentally explanatory, and in doing so, it is my belief and hope that I have followed a principle on which the Lectures themselves were written.

The introduction of this work as a text-book I regard as important, because, at least so far as my information entitles me to speak, there is no book better calculated to inspire an interest in historical study. That it has this power over the minds of students I can say from experience, which enables me also to add, that I have found it excellently suited to a course of college instruction. By intelligent and enterprising members of a class especially, it is studied as a text-book with zeal and animation.

In offering this volume for such use, I am not unaware of the difficulties arising from the fact that our college courses are both limited as to time and crowded with a considerable variety of studies—often perhaps too great a variety for sound education. The false academic ambition of making a display of many subjects has the inevitable effect of rendering instruction superficial in such studies as ought to be cultivated thoroughly. I should be sorry, therefore, to be contributing in any way to what may be regarded as an evil and an abuse—the injurious accumulation of subjects of study upon a course that is limited in duration. It is in order to avoid this, that I venture here to suggest an expedient by which instruction in these Lectures may be accomplished advantageously and without embarrassment or conflict with other studies. The student may be made well acquainted with these Lectures by the process of making written *abstracts* of them, for which the work is, as I have found, peculiarly adapted. Let me, however, fortify this suggestion by something far more valuable than my own opinion or experience—the authority of Dr. Arnold himself as to the value of the method. It will be found in his correspondence that he earnestly advises the making of an abstract of some standard work in history: besides the information gained, “the abstract itself,” are his words, “practises you in condensing and giving in your own words what another has said; a habit of great value, as it forces one to think about it, which extracting merely does not. It farther gives a brevity and simplicity to your language, two of the greatest merits which style can have.” This method may, it appears to me, be made with advantage a substitute, to a considerable extent, for what

is commonly called "*original composition*" of young writers. It avoids a danger which in that process has probably occurred to the minds of most persons who have had experience and are thoughtfully engaged in that branch of education. The danger I allude to has been wisely and I think not too strongly spoken of as the "immense peril of introducing dishonesty into a pupil's mind, of teaching him to utter phrases which answer to nothing that is actually within him, and do not describe any thing that he has actually seen or imagined." (*Lectures on National Education*, by the Rev. Prof. Maurice, now of King's College, London.)

A few words may be added here, for the general reader as well as the student. In order to receive just impressions from these Lectures it is important to bear in mind one or two of the peculiarly prominent traits of Dr. Arnold's intellectual, or rather moral character. The zeal to combat wrong—to withstand evil—engendered a polemical propensity, which leads him sometimes to speak as if he saw only evil in what may be mixed good and evil. His view of things, therefore, is occasionally both true and false, because one-sided and incomplete. Of chivalry, for instance, his mind appears to have dwelt only or chiefly on the dark side—the evils and abuses of it. 'Conservatism' was to him a symbol of evil, because he thought of it, not as preserving what is good, but a spirit of resistance to all change.

Arbitrary power, in any of its forms, was odious to the mind of Arnold, not simply because it creates restraint and subjection, but inasmuch as it retards or prevents improvement of faculties given to be improved. "Half of our virtue," he exclaims, quoting Homer's lines with a bold version, "Half of our virtue is torn away when a man becomes a slave, and the other half goes when he becomes a slave broke loose." The solemn and impassioned utterance of the great living poet, whom Arnold knew in personal converse, would not be too strong to express the feeling with which he looked upon oppression by lawless dominion :

" Never may from our souls one truth depart—
That an accursed thing it is to gaze
On prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye."

Liberty was prized by Arnold, not for its own sake—not as in itself

a good, but as a means—a condition of cultivation and improvement, and it became in his eyes a worthless boon, an abused privilege whenever not dutifully employed for the good of man and the glory of God.

Dr. Arnold's opinions must also often be judged of in their relative connection. "It is my nature," he says, "always to attack that evil which seems to me most present." Accordingly, the evil he would most strenuously condemn in one place, or time, or state of things, might elsewhere cease to be the most dangerous, or in deed give place to even an opposite evil. This has an important bearing upon any application of his principles or opinions to various political or social conditions; but be the thoughts and words what they may, there is assurance that they come from a man distinguished for that *straightforwardness* of purpose and of speech which everywhere and always is a virtue—

ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προσφέρει,
παρὰ τυραννίδι, χῶπτόταν δ' λαβρός στρατός,
χῶπταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι. Pyth. II.

Having spoken of applications of Dr. Arnold's thoughts, I wish to add, that there could be no more unworthy tribute rendered to him than either the careless, unreflecting adoption of his views, or the citing his words as a sanction for opinions that may in other minds be no more than prejudices—formed in ignorance or indifference, and held without earnestness or candor. Such is not the lesson to be learned from the character of one of whom I may say that he could not draw a happy breath in the presence of falsehood, and the master-passion of whose spirit was the love of Law and of Truth.


In the arrangement of this volume for the press, I have placed the notes of this edition at the end of each lecture, so that they may not intrude at all upon the text of the lectures, which differ in no other particular from the original, than merely the insertion of numbers for reference to the notes, and a correction of a slight error in a reference to an authority in Lecture VI. To prevent any possibility of error, let it be understood that Dr. Arnold's own notes, few in number, are printed as foot-notes, as in the original edition. The notes of this edition are in all cases referred to by numbers, and are placed after each lecture.

For several valuable suggestions and references, I am indebted to the learning and the kindness of the Rev. Professor George Allen, of Delaware College. I mention my obligation, because otherwise silence would bring me the self-reproach for something like unreal display. There is a pleasure too in making such an acknowledgment, especially when, in connection with this volume, it is to one whose earnest scholarship is kindred to that of Arnold himself in several respects, and chiefly in this—the not common combination of philological accuracy with cultivation of modern history and literature.

H. R. .

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,

PHILADELPHIA, *April* 23, 1845.



TO THE REVEREND
EDWARD HAWKINS, D. D.,
PROVOST OF ORIEL COLLEGE,
ETC., ETC., ETC.,


THESE LECTURES,

THE FIRST FRUITS OF A RENEWED CONNEXION WITH THE UNIVERSITY
AND ITS RESIDENT MEMBERS,

ARE INSCRIBED WITH TRUE RESPECT AND REGARD,

BY HIS SINCERELY ATTACHED FRIEND,

THE AUTHOR.



THE following Lectures are printed almost exactly as they were delivered. They were written with the expectation that they would be read in a room to a very limited audience; which may explain why the style in some instances is more colloquial than became the circumstances under which they were delivered actually.

Rugby, May 5th, 1842.



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
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INAUGURAL LECTURE.

It has been often remarked, that when a stranger enters St. Peter's for the first time, the immediate impression is one of disappointment; the building looks smaller than he expected to find it. So it is with the first sight of mountains; their summits never seem so near the clouds as we had hoped to see them. But a closer acquaintance with these, and with other grand or beautiful objects, convinces us that our first impression arose not from the want of greatness in what we saw, but from a want of comprehensiveness in ourselves to grasp it. What we saw was not all that existed; but all that our untaught glance could master. As we know it better, it remains the same, but we rise more nearly to its level: our greater admiration is but the proof that we are become able to appreciate it more truly. (1)

Something of this sort takes place, I think, in our un-instructed impressions of history. We are not inclined to rate very highly the qualifications required either in the student or in the writer of it. It seems to demand little more than memory in the one, and honesty and diligence in the other. It is, we say, only a record of facts; and such a work seems to offer no field for the imagination, or for the judgment, or for our powers of reasoning. History is but time's follower; she does not pretend to discover, but merely to register what time has brought to light already. Eminent men have been known to hold this language; Johnson, whose fondness for biography might have taught him to judge more truly, enter-

tained little respect for history. We cannot comprehend what we have never studied, and history must be content to share in the common portion of every thing great and good ; it must be undervalued by a hasty observer.

If I were to attempt to institute a comparison between the excellencies of history and those of other studies, I should be falling into the very fault which I have been just noticing ; I might be doing injustice to other branches of knowledge, only because I had no sufficient acquaintance with them. But I may be allowed to claim for history, not any particular rank, whether high or low, as compared with other studies, but simply that credit should be given it for containing more than a superficial view of it can appreciate ; for having treasures, neither lying on the surface nor immediately below the surface,—treasures not to be obtained without much labor, yet rewarding the hardest labor amply.

To these treasures it is my business to endeavor to point out the way. A Professor of history, if I understand his duties rightly, has two principal objects ; he must try to acquaint his hearers with the nature and value of the treasure for which they are searching ; and, secondly, he must try to show them the best and speediest method of discovering and extracting it. The first of these two things may be done once for all ; but the second must be his habitual employment, the business of his professorial life. I am now, therefore, not to attempt to enter upon the second, but to bestow my attention upon the first : I must try to state what is the treasure to be found by a search into the records of history ; if we cannot be satisfied that it is abundant and most valuable, we shall care little to be instructed how to gain it.

In speaking of history generally, I may appear to be forgetting that my proper subject is more limited ; that it is not history simply, but modern history. I am perfectly aware of this, and hope not to forget it in my practice : but still as

the outset I must trace the stream from its source ; I must ask you to remain with me awhile on the high ground, where the waters, which are hereafter to form the separate streams of ancient and modern history, lie as yet undistinguished in their common parent lake. I must speak of history in general, in order to understand the better the character of any one of its particular species.

The general idea of history seems to be, that it is the biography of a society. It does not appear to me to be history at all, but simply biography, unless it finds in the persons who are its subject something of a common purpose, the accomplishment of which is the object of their common life. History is to this common life of many, what biography is to the life of an individual. Take, for instance, any common family, and its members are soon so scattered from one another, and are engaged in such different pursuits, that although it is possible to write the biography of each individual, yet there can be no such thing, properly speaking, as the history of the family. But suppose all the members to be thrown together in one place, amidst strangers or savages, and there immediately becomes a common life,—a unity of action,—interest, and purpose, distinct from others around them, which renders them at once a fit subject of history. Perhaps I ought not to press the word “purpose ;” because purpose implies consciousness in the purposer, and a society may exist without being fully conscious of its own business as a society. But whether consciously or not, every society—so much is implied in the very word—must have in it something of community ; and so far as the members of it are members, so far as they are each incomplete parts, but taken together form a whole, so far, it appears to me, their joint life is the proper subject of history.

Accordingly we find the term history often applied to small

and subordinate societies. We speak of the history of literary or scientific societies; we have histories of commercial bodies; histories of religious orders; histories of universities. In all these cases, history has to do with that which the several members of each of these societies have in common; it is, as I said, the biography of their common life. And it seems to me that it could not perform its office, if it had no distinct notion in what this common life consisted.

But if the life of every society belongs to history, much more does the life of that highest and sovereign society which we call a state or a nation. And this in fact is considered the proper subject of history; insomuch that if we speak of it simply, without any qualifying epithet, we understand by it, not the biography of any subordinate society, but of some one or more of the great national societies of the human race, whatever political form their bond of connection may assume. And thus we get a somewhat stricter definition of history properly so called; we may describe it not simply as the biography of a society, but as the biography of a political society or commonwealth.

Now in a commonwealth or state, that common life which I have ventured to call the proper subject of history, finds its natural expression in those who are invested with the state's government. Here we have the varied elements which exist in the body of a nation, reduced as it were to an intelligible unity: the state appears to have a personal existence in its government. And where that government is lodged in the hands of a single individual, then biography and history seem to melt into one another, inasmuch as one and the same person combines in himself his life as an individual, and the common life of his nation.

That common life, then, which we could not find represented by any private members of the state, is brought to a head, as it were, and exhibited intelligibly and visibly in the

government. And thus history has generally taken governments as the proper representatives of nations; it has recorded the actions and fortunes of kings or national councils, and has so appeared to fulfil its appointed duty, that of recording the life of a commonwealth. Nor is this theoretically other than true; the idea of government is no doubt that it should represent the person of the state, desiring those ends, and contriving those means to compass them, which the state itself, if it could act for itself, ought to desire and to contrive. But practically and really this has not been so: governments have less represented the state than themselves; the individual life has so predominated in them over the common life, that what in theory is history, because it is recording the actions of a government, and the government represents the nation, becomes in fact no more than biography; it does but record the passions and actions of an individual, who is abusing the state's name for the purposes of selfish, rather than public good.

We see, then, in practice how history has been beguiled, so to speak, from its proper business, and has ceased to describe the life of a commonwealth. For, taking governments as the representatives of commonwealths, which in idea they are, history has watched their features, as if from them might be drawn the portrait of their respective nations. But as in this she has been deceived, so her portraits were necessarily unlike what they were intended to represent; they were not portraits of the commonwealth, but of individuals.

Again, the life of a commonwealth, like that of an individual, has two parts; it is partly external, and partly internal. Its external life is seen in its dealings with other commonwealths; its internal life, in its dealings with itself. Now in the former of these, government must ever be, in a certain degree, the representative of the nation; there must here be a community of interest, at least up to a certain

point, and something also of a community of feeling. If a government be overthrown by a foreign enemy, the nation shares in the evils of the conquest, and in the shame of the defeat; if it be victorious, the nation, even if not enriched with the spoils, is yet proud to claim its portion of the glory. And thus, in describing a government's external life, that is, its dealings with other governments, history has remained, and could not but remain, true to its proper subject: for in foreign war, the government must represent more than its individual self; here it really must act and suffer, not altogether, but yet to a considerable degree, for and with the nation.

I have assumed that the external life of a state is seen in little else than in its wars; and this I fear is true, with scarcely any qualification. A state acting out of itself, is mostly either repelling violence, or exercising it upon others; the friendly intercourse between nation and nation is for the most part negative. A nation's external life, then, is displayed in its wars, and here history has been sufficiently busy: the wars of the human race have been recorded, when the memory of every thing else has perished. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the external life of nations, as of individuals, is at once the most easily known and the most generally interesting. Action, in the common sense of the word, is intelligible to every one; its effects are visible and sensible; in itself, from its necessary connection with outward nature, it is often highly picturesque, while the qualities displayed in it are some of those which, by an irresistible instinct, we are most led to admire. Ability in the adaptation of means to ends, courage, endurance, and perseverance, the complete conquest over some of the most universal weaknesses of our nature, the victory over some of its most powerful temptations,—these are qualities displayed in action, and particularly in war. And it is our deep sympathy with

these qualities, much more than any fondness for scenes of horror and blood, which has made descriptions of battles, whether in poetry or history, so generally attractive. He who can read these without interest, differs, I am inclined to think, from the mass of mankind rather for the worse than for the better; he rather wants some noble qualities which other men have, than possesses some which other men want.

But still we have another life besides that of outward action; and it is this inward life after all which determines the character of the actions and of the man. And how eagerly do we desire in those great men whose actions fill so large a space in history, to know not only what they did but what they were: how much do we prize their letters or their recorded words, and not least such words as are uttered in their most private moments, which enable us to look as it were into the very nature of that mind, whose distant effects we know to be so marvellous! But a nation has its inward life no less than an individual, and from this its outward life also is characterized. For what does a nation effect by war, but either the securing of its existence, or the increasing of its power? We honor the heroism shown in accomplishing these objects; but power, nay even existence, are not ultimate ends; the question may be asked of every created being why he should live at all, and no satisfactory answer can be given, if his life does not, by doing God's will consciously or unconsciously, tend to God's glory and to the good of his brethren. And if a nation's annals contain the record of deeds ever so heroic, done in defence of the national freedom or existence, still we may require that the freedom or the life so bravely maintained should be also employed for worthy purposes; or else even the names of Thermopylæ and of Morgarten become in after years a reproach rather than a glory. (2)

Turning then to regard the inner life of a nation, we cannot but see that here, as in the life of an individual, it is

determined by the nature of its ultimate end. What is a nation's main object, is therefore a question which must be asked, before we can answer whether its inner life, and consequently its outward life also, which depends upon the inner life, is to be called good or evil. Now it does not seem easy to conceive that a nation can have any other object than that which is the highest object of every individual in it; if it can, then the attribute of sovereignty which is inseparable from nationality becomes the dominion of an evil principle. For suppose, for instance, that a nation as such is not cognizant of the notions of justice and humanity, but that its highest object is wealth, or dominion, or security. It then follows that the sovereign power in human life, which can influence the minds and compel the actions of us all, is a power altogether unmoral; and if unmoral, and yet commanding the actions of moral beings, then evil. Again, if being cognizant of the notions of justice and humanity it deliberately prefers other objects to them, then here is the dominion of an evil principle still more clearly. But if it be cognizant of them and appreciates them rightly, then it must see that they are more to be followed than any objects of outward advantage; then it acknowledges moral ends as a higher good than physical ends, and thus, as we said, agrees with every good individual man in its estimate of the highest object of national no less than of individual life.

It is sometimes urged, that although this be true of individuals, yet it is not true of every society; that we constantly see instances of the contrary; that, for example, the highest object of the Royal Society as a society is the advancement of science, although to the individuals of that society a moral and religious object would be incomparably of higher value. Why then may not the highest object of a nation, as such, be self-defence, or wealth, or any other outward good, although every individual of the nation puts a moral object before any

mere external benefits. The answer to this is simply because a nation is a sovereign society, and it is something monstrous that the ultimate power in human life should be destitute of a sense of right and wrong. For there being a right and a wrong in all or almost all our actions, the power which can command or forbid these actions without an appeal to any human tribunal higher than itself, must surely have a sense not only of the right or wrong of this particular action now commanded or forbidden, but generally of the comparative value of different ends, and thus of the highest end of all ; lest perchance while commanding what is in itself good, it may command it at a time or in a degree to interfere with some higher good ; and then it is in fact commanding evil. And that the power of government is thus extensive and sovereign seems admitted, not only historically, inasmuch as no known limits to it have ever been affixed, nor indeed can be, without contradiction, but also by our common sense and language, which feels and expresses that government does, and may, and ought to interpose in a great variety of matters ; various for instance, as education and the raising of a revenue, and the making of war or peace ; matters which it would be very difficult to class together under any one common head, except such as I have assigned as the end of political society, the highest good, namely, of the whole society or nation. And our common notions of the difference between a government and a police, between a government and an army, are alone sufficient to show the fallacy of the attempted comparison. It is the ultimate object of a police to provide for the security of our bodies and goods against violence at home, as it is the object of an army to secure them against violence from without. Policemen and soldiers have individually another and a higher object ; but the societies, if I may so call them, the institutions of a police and an army, have not. And who does not see that for this very reason

the police and the army are not sovereign societies, but essentially subordinate ; that because they are not cognizant of moral ends, therefore they are incapable of directing men's conduct in the last resort ; and that therefore they are themselves subject to a higher power, namely, that of the government, the representative of the national life ? If neither is the government cognizant of moral ends, then it too must be subject to some higher power, which is a contradiction in terms ; or else, as I said before, it cannot surely be the ordinance of God ; and if not, can it be otherwise than evil ?

Perhaps it was hardly necessary to dwell so long on this point before my present hearers ; yet the opposite doctrine to that which I have been asserting has been maintained, since Warburton, by names deserving of no common respect ; and what seems to me the truth, was necessary to be stated, because on it depends our whole view of history, so far as history is more than a mere record of wars. In wars no doubt the end sought is no more than a nation's security or power ; in other words, that she may develop her internal life at all, or develop it with vigour. But we must recognise some worthy end for the life thus preserved, or strengthened ; otherwise it is but given in vain.

That end appears to be the promoting and securing a nation's highest happiness ; so we must express it in its most general formula ; but under the most favorable combination of circumstances, this same end is conceived and expressed more purely, as the setting forth God's glory by doing His appointed work. And that work for a nation seems to imply not only the greatest possible perfecting of the natures of its individual members, but also the perfecting of all those acts which are done by the nation collectively, or by the government standing in its place, and faithfully representing it. For that conceivably a nation may have duties of vast importance to perform in its national capacity, and which cannot

be effected by its individual members, however excellent—duties of its external life of a very different sort from ordinary wars, even when justifiable, seems to follow at once from the consideration that every single state is but a member of a greater body ; that is, immediately, of the great body of organized states throughout the world, and still farther, of the universal family of mankind, and that it is a member of both according to the will of God.

But perfection in outward life is the fruit of perfection in the life within us. And a nation's inner life consists in its action upon and within itself. Now in order to the perfecting of itself, it must follow certain principles, and acquire certain habits ; in other words, it must have its laws and institutions adapted to the accomplishment of its great end. On these the characters of its people so mainly depend, that if these be faulty, the whole inner life is corrupted ; if these be good, it is likely to go on healthfully. The history then of a nation's internal life, is the history of its institutions and of its laws, both of which are included under the term *laws*, in the comprehensive sense of that word as used by the Greeks ; (3) but for us it is most convenient to distinguish them. Let us consider how much these two terms include.

I would first say that by institutions I wish to understand such offices, orders of men, public bodies, settlements of property, customs, or regulations, concerning matters of general usage, as do not owe their existence to any express law or laws, but having originated in various ways at a period of remote antiquity, are already parts of the national system, at the very beginning of our historical view of it, and are recognised by all actual laws, as being themselves a kind of primary condition on which all recorded legislation proceeds. And I would confine the term *laws* to the enactments of a known legislative power, at a certain known period.

Here then, in the institutions and legislation of a country,

the principles, and rules, and influencing powers of its internal life, we have one of the noblest subjects of history. For by one or both of these, generally from institutions modified by laws, comes in the first place what we call the constitution of a country; that is, to speak generally, its peculiar arrangement of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government. The bearing of the constitution of a country upon its internal life is twofold; direct and indirect. For example, the effect of any particular arrangement of the judicial power is seen directly in the greater or less purity with which justice is administered; but there is a farther effect, and one of the highest importance, in its furnishing to a greater or less portion of the nation one of the best means of moral and intellectual culture, the opportunity, namely, of exercising the functions of a judge. I mean, that to accustom a number of persons to the intellectual exercise of attending to, and weighing, and comparing evidence, and to the moral exercise of being placed in a high and responsible situation, invested with one of God's own attributes, that of judgment, and having to determine with authority between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, is to furnish them with very high means of moral and intellectual culture; in other words, it is providing them with one of the highest kinds of education. And thus a judicial constitution may secure a pure administration of justice, and yet fail as an engine of national cultivation, when it is vested in the hands of a small body of professional men, like the old French parliaments. While, on the other hand, it may communicate the judicial office very widely, as by our system of juries, and thus may educate, if I may so speak, a very large portion of the nation, but yet may not succeed in obtaining the greatest certainty of just legal decisions. I do not mean that our jury system does not succeed, but it is conceivable that it should not. So in the same way different arrangements of the executive

and legislative powers should be always regarded in this twofold aspect ; as effecting their direct objects, good government and good legislation ; and as educating the nation more or less extensively, by affording to a greater or less number of persons practical lessons in governing and legislating.

I have noticed the political constitution of a country, the first of all its institutions, because it is the one which from its prominence first attracts our notice. Others, however, although less conspicuous, have an influence not less important. Of these are all such institutions or laws as relate to public instruction in the widest sense, whether of the young, or of persons of all ages. There are certain principles which the State wishes to inculcate on all its members, certain habits which it wishes to form, a certain kind and degree of knowledge which it wishes to communicate ; such, namely, as bear more or less immediately on its great end, its own intellectual and moral perfection, arising out of the perfection of its several members. Now as far as this instruction, using the term again in its widest sense, and including under it the formation of habits, as far as this instruction is applied to the young, it goes under the name of education ; as far as it regards persons of all ages, it generally takes the form of religion. Even in heathen countries, where direct teaching was no part of the business of the ministers of religion, still the solemn festivals, the games, the sacrifices, the systems of divination, nay, the very temples themselves, had an undoubted moral effect on the people, whether for good or for evil, and were designed to have it ; so that in the larger sense already claimed for the word, they may be called a sort of public instruction. In Christian countries, religion at once inculcates truths and forms habits ; the first, by what I may be allowed to call prophesying or direct teaching ; the second, by this also, and farther by the ritual and social agency of the Church. Nor need I add one word to my present audi-

ence to impress the vast importance of this one of a nation's institutions.

Neither let it be thought an abrupt or painful descent, if, from the mention of public instruction in its very highest form, I pass to another class of institutions and laws, which some may look upon as regarding only the lowest part of a state's external life; those institutions and laws, I mean, which affect the acquisition and the distribution of property. I grant that the way in which economical questions are sometimes discussed may create a prejudice against the study of them; excusably, it may be, yet not over reasonably. For in economical works, the economical end alone is regarded, without taking account of its bearings upon the higher or political end to which it should minister. But surely this, as it would be very faulty in a statesman, is not at all faulty in one who professes only to be an economist; it does not seem to me that, in discussing any subordinate science, its relations with the supreme or architectonical science fall properly under our consideration. (4) We are but to send in our report of the facts within our special subject of inquiry; to legislate upon this report belongs to a higher department. It is very useful to consider economical questions in a purely economical point of view, in order to discover the truth respecting them merely as points of economy; although it by no means follows that what is expedient economically, is expedient also politically, because it may well be that another end rather than the economical may best further the attainment of the great end of the commonwealth. But no man who thinks seriously about it, can doubt the vast moral importance of institutions and laws relating to property. It has been said that the possession of property implies education; that is, that it calls forth and exercises so many valuable qualities,—forethought, love of order, justice, beneficence, and wisdom in the use of power,—that he who possesses it

cannot live in the extreme of ignorance or brutality : he has learnt unavoidably some of the higher lessons of humanity. It is at least certain that the utter want of property offers obstacles to the moral and intellectual education of persons labouring under it, such as no book teaching can in ordinary circumstances overcome. Laws therefore which affect, directly or indirectly, the distribution of property, affect also a nation's internal life very deeply. It is not a matter of indifference whether the laws of inheritance direct the equal distribution of a man's property among all his children, or whether they establish a right of primogeniture ; whether they fix the principle of succession independently of individual discretion, or whether they leave a man the power of disposing of his property by will, according to his own pleasure. Nor, again, is it indifferent whether the law favors the stability of property, or its rapid circulation ; whether it encourages entails, or forbids them ; whether it determines that land held in mortmain is an advantage or an evil. I might allude to the importance of commercial laws, whether for good or for evil ; and to that fruitful source of political disputes in modern times, the amount and character of a country's taxation. But it is enough to have just noticed these points, in order to show that economical questions, or such as relate to wealth or property, demand the careful attention of the historian, inasmuch as they influence most powerfully a nation's moral and political condition, that is, in the highest sense of the terms, its welfare or its misery. (5)

Hitherto we have considered the history of a nation's natural life as busied with its institutions and laws ; and as tracing their effects in their three great divisions of, 1st, politics, 2d, instruction in the widest sense, and, 3d, economy. Yet life, whether individual or national, is subject to a variety of irregular influences, such as originate in no

known law. Unless the national will, as at Sparta, attempt to absorb into itself the wills of individuals, so that they shall do nothing, suffer nothing, desire nothing, but according to the bidding of law, there must always exist along with the most vigorous positive institutions and laws, a great mass of independent individual action and feeling, which cannot be without its influence on the national virtue and happiness. To these spontaneous elements belong science, art, and literature, which may indeed be encouraged by institutions and laws, or discouraged, but yet on the whole their origin and growth in any given country has been owing to individuals rather than to the nation, or more properly perhaps to causes external to both, to those causes which have given genius and taste to some races of mankind in remarkable measure, and have denied them to others; causes which have first prepared the fuel ready for kindling, and then have sent the spark to light it up into a blaze. No man can say why the great discoveries of science were made only at the time and in the country when and where they were made actually: why the compass was withheld from the navigation of the Roman Empire, but was already in existence when it was needed to aid the genius of Columbus: why printing was invented in time to preserve that portion of Greek literature which still survived in the fifteenth century, but was not known early enough to prevent the irreparable mischiefs of the Latin storming of Constantinople in the thirteenth: (6) why the steam-engine, triumphing over time and space, was denied to the stirring spirit of the sixteenth century, and reserved to display its wonderful works only to the nineteenth.

Other influences may possibly be named which have their effect on the national character and happiness; but I may be pardoned if in so vast a field something should be omitted unconsciously, and something necessarily passed over, not to encroach too largely on your time and patience. But enough

has been said I think to show that history contains no mean treasures: that as being the biography of a nation, it partakes of the richness and variety of those elements which make up a nation's life. Whatever there is of greatness in the final cause of all human thought and action, God's glory and man's perfection, that is the measure of the greatness of history. Whatever there is of variety and intense interest in human nature, in its elevation, whether proud as by nature or sanctified as by God's grace; in its suffering, whether blessed or unblessed, a martyrdom or a judgment; in its strange reverses, in its varied adventures, in its yet more varied powers, its courage and its patience, its genius and its wisdom, its justice and its love, that also is the measure of the interest and variety of history. The treasures indeed are ample, but we may more reasonably fear whether we may have strength and skill to win them.

I have thus far spoken of history in the abstract; at least of history so far as it relates to civilized nations, with no reference to any one time or country more than to another. But, as I said before, I must not forget that my particular business is not history generally, but modern history; and without going farther into details than is suitable to the present occasion, it may yet be proper, as we have considered what history in general has to offer, so now to see also whether there is any peculiar attraction in modern history: and whether ancient and modern history in the popular sense of the words differ only in this, that the one relates to events which took place before a certain period, and the other to events which have happened since that period; or whether there is a real distinction between them, grounded upon an essential difference in their nature. If they differ only chronologically, it is manifest that the line which separates them is purely arbitrary: and we might equally well fix the limit of ancient history at the fall of the Babylonian monarchy,

and embrace the whole fortunes of Greece and Rome within what we choose to call modern ; or, on the other hand, we might carry on ancient history to the close of the fifteenth century, and place the beginning of modern history at that memorable period which witnessed the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the discovery of America, and, only a few years later, the Reformation.

It seems, however, that there is a real difference between ancient and modern history, which justifies the limit usually assigned to them ; the fall, namely, of the western empire ; that is to say, the fall of the western empire separates the subsequent period from that which preceded it by a broader line, so far as we are concerned, than can be found at any other point either earlier or later. For the state of things now in existence, dates its origin from the fall of the western empire ; so far we can trace up the fortunes of nations which are still flourishing ; history so far is the biography of the living ; beyond, it is but the biography of the dead. In our own island we see this most clearly : our history clearly begins with the coming over of the Saxons ; the Britons and Romans had lived in our country, but they are not our fathers ; we are connected with them as men indeed, but nationally speaking, the history of Cæsar's invasion has no more to do with us, than the natural history of the animals which then inhabited our forests. We, this great English nation, whose race and language are now overrunning the earth from one end of it to the other—we were born when the white horse of the Saxons had established his dominion from the Tweed to the Tamar. (7) So far we can trace our blood, our language, the name and actual divisions of our country, the beginnings of some of our institutions. So far our national identity extends, so far history is modern, for it treats of a life which was then, and is not yet extinguished.

And if we cross the channel, what is the case with our

great neighbour nation of France ? Roman Gaul had existed since the Christian æra ; the origin of Keltic Gaul is older than history : (8) but France and Frenchmen came into being when the Franks established themselves west of the Rhine. Not that before that period the fathers of the majority of the actual French people were living on the Elbe or the Saal ; for the Franks were numerically few, and throughout the south of France the population is predominantly, and much more than predominantly, of Gallo-Roman origin. But Clovis and his Germans struck root so deeply, and their institutions wrought such changes, that the identity of France cannot be carried back beyond their invasion : the older elements no doubt have helped greatly to characterize the existing nation ; but they cannot be said by themselves to be that nation.

The essential character then of modern history appears to be this ; that it treats of national life still in existence : it commences with that period when all the great elements of the existing state of things had met together ; so that subsequent changes, great as they have been, have only combined or disposed these same elements differently ; they have added to them no new one. By the great elements of nationality, I mean race, language, institutions, and religion ; and it will be seen that throughout Europe all these four may be traced up, if not actually in every case to the fall of the western empire, yet to the dark period which followed that fall, while in no case are all the four to be found united before it. Otherwise, if we allow the two first of these elements, without the third and fourth, to constitute national identity, especially when combined with sameness of place, we must then say that the northern countries of Europe have no ancient history, inasmuch as they have been inhabited from the earliest times by the same race speaking what is radically the same language. But it is better not to admit national identity, till

the two elements of institutions and religion, or at any rate one of them, be added to those of blood and language. At all events it cannot be doubted, that as soon as the four are united, the national personality becomes complete.

It cannot be doubted then that modern history so defined is especially interesting to us, inasmuch as it treats only of national existence not yet extinct: it contains, so to speak, the first acts of a great drama now actually in the process of being represented, and of which the catastrophe is still future. But besides this personal interest, is there nothing in modern history of more essential difference from ancient—of difference such as would remain, even if we could conceive ourselves living in some third period of history, when existing nations had passed away like those which we now call ancient, and when our modern history would have become what the history of Greece and Rome is to us?

Such a difference does characterize what we now call modern history, and must continue to characterize it forever. Modern history exhibits a fuller development of the human race, a richer combination of its most remarkable elements. We ourselves are one of the most striking examples of this. We derive scarcely one drop of our blood from Roman fathers; we are in our race strangers to Greece, and strangers to Israel. But morally how much do we derive from all three: in this respect their life is in a manner continued in ours; their influences, to say the least, have not perished.

Here then we have, if I may so speak, the ancient world still existing, but with a new element added, the element of our English race. And that this element is an important one, cannot be doubted for an instant. Our English race is the German race; for though our Norman fathers had learned to speak a stranger's language, yet in blood, as we know, they were the Saxons' brethren: both alike belong to the Teutonic or German stock. (9) Now the importance of this

stock is plain from this, that its intermixture with the Keltic and Roman races at the fall of the western empire has changed the whole face of Europe. It is doubly remarkable, because the other elements of modern history are derived from the ancient world. If we consider the Roman empire in the fourth century of the Christian æra, we shall find in it Christianity, we shall find in it all the intellectual treasures of Greece, all the social and political wisdom of Rome. (10) What was not there, was simply the German race, and the peculiar qualities which characterize it. This one addition was of such power, that it changed the character of the whole mass: the peculiar stamp of the middle ages is undoubtedly German; the change manifested in the last three centuries has been owing to the revival of the older elements with greater power, so that the German element has been less manifestly predominant. But that element still preserves its force, and is felt for good or for evil in almost every country of the civilized world. (11)

We will pause for a moment to observe over how large a portion of the earth this influence is now extended. It affects more or less the whole west of Europe, from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia to the most southern promontory of Sicily, from the Oder and the Adriatic to the Hebrides and to Lisbon. It is true that the language spoken over a large portion of this space is not predominantly German; but even in France, and Italy, and Spain, the influence of the Franks, Burgundians, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Lombards, while it has colored even the language, has in blood and institutions left its mark legibly and indelibly. Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland for the most part, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and our own islands, are all in language, in blood, and in institutions, German most decidedly. But all South America is peopled with Spaniards and Portuguese, all North America and all Australia with Englishmen. I say

nothing of the prospects and influence of the German race in Africa and in India : it is enough to say that half of Europe, and all America and Australia, are German more or less completely, in race, in language, or in institutions, or in all.

Modern history then differs from ancient history in this, that while it preserves the elements of ancient history undestroyed, it has added others to them ; and these, as we have seen, elements of no common power. (12) But the German race is not the only one which has been thus added ; the Slavonic race is another new element, which has overrun the east of Europe, as the German has overrun the west. And when we consider that the Slavonic race wields the mighty empire of Russia, we may believe that its future influence on the condition of Europe and of the world may be far greater than that which it exercises now.

This leads us to a view of modern history, which cannot indeed be confidently relied on, but which still impresses the mind with an imagination, if not with a conviction, of its reality. I mean, that modern history appears to be not only *a* step in advance of ancient history, but *the* last step ; it appears to bear marks of the fulness of time, as if there would be no future history beyond it. For the last eighteen hundred years, Greece has fed the human intellect ; Rome, taught by Greece and improving upon her teacher, has been the source of law and government and social civilization ; and what neither Greece nor Rome could furnish, the perfection of moral and spiritual truth, has been given by Christianity. The changes which have been wrought have arisen out of the reception of these elements by new races ; races endowed with such force of character that what was old in itself, when exhibited in them, seemed to become something new. But races so gifted are and have been from the beginning of the world few in number : the mass of mankind have no such power ; they either receive the impression of foreign

elements so completely that their own individual character is absorbed, and they take their whole being from without ; or being incapable of taking in higher elements, they dwindle away when brought into the presence of a more powerful life, and become at last extinct altogether. Now looking anxiously round the world for any new races which may receive the seed (so to speak) of our present history into a kindly yet a vigorous soil, and may reproduce it, the same and yet new, for a future period, we know not where such* are to be found. Some appear exhausted, others incapable, and yet the surface of the whole globe is known to us. The Roman colonies along the banks of the Rhine and Danube looked out on the country beyond those rivers as we look up at the stars, and actually see with our eyes a world of which we know nothing. The Romans knew that there was a vast portion of the earth which they did not know ; how vast it might be was a part of its mysteries. But to us all is explored : imagination can hope for no new Atlantic island to realize the vision of Plato's Critias : no new continent peopled by youthful races, the destined restorers of our worn-out generations. Everywhere the search has been made, and the report has been received ; we have the full amount of earth's resources before us, and they seem inadequate to supply life for a third period of human history.

I am well aware that to state this as a matter of positive belief would be the extreme of presumption ; there may be nations reserved hereafter for great purposes of God's providence, whose fitness for their appointed work will not betray itself till the work and the time for doing it be come. There was a period perhaps when the ancestors of the Athenians were to be no otherwise distinguished from their barbarian

* What may be done hereafter by the Slavonic nations, is not prejudged by this statement ; because the Slavonic nations are elements of our actual history, although their powers may be as yet only partially developed.

neighbours than by some finer taste in the decorations of their arms, and something of a loftier spirit in the songs which told of the exploits of their warriors ; and when Aristotle heard that Rome had been taken by the Gauls, he knew not that its total destruction would have been a greater loss to mankind than the recent overthrow of Veii. But without any presumptuous confidence, if there be any signs, however uncertain, that we are living in the latest period of the world's history, that no other races remain behind to perform what we have neglected or to restore what we have ruined, then indeed the interest of modern history does become intense, and the importance of not wasting the time still left to us may well be called incalculable. When an army's last reserve has been brought into action, every single soldier knows that he must do his duty to the utmost ; that if he cannot win the battle now, he must lose it. So if our existing nations are the last reserve of the world, its fate may be said to be in their hands—God's work on earth will be left undone if they do not do it.

But our future course must be hesitating or mistaken, if we do not know what course has brought us to the point where we are at present. Otherwise, the simple fact that after so many years of trial the world has made no greater progress than it has, must impress our minds injuriously ; either making us despair of doing what our fathers have not done, or if we do not despair, then it may make us unreasonably presumptuous, as if we could do more than had been done by other generations, because we were wiser than they or better. But history forbids despair without authorizing vanity : it explains why more has not been done by our forefathers : it shows the difficulties which beset them, rendering success impossible ; while it records the greatness of their efforts, which we cannot hope to surpass. But without surpassing, perhaps without equalling their efforts, we may

learn by their experience to avoid their difficulties: Napoleon crossed the Alps with scarcely the loss of a man, while Hannibal left behind him nearly half his army; yet Napoleon was not a greater man than Hannibal, nor was his enterprise conducted with greater ability. (13) Two things we ought to learn from history; one, that we are not in ourselves superior to our fathers; another, that we are shamefully and monstrosly inferior to them, if we do not advance beyond them.

And now if the view here taken of the greatness, first of all history, and then especially of modern history, be correct, it will at once show in what way the professorship which I have the honor to hold, may be made productive of some benefit to the University. It is certainly no affected humility, but the very simple truth, to acknowledge, that of many large and fruitful districts in the vast territory of modern history I possess only the most superficial knowledge, of some I am all but totally ignorant. I could but ill pretend to guide others where I should be at a loss myself: and though many might possess a knowledge far surpassing mine, yet the mere ordinary length of human life renders it impossible for any one to have that profound acquaintance with every part of modern history in detail, which might enable him to impart a full understanding of it to others. But yet it may be possible, and this indeed is my hope, to encourage others to study it, to point out how much is to be done, and to suggest some rules for doing it. And if, in addition to this, I could myself exemplify these rules in working at some one particular portion of history, I should have accomplished all that I can venture to anticipate. Meanwhile we have in this place an immense help towards the study of modern history, in our familiar acquaintance with the history of the ancient world, or at any rate with the works of its greatest historians. The importance of this preparation is continually brought to my

mind by observing the bad effects of the want of it in those who have not enjoyed our advantages: on the other hand, here, as in other matters, advantages neglected are but our shame, and if we here are ignorant of modern history, we are I think especially inexcusable.

I have detained you I fear too long, and yet have left much unsaid, and have compressed some part of what I have said into limits which I am afraid have scarcely allowed it to be stated intelligibly. This defect however it may be possible to remedy on future occasions, when much that has been now put summarily may be developed more fully. For other defects not equally within my power to remedy, I have only in all sincerity to request your indulgence. Deeply as I value the privilege of addressing you as one of the professors of this University—and there is no privilege which I more value, no public reward or honour which could be to me so welcome—I feel no less keenly the responsibility which it involves, and the impossibility of discharging its duties in any manner proportioned to its importance, or to my own sense of what it requires. (14)

NOTES

TO

INAUGURAL LECTURE.

NOTE 1.—Page 25.

* * * “The works of great poets require to be approached at the outset with a full faith in their excellence: the reader must be convinced that if he does not fully admire them, it is his fault and not theirs. This is no more than a just tribute to their reputation; in other words, it is the proper modesty of an individual thinking his own unpractised judgment more likely to be mistaken than the concurring voice of the public. And it is the property of the greatest works of genius in other departments also, that a first view of them is generally disappointing; and if a man were foolish enough to go away trusting more to his own hasty impressions than to the deliberate judgment of the world, he would remain continually as blind and ignorant as he was at the beginning. The cartoons of Raphael, at Hampton Court Palace, the frescoes of the same great painter in the galleries of the Vatican at Rome, the famous statues of the Laocoon and the Apollo Belvidere, and the Church of St Peter at Rome, the most magnificent building perhaps in the world—all alike are generally found to disappoint a person on his first view of them. But let him be sure that they are excellent, and that he only wants the knowledge and the taste to appreciate them properly, and every succeeding sight of them will open his eyes more and more, till he learns to admire them, not indeed as much as they deserve, but so much as greatly to enrich and enlarge his own mind, by becoming acquainted with such perfect beauty. So it is with great poets: they must be read often and studied reverently, before an unpractised mind can gain any thing like an adequate notion of their excellence. Meanwhile, the process is in itself

most useful : it is a good thing to doubt our own wisdom, it is a good thing to believe, it is a good thing to admire. By continually looking upwards our minds will themselves grow upwards ; and as a man, by indulging in habits of scorn and contempt for others, is sure to descend to the level of what he despises, so the opposite habits of admiration and enthusiastic reverence for excellence impart to ourselves a portion of the qualities which we admire ; and here, as in every thing else, humility is the surest path to exaltation."

Dr. Arnold's *Preface to 'Poetry of Common Life.'*

NOTE 2.—Page 31.

In one of his 'travelling journals,' Dr. Arnold writes :

"This is the Canton Uri, one of the Wald Staaten or Forest Cantons, which were the original germ of the Swiss confederacy. But Uri, like Sparta, has to answer the question, what has mankind gained over and above the ever precious example of noble deeds, from Murgarten, Sempach, or Thermopylæ. What the world has gained by Salamis and Platæa, and by Zama, is on the other hand no question, any more than it ought to be a question what the world has gained by the defeat of Philip's armada, or by Trafalgar and Waterloo. But if a nation only does great deeds that it may live, and does not show some worthy object for which it has lived—and Uri and Switzerland have shown but too little of any such—then our sympathy with the great deeds of their history can hardly go beyond the generation by which those deeds were performed ; and I cannot help thinking of the mercenary Swiss of Novara and Margignano, and of the oppression exercised over the Italian bailiwicks and the Pays de Vaud, and all the tyrannical exclusiveness of these little barren oligarchies, as much as of the heroic deeds of the three men, Tell and his comrades, or of the self-devotion of my namesake of Winkelried, when at Sempach he received into his breast 'a sheaf of Austrian spears.' "

Life and Correspondence : Appendix C, No. ix

He, too, of battle-martyrs chief!
Who, to recall his daunted peers,
For victory shaped an open space.

By gathering with a wide embrace,
 Into his single breast a sheaf
 Of fatal Austrian spears.”*

Wordsworth's Poetical Works, vol. iv. p. 147.

In his *History of Rome*, (ch. xxxvii.) Dr. Arnold speaks of a state of society where patriotism becomes impossible—the inner life being so exhausted as to inspire the citizens (of the Greek commonwealth in their decline) with neither respect nor attachment.

NOTE 3.—Page 35.

“These ‘high commissioners,’ (under the Terentilian law,) ‘Decemviri legibus scribendis,’ were like the Greek νομοθέται, or in the language of Thucydides, (viii. 67,) which exactly expresses the object of the law, δέκα ἄνδρας ἐλῆσθαι ζυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας—καθ’ ὃ τι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται. We are so accustomed to distinguish between a constitution and a code of laws, that we have no one word which will express both, or convey a full idea of the wide range of the commissioners’ powers; which embraced at once the work of the French constituent assembly, and that of Napoleon, when he drew up his code. But this comprehensiveness belonged to the character of the ancient *lawgivers*; a far higher term than *legislators*, although etymologically the same; they provided for the whole life of their citizens in all its relations, social, civil, political, moral, and religious.”

Arnold's *History of Rome*, vol. i. 228, note.

* * * “The Greeks had, as we have, their ἄγραφος νόμος, or unwritten law of reason and conscience: but they had no other *written* law, νόμος γεγραμμένος, than the civil law of each particular state; and by this law not only their civil but their moral and religious duties also were in ordinary cases regulated. It was the sole authority by which the several virtues could be enforced on the mass of mankind; and to weaken this sanction in public opinion, by representing the law as a thing mutable and subject to the popular judgment, instead of being its guide and standard, was to leave men

* “Arnold Winkelried, at the battle of Sempach, broke an Austrian phalanx in this manner. The event is one of the most famous in the annals of Swiss heroism; and pictures and prints of it are frequent throughout the country.”

with no other law than their own reason and conscience ; a state for which even Christians are not yet sufficiently advanced, with all the lights and helps that their reason and conscience ought to have derived from the truths and motives of the gospel. In short, the νόμος γεγραμμένος with the Greeks corresponded at once to the law of the land, and to the revealed law of God in Christian countries ; and if both these laws amongst us had only the same authority of human institution and custom ; if the one could not be altered without lessening our veneration for the other ; who would not say with Cleon, that it was far better to endure bad political institutions than to destroy the only generally understood sanction of moral duty, and to leave the mass of mankind with no law but that of their own minds, or, as it would too often be, their own prejudices and passions?"

Arnold's *Thucydides*, vol. i. 388, note

NOTE 4.—Page 38.

* * * "I agree with Carlyle in thinking that they (the Liberal party) greatly over-estimate Bentham, and also that they overrate the political economists generally ; not that I doubt the ability of those writers, or the truth of their conclusions, as far as regards their own science ; but I think that the summum bonum of their science, and of human life, are not identical ; and, therefore, many questions in which free trade is involved, and the advantages of large capital, &c., although perfectly simple in an economical point of view, become, when considered politically, very complex ; and the economical good is very often, from a neglect of other points, made in practice a direct social evil."

"*Life and Correspondence*," letter Jan. 23, 1840. Am. edit. p. 367.

* * * "It is right—it is absolutely necessary at this day—that all who value their country should raise a warning voice, whether in the legislature, or in the pulpit, or in schools, or in books, against the theory which would make this accumulation ('the augmentation of comforts and enjoyments, and all the other elements which make up an accumulation of national good out of the separate good of individuals and of families') the end of society and the primary obligation of the citizen. Such a theory has now gnawed its way not

only into all our political philosophy but into our public legislation and private practice, till it has degraded society from its highest functions, has sensualized and animalized its character, has introduced a chaos of conflicting elements into our system of laws, has secretly dissolved the ties which bound us to each other as well as to our sovereign, and has extinguished the noblest instincts of private as of public life. It must be thus whenever expediency is made the rule of action, especially of political action."

Sewell's "*Christian Politics*," p. 160

NOTE 5.—Page 39.

* * * "There are few points of more importance in the history of a nation: the law of property, of real property especially, and a knowledge of all the circumstances of its tenure and divisions, would throw light upon more than the physical condition of a people; it would furnish the key to some of the main principles prevalent in their society. For instance, the feudal notion that property in land confers jurisdiction, and the derivation of property either from the owner's own sword, or from the gift of the stronger chief whose sword he had aided, not from the regular assignment of society, has most deeply affected the political and social state of the nations of modern Europe. At Rome, as elsewhere among the free commonwealths of the ancient world, property was derived from political rights rather than political rights from property; and the division and assignation of lands to the individual members of the state by the deliberate act of the whole community, was familiarly recognised as the manner in which such property was most regularly acquired."

History of Rome, chap. xiv. vol. i. p. 266.

* * * "As society advances in true civilization, its supremacy over all individual rights of property becomes more fully recognised: and it is understood that we are but stewards of our possessions with regard to the commonwealth of which we are members, as well as with respect to God."

History of Rome, chap. xiv. vol. i. p. 264.

* * "In order to point out the restrictions which exist, and which I contend are useless and prejudicial, I shall be obliged to refer

shortly to the origin and history of the mortmain laws ; and I trust I shall be able to show from that reference, that restrictions which might be beneficial in the fifteenth, are altogether the reverse in the nineteenth century. In England, I maintain, restrictions in mortmain originated in the natural dread which the great feudal barons, and each successive king, as the great landowner in the kingdom, entertained of the growing power and wealth of the monastic body : they were imposed, not from any political-economic notion that it was unwise to tie up land in perpetuity, but because, as is invariably alleged in the preamble of those acts, such alienations to religious bodies deprived the lords of the advantages of tenure, and weakened the military defences of the country. Take the first and most important of those acts, the 9th of Henry III. ; it was confined in terms to the regular clergy, and merely restrained the tenants of other lords from transferring their tenure by a fictitious process to religious houses. And so far am I from saying that this law, or the laws passed in the reign of Edward I. and subsequent reigns, were uncalled for, that I look on it as a matter of deep regret that the monastic institutions in those ages were not still more stringently supervised and guarded against, so that their wholesale and fatal destruction at the Reformation might have been averted. But I contend that restrictions which were useful then, are useful no longer. What reasonable ground of fear is there now of a fictitious title being set up by religious houses to lands which donors wish to grant to them ? What reason is there now to apprehend detriment to the lords or danger to the state, from tenants setting up crosses in their fields in order to avoid performing their proper military service ? I think it so obvious, that no argument in favor of mortmain laws can be drawn from enactments passed previous to the Reformation, from a state of society ecclesiastically and politically so different from our own, that I shall not weary the House by any farther consideration of them."

Lord John Manners' Speech on the Laws of Mortmain,
in the House of Commons, Aug. 1, 1843.

NOTE 6.—Page 40.

- * * * "Photius, who was patriarch of Constantinople in the latter half of the ninth century, has left a sort of catalogue raisonné, or

rather an abstract, of the various books which he was in the habit of reading. In this work, which he called his library, there are preserved abridgments of many books which would otherwise have been altogether lost to us. * * * * So capricious is the chance which has preserved some portions of ancient history from oblivion, while it has utterly destroyed all record of others. But Photius's library, compiled in the ninth century, shows what treasures of Greek literature were then existing at Constantinople, which in the course of the six following centuries perished irrecoverably. In this respect the French and Venetian conquest in the thirteenth century was far more destructive than the Turkish conquest in the fifteenth."

History of Rome, ch. xxxv. vol. ii. p. 408, note.

NOTE 7.—Page 42.

* * * La colonie Saxonne "recevait des Bretons, ses hôtes, toutes les choses nécessaires à la vie ; plusieurs fois elle combattit vaillamment et fidèlement pour eux, et leva contre les Pictes et les Scots son étendard où était peint un cheval blanc, espèce d'emblemme conforme au nom de ses deux chefs," Henghist et Horsa.*

Thierry, Hist. de la Conquête de l'Angleterre, liv. 1er, p. 44.

NOTE 8.—Page 43.

"We can trace with great distinctness the period at which the Kelts became familiarly known to the Greeks. Herodotus only knew of them from the Phœnician navigators : Thucydides does not name them at all : Xenophon only notices them as forming part of the auxiliary force sent by Dionysius to the aid of Lacedæmon. Isocrates makes no mention of them. But immediately afterwards their incursions into central and southern Italy, on the one hand, and into the countries between the Danube and Macedonia on the other, had made them objects of general interest and curiosity ; and Aristotle notices several points in their habits and character, in different parts of his philosophical works."

History of Rome, vol. i. p. 491, note.

* 'L'orthographe saxonne est *Hengrist*. *Hengist* signifie un étalon, et *hros*, al *hros*, un cheval.'

In the fourth century before the Christian era, "the Kelts or Gauls broke through the thin screen which had hitherto concealed them from sight, and began for the first time to take their part in the great drama of the nations. For nearly two hundred years they continued to fill Europe and Asia with the terror of their name: but it was a passing tempest, and if useful at all, it was useful only to destroy. The Gauls could communicate no essential points of human character in which other races might be deficient; they could neither improve the intellectual state of mankind, nor its social and political relations. When, therefore, they had done their appointed work of havoc, they were doomed to be themselves extirpated, or to be lost amidst nations of greater creative and constructive power; nor is there any race which has left fewer traces of itself in the character and institutions of modern civilization."

History of Rome, vol. i. chap. xxii. p. 499

NOTE 9.—Page 44.

The Saxons, Danes, and Normans, by whom England was successively invaded, were "all originally of the same race, but so altered by their various fortunes, that the Danish invaders had no national sympathy with the Anglo-Saxons of Alfred and Ethelred; and the Normans, having changed their language as well as their habits, were regarded both by Saxons and Danes as not only a different nation, but actually a different race. The historians of Denmark speak of the Norman conquerors of England as a people of Roman or Latin race, and deplore the conquest as a triumph of the Roman blood and language over the Teutonic."

Arnold's *Thucydides*, vol. ii. p. 55, note

NOTE 10.—Page 45.

*** (Rome) "Of earthly sights *τίπτερον αὐτὸ*—Athens and Jerusalem are the other two—the three people of God's election, two for things temporal, and one for things eternal. Yet even in the things eternal they were allowed to minister. Greek cultivation and Roman polity prepared men for Christianity. * * "

Life and Correspondence, Appendix C, No. ix. 6

NOTE 11.—Page 45.

***“The river itself (the Rhine) was the frontier of the (Roman) empire—the limit as it were of two worlds, that of Roman laws and customs, and that of German. Far before us lay the land of our Saxon and Teutonic forefathers—the land uncorrupted by Roman or any other mixture; the birth-place of the most moral races of men that the world has yet seen—of the soundest laws—the least violent passions, and the fairest domestic and civil virtues. I thought of that memorable* defeat of Varus and his three legions, which forever confined the Romans to the western side of the Rhine, and preserved the Teutonic nation—the regenerating element in modern Europe—safe and free.”

Life and Correspondence, Appendix C, No. iii. 1.

NOTE 12.—Page 46.

In his edition of Thucydides, Dr. Arnold has taken another view of the divisions of history, and lays great stress upon what he regards as “a more sensible, a more philosophical division of history than that, which is commonly adopted, of ancient and modern.” “We shall see,” he adds, “that there is in fact an ancient and a modern period in the history of every people; the ancient differing, and the modern in many essential points agreeing, with that in which we now live. Thus, the largest portion of that history which we commonly call ancient is practically modern, as it describes society in a stage analogous to that in which it now is; while, on the other hand, much of what is called modern history is practically ancient, as it relates to a state of things which has passed away. Thucydides and Xenophon, the orators of Athens, and the philosophers, speak a wisdom more applicable to us politically than the wisdom of even our own countrymen who lived in the middle ages; and their position, both intellectual and political, more nearly resembled our own.”

Essay on the Progress of Society, Appendix i. vol. i. of Thucydides.

* “This, and the defeat of the Moors by Charles Martel, he used to rank as the two most important battles in the world.”

The subject is also referred to in the preface to vol. iii. as follows : " In conclusion, I must beg to repeat what I have said before, that the period to which the work of Thucydides refers belongs properly to modern and not to ancient history ; and it is this circumstance, over and above the great ability of the historian himself, which makes it so peculiarly deserving of our study. The state of Greece from Pericles to Alexander, fully described to us as it is in the works of the great contemporary historians, poets, orators, and philosophers, affords a political lesson perhaps more applicable to our own times, if taken all together, than any other portion of history which can be named anterior to the eighteenth century. Where Thucydides, in his reflections on the bloody dissensions at Corcyra, notices the decay and extinction of the simplicity of old times, he marks the great transition from ancient history to modern, the transition from an age of feeling to one of reflection, from a period of ignorance and credulity to one of inquiry and scepticism. Now such a transition took place in part in the sixteenth century ; the period of the Reformation, when compared with the ages preceding it, was undoubtedly one of inquiry and reflection. But still it was an age of strong feeling and of intense belief ; the human mind cleared a space for itself vigorously within a certain circle ; but except in individual cases, and even those scarcely avowed, there were still acknowledged limits of authority, which inquiry had not yet ventured to question. The period of Roman civilization from the times of the Gracchi to those of the Antonines, was in this respect far more completely modern ; and accordingly this is one of the periods of history which we should do well to study most carefully. But unfortunately our information respecting it is much scantier than in the case of the corresponding portion of Greek history ; the writers, generally speaking, are greatly inferior ; and in freedom of inquiry no greater range was or could be taken than that which the mind of Greece had reached already. And in point of political experience, we are even at this hour scarcely on a level with the statesmen of the age of Alexander. Mere lapse of years confers here no increase of knowledge ; four thousand years have furnished the Asiatic with scarcely any thing that deserves the name of political experience ; two thousand years since the fall of Carthage have furnished the African with absolutely

nothing. Even in Europe and in America, it would not be easy now to collect such a treasure of experience as the constitutions of a hundred and fifty-three commonwealths along the various coasts of the Mediterranean afforded to Aristotle. There he might study the institutions of various races derived from various sources: every possible variety of external position, of national character, of positive law; agricultural states and commercial, military powers and maritime, wealthy countries and poor ones, monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, with every imaginable form and combination of each and all; states overpeopled and underpeopled, old and new, in every circumstance of advance, maturity, and decline. So rich was the experience which Aristotle enjoyed, but which to us is only attainable mediately and imperfectly through his other writings; his own record of all these commonwealths, as well as all other information concerning the greatest part of them, having unhappily perished. Nor was the moral experience of the age of Greek civilization less complete. By moral experience I mean an acquaintance with the whole compass of those questions which relate to the metaphysical analysis of man's nature and faculties, and to the practical object of his being. This was derived from the strong critical and inquiring spirit of the Greek sophists and philosophers, and from the unbounded freedom which they enjoyed. In mere metaphysical research the schoolmen were indefatigable and bold, but in moral questions there was an authority which restrained them: among Christians, the notions of duty and of virtue must be assumed as beyond dispute. But not the wildest extravagance of atheistic wickedness in modern times can go farther than the sophists of Greece went before them; whatever audacity can dare and subtilty contrive to make the words 'good' and 'evil' change their meaning, has been already tried in the days of Plato, and by his eloquence, and wisdom, and faith unshaken, has been put to shame. Thus it is that, while the advance of civilization destroys much that is noble, and throws over the mass of human society an atmosphere somewhat dull and hard; yet it is only by its peculiar trials, no less than by its positive advantages, that the utmost virtue of human nature can be matured; and those who vainly lament that progress of earthly things which, whether good or evil, is certainly inevitable may be consoled by the thought that its sure tendency is

to confirm and purify the virtue of the good : and that to us, holding in our hands, not the wisdom of Plato only, but also a treasure of wisdom and of comfort which to Plato was denied. the utmost activity of the human mind may be viewed without apprehension, in the confidence that we possess a charm to deprive it of its evil, and to make it minister for ourselves certainly, and through us, if we use it rightly, for the world in general, to the more perfect triumph of good.

"I linger round a subject which nothing could tempt me to quit but the consciousness of treating it too unworthily. What is mis-called ancient history, the really modern history of the civilization of Greece and Rome, has for years interested me so deeply, that it is painful to feel myself after all so unable to paint it fully. Of the manifold imperfections of this edition of Thucydides none can be more aware than I am ; but in the present state of knowledge these will be soon corrected and supplied by others ; and I will at least hope that these volumes may encourage a spirit of research into history, and may in some measure assist in directing it ; that they may contribute to the conviction that history is to be studied as a whole, and according to its philosophical divisions, not such as are merely geographical and chronological ; that the history of Greece and of Rome is not an idle inquiry about remote ages and forgotten institutions, but a living picture of things present, fitted not so much for the curiosity of the scholar, as for the instruction of the statesman and the citizen.

"*January, 1835* "

NOTE 13.—Page 49.

* * * "Hannibal was arrived in Italy, but with a force so weakened by its losses in men and horses, and by the exhausted state of the survivors, that he might seem to have accomplished his great march in vain. According to his own statement, which there is no reason to doubt, he brought out of the Alpine valleys no more than twelve thousand African and eight thousand Spanish infantry, with six thousand cavalry ; so that his march from the Pyrenees to the plains of northern Italy must have cost him thirty-three thousand men ; an enormous loss, which proves how severely the army must

have suffered from the privations of the march, and the severity of the Alpine climate; for not half of these thirty-three thousand men can have fallen in battle."

History of Rome, chap. xliii. vol. iii. p. 91

* * "Such is the story of the earliest recorded passage of the Alps by civilized men, the earliest and the most memorable. Accustomed as we are, since the completion of the great Alpine roads in the present century, to regard the crossing of the Alps as an easy summer excursion, we can even less than our fathers conceive the difficulties of Hannibal's march, and the enormous sacrifices by which it was accomplished. He himself declared that he had lost above thirty thousand men since he had crossed the Pyrenees, and that the remnant of his army, when he reached the plains of Italy, amounted to no more than twenty thousand foot and six thousand horsemen: nor does Polybius seem to suspect any exaggeration in the statement. Yet eleven years afterwards Hasdrubal crossed the Alps in his brother's track without sustaining any loss deserving of notice, and 'a few accidents' are all that occurred in the most memorable passage of modern times, that of Napoleon over the great St. Bernard, ('On n'eut que peu d'accidens.' Napoleon's Memoirs, i. 261.) It is evident that Hannibal could have found nothing deserving the name of a road, no bridges over the rivers, torrents, and gorges, nothing but mere mountain paths, liable to be destroyed by the first avalanche or landslip, and which the barbarians neither could nor cared to repair, but on the destruction of which they looked out for another line, such as for their purposes of communication it was not difficult to find."

History of Rome, vol. iii. p. 480, note.

NOTE 14.—Page 50.

In connection with this lecture there should be read the account of Dr. Arnold's character as a student and writer of history, given in Mr. Stanley's excellent biography of him. Appendix No. 1 of this volume will be found to contain a selection from it.

In Appendix No. 2, I have selected from his description of 'Rugby School' some of his opinions upon historical instruction.

APPENDIX.

I HAVE alluded in my Inaugural Lecture to authorities deserving of all respect which maintain the doctrine of Warburton, that "the object of political society is the preservation of body and goods." I alluded particularly to the Archbishop of Dublin, and to the author of a Review of Mr. Gladstone's book, "The State in its Relations with the Church," in the 139th number of the Edinburgh Review. It is due to such opponents not to pass by their arguments unnoticed; it is due to them, and still more to myself, lest I should be suspected of leaving them unanswered because I could not answer them.

It appears to me that the Reviewer is led to maintain Warburton's doctrine, chiefly in consequence of certain practical difficulties which seem to result from the doctrine opposed to it. He does not wish to restrict the state from regarding religious and moral ends; but fearing that its regard for them will lead to practical mischief, he will only allow it to consider them in the second place, so far, that is, as they do not interfere with its primary object, the protection of persons and property. The Warburtonian theory appears not to be the natural conclusion of inquiries into the object of governments, but an ingenious device to enable us to escape from some difficulties which we know not how to deal with. If the opposite theory can be freed from these difficulties, it may be believed that the Reviewer would gladly sacrifice the theory of Warburton.

I regard the theory of government, maintained in my Lecture, to be a theory which we can in practice only partially realize. This I quite allow, at least with regard either to the present, or to any future, which we can as yet venture to anticipate. It is a theory which, nowhere perfectly realized, is realized imperfectly in very different degrees in different times and countries. It must not be forced upon a state of things not ripe for it, and therefore its most zealous advocates must often be content to tolerate violations of it more or less flagrant. All this is true ; but yet I believe it to be the true theory of government, and that by acknowledging it to be so, and keeping it therefore always in sight, we may be able at last to approach indefinitely near to it.

The moral character of government seems to follow necessarily from its sovereign power ; this is the simple ground of what I will venture to call the moral theory of its objects. For as in each individual man there is a higher object than the preservation of his body and goods, so if he be subjected in the last resort to a power incapable of appreciating this higher object, his social or political relations, instead of being the perfection of his being, must be its corruption ; the voice of law can only agree accidentally with that of his conscience, and yet on this voice of law his life and death are to depend ; for its sovereignty over him must be, by the nature of the case, absolute.

The Reviewer's distinction between primary and secondary ends, and his estimate of physical ends as primary and moral as secondary, may apply perfectly well to any society, except that which is sovereign over all human life ; because so long as this sovereign society preserves the due order of objects, postponing the physical to the moral, other societies may safely in their subordinate sphere reverse it, the check upon them being always at hand ; the confession theoretically, and the care practically, that the physical end shall

take precedence of the moral only at certain times and in certain instances, but that the rule of life is the other way.

And again, that singleness of object which the Reviewer considers so great an excellence, "every contrivance of human wisdom being likely to answer its end best when it is constructed with a single view to that end," belongs it is true to subordinate societies or contrivances, but ceases to exist as we ascend from the subordinate to the supreme. This is the exact difference between teaching and education; a teacher, whether it be of Latin and Greek, or of French and German, or of geography and history, or of drawing, or of gymnastics, has nothing to think of beyond his own immediate subject; it is not his concern if his pupil's tastes and abilities are more adapted to other studies, if that particular knowledge which he is communicating is claiming a portion of time more than in accordance with its value. He has one single object, to teach his own science effectually. But he who educates must take a higher view, and pursue an end accordingly far more complicated. He must adjust the respective claims of bodily and mental exercise, of different kinds of intellectual labour;—he must consider every part of his pupil's nature, physical, intellectual, and moral; regarding the cultivation of the last, however, as paramount to that of either of the others. (1) Now, according to the Reviewer's theory, the state is like the subordinate teacher, according to mine it is like the educator, and for this very reason, because its part cannot be subordinate; if you make the state no more than a particular teacher, we must look for the educator elsewhere; for the sovereign authority over us must be like the educator, it must regulate our particular lessons, and determine that we shall study most what is of most value.

But I believe that the moral theory of the objects of a state, expressed as I have here expressed it, would in itself

never have been disputed. It is considered to be objectionable and leading to great practical mischief, when stated somewhat differently ; when it is said, that the great object of a state is to promote and propagate religious truth ; a statement which yet appears to be identical, or nearly so, with the moral theory ; so that if it be false, the moral theory is thought to be overturned with it. But it has always appeared to me that here precisely we find the great confusions of the whole question ; and that the substitution of the term “religious truth” in the place of “man’s highest perfection” has given birth to the great difficulties of the case. For by “religious truth” we immediately understand certain dogmatical propositions on matters more or less connected with religion ; these we connect with a certain creed and a certain sect or church, and then the theory comes to be, that the great object of a state is to uphold some one particular church, conceived to be the true one, and to discountenance all who are not members of it ; a form in which I do not wonder that the moral theory should be regarded as most objectionable.

All societies of men, whether we call them states or churches, should make their bond to consist in a common object and a common practice, rather than in a common belief ; in other words, their end should be good rather than truth. We may consent to act together, but we cannot consent to believe together ; many motives may persuade us to the one ; we may like the object, or we may like our company, or we may think it safest to join them, or most convenient, and any one of these motives is quite sufficient to induce a unity of action, action being a thing in our own power. But no motives can persuade us to believe together ; we may wish a statement to be true, we may admire those who believe it, we may find it very inconvenient not to believe it ; all this helps us nothing ; unless our own mind is freely con-

vinced that the statement or doctrine be true, we cannot by possibility believe it. That union in action will in the end lead very often to union of belief is most true; but we cannot ensure its doing so; and the social bond cannot directly require for its perfectness more than union of action. It cannot properly require more than it is in the power of men to give; and men can submit their actions to a common law at their own choice, but their internal convictions they cannot.

Such a union of action appears historically to have been the original bond of the Christian church. Whoever was willing to receive Christ as his master, to join His people, and to walk according to their rules, he was admitted to the Christian society. We know that in the earliest church there existed the strangest varieties of belief, some Christians not even believing that there would be a resurrection of the dead. Of course it was not intended that such varieties should be perpetual; a closer union of belief was gradually effected: but the point to observe, is that the union of belief grew out of the union of action: it was the result of belonging to the society rather than a previous condition required for belonging to it. And it is true farther, that all union of action implies in one sense a union of belief; that is, they who agree to do a certain thing must believe that in some way or other, either as a positive good or as the lesser evil, it is desirable for them to do it. But belief in the desirableness of an act differs greatly from belief in the truth of a proposition; even fear may give unity of action, and such unity of belief as is implied by it: a soldier is threatened with death if he does not fight, and so believing that to fight is now desirable for him, as a less evil than certain death, he stands his ground and fights accordingly. But fear, though it may make us wish with all our hearts that we could believe the truth of a proposition, yet cannot enable or compel us to believe it.

Now the state aiming at the highest perfection of its members, can require them to conform their conduct to a certain law; and it may exclude from its benefits those who dispute this law's authority. Nor does it in the least matter whether the law so enforced be of the state's own invention, or be borrowed from some other nation, as many countries have adopted the Roman law; or be received not from any human author at all, but from God. A state may as justly declare the New Testament to be its law, as it may choose the institutes and code of Justinian. In this manner the law of Christ's church may be made its law; and all the institutions which this law enjoins, whether in ritual or discipline, may be adopted as national institutions just as legitimately as any institutions of mere human origin.

The question then which is sometimes asked so indignantly,—Is the government to impose its religion upon the people? may be answered by asking again,—Is the government to impose its own laws upon the people? We speak of the government as distinct from the people, without thereby implying that it is in opposition to the people. In a corrupt state the government and people are wholly at variance; in a perfect state they would be wholly one; in ordinary states they are one more or less imperfectly. We need not be afraid to say, that in a perfect state the law of the government would be the law of the people, the law of their choice, the expression of their mind. In less perfect states the law of the government is more or less the law of the people, suiting them in the main if not entirely. If it be wholly or in great part unwelcome to them, something in that state is greatly wrong; and although I believe that there are cases where a dictatorship is a good, and where good laws may rightfully be imposed on a barbarian and unwilling people; yet, as the rule, there can be no doubt that such a state of things is tyranny. When I speak therefore

of the government, I am speaking of it as expressing the mind and will of the nation ; and though a government may not impose its own law, whether human or divine, upon an adverse people ; yet a nation, acting through its government, may certainly choose for itself such a law as it deems most for its good.

And therefore when it has been said that “these islands do not belong to the king and parliament in the same manner as the house or land of any individual belongs to the owner,” and that therefore a government may not settle the religious law of a country as the master of a family may settle the religious practices of his household ; this is true only if we consider the king and parliament as not speaking the voice of the nation, but their own opposed to that of the nation. For the right of a nation over its own territory must be at least as absolute as that of any individual over his own house and land ; and it surely is not an absurdity to suppose that the voice of government can ever be the voice of the nation : although they unhappily too often differ, yet surely they may conceivably, and very often do in practice, completely agree.

The only question then is, how far the nation or society may impose its law upon a number of dissentient individuals ; what we have to do with, are the rights of the body in relation to those of the several members ; a grave question certainly—I know of none more difficult ; but which exists in all its force, even if we abandon the moral theory of the state altogether. For if we acknowledge the idea of a church, the difficulty meets us no less ; the names of state and church make no difference in the matter ; we have still a body imposing its laws upon individuals ; if the state may not interfere with an individual’s religion, how can the church do it ? for the difficulty is that the individual cannot and must not be wholly merged in the society ; he cannot yield all his con-

victions of truth and right to the convictions of other men : he may sometimes be called upon to dissent from, and to disobey, chief priests and doctors, bishops and presbyters, no less than the secular authorities, as they are called, of emperors and kings, proconsuls and parliaments. Long before Constantine interfered with his imperial power in the concerns of the church, the question existed : conscience might be lorded over, tastes and feelings rudely shocked, belief claimed for that which to the mind of the individual appeared certain error ; the majority might tyrannize over the minority ; the society might interfere with the most sacred rights of the individual.

Nor is it the state alone which, by imposing articles of faith, is guilty of tempting men to hypocrisy ; a charge which has been very strongly urged against the system of making full citizenship depend on the profession of Christianity : nor is it the state alone which does more than merely instruct and persuade, and which employs "secular coercion" in the cause of the Gospel ; all which things have been said to be "at variance with the true spirit of the Gospel," and to "imply a sinful distrust, want of faith in Christ's wisdom, and goodness, and power." The church has required obedience and punished disobedience ; I will not appeal to St. Paul's expression of "delivering a man to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord," because what is there meant is uncertain, and the power claimed may be extraordinary ; but I maintain that the sentence of excommunication, which has been held always to belong to the church, is to all intents and purposes a secular coercion ; it goes much beyond instruction and persuasion, it is a punishment as completely as ever was the ancient *ἀτιμία*, or deprivation of political rights : (2) it inflicts and is meant to inflict great inconvenience and great suffering, acting most keenly upon the noblest minds, but yet touching

the meanest as effectually, to say the least, as the ancient civil penalty of banishment.

Now accidentally excommunication may be a small penalty, but in its own nature it is most grievous. It cuts a man off from the kindness and society of his nearest and dearest friends; it divides him from those with whom alone he can in the nature of things feel strong sympathy; for where can a Christian find such but among Christ's people, and from these excommunication cuts him off. And conceive the case of a country, geographically remote from other countries, and inhabited only by Christians; what resource would, under such circumstances, be left to an excommunicated person? and would not the temptation be extreme to him to profess his belief in whatever the church taught, to yield obedience to whatever it required, in order to be saved from a life of loneliness and of infamy? Yet the power of excommunicating for heretical opinions is one which the church is supposed to hold lawfully, while the power of disfranchising for such opinions is called persecution, and a making Christ's kingdom a kingdom of the world.

It is of some consequence to disentangle this confusion, because what I have called the moral theory of a state, is really open to no objections but such as apply with equal force to the theory of a church, and especially to the theory of a national, and still more of a universal church. Wherever there is centralization, there is danger of the parts of the body being too much crippled in their individual action; and yet centralization is essential to their healthy activity no less than to the perfection of the body. But if men run away with the mistaken notion that liberty of conscience is threatened only by a state religion, and not at all by a church religion, the danger is that they will abandon religion altogether to what they call the church, that is, to the power of a society far worse governed than most states, and likely to

lay far heavier burdens on individual conscience, because the spirit dominant in it is narrower and more intolerant.

No doubt all societies, whether they are called states or churches, are bound to avoid tempting the consciences of individuals by overstraining the terms of citizenship or communion. And it is desirable, as I said before, to require a profession of obedience rather than of belief, because obedience can and will often be readily rendered where belief would be withheld. But as states require declarations of allegiance to the sovereign, so they may require declarations of submission to the authority of a particular law. If a man believes himself bound to refuse obedience to the law of Christianity, or will not pledge himself to regard it as paramount in authority to any human legislation, he cannot properly be a member of a society which conceives itself bound to regulate all its proceedings by this law, and cannot allow any of its provisions to be regarded as revocable or alterable. But no human power can presume to inquire into the degree of a man's positive belief: the heretic was not properly he who did not believe what the church taught, but he who wilfully withdrew himself from its society, refusing to conform to its system, and setting up another system of his own.

I know that it will be objected to this, that it is no other than the system of the old philosophers, who upheld paganism as expedient, while they laughed at it in their hearts as false. But he who makes such an objection must surely forget the essential difference between paganism and Christianity. Paganism, in the days of the philosophers, scarcely pretended to rest on a foundation of historical truth; no thinking man believed in it, except as allegorically true. But Christianity commends itself to the minds of a vast majority of thinking men, as being true in fact no less than in doctrine; they believe in it as literally true no less than spiritually. When I speak then of a state requiring obedience to the Christian

law, it means that the state, being the perfect church, should do the church's work ; that is, that it should provide for the Christian education of the young, and the Christian instruction of the old ; that it should, by public worship and by a Christian discipline, endeavour, as much as may be, to realize Christianity to all its people. Under such a system, the teachers would speak because they believed, for Christian teachers as a general rule do so, and their hearers would, in like manner, learn to believe also. Farther, the evidence of the Christian religion, in itself so unanswerable, would be confirmed by the manifest witness of the Christian church, when possessing a real living constitution, and purified by an efficient discipline ; so that the temptations to unbelief would be continually lessened, and unbelief, in all human probability, would become continually of more rare occurrence. And possibly the time might come when a rejection of Christianity would be so clearly a moral offence, that profane writings would be as great a shock to all men's notions of right and wrong as obscene writings are now, and the one might be punished with no greater injury to liberty of conscience than the other.

But this general hearty belief in Christianity is to be regarded by the Christian society, whether it be called church or state, not as its starting point, but as its highest perfection. To begin with a strict creed and no efficient Christian institutions, is the sure way to hypocrisy and unbelief ; to begin with the most general confession of faith, imposed, that is, as a test of membership, but with vigorous Christian institutions, is the way most likely to lead, not only to a real and general belief, but also to a lively perception of the highest points of Christian faith. In other words, intellectual objections to Christianity should be tolerated, where they are combined with moral obedience ; tolerated, because in this way they are most surely removed ; whereas a corrupt or disorganized

church with a minute creed, encourages intellectual objections; and if it proceeds to put them down by force, it does often violate the right of conscience, punishing an unbelief which its own evil has provoked, and, so far as human judgment can see, has in a great measure justified.

I have endeavored to show that the favorite objections against the state's concerning itself with religion, apply no less to the theory of a church; the difficulty being to prevent the society from controlling the individual mind too completely, and from encouraging unbelief and hypocrisy by requiring prematurely a declaration of belief from its members, rather than a promise of obedience. It is hardly necessary to observe, that the moral theory of a state is not open to the objection commonly brought against our actual constitution, namely, that parliament is not a fit body to legislate on matters of religion; for the council of a really Christian state would consist of Christians at once good and sensible, quite as much as the council of a really Christian church; and if we take a nominally Christian state, or a nominally Christian church, their councils will be equally unfit to legislate; to say nothing of the obvious answer, that the details of all great legislative measures, whether ecclesiastical, or legal, or military, may be safely left to professional knowledge and experience, so long as there remains a higher power, not professional, to give to them the sanction of law.

Finally, the moral theory of a state, which I believe to be the foundation of political truth, agrees and matches, so to speak, with the only true theory of a church. If the state under any form, and in its highest state of perfection, can only primarily take cognizance of physical ends; then its rulers can certainly never be the rulers of the church, and the church must be governed by rulers of its own. Now the notion of a priesthood, or of a divinely appointed succession of church governors, does not indeed necessarily follow from

this ; but at any rate it agrees marvellously with it : while, on the other hand, if there be in the church no priesthood, and no divinely ordered succession of governors, then it is ready to become identified with the Christian state, and to adopt its forms of government ; and if the Christian state be a contradiction in terms, because the state must always prefer physical objects to moral, then the church has no resource but to imitate its forms as well as it can, although in a subordinate society they must lose their own proper efficacy.

Now believing with the Archbishop of Dublin, that there is in the Christian church neither priesthood nor divine succession of governors, and believing with Mr. Gladstone that the state's highest objects are moral and not physical, I cannot but wonder that these two truths are in each of their systems divorced from their proper mates. The church freed from the notions of priesthood and apostolical succession, is divested of all unchristian and tyrannical power ; but craves by reason of its subordinate condition the power of sovereign government, that power which the forms of a free state can alone supply healthfully. And the state having sovereign power, and also, as Mr. Gladstone allows, having a moral end paramount to all others, is at once fit to do the work of the church perfectly, so soon as it becomes Christian ; nor can it abandon its responsibility, and surrender its conscience up into the hands of a priesthood, who have no knowledge superior to its own, and who cannot exercise its sovereignty. The Christian king, or council, or assembly, excludes the interference of the priesthood ; the church without a priesthood, craves its Christian assembly, or council, or king.

Believing that the church has no divinely appointed succession of governors or form of government, and that its actual governments, considering it as distinct from the state, have been greatly inferior to the governments of well-ordered kingdoms and commonwealths ; believing that the end and

object of a Christian kingdom or commonwealth is precisely the same with that of a Christian church, and that the separation of the two has led to the grievous corruption of both, making the state worldly and profane, and the church formal, superstitious, and idolatrous ; believing farther, that the state cannot be perfect till it possess the wisdom of the church, nor the church be perfect till it possess the power of the state ; that the one has as it were the soul, and the other the organized body, each of which requires to be united with the other ; I would unite one half of the Archbishop of Dublin's theory with one half of Mr. Gladstone's ; agreeing cordially with Mr. Gladstone in the moral theory of the state, and agreeing as cordially with the archbishop in what I will venture to call the Christian theory of the church, and deducing from the two the conclusion that the perfect state and the perfect church are identical.

In what has been said above, I have rather attempted to answer objections and to remove misconceptions with regard to the moral theory of a state, than to offer any positive proof of that theory. It seems to me to be one of those truths which in itself command general assent, and that the opposition to it is mostly an after-thought, originating solely in a sense of the difficulties which it is supposed practically to involve. And therefore to remove those difficulties, leaves the theory with its own internal persuasiveness unimpaired, and likely as such to be generally received. Something, however, in support of the theory itself has been offered in the Inaugural Lecture ; and it may farther be proper to notice here a little more in detail two elaborate attacks upon it, which have been made in the Archbishop of Dublin's "Additional remarks on the Jews' Relief Bill," published in the volume entitled, "Charges and other Tracts," printed in 1836 : and in his work on the "Kingdom of Christ," printed in 1841.

In these works it is asserted and implied continually, that

religion is not within the province of the civil magistrate; and that secular or legal coercion may not be employed in the cause of the Gospel. Now the first of these statements is surely not a thing to be taken for granted; and whether it be right or wrong, it is certain that such a doctrine is condemned by the almost unanimous consent of all writers on government, whether heathen or Christian, down to the eighteenth century; and in later times, to name no others, by Burke* and Coleridge. Grotius, no mean authority surely on points of law and government, has an express work, "*De imperio summarum Potestatum circa sacra*;" in which he uses nearly the same argument that I have adopted in my Inaugural Lecture: namely, that the sovereignty of the state makes it necessarily embrace all points of human life and conduct. And he says, "*Si quis dixerit actiones esse diversas, alias puta judiciales, alias militares, alias ecclesiasticas, ac proinde hujus diversitatis respectu posse ipsum summum imperium in plures dividi, sequitur ex ejus sententia, ut eodem tempore idem homo ab hoc ire jussus ad forum, ab illo ad castra, ab illo rursus in templum, his omnibus parere teneatur, quod est impossibile.*" Grotius, *Opera Theol.* tom. iv. (iii.) p. 204, ed. Londin. 1679. Nay, it is allowed by those who object to the moral theory of a state, that Christian legislators did well in forcibly suppressing gladiatorial shows and impure rites, "as being immoral and pernicious ac-

* "An alliance between church and state in a Christian commonwealth, is, in my opinion, an idle and a fanciful speculation. An alliance is between two things that are in their nature distinct and independent, such as between two sovereign states. But in a Christian commonwealth, the church and the state are one and the same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole
 *** Religion is so far, in my opinion, from being out of the province or duty of a Christian magistrate, that it is, and it ought to be, not only his care, but the principal thing in his care; because it is one of the great bonds of human society, and its object the supreme good, the ultimate end and object of man himself." Speech on the Unitarian Petition, 1792. *Burke's Works*, vol. x. p. 43 ed. 1818.

sions ;” but if the legislator has any thing to do with morality, the whole question is conceded ; for morality is surely not another name for expediency, or what is advantageous for body and goods ; yet if it be not, and a legislator may prohibit any practice because it is wicked, then he regards moral ends, and his care is directed towards man’s highest happiness, and to the putting down his greatest misery, moral evil. Nor in fact does it appear how, on other than purely moral considerations, a state is justified in making certain abominations penal ; such acts involving in them no violence or fraud upon persons or property, which, according to Warburton, are the only objects of a state’s care.

The words “secular” and “temporal” appear to me to be used by the adversaries of the moral theory of a state with some confusion. (3) Every thing done on earth is secular and temporal ; and in this sense no society, whether it be called church or state, can have for its direct objects any other than such as are secular and temporal. The object of the church is not to raise men to heaven, but to make them fit for heaven ; but this is a work done in time and in the world, and completed there ; nor does it differ from what it would be if there were no future life at all ; our duties to God and man would be just the same whether we were to exist for seventy years or for forever, although our hope and encouragement would be infinitely different. The words “temporal” and “secular” have therefore no place in this question, unless we believe that the God of this world is really and truly not the God of the next ; and that “temporal” things therefore are subject to a different government from things eternal. And so with the term “secular coercion :” it is manifest that no coercion can be applied to any man in this life without affecting his present well-being or enjoyment : excommunication is a “secular coercion” as much as imprisonment ; it inflicts a present harm, it makes a man’s life less happy than it would

be otherwise. It is, in fact, one of the severest of earthly punishments ; for it is very well to talk of it as the natural act of a society against those who will not comply with its rules, and that it involves no injury, because a man has only to leave a society if he does not like it. But that society may be one to which it is the pride and pleasure of his life to belong ; and if the majority form rules which he finds very irksome, and then expel him for not complying with them, he sustains, I will not say an injury, but a hurt and loss ; he is put out of a society which he earnestly wished to belong to, and which comprehends, it may be, every respectable person in his neighbourhood. He has a strong temptation to comply even against his conscience, rather than incur such a penalty ; and when the society is the church of God, to live out of which would be to many minds intolerable, is it true that exclusion from that society is no temporal punishment or coercion ?

. But the argument against which I am contending relies mainly on our Lord's declaration to Pilate that " His kingdom was not of this world ;" from which it is concluded that Christians can never be justified in making the profession of obedience to Christ a condition of citizenship, for that is to make Christ's kingdom a kingdom of the world. I have been in the habit of understanding our Lord to mean that His spiritual dominion did not of itself confer any earthly authority ; that, therefore, His servants did not fight for him against the Roman soldiers, as the servants of an earthly king would be bound to defend their master against the servants of a foreign power. And so neither does the spiritual superiority of Christians either exempt them from obedience to the law of ordinary government, or authorize them to impose their own law on other men by virtue of that superiority. In other words, their religion gives them no political rights whatever which they would not have had without it.

But this meaning is not considered sufficient. Our Lord meant to disclaim political power for His people, not only in their actual circumstances, but in all other conceivable circumstances : not only as claimed by virtue of their religious superiority, but as claimed according to the simplest and most acknowledged principles of political right. If in days to come, emperor, senate, and people, shall have become Christians by the mere force of the truth and holiness of Christianity, yet they must not think that they may exercise their executive and legislative powers to the hurt of any law or institution now existing in the Roman heathen world. Never may they dare to interfere with the Roman's peculiar pride, the absolute dominion of the father over his sons ; nor with the state of slavery ; nor with the solemn gladiatorial sacrifice, so grateful to the shades of the departed ; nor with those festive rites of Flora, in which the people expressed their homage to the vivifying and prolific powers of nature. To stop one of these will be to make Christ's kingdom a kingdom of the world, which Christ has forbidden. True it is that to us these institutions appear immoral or unjust, because Christianity has taught us so to regard them ; but to a Roman they were privileges, or powers, or pleasures, which he could ill bear to abandon. And most strange is the statement that "every tribe having been accustomed to establish, wherever they were able, a monopoly of political rights for themselves, keeping all other inhabitants of the same territory in a state of tributary subjection, this was probably the very thing apprehended by those who persecuted the early Christians as disaffected persons." In the first place, "the notion of one tribe establishing a monopoly of political rights," belonged to a state of things which had long since perished, and was the last thing which any man would apprehend in the Roman world in the days of Tiberius, when all distinctions of condition between the various races subject to the empire had

either been done away long since by Alexander's conquests, or were daily being destroyed by the gift of the Roman franchise more and more widely. What the Romans dreaded was simply a revolt of Judæa; they heard that there was a king of the Jews, and they naturally thought that he would attempt to recover the ancient kingdom of his nation; and to this it was a clear and satisfactory answer, that the kingdom spoken of was not an earthly kingdom, that no one claimed as David's heir to expel Cæsar as a foreign usurper. That the heathen Romans persecuted the Christians from a fear of losing their civil rights should Christians become the predominant party in the empire, is not only a statement without evidence, but against it. We know from the Christian apologists what were the grounds of the persecution; we know it farther from the well-known letters of Pliny and Trajan. The Christians were punished for their resolute non-conformity to the laws and customs of Rome, and as men who, by their principles and lives, seemed to condemn the common principles and practice of mankind. They were punished not as men who might change the laws of Rome hereafter, but as men who disobeyed them now.

I am content with that interpretation of our Lord's words which I believe has been generally given to them; that He did not mean to call Himself king of the Jews in the common sense of the term, so as to imply any opposition to the government of the Romans. And as a general deduction from His words, I accept a very important truth which fanaticism has often neglected—that moral and spiritual superiority does not interfere with the ordinary laws, of political right; that the children of God are not by virtue of that relation to claim any dominion upon earth. Being perfectly convinced that our Lord has not forbidden His people to establish His kingdom, when they can do so without the breach of any rule of common justice, I should hail as the perfect consum-

mation of earthly things, the fulfilment of the word, that the kingdoms of the world should become the kingdoms of God and of Christ. And that kingdoms of the world not only may, but are bound to provide for the highest welfare of their people according to their knowledge, is a truth in which philosophers and statesmen, all theory and all practice, have agreed with wonderful unanimity down to the time of the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, however, and since, the old truth has not wanted illustrious advocates. I have already named Burke and Coleridge in our own country, nor am I aware that the opposite notion has ever received any countenance from any one of the great men of Germany. Up to this moment the weight of authority is beyond all comparison against it; and it is for its advocates to establish it, if they can, by some clear proofs. At present there is no valid objection raised against the moral theory of a state's objects; difficulties only are suggested as to points of practical detail, some of them arising from the mixture of extraneous and indefensible doctrines with the simple theory itself, and others applicable indeed to that theory, but no less applicable to any theory which can be given of a Christian church, and to be avoided only by a system of complete individual independence, in matters relating to morals and to religion. (4)

NOTES

TO

APPENDIX TO INAUGURAL LECTURE.

NOTE 1.—Page 66.

* * “ *A mere apprenticeship is not good education.*

“ Whatever system of tuition is solely adapted to enable the pupil to play a certain part in the world’s drama, whether for his own earthly advantage, or for that of any other man, or community of men, is a mere apprenticeship. It matters not whether the part be high or low, the hero or the fool.

“ A *good education*, on the other hand, looks primarily to the right formation of the Man in man, and its final cause is the well-being of the pupil, as he is a moral, responsible, and immortal being.

“ But, because to every man there is appointed a certain ministry and service, a path prescribed of duty, a work to perform, and a race to run, an office in the economy of Providence, a good education always provides a good apprenticeship; for usefulness is a necessary property of goodness.

“ The moral culture of man and so much of intellectual culture as is conducive thereto, is essential to education. Whatever of intellectual culture is beyond this, should be regarded as pertaining to apprenticeship, and should be apportioned to the demands of the vocation for which that apprenticeship is designed to qualify.

“ A man whose education is without apprenticeship, will be useless; a man whose education is all apprenticeship, will be bad, and therefore pernicious, and the more pernicious in proportion as his function is high, noble, or influential.”

HARTLEY COLERIDGE’S ‘*Lives of Distinguished Northerns,*’

n 529, note.

NOTE 2.—Page 71.

“*Ἀτίμια* was either total or partial. A man was totally deprived of his rights, both for himself and for his descendants, when he was convicted of murder, theft, false witness, partiality as arbiter, violence offered to a magistrate, and so forth. This highest degree of *ἀτίμια* excluded the person affected by it from the forum, and from all public assemblies; from the public sacrifices, and from the law courts; or rendered him liable to immediate imprisonment, if he was found in any of these places. It was either temporary or perpetual; and either accompanied or not with confiscation of property. Partial *ἀτίμια* only involved the forfeiture of some few rights, as for instance, the right of pleading in court. Public debtors were suspended from their civic functions till they discharged their debt to the state. People who had once become altogether *ἄτιμοι* were very seldom restored to their lost privileges. The converse term to *ἀτίμια* was *ἐπιτιμία*.”

‘*Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities.*’

Edited by Dr. W. Smith. London, 1842.

NOTE 3.—Page 79.

In the contemplation of carrying on his history of Rome, to what he regarded as “its natural termination at the revival of the Western empire, in the year 800 of the Christian æra, by the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome,” Dr. Arnold writes—“We shall then have passed through the chaos which followed the destruction of the old Western empire, and shall have seen its several elements combined with others which in that great convulsion had been mixed with them, organized again into their new form. That new form exhibited a marked and recognised division between the so-called secular and spiritual powers, and thereby has maintained in Christian Europe the unhappy distinction which necessarily prevailed in the heathen empire between the church and the state; a distinction now so deeply seated in our laws, our language, and our very notions, that nothing less than a miraculous interposition of God’s providence seems capable, within any definite time, of eradicating it.”

Hist. of Rome, vol. I., Preface, viii

NOTE 4.—Page 83.

* * “Law is more or less the expression of man’s reason, as opposed to his interest and his passion. I do not say that it has ever been the expression of pure reason; it has not been so, for man’s best reason is not pure. Nor has it been often free from the influence of interest, nor always from that of passion: there have been unjust laws in abundance; cruel and vindictive laws have not been wanting. Law, in short, like every thing human, has been greatly corrupted, but still it has never lost its character of good altogether: there never, I suppose, has been an age or country in which the laws, however bad, were not better than no law at all; they have ever preserved something of their essential excellence—that they acknowledged the authority of right, and not of might. Again, law has, and must have, along with this inherent respect for right and justice, an immense power; it is that which, in the last resort, controls human life. It is, on the one hand, the source of the highest honours and advantages which men can bestow on men; it awards, on the other hand, the extremity of outward evil—poverty, dishonour, and death. Here, then, we have a mighty power, necessary by the very condition of our nature; clearly good in its tendency, however corrupted, and therefore assuredly coming from God, and swaying the whole frame of human society with supreme dominion. Such is law in itself; such is a kingdom of this world. Now, then, conceive this law . . . to become instinct and inspired, as it were, by the spirit of Christ’s gospel; and it retains all its sovereign power, all its necessity, all its original and inherent virtue; it does but lose its corruptions; it is not only the pure expression of human reason, cleansed from interest and passion, but the expression of a purer reason than man’s. Law in a Christian country, so far as that country is really Christian, has, indeed, to use the magnificent language of Hooker, her seat in the bosom of God; and her voice, inasmuch as it breathes the spirit of divine truth, is indeed the harmony of the world.”

Arnold’s Sermons, vol. iv., p. 444.

The following passage in Dr. Arnold’s preface to the third vol-

ame of his Thucydides, has a bearing on the opinions in the Appendix to the Inaugural Lecture :

“ There is another point not peculiarly connected with Thucydides, except so far as he may be considered as the representative of all Grecian history, which appears to me deserving of notice ; that state of imperfect citizenship so common in Greece under the various names of *μέτοικοι*, *περίοικοι*, *σύνοικοι*, etc. This is a matter of importance, as bearing upon some of the great and eternal principles of political science, and thus applying more or less to the history of every age and nation.

“ It seems to be assumed in modern times that the being born of free parents within the territory of any particular state, and the paying towards the support of its government, conveys a natural claim to the rights of citizenship. In the ancient world, on the contrary, citizenship, unless specially conferred as a favour by some definite law or charter, was derivable only from race. The descendants of a foreigner remained foreigners to the end of time ; the circumstance of their being born and bred in the country was held to make no change in their condition ; community of place could no more convert aliens into citizens than it could change domestic animals into men. Nor did the paying of taxes confer citizenship ; taxation was the price paid by a stranger for the liberty of residing in a country not his own, and for the protection afforded by its laws to his person and property ; but it was thought to have no necessary connection with the franchise of a citizen, far less with the right of legislating for the commonwealth.

“ Citizenship was derived from race ; but distinctions of race were not of that odious and fantastic character which they have borne in modern times : they implied real differences often of the most important kind, religious and moral. Particular races worshipped particular gods, and in a particular manner. But different gods had different attributes, and the moral image thus presented to the continual contemplation and veneration of the people could not but produce some effect on the national character. According to the attributes of the god was the nature of the hymns in which he was celebrated : even the music varied ; and this alone, to a people of such lively sensibilities as the Greeks, was held to be a powerful moral engine ; whilst the accompanying ceremonies of the worship

enforced with still greater effect the impression produced by the hymns and music. Again, particular races had particular customs which affected the relations of domestic life and of public. Amongst some polygamy was allowed, amongst others forbidden; some held infanticide to be an atrocious crime, others in certain cases ordained it by law. Practices and professions regarded as infamous by some, were freely tolerated or honoured amongst others; the laws of property and of inheritance were completely various. It is not then to be wondered at that Thucydides, when speaking of a city founded jointly by Ionians and Dorians, should have thought it right to add 'that the prevailing institutions of the place were the Ionian;' for according as they were derived from one or the other of the two races, the whole character of the people would be different. And therefore the mixture of persons of different race in the same commonwealth, unless one race had a complete ascendancy, tended to confuse all the relations of life, and all men's notions of right and wrong; or by compelling men to tolerate, in so near a relation as that of fellow-citizens, differences upon the main point of human life, led to a general carelessness and scepticism, and encouraged the notion that right and wrong have no real existence, but are the mere creatures of human opinion.

"But the interests of ambition and avarice are ever impatient of moral barriers. When a conquering prince or people had formed a vast dominion out of a number of different nations, the several customs and religions of each were either to be extirpated or melted into one mass, in which each learned to tolerate those of its neighbours and to despise its own. And the same blending of races, and consequent confusion and degeneracy of manners, was favoured by commercial policy; which, regarding men solely in the relation of buyers and sellers, considered other points as comparatively unimportant, and in order to win customers would readily sacrifice or endanger the purity of moral and religious institutions. So that in the ancient world, civilization, which grew chiefly out of conquest or commerce, went almost hand in hand with demoralization.

"Now to those who think that political society was ordained for higher purposes than those of mere police or of traffic, the principle of the ancient commonwealths in making agreement in religion

and morals the test of citizenship, cannot but appear wise and good. And yet the mixture of races is essential to the improvement of mankind, and an exclusive attachment to national customs is incompatible with true liberality. How then was the problem to be solved? how could civilization be attained without moral degeneracy? how could a narrow-minded bigotry be escaped without falling into the worse evil of Epicurean indifference? Christianity has answered these questions most satisfactorily, by making religious and moral agreement independent of race or national customs; by furnishing us with a sure criterion to distinguish between what is essential and eternal, and what is indifferent, and temporal or local: allowing, nay, commanding us to be with regard to every thing of this latter kind in the highest degree tolerant, liberal, and comprehensive; while it gives to the former that only sanction to which implicit reverence may safely and usefully be paid, not the fond sanction of custom, or national prejudice, or human authority of any kind whatever, but the sanction of the truth of God.

“That bond and test of citizenship then, which the ancient legislators were compelled to seek in sameness of race, because thus only could they avoid the worst of evils, a confusion and consequent indifference in men’s notions of right and wrong, is now furnished to us in the profession of Christianity. He who is a Christian, let his race be what it will, let his national customs be ever so different from ours, is fitted to become our fellow-citizen; for his being a Christian implies that he retains such of his national customs only as are morally indifferent; and for all such we ought to feel the most perfect toleration. He who is not a Christian, though his family may have lived for generations on the same soil with us, though they may have bought and sold with us, though they may have been protected by our laws, and paid* taxes in return for that

* “It is considered in our days that those who are possessed of property in a country ought to be citizens in it: the ancient maxim was, that those who were citizens ought to be possessed of property. The difference involved in these two different views is most remarkable.”

In one of his letters also, Dr. Arnold remarks, “The correlative to taxation, in my opinion, is not citizenship but protection. . . . To confound the right of taxing oneself with the right of general legislation, is one of the Jacobinical confusions of later days, arising from those low Warburtonian notions of the ends of political society.”

Arnold’s mind was so deeply imbued with Greek philosophy—especially that of his

protection, is yet essentially not a citizen but a sojourner ; and to admit such a person to the rights of citizenship tends in principle to the confusion of right and wrong, and lowers the objects of political society to such as are merely physical and external."

The reader, who desires to investigate the subject discussed in the Appendix to the Inaugural Lecture, may consult, besides the authorities referred to there, the following works : Coleridge's '*Constitution of Church and State according to the Idea of Each*,' Maurice's '*Kingdom of Christ*,' and Derwent Coleridge's '*Scriptural Character of the English Church*.'

chief favourite Aristotle, his feeling for whom was ever finding utterance in terms of even affectionate and familiar endearment, that to understand him rightly, it is necessary to bear in mind how much higher and more comprehensive a meaning there was in the Greek '*πολιτικη*' than in our English term 'politics.' It has been well remarked by the writer of the article '*Civitas*' in the '*Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*,' that, "If we would picture to ourselves the true notion which the Greeks embodied in the word *πολις*, we must lay aside all modern ideas respecting the nature and object of a state. With us practically, if not in theory, the *essential* object of a state hardly embraces more than the protection of life and property. The Greeks, on the other hand, had the most vivid conception of the state as a whole, every part of which was to co-operate to some great end, to which all other duties were considered as subordinate."

LECTURE I.

It will not, I trust, be deemed impertinent or affected, if at the very outset of these Lectures I venture again to request the indulgence of my hearers for the many deficiencies which will undoubtedly be found in them. I could not enter on the duties of my office with tolerable cheerfulness, if I might not confess how imperfectly I can hope to fulfil them. And this is the more necessary, because I hope that our standard of excellence in history will be continually rising ; we shall be convinced, I trust, more and more, of the vast amount of knowledge which the historical student should aim at, and of the rare union of high qualifications required in a perfect historian. Now just in proportion to your sense of this, must be unavoidably your sense of the defects of these Lectures ; because I must often dwell on the value of a knowledge which I do not possess ; and must thus lay open my own ignorance by the very course which I believe to be most beneficial to my hearers.

I would gladly consent, however, even to call your attention to my want of knowledge, because it is, I think, of such great importance to all of us to have a lively consciousness of the exact limits of our knowledge and our ignorance. A keen sense of either implies, indeed, an equally keen sense of the other. A bad geographer looks upon the map of a known and of an unknown country with pretty nearly the same eyes. The random line which expresses the form of a coast not yet explored ; the streams suddenly stopping in

their course, or as suddenly beginning to be delineated, because their outlet or their sources are unknown; these convey to the eye of an untaught person no sense of deficiency, because the most complete survey of the most thoroughly explored country gives him no sense of full information. But he who knows how to value a good map, is painfully aware of the defects of a bad one; and he who feels these defects, would also value the opposite excellencies. And thus in all things, as our knowledge and ignorance are curiously intermixed with one another, so it is most important to keep the limits of each distinctly traced, that we may be able confidently to make use of the one, while we endeavour to remove or lessen the other.

One other remark of a different nature I would wish to make also, before I enter upon my lectures. Considering that the great questions on which men most widely differ from each other, belong almost all to modern history, it seems scarcely possible to avoid expressing opinions which some of my hearers will think erroneous. Even if not expressed they would probably be indicated, and I do not know how this is to be avoided. Yet I shall be greatly disappointed if at the close of these lectures, our feeling of agreement with one another is not much stronger than our feeling of difference. You will not judge me so hardly as to suppose that I am expressing a hope of proselytizing any one: my meaning is very different. But I suppose that all calm inquiry conducted amongst those who have their main principles of judgment in common, leads, if not to an approximation of views, yet at least to an increase of sympathy. And the truths of historical science, which I certainly believe to be very real and very important, are not exactly the same thing with the opinions of any actual party.

I will now detain you no longer with any prefatory observations, but will proceed directly to our subject. I will sup-

pose then, if you please, the case of a member of this university who has just taken his degree, and finding himself at leisure to enter now more fully into other than classical or mathematical studies, proposes to apply himself to modern history. We will suppose, moreover, that his actual knowledge of the subject goes no farther than what he has collected from any of the common popular compendiums. And now our question is, in what manner he should be recommended to proceed.

We must allow that the case is one of considerable perplexity. Hitherto in ancient profane history, his attention has been confined almost exclusively to two countries : and to a few great writers whose superior claims to attention are indisputable. Nay, if he goes farther, and endeavours to illustrate the regular historians from the other and miscellaneous literature of the period, yet his work in most cases is to be accomplished without any impossible exertion ; for many periods indeed of ancient history, and these not the least interesting, all our existing materials are so scanty that it takes but little time to acquaint ourselves with them all, and their information is not of a bulk to oppress any but the very feeblest memory.

How overwhelming is the contrast when the student turns to modern history ! Instead of two countries claiming his attention, he finds several systems of countries, if I may so speak, any one of which offers a wide field of inquiry. First of all, there is the history of Europe ; then quite distinct from this there is oriental history ; and thirdly, there is the history of European colonies. But when we turn from the subjects of inquiry to the sources of information, the difference is greater still. Consider the long rows of folio volumes which present themselves to our notice in the Bodleian, or in our college libraries ; and think how many of these relate to modern history. There is the Benedictine collection of the

early French historians, and Muratori's great collection of the Italian historians of the middle ages : and these, vast as they are, relate only to two countries, and to particular periods. What shall we say of the great collections of works directly subsidiary to history, such as Rymer's *Fœdera*, and the various collections of treaties ; of bodies of laws, the statutes at large for example for England only : of such works as the publications of the Record Commission, or as the Journals of the Houses of Parliament. Turning then to lighter works, which contain some of the most precious materials for history, we find the countless volumes of the French memoirs, magazines, newspapers, (it is enough to remind you of the set of the *Moniteurs* in the Bodleian ;) correspondence of eminent men printed or in MS., (the library at Besançon contains sixty volumes of the Letters of Granvella, Charles the Fifth's great minister,) and lastly, the swarm of miscellaneous pamphlets, which in these later days as we know are in numbers numberless, but which in the seventeenth and even in the sixteenth centuries were more numerous than we sometimes are aware of. There is a collection of these in Corpus library for example, of which I retain a very grateful recollection for many hours of amusement which they used to afford me. I might go on and extend my catalogue till it far exceeded the length of the Homeric catalogue of the ships : but I have mentioned quite enough for my purpose. We may well conceive that amid this boundless wilderness of historical materials, the student may be oppressed with a sense of the hopelessness of all his efforts ; which way shall he choose among so many ? what progress can he hope to make in a space so boundless ?

It is quite manifest that a choice must be made immediately. The English student, unless determined by particular circumstances, will have no difficulty in seeing that European history should be preferred to oriental or to colonial ; and again,

in European history itself, that that of our own country, or of France, or of Germany, or of Italy, has a peculiar claim on his notice. Next, when he has fixed upon the country, he has to determine the period which he will study, whether he will apply himself to any one of the three last centuries, or to the middle ages; and if to these last, whether to their earlier period or to their close. And here again, particular circumstances or the taste of the student will of course influence his decision. It matters very little, I think, on which his choice may happen to fall.

We will suppose then the choice to be made of some one period, it should not be a very long one, whether bounded by merely arbitrary limits, as any one particular century, or by such as constitute a natural beginning and end, as for example the period in German history between the Reformation and the peace of Westphalia. If the period fixed on be very short, it may be made to include the history of two or three countries; but it would be best perhaps to select for our principal subject one country only. And now with our work limited sufficiently both as to time and as to space, it will assume a more compassable shape: and we shall be inclined to set about it vigorously.

In the first place then we should take, I think, some one history as nearly contemporary as may be, and written, to speak generally, by a native historian. For instance, suppose that our subject be France in the middle of the fifteenth century, we should begin by reading the memoirs of Philip de Comines. The reason of this rule is evident; that it is important to look at an age or country in its own point of view; which of course is best to be obtained from a native and contemporary writer. Such a history is in fact a double lesson: it gives us the actions and the mind of the actors at the same time, telling us not only what was done, but with what motives and in what spirit it was done. Again, the language

of a native contemporary historian is the language of those of whom he is writing ; in reading him we are in some sort hearing them, and an impression of the style and peculiarities of any man's language is an important help towards realizing our notion of him altogether. I know not whether others have been struck with this equally ; but for myself I have seemed to gain a far more lively impression of what James the First was, ever since I read those humorous scenes in the *Fortunes of Nigel* which remind one so forcibly that he spoke a broad Scotch dialect. (1)

If the period which we have chosen be one marked by important foreign wars, it will be desirable also to read another contemporary history, written by a native of the other belligerent power. The same war is regarded so differently by the two parties engaged in it, that it is of importance to see it in more than one point of view, not merely for the correction of military details, but to make our general impressions and our sympathies with either side more impartial. . And in contemporary histories of wars we have the passions and prejudices of both parties generally expressed with all their freshness, even in cases where both nations, when passion has gone to sleep, agree in passing the same judgment. Joan of Arc is now a heroine to Englishmen no less than to Frenchmen : but in the fifteenth century she was looked upon by Englishmen as a witch, while the French regarded her as a messenger sent from heaven. (2)

And now the one or two general contemporary histories of our period having put us in possession not only of the outline and of some of the details of events, but also of the prevailing tone of opinion and feeling, we next proceed to a process which is indeed not a little laborious, and in many places would be impracticable, from the difficulty of obtaining the books required. But I am convinced that it is essential to be gone through once, if we wish to learn the true method of

historical investigation: and if done once, for one period, the benefit of it will be felt in all our future reading, because we shall always know how to explore below the surface, whenever we wish to do so, and we shall be able to estimate rightly those popular histories which after all must be our ordinary sources of information, except where we find it needful to carry on our researches more deeply. And I am addressing those who having the benefit of the libraries of this place, can really carry into effect, if they will, such a course of study as I am going to recommend. I cannot indeed too earnestly advise every one who is resident in the university to seize this golden time for his own reading, whilst he has on the one hand the riches of our libraries at his command, and before the pressure of actual life has come upon him, when the acquisition of knowledge is mostly out of the question, and we must be content to live upon what we have already gained. Many and many a time since I ceased to be resident in Oxford, has the sense of your advantages been forced upon my mind; for with the keenest love of historical researches, want of books and want of time have continually thrown obstacles in my way; and to this hour I look back with the greatest gratitude to the libraries and the comparative leisure of this place, as having enabled me to do far more than I should ever have been able to effect elsewhere, and amidst the engagements of a profession.

I think therefore that here I may venture to recommend what I believe to be the best method of historical reading; for although even here there will be more or less impediments in the way of our carrying it out completely, still the probability is that some may have both the will and the power to do it; and even an approximation to it, and a regarding it as the standard which we should always be trying to reach, will, I think, be found to be valuable.

To proceed therefore with our supposed student's course of reading. Keeping the general history which he has been reading as his text, and getting from it the skeleton, in a manner, of the future figure, he must now break forth excursively to the right and left, collecting richness and fulness of knowledge from the most various sources. For example, we will suppose that where his popular historian has mentioned that an alliance was concluded between two powers, or a treaty of peace agreed upon, he first of all resolves to consult the actual documents themselves, as they are to be found in some one of the great collections of European treaties, or if they are connected with English history, in Rymer's *Fœdera*. By comparing the actual treaty with his historian's report of its provisions, we get in the first place a critical process of some value, inasmuch as the historian's accuracy is at once tested: but there are other purposes answered besides. An historian's report of a treaty is almost always an abridgment of it; minor articles will probably be omitted, and the rest condensed, and stripped of all their formal language. But our object now being to reproduce to ourselves, so far as is possible, the very life of the period which we are studying, minute particulars help us to do this; nay, the very formal enumeration of titles, and the specification of towns and districts in their legal style, help to realize the time to us, if it be only from their very particularity. Every common history records the substance of the treaty of Troyes, May, 1420, by which the succession to the crown of France was given to Henry the Fifth. But the treaty in itself, or the English version of it which Henry sent over to England to be proclaimed there, gives a far more lively impression of the triumphant state of the great conqueror, and the utter weakness of the poor French king, Charles the Sixth, in the ostentatious care taken to provide for the recognition of his formal title during his lifetime, while all real power is ceded to Henry,

and provision is made for the perpetual union hereafter of the two kingdoms under his sole government.

I have named treaties as the first class of official instruments to be consulted, because the mention of them occurs unavoidably in every history. Another class of documents, certainly of no less importance, yet much less frequently referred to by popular historians, consists of statutes, ordinances, proclamations, acts, or by whatever various names the laws of each particular period happen to be designated. That the Statute Book has not been more habitually referred to by writers on English history, has always seemed to me matter of surprise. Legislation has not perhaps been so busy in every country as it has been with us, yet everywhere and in every period it has done something: evils real or supposed have always existed, which the supreme power in the nation has endeavoured to remove by the provisions of law. And under the name of laws I would include the acts of councils, which form an important part of the history of European nations during many centuries; provincial councils, as you are aware, having been held very frequently, and their enactments relating to local and particular evils, so that they illustrate history in a very lively manner. Now in these and all the other laws of any given period, we find in the first place from their particularity a great additional help towards becoming familiar with the times in which they were passed; we learn the names of various officers, courts, and processes; and these, when understood, (and I suppose always the habit of reading nothing without taking pains to understand it,) help us from their very number to realize the state of things then existing; a lively notion of any object depending on our clearly seeing some of its parts, and the more we people it, so to speak, with distinct images, the more it comes to resemble the crowded world around us. But in addition to this benefit, which I am disposed to rate in itself very

highly, every thing of the nature of law has a peculiar interest and value, because it is the expression of the deliberate mind of the supreme government of society ; and as history, as commonly written, records so much of the passionate and unreflecting part of human nature, we are bound in fairness to acquaint ourselves with its calmer and better part also. And then if we find, as unhappily we often shall find, that this calmer and better part was in itself neither good nor wise ; that law, which should be the very voice of justice, was on the other hand unequal, oppressive, insolent ; that the deliberate mind of the ruling spirits of any age was sunk in ignorance or perverted by wickedness, then we may feel sure that with whatever bright spots to be found here and there, the general state of that age was evil.

I am imprudent perhaps in leading you at the outset of our historical studies into a region so forbidding ; the large volumes of treaties and laws with which I have recommended the student to become familiar, may seem enough to crush the boldest spirit of enterprise. There is an alchemy, however, which can change these apparently dull materials into bright gold ; but I must not now anticipate the mention of it. I will rather proceed to offer some relief to the student by inviting him next to turn to volumes of a very different character. Some of the great men of an age have in all probability left some memorials of their minds behind them, speeches, it may be, or letters, or a journal ; or possibly works of a deeper character, in which they have handled, expressly and deliberately, some of the questions which most interested their generation. Now if our former researches have enabled us to people our view of the past with many images of events, institutions, usages, titles, &c., to make up with some completeness what may be called the still life of the picture, we shall next be anxious to people it also with the images of its great individual men, to change it as it were from a land-

scape or a view of buildings, to what may truly be called an historical picture. Whoever has made himself famous by his actions, or even by his rank or position in society, so that his name is at once familiar to our ears, such a man's writings have an interest for us even before we begin to read them; the instant that he gets up as it were to address us, we are hushed into the deepest attention. These works give us an insight not only into the spirit of an age, as exemplified in the minds of its greatest men, but they multiply in some sort the number of those with whom we are personally and individually in sympathy; they enable us to recognise amidst the dimness of remote and uncongenial ages, the features of friends and of brethren.

But the greatest, or at least the most active men of an age, may have left but little behind them in writing; memorials of this kind, however precious, will often be but few. We next then consider who those were who were eminent by their writings only, who before they began to speak had no peculiar claim to be heard, but who won and fixed attention by the wisdom or eloquence of what they uttered. Or again, to take a still lower step, there may have been men who spoke only to a limited audience, men of eminence merely in their own profession or study, but who within their own precinct were listened to, and exercised considerable influence. Yet once again, there is a still lower division of literature, there are works neither of men great by their actions, nor of men proved to be great by these very works themselves; nor of men, who though not great properly in any sense, were yet within a certain circle respected and influential; but works written by common persons for common persons, works written because the profession, or circumstances, or necessities of their authors led them to write, second and third rate works of theology, second and third rate political, or legal, or philosophical, or literary disquisitions, ordinary histories,

poetry of that class which is to a proverb worthless, novels and tales which no man reads twice, and only an indiscriminate literary voracity would read once. Time gives even to this mass of rubbish an accidental value; what was in its lifetime mere moss, becomes in the lapse of ages, after being buried in its peat-bed, of some value as fuel; it is capable of yielding both light and heat. And so even the most worthless pieces of the literature of a remote period, contain in them both instruction and amusement. The historical student should consult such of these as time has spared; all the four divisions of the literature of a period which I have mentioned, should engage his attention, not all certainly in an equal degree, but all are of importance towards that object which at this part of his course he is especially pursuing; the realizing to himself, I mean, as vividly and as perfectly as possible, all the varied aspects of the period which he is investigating.

I feel sure that whilst I have been reading the three or four last pages, I have been drawing rather largely on your kind readiness to put the best construction on my words which they will possibly bear. But after all, you must I fear be unable to acquit me of great extravagance, in recommending the student to make himself acquainted with the whole literature of the period of which he wishes to learn the history. I trust, however, to clear myself of this imputation, by explaining in what manner so wide a range of reading is really practicable. There is no greater confusion than exists in many men's notions of deep and superficial reading. It is often supposed, I believe, that deep reading consists in going through many books from beginning to end, superficial reading in looking only at parts of them. But depth and shallowness have reference properly to our particular object: so that the very same amount of reading may be superficial in one sense, and deep in another. For example, I want to **know** whether a peculiar mode of expression occurs in a

given writer ; an expression, we will say, supposed to have come into existence only at a later period. Now with a view to this object, any thing short of an almost complete perusal of the writer's works from beginning to end is superficial : because I cannot be in a condition to decide the question on a partial hearing of the evidence ; and the evidence in this case is not any given portion of the author's writings, but the whole of them. Again, if I wish to know what a writer has said on some one particular subject, and he has written an express work on this subject, my reading is not superficial if I go through that one work, although I may leave a hundred of his works on other subjects unread altogether. Now for what purpose is it that we wish to consult the general second-rate literature of a period, as an illustration of its history ? Is it not in order to discover what was the prevailing tone and taste of men's minds ; how they reasoned ; what ideas had most possession of them ; what they knew, and what use they made of their knowledge ? For this object, a judicious selection following a general survey of the contents of an author's works is really quite sufficient. We take the volume or volumes of them into our hands ; we look at the contents, and so learn the subjects and nature of his several writings. It may be and often is the case, that amongst them we find some letters ; on these we should fasten immediately, and read through several of them, taking some from different periods of his life, if his correspondence run through several years. Again, his works may contain treatises, we will say, on various subjects ; if he be a theologian, they may contain commentaries also on the whole or parts of the Scripture ; or controversial tracts, or meditations and prayers. Amongst his treatises we should select such as must from their subject call forth the character of his mind most fully ; and one or two of these we should read through. So again, we can test his character as a commentator by consulting him on such

parts of Scripture as necessarily lead to the fullest development of his opinions and knowledge ; and we can deal in a similar way with his other writings. If he be an historian, a portion of his work will certainly display his historical powers sufficiently ; if he be a poet, the strength and character of his genius will appear, without our reading every line which he has written. It is possible certainly that an estimate so formed may not be altogether correct ; we should not value Shakespeare sufficiently without being acquainted with all his great plays ; yet even in the case of Shakespeare, a knowledge of any one of his best tragedies, and any one of his best comedies, would give us a notion faithful in kind, although requiring to be augmented in degree. But what I am saying does not apply to the works of the very highest class of minds, but to the mass of ordinary literature ; and surely any one canto of Glover's *Leonidas* would enable us to judge very fairly of the merits and style of the poem ; and half a dozen of the letters of Junius would express faithfully the excellencies and faults of the author as a political writer, without our being obliged to read through the whole volume. (3)

That, however, is really superficial reading, which dips merely into a great many places of a volume at random, and studies no considerable portion of it consecutively. One whole treatise upon a striking subject may, and will, give us an accurate estimate of a writer's powers ; it will exhibit his way of handling a question, his fairness or unfairness, his judgment, his clearness, his eloquence, or his powers of reasoning. One single treatise out of a great many will show us this, but not mere extracts even from many treatises. Particular passages selected, whether for good or for bad, are really apt to remind one of the brick which the old pedant carried about as a specimen of his house. It is vain to judge of any writer from isolated quotations, least of all, when we

want to judge of him as illustrating the views and habits of his time. Nothing can be more unsafe than to venture to criticise the literature of a period from turning over the pages even of the fullest literary history: Tiraboschi is invaluable as a book of reference, furnishing us with the number of Italian writers who flourished at any one time, and with a catalogue raisonnée of their writings; but a catalogue is to guide research, not to supersede it. Besides, quotations made from writers to show the character of their opinions, are not always to be trusted even for their honesty. One instance of this is so remarkable, and affords so memorable a warning, that I cannot refrain from noticing it, as it may possibly be new to some of my hearers. Mosheim, in his Ecclesiastical History, gave in one of his notes the following passage from the works of Eligius or Eloy, bishop of Noyon in the middle of the seventh century, as a specimen of the false notions of Christian duty entertained generally at that period, even by men of the highest reputed holiness.* Robertson, in his notes

* Text of Mosheim. "The Christians of this century (the seventh) seemed by their superstitious doctrine to exclude from the kingdom of heaven such as had not contributed by their offerings to augment the riches of the clergy or the church." Century VII. part ii. ch. 3, edit. 8vo. 1806.

His note is as follows: "S. Eligius or Eloi expresses himself upon this matter in the following manner: Bonus Christianus est qui ad ecclesiam frequenter venit, et oblationem, quæ in altari Deo offeratur, exhibet: qui de fructibus suis non gustat nisi prius Deo aliquid offerat: qui quoties sanctæ solemnitates adveniunt, ante dies plures castitatem etiam cum propriâ uxore custodit, ut securâ conscientia Domini altare accedere possit; qui postremo symbolum vel orationem Dominicam memoriter tenet . . . Redimite animas vestras de penâ, dum habetis in potestate remedia . . . oblationes et decimas ecclesiis offerte, luminaria sanctis locis, juxta quod habetis, exhibete . . . ad ecclesiam quoque frequentius convenite, sanctorum patrocinia humiliter expetite . . . quod si observaveritis, securi in die judicii ante tribunal æterni judicis venientes dicetis: Da, Domine, quia dedimus." Maclaine, the English translator, then adds this farther note of his own: "We see here a large and ample description of the character of a *good Christian*, in which there is not the least mention of the *love of God*, *resignation to his will*, *obedience to his laws*, or of *justice*, *benevolence*, and *charity* towards men, and in which the whole of religion is made to consist in *coming often to the church*, *bringing offerings*

to his Charles V., borrowed the quotation, to prove, that at that period "men instead of aspiring to sanctity and virtue,

to the altar, lighting candles in consecrated places, and such like vain services."

I am glad to say that Schröckh, although he quotes the passage as showing now much stress was laid on gifts to the church, yet quotes it quite fairly, without garbling, and expressly says before he begins to quote it, "Man muss gestehen, dass darunter viel wahres und schriftmässiges vorkommt." Christl. Kirch. Geschichte. xix Theil. p. 438, ed. 1794. Leipzig. The whole passage is as follows :

"Qui verus Christianus vult esse, hæc ei necesse est præcepta custodire ; si enim non custodit, ipse se circumvenit. Ille itaque bonus Christianus est, qui nulla phylacteria vel adinventiones diaboli credit, sed omnem spem suam in solo Christo ponit : qui peregrinos tanquam ipsum Christum cum gaudio suscipit, quia ipse dicit, Hospes fui et suscepistis me ; Et, quando fecistis uni ex minimis meis mihi fecistis. Ille inquam bonus Christianus est qui hospitibus pedes lavat, et tanquam parentes carissimos diligit, qui juxta quod habet pauperibus eleemosynam tribuit, qui ad ecclesiam frequenter venit, et oblationem quæ in altari Deo offeratur exhibet, qui de fructibus suis non gustat, nisi prius Deo aliquid offerat : qui stateras dolosas et mensuras duplices non habet ; qui pecuniam suam non dedit ad usuram ; qui ipse caste vivit et filios vel vicinos docet, ut caste et cum timore Dei vivant : et quoties sanctæ solennitates adveniunt ante dies plures castitatem etiam cum propriâ uxore custodit, ut securâ conscientiâ Domini altare accedere possit : qui postremo symbolum vel orationem dominicam memoriter tenet, et filios ac familiam eandem docet. Qui talis est, sine dubio verus Christianus est, sed et Christus in ipso habitat, qui dixit, Ego et pater veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Similiter et per prophetam dixit, Ego inhabitabo in eis et inter illos ambulabo, et ero illorum Deus.

"Ecce audistis fratres quales sint Christiani boni, ideo quantum potestis cum Dei adjutorio laborate, ut nomen Christianum non sit falsum in vobis, sed ut veri Christiani esse possitis : semper præcepta Christi et cogitate in mente, et implete in operatione. Redimite animas vestras de pœnâ, dum habetis in potestate remedia : eleemosynam juxta vires facite, pacem et charitatem habete, discordes ad concordiam revocate, mendacium fugite, perjurium expavescite, falsum testimonium non dicite, furtum non facite : oblationes et decimas ecclesiis offerte, luminaria sanctis locis juxta quod habetis, exhibete, symbolum et orationem Dominicam memoriâ retinete et filiis vestris insinuate, filios etiam quos ex baptismo suscepistis docete et castigate ut semper cum timore Dei vivant : scitote vos fidejussores pro ipsis apud Deum esse. Ad ecclesiam quoque frequenter convenite, sanctorum patrocinia humiliter expetite ; diem Dominicum pro reverentiâ resurrectionis Christi absque ullo servili opere colite, sanctorum solennitates pio affectu celebrate, proximos vestros sicut vos ipsos diligite : quod vobis vultis ab aliis fieri hoc et vos aliis facite : quod vobis non vultis fieri nulli facite : charitatem ante omnia habete, quia charitas operit

imagined that they satisfied every obligation of duty by a scrupulous observance of external ceremonies." Mr. Hallam, in the first editions of his work on the Middle Ages, (in the later editions the error has been corrected,) transcribed it into his account of the state of society, to show that "priests made submission to the church not only the condition but the measure of all praise." Dr. Waddington, in the text of his *History of the Church*, had referred to the self-same passage, which he gave accordingly, still copied from Mosheim, in a note at the foot of his page. But being led to inquire a little more fully into the matter, he found the whole passage in D'Acheri's *Spicilegium Veterum Scriptorum*, (D'Acheri was one of the learned French Benedictines of the seventeenth century,) and there he discovered that the quotation in Mosheim, which Robertson, and Mr. Hallam, and himself had all copied from him in reliance on its fidelity, was utterly garbled, as you will see for yourselves when I read it to you at length. Here then is Eligius quoted by successive historians as proving what his real words do in fact effectually

multitudinem peccatorum: estote hospitales, humiles, omnem sollicitudinem vestram ponentes in Deum, quoniam ipsi cura est de vobis. Infirmos visitate, carceratos requirite, peregrinos suscipite, esurientes pascite, nudos vestite. Ariolos et magos spernite: sit vobis æqualitas in pondere et mensurâ: sit statera justa, justus modius, æquusque sextarius, nec plusquam dedistis repetatis, neque usuras pro fenerata pecuniâ a quoquam exigatis. Quod si observaveritis, securi in die judicii ante tribunal æterni judicis venientes dicetis, Da Domine, quia dedimus; miserere, quia misericordiam fecimus; nos implevimus quod jussisti, tu redde quod promisisti."

I am only concerned with this passage as an instance of great misrepresentation: there is enough really bad in Eligius's theology to make it unnecessary to make it worse; and after all, how far it is Eligius's doctrine or not is very questionable; for the author of his *Life* merely professes to give the substance of his general teaching, to which he devotes eleven folio pages of double columns. It does not appear that it is more than a vague traditional impression of what he used to say; and the *Life* in which it appears, though professing to be written by S. Ouen, has been greatly interpolated, according to Baluze, by a later hand. The above extract has been made from Baluze's edition of D'Achery, 3 vols. folio. Paris, 1723. Vol. ii. pp. 96, 97.

disprove Well might Niebuhr protest against the practice of making quotations at second hand, instead of going ourselves to the original source. To do this is indeed a sort of superficial reading which we cannot be too careful to avoid. (4)

You will therefore, I trust, acquit me of recommending any thing which really deserves the name of superficial reading; and yet I think that by following the method which I have suggested, we may arrive at a very just and full knowledge of the character of the literature of a period, and thereby of the period itself, without undergoing any extravagant burden of labor, or sacrificing an undue portion of time. And by such means, followed up still farther by those who have a taste for such studies, by inquiring into the state of art, whether in painting, sculpture, or architecture, or as exemplified in matters of common life, we may I think imbue ourselves effectually with the spirit of a period, no less than with the actual events which it witnessed; we may be able to image it to our minds in detail, and conceive of it as of an object with which we are really familiar.

But is our work now done? Is this full and distinct impression of the events, characters, institutions, manners, and ways of thinking of any period, that true historical knowledge which we require? The answer at once is "No." What we have attained to is no more than antiquarianism, an indispensable element in history, but not history itself. Antiquarianism is no teacher of wisdom; on the contrary, few things seem more to contract and enfeeble the mind, few things differ more widely from that comprehensive view which becomes the true historian. And this is a point so important that I must venture to dwell upon it a little more particularly.

What is it that the mere antiquarian wants, and which the mere scholar wants also; so that satire, sagacious enough in

detecting the weak points of every character, has often held them both up to ridicule? They have wanted what is the essential accompaniment to all our knowledge of the past, a lively and extensive knowledge of the present; they wanted the habit of continually viewing the two in combination with each other; they wanted that master power, which enables us to take a point from which to contemplate both at a distance, and so to judge of each and of both as if we belonged to neither. For it is from the views so obtained, from the conclusions so acquired, that the wisdom is formed which may really assist in shaping and preparing the course of the future.

Antiquarianism, then, is the knowledge of the past enjoyed by one who has no lively knowledge of the present. Thence it is, when concerned with great matters, a dull knowledge. It may be lively in little things, it may conceive vividly the shape and color of a dress, or the style of a building, because no man can be so ignorant as not to have a distinct notion of these in his own times; he must have a full conception of the coat he wears and the house he lives in. But the past is reflected to us by the present; so far as we see and understand the present, so far we can see and understand the past: so far but no farther. And this is the reason why scholars and antiquarians, nay, and men calling themselves historians also, have written so uninstructionally of the ancient world: they could do no otherwise, for they did not understand the world around them. How can he comprehend the parties of other days, who has no clear notion of those of his own? What sense can he have of the progress of the great contest of human affairs in its earlier stages, when it rages around him at this actual moment unnoticed, or felt to be no more than a mere indistinct hubbub of sounds and confusion of weapons?—what cause is at issue in the combat he knows not. Whereas on the other hand, he who feels his own times keenly, to whom they are a positive reality, with a good and evil dis-

tinctly perceived in them, such a man will write a lively and impressive account of past times, even though his knowledge be insufficient, and his prejudices strong. This I think is the merit of Mitford, and it is a great one. His very anti-jacobin partialities, much as they have interfered with the fairness of his history, have yet completely saved it from being dull. He took an interest in the parties of Greece because he was alive to the parties of his own time: he described the popular party in Athens just as he would have described the whigs of England; he was unjust to Demosthenes because he would have been unjust to Mr. Fox. His knowledge of the Greek language was limited, and so was his learning altogether; but because he was an English gentleman who felt and understood the state of things around him, and entered warmly into its parties, therefore he was able to write a history of Greece, which has the great charm of reality; and which, if I may judge by my own experience, is read at first with interest and retains its hold firmly on the memory. (5)

This is an example of what I mean; and it were easy to add others. Raleigh had perhaps less learning than Mitford; he had at no time of his life the leisure or the opportunity to collect a great store of antiquarian knowledge. But he had seen life in his own times extensively, and entered keenly into its various pursuits. Soldier, seaman, court favorite, I am afraid we must add, intriguer, war and policy were perfectly familiar to him. His accounts therefore of ancient affairs have also a peculiar charm; they too are a reality; he entered into the difficulties of ancient generals from remembering what he had himself experienced; he related their gallant actions with all his heart, recollecting what he had himself seen and done. (6) Now I am well aware that this lively notion of our own times is extraneous to any course of historical study, and depends on other causes than those

with which we are concerned now. And farther, even under favorable circumstances, it can scarcely be attained in perfection by a young man, whose experience of life and its business is necessarily scanty. But where it does not exist, it is of importance that we should be aware of the greatness of the defect, and to take care lest while it destroys the benefit of our historical studies, they in their turn should aggravate it, and thus each should go on with an effect reciprocally injurious. And we should try, if not by the most effectual means then by some of inferior virtue, to prevent our historical studies from becoming mere antiquarianism. Accordingly, after having made ourselves familiar with the spirit of any given period from a study of the different writers of the period itself, we should turn to a history of it written by a modern writer, and observe how its peculiarities accord with those of a different age, and what judgment is passed by posterity upon its favorite views and practices. It does not follow that this judgment is to be an infallible guide to ours, but it is useful to listen to it, for in some points it will certainly be true, and its very difference from the judgment of our earlier period, even where it runs into an opposite extreme, is of itself worth attending to. And thus by seeing what was underrated once receiving its due and perhaps more than its due honor at a subsequent period, and by observing that what is now unjustly slighted was in times past excessively overvalued, we shall escape that Quixotism of zeal, whether for or against any particular institution, which is apt to be the result of a limited knowledge ; as if what we now find over honored or too much despised, had never undergone the opposite fate ; as if it were for us now to redress for the first time the injustice of fortune, and to make up by the vehemence of our admiration for centuries of contempt, or by our scorn for centuries of blind veneration.

We may hope that such a comparison of the views of dif

ferent periods will save us from one of the besetting faults of minds raised a little above the mass, but not arrived at any high pitch of wisdom ; I mean the habit either of sneering at or extravagantly exalting the age in which we ourselves live. At the same time I am inclined to think that although both are faulty, yet the temptation is far greater to undervalue our own age than to overvalue it. I am not speaking, be it observed, of the mass of mere ordinary minds, but of those which possess some portion of intelligence and cultivation. Our personal superiority seems much more advanced by decrying our contemporaries than by decrying our fathers. The dead are not our real rivals, nor is pride very much gratified by asserting a superiority over those who cannot deny it. But if we run down the living, that is, those with whom our whole competition exists, what do we but exalt ourselves, as having at any rate that great mark of superior wisdom, that we discern deficiency where others find nothing but matter of admiration. It is far more tempting to personal vanity to think ourselves the only wise amongst a generation of fools, than to glory in belonging to a wise generation, where our personal wisdom, be it what it may, cannot at least have the distinction of singularity.

Thus far then we seem to have proceeded in our outline of the course of reading to be pursued by the historical student. It has combined at present two points, a full knowledge of the particular period which we choose to study, as derived from a general acquaintance with its contemporary literature, and then what I may call a knowledge of its bearings with respect to other and later periods, and not least with respect to our own times ; that is to say, how succeeding ages have judged of it, how far their sympathies have gone along with its own in admiring what it admired ; and as collected from this judgment, how far it coloured the times

which followed it ; in other words, what part it has played for good or for evil in the great drama of the world's history ; what of its influence has survived and what has perished. And he who has so studied and so understood one period, deserves the praise generally of understanding history. For to know all history actually is impossible ; our object should be to possess the power of knowing any portion of history which we wish to learn, at a less cost of labour and with far greater certainty of success than belong to other men. For by our careful study of some one period, we have learnt a method of proceeding with all ; so that if we open any history, its facts at once fall into their proper places, indicating their causes, implying their consequences ; we have gained also a measure of their value, teaching us what are productive, and what are barren, what will combine with other facts, and establish and illustrate a truth, and what in our present state of knowledge are isolated, of no worth in themselves, and leading to nothing. This will be still more apparent, when we come to examine more carefully our student's process in mastering the history of any one period ; for hitherto, you will observe, I have said nothing of the difficulties or questions which will occur to him in his reading ; I have only said generally what he should read.

I purpose then in the following lectures to notice some of the principal difficulties or questions which the historical student will encounter, whether the period which he has chosen belong to the times of imperfect or of advanced civilization : for the questions in each of these are not altogether the same. And I will begin with the difficulties presented by the history of a period of imperfect civilization.

NOTES

TO

LECTURE

NOTE 1.—Page 96.

Though Lord Clarendon has not preserved the dialect of James the First, the dramatic form of several passages in the first book of his History gives a very life-like notion of the King's familiar conversation—the coarse mind and manners distinctly reflected in the coarseness and voluble profanity of his speech.

NOTE 2.—Page 96.

“The fate of Joan in literature has been strange,—almost as strange as her fate in life. The ponderous cantos of Chapelain in her praise have long since perished—all but a few lines that live embalmed in the satires of Boileau. But besides Schiller's powerful drama, two considerable narrative poems yet survive with Joan of Arc for their subject: the epic of Southey, and the epic of Voltaire. The one, a young poet's earnest and touching tribute to heroic worth—the first flight of the muse that was ere long to soar over India and Spain; the other full of ribaldry and blasphemous jests, holding out the Maid of Orleans as a fitting mark for slander and derision. But from whom did these far different poems proceed? The shaft of ridicule came from a French—the token of respect from an English—hand!

*** “Who that has ever trodden the gorgeous galleries of Versailles, has not fondly lingered before that noble work of art—before that touching impersonation of the Christian heroine—the head meekly bended, and the hands devoutly clasping the sword in sign of the cross, but firm resolution imprinted on that close-pressed

mouth, and beaming from that lofty brow! Whose thoughts, as he paused to gaze and gaze again, might not sometimes wander from old times to the present, and turn to the sculptress—sprung from the same royal lineage which Joan had risen in arms to restore—so highly gifted in talent, in fortunes, in hopes of happiness, yet doomed to an end so grievous and untimely? Thus the statue has grown to be a monument, not only to the memory of the Maid, but to her own: thus future generations in France—all those at least who know how to prize either genius or goodness in woman—will love to blend together the two names, the female artist and the female warrior—MARY OF WURTEMBERG and JOAN OF ARC.”

Quar. Review, vol. lxix., p. 328, March, 1842.

NOTE 3.—Page 104.

“Keep your view of men and things extensive, and depend upon it that a mixed knowledge is not a superficial one;—as far as it goes, the views that it gives are true,—but he who reads deeply in one class of writers only, gets views which are almost sure to be perverted, and which are not only narrow but false. Adjust your proposed amount of reading to your time and inclination—this is perfectly free to every man, but whether that amount be large or small, let it be varied in its kind, and widely varied. If I have a confident opinion on any one point connected with the improvement of the human mind, it is on this.”

Life and Correspondence, Letter ccv., Am. edition, 357.

“It is a very hard thing to read at once passionately and critically, by no means to be cold, captious, sneering, or scoffing; to admire greatness and goodness with an intense love and veneration, yet to judge all things; to be the slave neither of names nor of parties, and to sacrifice even the most beautiful associations for the sake of truth. I would say, as a good general rule, never read the works of any ordinary man, except on scientific matters, or when they contain simple matters of fact. Even on matters of fact, silly and ignorant men, however honest and industrious in their particular subject, require to be read with constant watchfulness and suspicion; whereas great men are always instructive, even amidst much of error on particular points. In general, however, I hold it

to be certain, that the truth is to be found in the great men, and the error in the little ones."

Life and Correspondence, Letter xcvi., Am. edit. p. 245.

NOTE 4.—Page 108.

This case of the traditional misrepresentation of St. Eligius and of the times he lived in has been even more completely and conclusively treated by Mr. Maitland, in one of the numbers (vii.) of his work entitled "*The Dark Ages*,"—a volume in which the genuine learning and the dauntless love of truth, that were needed to expose old habitual falsehood, are happily united with much appropriate pleasantness of thought and with true and well-directed satire. He remarks that the sermon which was mutilated seems almost as if it had been written in anticipation of all and each of Mosheim's and Maclaine's charges, and he quotes the observations of the late Hugh James Rose, by whom it was well said :

"Here we find not only an individual *traduced*, but, through him, the religious character of a whole age *misrepresented*, and this misrepresentation now *generally believed*. We find men leaving out what a writer says, and then reproaching him and his age for *not saying it*. We find Mosheim, Maclaine, Robertson, Jortin, White, *mangling*, misusing, and (some of them) traducing a writer whose works not one of them, except Mosheim, (if even he,) *had ever seen*. These things are very serious. We may just as well, or better, not read at all, if we read only second-hand writers, or do not take care that those whom we do trust read for themselves, and report honestly. We, in short, trust a painter who paints that *black* which is *white*, and then think we have a clear idea of the object."

This is a case that cannot be too strongly condemned, for it is but one of many examples that might, with little pains, be collected, of the vicious habit of unacknowledged quotation at second hand, or at some even more remote degree from the original—a vicious habit, for at least two reasons: that it is a frequent cause of historical error, gaining authority by the activity of falsehood; and that it is the ready device by which the superficial and the uncandid can make a false display.

NOTE 5.—Page 110.

It is to Mitford and his history that Bishop Thirlwall alludes when, in a note in his History of Greece, he speaks of “a writer who considers it as the great business of history to place royalty in the most favourable light;” and in another note, he speaks of “a work which, though cast in an historical form, is intended not to give historical information, but to state opinions, and then to give such facts as square with them.”

NOTE 6.—Page 110.

In Raleigh's History of the World, says Mr. Hallam, “the Greek and Roman story is told more fully and exactly than by any earlier English author, and with a plain eloquence, which has given this book a classical reputation in our language, though from its length, and the want of that critical sifting of facts which we now justly demand, it is not greatly read. Raleigh has intermingled political reflections, and illustrated his history by episodes from modern times, which perhaps are now the most interesting passages.”

Introduction to Literature of Europe, vol. iii p. 657

LECTURE II.

THE first step which I ventured to recommend in the study of the history of any period, was, that we should take some one contemporary historian, and if we were studying the history of any one country in particular, then it should be also an historian of that country, and that we should so gain our first introduction both to the events and to the general character of the times. I am now to consider what difficulties and what questions will be likely to present themselves in reading such an historian, interfering, if not answered, with our deriving from him all the instruction which he is capable of rendering. Now you will observe that I am purposely looking out for the difficulties in history, but I am very far from professing to be able to solve them. Still I think that what I am doing may be very useful: because to direct attention to what is to be done is the best means of procuring that it shall be done. And farther, an enterprising student will be rather encouraged by hearing that the work is not all done to his hands; he will be glad to find that the motto upon history, in spite of all that has been lately accomplished, is still "Plus ultra:" the actual boundary reached is not the final one; every bold and able adventurer in this wide ocean may hope to obtain the honours of a discoverer of countries hitherto unknown.

In the first place I said that the difficulties and questions which occurred in reading an historian of a period of imperfect civilization, were not in all respects the same which we

should meet with in an historian of a more advanced age. This leads me naturally to consider what constitutes the difference between these two classes of historians, before I proceed to the proper subject of this lecture, the questions namely suggested by the former class, or those of a period imperfectly civilized.

There are some persons whose prejudices are so violent against their own age, and that immediately preceding it, that they take offence at their claim to a higher civilization, and will by no means allow the earlier centuries of modern history to have been their inferiors in this respect. For my own part, I should find it very difficult, even if I thought it desirable, to relinquish the habitual language of our age; which calls itself civilized, and the middle ages as in comparison half civilized, not in the spirit of controversy or of boasting, but as a simple matter of fact. However, I do not wish to assume any conclusion at the outset which may be supposed to be disputable; and therefore, I will not if I can help it use the terms more or less civilized as applied to the earlier or later periods of modern history, but will state the difference between them in more neutral language. For that there is a difference will scarcely I think be disputed: or that this difference coincides chronologically, or nearly so, with the sixteenth century; so that the historians prior to this period up to the very beginning of modern history, have, speaking generally, one character; and those who flourished subsequently to it have another. And farther, I cannot think it disputable, that the great historians of Greece and Rome resemble for the most part the historians of the last two or three centuries, and differ from those of the early or middle ages.

Now without using the invidious words, "civilized" or "half civilized," the difference may be stated thus; that the writers of the early and middle ages belonged to a period in

which the active elements were fewer, and the views generally prevalent were therefore fewer also. Fewer in two ways, first inasmuch as the classes or orders of society which expressed themselves actively in word or deed were fewer; and then, as there were very much fewer individual varieties amongst members of the same class. Hence therefore the history of the early ages is simple; that of later times is complicated. In the former the active elements were kings, popes, bishops, lords, and knights, with exceptions here and there of remarkable individuals; but generally speaking the other elements of society were passive. In later times, on the other hand, other orders of men have been taking their part actively; and the number of these appears to be continually increasing. So that the number of views of human life, and the number of agencies at work upon it, are multiplied; the difficulty of judging between them all theoretically is very great: that of adjusting their respective claims practically is almost insuperable. Again, in later times, the individual differences between members of the same class or order have been far greater; for while the common class or professional influence has still been powerful, yet the restraint from without having been removed, which forced the individual to abstain from disputing that influence, the tendencies of men's individual minds have worked freely, and where these were strong, they have modified the class or professional influence variously, and have thus produced a great variety of theories on the same subject. The introduction of new classes or bodies of men into the active elements of society may be exemplified by the increased importance in later times of the science of political economy, while the individual variety amongst those of the same order is shown by the various theories which have been advanced at different times by different economical writers. This will explain what I mean, when I divide the historians

of modern history into two classes, and when I call the one class, that belonging to a simpler state of things; and the other that belonging to a state more complicated.

We are now, you will remember, concerned with the writers of the first class; and as a specimen of these in their simplest form, we will take the Church History of the Venerable Bede. This work has been lately published, 1838, in a convenient form, 1 vol. 8vo, by the English Historical Society; and it is their edition to which my references have been made. I need scarcely remind you of the date and circumstances of Bede's life. Born in 674, only fifty years after the flight of Mahomet from Mecca, he died at the age of sixty-one, in 735, two or three years after that great victory of Charles Martel over the Saracens, which delivered France and Europe from Mahometan conquest. At seven years old he was placed under the care of the abbot of Wearmouth, and from that monastery he removed to the neighbouring one of Jarrow, and there passed the remainder of his life. He was ordained deacon in his nineteenth year, and priest in his thirtieth, and beyond these two events we know nothing of his external life except his writings. These are various, and he himself, at the conclusion of his Ecclesiastical History, has left us a list of them:—they consist of commentaries on almost all the books of Scripture, of treatises on some scriptural subjects, of religious biographies, of a book of hymns; and of some of a different character, on general history and chronology, a book *de orthographiâ*, and another *de metricâ arte*. His Ecclesiastical History, in five books, embraces the period from Augustine's arrival in 597, down to the year 731, only four years before his own death; so that for a considerable portion of the time to which it relates his work is a contemporary history.

In Bede we shall find no political questions of any kind to create any difficulty, nor are there those varied details of

war and peace which, before they can be vividly comprehended, require a certain degree of miscellaneous knowledge. I may notice then in him one or two things which belong more or less to all history. First, his language. We derive, or ought to derive from our philological studies, a great advantage in this respect; we ought to have acquired in some degree the habit of regarding language critically, and of interpreting it correctly. This is not a trifling matter; for as an immense majority of histories must be written in a foreign language, it is very possible for a careless reader, who has never been trained as we have been from our earliest years in grammatical analysis, to make important mistakes as to the meaning of his author; for translation, to be thoroughly good, must be a matter of habit, and must be grounded on such a minutely accurate process as we are early trained to in our study of Greek and Latin writers. It must be grounded on such a process, the great value of which is, that it hinders us from neglecting little words, conjunctions especially, on which so large a portion of the meaning of continuous writing depends, and which a careless reader not so trained is apt to pass over. But there is a higher step in translation which is by no means a mere matter of ornament, and which I believe is not always attended to as it deserves even amongst ourselves. I mean translation as distinguished from construing; a process which retains all the accuracy of the earlier habit; its searching view into every corner, so to speak, of the passage to be translated; its appreciation of every little word, of every shade of distinction in mood or tense; but from this accuracy makes its way to another still more perfect—the exact expression of the mind of the original, so that the feelings excited by the translation, the images conveyed by the words, the force of their arrangement, their tone, whether serious or half playful, should be the exact representation of the original. And in this greater accuracy

construing must always be deficient, because the grammatical order of one language is not the same as that of another, and to keep the real order, which is of great importance to the fidelity of the translation, the grammatical order must often be sacrificed. I have ventured to say thus much, because I have continually had occasion to feel the difficulty of good translation, and because in this respect our admirable classical system is apt, I think, to forego one of its great advantages, that in the habit of *vivâ voce* translation, as opposed to construing, we have an exercise at once in the two great subjects of grammar and rhetoric—an exercise in extemporaneous composition in our own language to which none other is comparable, no less than an exercise in the language from which we are translating. (1)

To return, however, to the language of Bede. We in one way may have a source of error peculiarly our own; that is, our almost exclusive familiarity with classical Latin is sometimes apt to mislead us, when we transfer its rules, and its senses of words, without hesitation, to the Latin of what are called the low or middle ages. As a single and very familiar instance of the difference between classical Latin and low Latin, I may notice the perpetual usage of the conjunction "*quia*" in the latter in the sense of the Greek $\epsilon\tau\iota$. "*Nosti quia* ad tui oris imperium semper vivere studui," "Thou knowest that I have ever been careful to live in obedience to thy words;" iv. 29. This occurs in the Latin of unclassical writers continually. I do not know what is the earliest instance of it, but it is frequent in the Latin version of the Scriptures which was used by the western churches before Jerome's time, and in the old Latin translation of Irenæus. Facciolati gives no instance of it in any classical writer, except we choose to bestow that title on Palladius, one of the agricultural writers, whose date is not known, but who certainly did not flourish earlier than the third century, or the very end of the second, inasmuch as he quotes Apuleius, who

lived under M. Aurelius Antoninus. Besides this, it is always worth while in reading the Latin of the lower ages, to observe the gradual introduction of words of Barbarian origin, such as *scabini*, *scaccarium*, *marchio*, *batallum*, and innumerable others of which the pages of Ducange are full. But of these, very few, perhaps no certain instance, is to be found in Bede.

Another question comes before us in the history of Bede, which also is common to all history, although in him and in the other writers of the middle ages it often takes a peculiar form. I mean the great question of the trustworthiness of historians; on what grounds and to what degree we may venture to yield our belief to what we read in them. In Bede and in many others the question takes this form, What credit is to be attached to the frequent stories of miracles or of wonders which occur in their narratives? And it is this peculiar form of it which I would wish to notice now. The question is not an easy one, and I must here remind you of what I said at the beginning of this lecture, that while pointing out the difficulties of history, I was very far from professing to be able always to solve them.

You will, I think, allow that the difficulty here relates much more to miracles than to mere wonders. By the term miracle we imply I think two things which do not exist in mere wonders; two things, or perhaps more properly one, that God is not only the author of the wonderful work, but that it is wrought for us to observe and be influenced by it: whereas a wonder is no doubt God's work also, but it is not wrought so far as we can discern for our sakes; so far as we are concerned it is a work without an object. Being therefore wholly ignorant of the nature and object of wonders, and being ignorant of a great many natural laws, by which they may be produced, the question of their credibility resolves itself into little more than a mere question as to the credibility of the witnesses; there is little room for considerations of

internal evidence as to the time and circumstances when the wonder is said to have happened. The internal evidence only comes in with respect to our knowledge of the law, which the wonder is supposed to violate : in proportion to our observations of its comprehensiveness and its unbroken observance, would be our unwillingness to believe that it had been ever departed from. And thus I suppose that any deviation from the observed laws with respect to the heavenly bodies, as, for instance, to the time of the sun's rising or setting, if we looked upon it as a mere wonder and not as a miracle, we should scarcely be persuaded by any weight of evidence to believe : or to speak more correctly, if the weight of evidence were overwhelmingly great, we should be obliged to regard the phenomenon as a miracle, and not as a wonder ; as a sign given by God for our instruction. But in a great number of cases, we may admit the existence of a wonder without seeing any reason to conclude that it is a miracle. A man may appear ridiculous if he expresses his belief in any particular story of this sort to those who know nothing of it but its strangeness. And there is no doubt that human folly and human fraud are mixed up largely with most accounts of wonders, and render it our duty to receive them not with caution merely, but with unwillingness and suspicion. Yet to say that all recorded wonders are false, from those recorded by Herodotus down to the latest reports of animal magnetism, would be a boldness of assertion wholly unjustifiable and extravagant. The accounts of wonders then, from Livy's prodigies downwards, I should receive according to Herodotus's expression when speaking of one of them, οὔτε ἀπιστέων, οὔτε πιστεύων τι λίην : sometimes considering of what fact they were an exaggerated or corrupted representation, at other times trying to remember whether any and how many other notices occur of the same thing, and whether they are of force enough to lead us to search for some law

hitherto undiscovered, to which they may all be referred, and become hereafter the foundation of a new science. (2)

But when a wonderful thing is represented as a miracle, the question becomes far graver and far more complicated. Moral and religious considerations then come in unavoidably, and involve some of the deepest questions of theology. What is reported as a miracle may be either the answer to the believing prayer of a Christian, or it may be the working of one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, or it may be a special sign sent from God for a special mercy or judgment in the particular case, and for the instruction and warning of others. And whichever of these kinds it may be, the question follows, why then are miracles not performed in every age and in every Christian country? And if they are not, are the ages and countries thus excepted, to be considered as having fallen away from the faith, and to have forfeited what is properly a perpetual privilege of Christianity, to have God visibly and sensibly near to us? Say that we acquiesce in this conclusion, yet proceeding to regard the question in this point of view, is it embarrassed with no difficulties? Is it possible to deny that the individuals, the churches, and the times, which appear to have been left without miracles, have displayed other and even more unquestionable signs of God's presence amongst them; signs which have not always existed with peculiar brightness where miracles are alleged to have most abounded? Or again, Can it be denied that the times and the writers where these miraculous accounts are to be found, were generally, as compared with those where they are wanting, apt to take little pains in their examination of truth, of such truth, I mean, as their previous state of mind did not dispose them to question? We see this from their accounts of points of natural history; how few of these can be depended upon, and what extravagant and palpable fables were transmitted from generation to generation! It is enough

to notice the famous story of the barnacle-tree, which dropped its fruit into the water, and the fruit cracked, and out swam a gosling. Bede's accounts of natural objects are few, but it so happens that one of these relates to a place with which I have been acquainted all my life, and its incorrectness is remarkable. He says that in the Solent sea, which separates the Isle of Wight from Hampshire, "two tides of the ocean, breaking forth round Britain from the boundless Northern ocean, meet every day in mutual conflict with each other beyond the mouth of the river of Homelea, (Hamble,) and after their conflict is over they sweep back to the ocean, and return to the place from whence they came."* Who could recognise in this description the sort of race which runs at certain times of the tide, and in rough weather, over the shoal called the Brambles, or the slight agitation sometimes produced, not by the conflicting tides of the Solent sea itself, but by the ebb of the Southampton or Hamble river meeting at an angle with the tide of the Solent? We have to weigh then this fact in the character of Bede and other such historians, and this, added to the religious difficulty noticed above, may incline us rather to take the opposite conclusion, and limiting miracles to the earliest times of Christianity, refuse our belief to all those which are reported by the historians of subsequent centuries.

Yet, again, this conclusion has its difficulties. We may not like to refuse assent to so many statements of so many writers, of men, so far as we know, who believe that they were speaking the truth. And we may be taxed with inconsistency in stopping our scepticism arbitrarily as it may seem when we arrive at the first century, and according to the miracles of the Gospels that belief which we refuse to those of ecclesiastical history. This last charge, however, we may

* *Histor. Ecclesiast.* iv. 16.

satisfactorily repel. The miracles of the Gospel and those of later history do not stand on the same ground. I do not think that they stand on the same ground of external evidence; I cannot think that the unbelieving spirit of the Roman world in the first century was equally favorable to the origination and admission of stories of miracles, with the credulous tendencies of the middle ages. But the difference goes far deeper than this to all those who can appreciate the other evidences of Christianity, and who therefore feel that in the one case what we call miracles were but the natural accompaniments, if I may so speak, of the Christian revelation; accompaniments, the absence of which would have been far more wonderful than their presence. This, as I may almost call it, this *a priori* probability in favour of the miracles of the Gospel cannot be said to exist in favour of those of later history.

Disembarrassed then of this painful parallel, and able to judge freely of the miraculous stories of Bede and other historians, without feeling our whole Christian faith to rest on the decision, it will not however follow, as some appear to think, that we shall riot as it were in a full license of unbelief, or that a reasonable mind will exercise no belief in religious matters except such as it dares not withhold. Some appear to be unable to conceive of belief or unbelief except as having some ulterior object; "we believe this, because we love it; we disbelieve it, because we wish it to be disproved." There is, however, in minds more healthfully constituted, a belief and a disbelief grounded solely upon the evidence of the case, arising neither out of partiality nor out of prejudice against the supposed conclusions which may result from its truth or falsehood. And in such a spirit the historical student will consider the cases of Bede's and other historians' miracles. He will, I think, as a general rule disbelieve them; for the immense multitude which he finds re-

corded, and which I suppose no credulity could believe in, shows sufficiently that on this point there was a total want of judgment and a blindness of belief generally existing which makes the testimony wholly insufficient; and while the external evidence in favour of these alleged miracles is so unsatisfactory, there are, for the most part, strong internal improbabilities against them. But with regard to some miracles, he will see that there is no strong *a priori* improbability in their occurrence, but rather the contrary; as, for instance, where the first missionaries of the Gospel in a barbarous country are said to have been assisted by a manifestation of the spirit of power, and if the evidence appears to warrant his belief, he will readily and gladly yield it. And in doing so he will have the countenance of a great man,* who in his fragment of English history has not hesitated to express the same sentiments. (3) Nor will he be unwilling, but most thankful, to find sufficient grounds for believing, that not only at the beginning of the Gospel, but in ages long afterwards, believing prayer has received extraordinary answers, that it has been heard even in more than it might have dared to ask for. Yet again, if the gift of faith—the gift as distinguished from the grace—of the faith which removes mountains, has been given to any in later times in remarkable measure, the mighty works which such faith may have wrought cannot be incredible in themselves to those who remember our Lord's promise; and if it appears from satisfactory evidence that they were wrought actually, we shall believe them, and believe with joy. Only as it is in most cases impossible to admit the trustworthiness of the evidence, our minds must remain at the most in a state of suspense, and I do not know why it is necessary to come to any positive decision. For if we think that supposing the miracle to be

* Burke.

true, it gives the seal of God's approbation to all the belief of him who performed it, this is manifestly a most hasty and untenable inference. The gift of faith does not imply the gift of wisdom, nor is every believing Christian, whose prayer God may hear in an extraordinary manner, endued also with an exemption from error. Men's gifts are infinitely different, distinct from each other, as from God's gifts of inward grace; unequal in value outwardly, the highest, it may be, of less value spiritually to its possessor than the humblest grace of him who has no remarkable gift at all. Yet the grace cannot do the work of the gift, nor the higher gift the work of the meaner; nor may he who can work miracles claim therefore the gift of understanding the Scripture, and interpreting it with infallible truth. Cyprian said of the martyrs, when he thought that they were impairing the discipline of the church by granting tickets of communion over hastily to the Lapsi, or those who had fallen away in the persecutions, "The martyrs do not make the Gospel, for it is through the Gospel that they acquire the glory of martyrdom."* And so we might say of certain miracles, if there were any such, wrought by persons who had in many points grievously corrupted the Christian faith, "Miracles must not be allowed to overrule the Gospel; for it is only through our belief in the Gospel that we accord our belief to them." (4)

I do not make any apology for the length of this discussion, because the subject was one which lay directly in our way, and could not be passed over hastily; and I am never averse to showing how closely connected are those studies which we will attempt to divide by the names religious and secular, injuring both by trying to separate them. Let us now proceed with our review of the difficulties of history, and still confining ourselves to what I have called the simpler period,

* Cyprian Epist. xxvii. "Minime consideravit quod non martyres Evangelium faciant, sed per Evangelium martyres fiant."

we will pass on however from the eighth to the thirteenth century, and briefly notice some of the questions which suggest themselves when we read Matthew Paris, or, still more, any of the French, German, or Italian historians of the same period.

The thirteenth century contains in it at its beginning the most splendid period of the papacy, the time of Innocent the Third ; its end coincides with that great struggle between Boniface the Eighth and Philip the Fair, which marks the first stage of its decline. It contains the reign of Frederick the Second, and his long contests with the popes in Italy ; the foundation of the orders of friars, Dominican and Franciscan ; the last period of the crusades, and the age of the greatest glory of the schoolmen. Thus full of matters of interest as it is, it will yet be found that all its interest is more or less connected with two great questions concerning the church ; namely, the power of the priesthood in matters of government and in matters of faith ; the merits of the contest between the papacy and the kings of Europe ; the nature and character of that influence over men's minds which affected the whole philosophy of the period, the whole intellectual condition of the Christian world.

It would be out of place here altogether to enter at large into either of these questions. But it is closely connected with my subject, to notice one or two points as to the method of studying them. I observed in my first lecture, that after studying the history of any period in its own contemporary writers, it was desirable also to study the view of it entertained by a later period, as whether more or less true, it was sure to be different, and would probably afford some truth in which the contemporary view was deficient. This holds good with the thirteenth century as with other periods ; it is quite important that we should see it as it appears in the eyes of later times, no less than as it appears in its own. But the

questions of the thirteenth century, if I am right in saying that they are connected with the church, require especially that our view should be cast backwards as well as forwards; we should regard them not only as they appear to later times, but to a time far earlier; the merits or demerits of the papacy must be tried with reference to the original system of Christianity, not as exhibited only in what is called the early church, but much more as exhibited in Scripture. Is the church system of Innocent the Third, either in faith or in government, the system of the New Testament? That the two differ widely is certain; but is one the developement of the other? Is the spirit of both the same, with no other alteration than one merely external, such as must be found in passing from the infancy of the church to its maturity? Or is the spirit altogether different, so that the later system is not the developement of the earlier, but its perversion? And then follows the inquiry, intensely interesting to those who are able to pursue it, what is the history of this perversion, and how far is it unlike merely, without being corrupted from, the Gospel; for the perversion may not extend through every part of it; there may be in it differences from the original system which are merely external; there may be in it, even where superficially considered it is at variance with the scriptural system, there may be in it developement merely in some instances while there is perversion in others. Only it is essential that we do not look at the first century through the medium of the thirteenth, nor through the medium of any earlier century: the judge's words must not be taken according to the advocate's sense of them: the first century is to determine our judgment of the second, and of all subsequent centuries; it will not do to assume that the judgment must be interpreted by the very practices and opinions the merits of which it has to try.

We may, however, choose rather to look at the outside of

the middle ages than penetrate to the deeper principles which are involved in their contests and their condition. We may study the chroniclers rather, who paint the visible face of things with exceeding liveliness, however little they may be able or may choose to descend to what lies within. And as a specimen of these we may take one of the latest of their number, the celebrated Philip de Comines.

Philip de Comines came from the small town of that name near Lisle in Flanders, and was thus born a subject of the dukes of Burgundy, in the reign of Duke Philip the Good, in the year 1445. He served Duke Philip, and his son Duke Charles the Bold, but left the latter and went over to the service of Louis the Eleventh in 1472, by whom he was employed in his most important and confidential affairs. He was present with Louis during the last scenes of his life at Plessis les Tours; he lived through the reign of Charles the Eighth with great varieties of fortune, being at one time shut up in prison, and at another employed in honourable and important duties, and he died in the reign of Louis the Twelfth. His Memoirs embrace a period of thirty-four years, from 1464, when he first entered into the service of Duke Charles of Burgundy, then Count of Charolois, to the death of King Charles the Eighth in 1498. Thus they are not only a contemporary history, but relate mostly to transactions which the writer actually witnessed, or in which he was more or less concerned.

Philip de Comines has been called the father of modern history, a title which would class him with the writers of the second, or what I have called the more complicated period. But it seems to me that he belongs entirely to the simpler period; and this is most apparent when we compare him with Machiavelli, who, although almost his contemporary, yet does in his whole style, and in the tone of his mind, really belong to the later period. Thus in Philip de Comines

we meet with scarcely any thing of the great political questions which arose in the next century; his *Memoirs* paint the wars and intrigues carried on by one prince against another for the mere purpose of enlarging his dominions; and, except in the revolts of Liege against the Duke of Burgundy, we see no symptoms of any thing like a war of opinion. We get then only a view of the external appearance of things; and meet with no other difficulties than such as arise from a want of sufficient circumstantial knowledge to enable us to realize his pictures fully.

And here I cannot but congratulate ourselves in this place on those habits of careful sifting and analysis which we either have, or ought to have gained, from our classical studies. Take any large work of a classical historian, and with what niceness of attention have we been accustomed to read it. How many books have we consulted in illustration of its grammatical difficulties, how have we studied our maps to become familiar with its geography; what various aids have we employed to throw light on its historical allusions, on every office or institution casually named; on all points of military detail, the divisions of the army, the form of the camp, the nature of the weapons and engines used in battles or in sieges; or on all matters of private life, points of law, of domestic economy, of general usages and manners. In this way we penetrate an ancient history by a thousand passages, we explore every thing contained in it; if some points remain obscure, they stand apart from the rest for that very reason distinctly remembered, the very page in which they occur is familiar to us. We are already trained, therefore, in the process of studying history thoroughly; and we have only to repeat for Philip de Comines, or any other writer on whom we may have fixed our choice, the very same method which we have been accustomed to employ with Herodotus and Thucydides.

At the same time it is fair to add, that this process with a modern historian is accidentally much more difficult. For the ancient writers we have our helps ready at hand, well-known, cheap, and accessible. The school-boy has his Ainsworth or his Donnegan; he has his small atlas of ancient maps, his compendium of Greek or Roman antiquities, his abridgments of Greek and Roman history. The more advanced student has his Facciolati, his Schneider, or his Passow; his more elaborate atlas, his fuller histories, his vast collections of Greek and Roman antiquities, to which all the learning of Europe has contributed its aid. How different is the case with the history of the middle ages! If there are any cheap or compendious helps for the study of them, I must profess my ignorance of them. There may be many, known on the Continent if not in England, but I am unable to mention them. For the Latin of the middle ages, I know of nothing in a smaller form than Adelung's abridged edition of Ducange; yet this abridgment consists of six thick octavos. (5) Maps accommodated to the geography of the middle ages, and generally accessible, there are I think, at least in England, none.* We have nothing, I think, for the history of the middle ages answering in fulness and convenience to that book so well known to us all, Lemprière's Classical Dictionary. For antiquities, laws, manners, customs, &c., many large and valuable works might be named,—many sources of information scattered about in different places; let me name several excellent papers by Lancelot, St. Palaye, and others, occurring in the volumes of the Memoirs of the French Academy,—but a cheap popular compendium like our old acquaintances Adam and Potter, or the more improved works which are now superseding them, does not, I believe, exist. My object in stating this is

* An atlas of this kind, however, exhibiting the several countries of Europe at successive periods, is now in the course of publication in Germany.

twofold ; first, because to state publicly the want is likely perhaps to excite some one or other to make it good ; and secondly, to point out again to you how invaluable is the time which you are passing in this place, inasmuch as the libraries here furnish you with that information in abundance which to any one settled in the country is in ordinary cases inaccessible.

But to return to Philip de Comines. We find well exemplified in him one of the peculiarities of modern history, as distinguished from that of Greece and Rome, the importance namely of attending to genealogies. Many of the wars of modern Europe have been succession wars ; questions of disputed inheritance, where either competitor claimed to be the legal heir of the last undoubted possessor of the crown. Of such a nature were the great French wars in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of which Comines witnessed and has recorded the beginning. And this same thing shows us also how impossible it is to study any age by itself, how necessarily our inquiries run back into previous centuries, how instinctively we look forward to the results in a succeeding period of what we are now studying in its origin. For instance, Comines records the marriage of Mary duchess of Burgundy, daughter and sole heiress of Charles the Bold, with Maximilian archduke of Austria. This marriage, conveying all the dominions of Burgundy to Maximilian and his heirs, established a great independent sovereign on the frontiers of France, giving to him on the north, not only the present kingdoms of Holland and Belgium, but large portions of what is now French territory, the old provinces of Artois and French Flanders, French Hainault and French Luxembourg : while on the east it gave him Franche Comté, thus yielding him a footing within the Jura, on the very banks of the Saône. Thence ensued, in after ages, when the Spanish branch of the house of Austria had inherited this part of

its dominions, the long contests which deluged the Netherlands with blood, the campaigns of King William and Luxembourg, the nine years of efforts no less skilful than valiant, in which Marlborough broke his way through the fortresses of the iron frontier. Again, when Spain became in a manner French by the accession of the house of Bourbon, the Netherlands reverted once more to Austria itself; and from thence the powers of Europe advanced almost in our own days to assail France as a republic; and on this ground, on the plains of Fleurus, was won the first of those great victories which for nearly twenty years carried the French standards triumphantly over Europe. Thus the marriage recorded by Comines has been working busily down to our very own times: it is only since the settlement of 1814, and that more recent one of 1830, that the Netherlands have ceased to be affected by the union of Charles the Bold's daughter with Maximilian of Austria.

Again, Comines records the expedition of Charles the Eighth of France into Italy to claim the crown of Naples. He found the throne filled by a prince of the house of Aragon. A Frenchman and a Spaniard contend for the inheritance of the most southern kingdom of Italy. We are obliged to unroll somewhat more of the scroll of time than the part which was at first lying open before us, in order to make this part intelligible. The French king represented the house of Anjou, the elder branch of which, more than two centuries earlier, had been invited by the pope into Italy to uphold the Guelf or papal cause against the Ghibelines or party of the emperors; headed as it was by Manfred king of Naples, son of the Swabian emperor of the house of Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second. And thus we open upon the rich story of the contests in Italy in the thirteenth century, the conquering march of Charles of Anjou, the unworthy brother of the noblest and holiest of monarchs Louis the Ninth; (6) the

battle of Benevento; the sad history of the young Conradin, Manfred's nephew—his defeat at Scurgola under the old walls of the Marsian and Pelasgian Alba, his cruel execution, the transferring of his claims to Peter of Aragon, who had married his cousin Constance, Manfred's daughter, the tragedy of the Sicilian vespers, and the enthroning of the Aragoneze monarch in Sicily. All these earlier events, and the extinction subsequently of the elder branch of the house of Anjou; the crimes and misfortunes of queen Joanna, her adoption of the younger branch of the house of Anjou, and the counter adoption of a prince of the house of Aragon by queen Joanna the Second, the new contest between the French and Spanish princes, and the triumph of the latter in 1442, fall naturally under our view, in order to explain the expedition of Charles the Eighth. I say nothing of inquiries less closely connected with our main subject, inquiries suggested by the events of the Italian expedition; the state of Florence after the unsubstantial lustre of Lorenzo di Medici's government had passed away; the state of the papacy when Alexander the Sixth could be elected to fill the papal chair. But in the more direct inquiries needed to illustrate the contest in Naples itself, we see how wide a field must be explored of earlier times, in order to understand the passing events of modern history.

The Memoirs of Philip de Comines terminate about twenty years before the reformation, six years after the first voyage of Columbus. They relate then to a tranquil period immediately preceding a period of extraordinary movement; to the last stage of an old state of things, now on the point of passing away. Such periods, the lull before the burst of the hurricane, the almost oppressive stillness which announces the eruption, or, to use Campbell's beautiful image—

“The torrent's smoothness ere it dash below,”

are always, I think, full of a very deep interest. But it is not from the mere force of contrast with the times that follow, nor yet from the solemnity which all things wear when their dissolution is fast approaching—the interest has yet another source ; our knowledge namely, that in that tranquil period lay the germs of the great changes following, taking their shape for good or for evil, and sometimes irreversibly, while all wore an outside of unconsciousness. We, enlightened by experience, are impatient of this deadly slumber, we wish in vain that the age could have been awakened to a sense of its condition, and taught the infinite preciousness of the passing hour. And as when a man has been cut off by sudden death, we are curious to know whether his previous words or behaviour indicated any sense of his coming fate, so we examine the records of a state of things just expiring, anxious to observe whether in any point there may be discerned an anticipation of the great future, or whether all was blindness and insensibility. In this respect Comines' *Memoirs* are striking from their perfect unconsciousness : the knell of the middle ages had been already sounded, yet Comines has no other notions than such as they had tended to foster ; he describes their events, their characters, their relations, as if they were to continue for centuries. His remarks are such as the simplest form of human affairs gives birth to ; he laments the instability of earthly fortune, as Homer notes our common mortality, or in the tone of that beautiful dialogue between Solon and Cræsus, when the philosopher assured the king that to be rich was not necessarily to be happy. But resembling Herodotus in his simple morality, (7) he is utterly unlike him in another point ; for whilst Herodotus speaks freely and honestly of all men without respect of persons, Philip de Comines praises his master Louis the Eleventh as one of the best of princes, although he witnessed not only the crimes of his life, but the miserable fears and suspicions of his latter

end, and has even faithfully recorded them. In this respect Philip de Comines is in no respect superior to Froissart, with whom the crimes committed by his knights and great lords never interfere with his general eulogies of them: the habit of deference and respect was too strong to be broken, and the facts which he himself relates to their discredit, appear to have produced on his mind no impression.

It is not then in Philip de Comines, nor in the other historians of the earlier period of modern history, that we find the greatest historical questions presenting themselves. If we attempt to ascend to these, we must seek them by ourselves; the historians themselves do not naturally lead us to them. But we must now proceed to the second or more complicated period, and we must see to what kind of inquiries the histories of this period immediately introduce us, and what is necessary to enable us fully to understand the scenes which they present to us. And on this subject I hope to enter in my next lecture:

NOTES

TO

LECTURE II.

NOTE 1.—Page 124.

The importance to the cause of education, of right theory and practice of *translation*, which induced Dr. Arnold to speak of it though only slightly connected with the subject of his lecture, leads me to follow it somewhat farther. The note which I wish to add to his remarks will be found in Appendix III. of this volume

NOTE 2.—Page 127.

In the Preface to the History of Rome, (p. x.) Dr. Arnold speaks of Niebuhr's "master art of doubting rightly, and believing rightly."

NOTE 3.—Page 130.

Speaking of the pagan condition of the Anglo-Saxons and their conversion to Christianity, Mr. Burke writes—"The introduction of Christianity, which, under whatever form, always confers such inestimable benefits on mankind, soon made a sensible change in these rude and fierce manners.

"It is by no means impossible, that, for an end so worthy, Providence, on some occasions, might directly have interposed. The books which contain the history of this time and change, are little else than a narrative of miracles; frequently, however, with such apparent marks of weakness or design, that they afford little encouragement to insist on them. They were received with a blind

credulity; they have been since rejected with as undistinguishing a disregard. But as it is not in my design nor inclination, nor indeed in my power, either to establish or refute these stories, it is sufficient to observe, that the reality or opinion of such miracles was the principal cause of the early acceptance and rapid progress of Christianity in this island."

Essay on English History, book ii. ch. 1.

NOTE 4.—Page 131.

"The clearest notion which can be given of rationalism would, I think, be this; that it is the abuse of the understanding in subjects where the divine and the human, so to speak, are intermingled. Of human things the understanding can judge, of divine things it cannot; and thus, where the two are mixed together, its inability to judge of the one part makes it derange the proportions of both, and the judgment of the whole is vitiated. For example, the understanding examines a miraculous history: it judges truly of what I may call the human part of the case; that is to say, of the rarity of miracles, of the fallibility of human testimony, of the proneness of most minds to exaggeration, and of the critical arguments affecting the genuineness or the date of the narrative itself. But it forgets the divine part, namely, the power and providence of God, that he is really ever present amongst us, and that the spiritual world, which exists invisibly all around us, may conceivably, and by no means impossibly exist, at some times and to some persons, even visibly."

Arnold's Sermons, vol. iv., "*Christian Life, its Course, etc.*,"

note, p. 465.

* * * "I neither affirm nor deny any thing as to the question how often in the history of the Church, or in what periods of it, God may have been pleased to suspend the operations of intermediate agents, for the purpose of showing that He is at all times the Author and Mover of them. This question must be determined by a careful study of historical evidence; upon the result of such a study I should be very sorry to dogmatize. Those who believe that miracles are for the assertion of order, and not for the violation of it, for the sake of proving the constant presence of a spiri-

tual power, and not for the sake of showing that it interferes occasionally with the affairs of the world, will be the least inclined to expect the frequent repetitions of such signs, for they hold, that being recorded as facts in the former ages of the world, they become laws in ours, that we are to own Him, who healed the sick of the palsy, in every cure which is wrought by the ordinary physician, Him who stilled the storm on the Lake of Gennesareth, in the guidance and preservation of every ship which crosses the ocean—and that this effect would be lost, if we were led to put any contempt upon that which is daily and habitual. Still, I should think it very presumptuous to say, that it has never been needful, in the modern history of the world, to break the idols of sense and experience by the same method which was sanctioned in the days of old. Far less should I be inclined to underrate the piety, and criticize the wisdom and honesty of those men, who, missing or overlooking intermediate powers, of which they knew little, at once referred the acts and events they witnessed to their primary source.”

MAURICE'S '*Kingdom of Christ*,' Part II., chap. iv., sect 6

NOTE 5.—Page 136.

“A good glossary to the schoolmen would be an interesting and instructive work; a glossary collecting all the words which they coined, pointing out the changes they made in the signification of old Latin words, explaining the ground of these innovations, and the wants they were meant to supply, and tracking all these words through the various languages of modern Europe. Valuable as Ducange's great work is for political, legal, ecclesiastical, military, and all manner of technical words, we still want a similar, though a far less bulky and laborious collection of such words as his plan did not embrace, especially of philosophical, scientific, and medical words, before we can be thoroughly acquainted with the alterations which Latin underwent, when, from being the language of Rome, it became that of all persons of education throughout Europe. Even from Ducange it would be well if some industrious grammarian would pick out all such words as have left any offspring amongst us. Then alone shall we be prepared for understanding the history of the English language, when its various elements

have been carefully separated, collected, arranged, and classified."

'*Guesses at Truth*,' p. 140.

NOTE 6.—Page 138.

"No direct instruction could leave on their (the pupils at Rugby) minds a livelier image of his (Dr. Arnold's) disgust at moral evil, than the black cloud of indignation which passed over his face when speaking of the crimes of Napoleon or of Cæsar, and the dead pause which followed, as if the acts had just been committed in his very presence. No expression of his reverence for a high standard of Christian excellence could have been more striking than the almost involuntary expressions of admiration which broke from him whenever mention was made of St. Louis of France."

Life, chap. iii.

NOTE 7.—Page 140.

It is perhaps partly for the pleasure of quoting from a work abounding in beautiful and wise criticism—one of the most valuable contributions that has been made to critical literature—a model of what Christian imaginative criticism should be—that I select Mr. Keble's words respecting the 'simple morality' of Herodotus.

* * "Habemus Herodotum, habemus Platonem: quorum alter Homerum refert non lingua tantum Ionica, et simplicitate illa ἀρχαιοτροπέη, sed et universo genere narrandi, et maxime omnium propter quasdam sententias, de vita caduca, rerumque mortalium ægritudine, quas ille mira dulcedine narrationibus suis intertexi curavit." * *

KEBLE: *Prælectiones*, i. 273.

* * * "If I were called upon to name what spirit of evil predominantly deserved the name of Antichrist, I should name the spirit of chivalry*—the more detestable for the very guise of the

* "Chivalry," or (as Dr. Arnold used more frequently to call the element in the middle ages which he thus condemned) "feudality, is especially Keltic and barbarian—incompatible with the highest virtue of which man is capable, and the last at which he arrives—a sense of justice. It sets up the personal allegiance to the chief above allegiance to God and law."

‘Archangel ruined,’ which has made it so seductive to the most generous spirits—but to me so hateful, because it is in direct opposition to the impartial justice of the Gospel, and its comprehensive feeling of equal brotherhood, and because it so fostered a sense of honour rather than a sense of duty.”

Life and Correspondence, chap. v., letter 4.

* * * “One relation alone, beyond those of blood, seems to have been acknowledged,” (in Cisalpine Gaul in the 3d century, A. C. ;) “the same which, introduced into Europe six hundred years afterwards by the victories of the German barbarians, has deeply tainted modern society down to this hour; the relation of chief and followers, or, as it was called in its subsequent form, lord and vassals. The head of a family distinguished for his strength and courage gathered around him a numerous train of followers from other families; and they formed his clan, or band, or followers, bound to him for life and death, bestowing on him those feelings of devoted attachment, which can be safely entertained only towards the commonwealth and its laws, and rendering him that blind obedience which is wickedness when paid to any less than God. This evil and degrading bond is well described by the Greek and Roman writers, by words expressive of unlawful and anti-social combinations, (‘Factio,’ Cæsar, de Bell. Gallic. vi. 11; *ἐταρξεία*, Polybius, ii. 17 :) it is the same which in other times and countries has appeared in the shape of sworn brotherhoods, factions, parties, sects, clubs, secret societies, and unions, everywhere and in every form the worst enemy both of individual and of social excellence, as it substitutes other objects in place of those to which as men and citizens we ought only to be bound, namely, God and Law.”

Hist. of Rome, vol. iii note, p 476

LECTURE III.

IT is my hope, if I am allowed to resume these lectures next year, to enter fully into the history of some one characteristic period of the middle ages, to point out as well as I can the sources of information respecting it, and to paint it, and enable you to judge of its nature both absolutely and relatively to us. But for the present, I must turn to that period which is properly to be called modern history, the modern of the modern, the complicated period as I have called it, in contradistinction to the simpler period which preceded it. And here too, if life and health be spared me, I hope hereafter to enter into minute details; selecting some one country as the principal subject of our inquiries, and illustrating the lessons of history for the most part from its particular experience. Now, however, I must content myself with more general notices: I must remember that I am endeavouring to assist the student of modern history, by suggesting to him the best method of studying it, and pointing out the principal difficulties which will impede his progress. I must not suppose the student to be working only at the history of one country, or one age: the points of interest in the three last centuries are so numerous that our researches may be carried on far apart from each other, and I must endeavour, so far as my knowledge will permit, to render these lectures serviceable generally.

Now in the first place, when we enter upon modern history, our work, limit it as we will, unavoidably grows in magni-

clude. Allowing that we are not so extravagant as to aim at mastering the details of the history of the whole world, that we set aside oriental history and colonial history ; that farther, having now restricted ourselves to Europe, we separate the western kingdoms from the northern and eastern, and confine our attention principally to our own country and to those which have been most closely connected with it ; yet still the limit which we strive to draw round our inquiries will be continually broken through, they will and must extend themselves beyond it. Northern, eastern, and south-eastern Europe, the vast world of European colonies, nay sometimes the distinct oriental world itself, will demand our attention : there is scarcely a portion of the globe of which we can be suffered to remain in complete ignorance. Amidst this wide field, widening as it were before us at every step, it becomes doubly important to gain certain principles of inquiry, lest we should be wandering about vaguely like an ignorant man in an ill-arranged museum, seeing and wondering at much, but learning nothing.

The immense variety of history makes it very possible for different persons to study it with different objects ; and here we have an obvious and convenient division. But the great object, as I cannot but think, is that which most nearly touches the inner life of civilized man, namely, the vicissitudes of institutions, social, political, and religious. This, in my judgment, is the *τελειότατον τέλος* of historical inquiry ; but because of its great and crowning magnitude we will assign to it its due place of honour, we will survey the exterior and the outer courts of the temple, before we approach the sanctuary.

In history, as in other things, a knowledge of the external is needed before we arrive at that which is within. We want to get a sort of frame for our picture ; a set of local habitations, *τόποι*, where our ideas may be arranged, a scene in which the struggle of principles is to be fought, and men who

are to fight it. And thus we want to know clearly the geographical bounds of different countries, and their external revolutions. This leads us in the first instance to geography and military history, even if our ultimate object lies beyond. But being led to them by necessity, we linger in them afterwards from choice ; so much is there in both of the most picturesque and poetical character, so much of beauty, of magnificence, and of interest, physical and moral.

The student of modern history especially needs a knowledge of geography, because, as I have said, his inquiries will lead him first or last to every quarter of the globe. But let us consider a little what a knowledge of geography is. First, I grant, it is a knowledge of the relative position and distance of places from one another : and by places I mean either towns, or the habitations of particular tribes or nations ; for I think our first notion of a map is that of a plan of the dwellings of the human race ; we connect it strictly with man, and with man's history. And here I believe many persons' geography stops : they have an idea of the shape, relative position, and distance of different countries ; and of the position, that is, as respects the points of the compass, and mutual distance, of the principal towns. Every one for example has a notion of the shapes of France and of Italy, that one is situated north-west of the other, and that their frontiers join : and again, every one knows that Paris is situated in the north of France, Bordeaux in the south-west ; that Venice lies at the north-east corner of Italy, and Rome nearly in the middle as regards north and south, and near to the western sea. Thus much of knowledge is indeed indispensable to the simplest understanding of history ; and this kind of knowledge, extending over more or less countries as it may be and embracing with more or less minuteness the divisions of provinces, and the position of the smaller towns, is that which passes, I believe, with many for a knowledge of geography.

Yet you will observe, that this knowledge does not touch the earth itself, but only the dwellings of men upon the earth. It regards the shapes of a certain number of great national estates, if I may so call them; the limits of which, like those of individuals' property, have often respect to no natural boundaries, but are purely arbitrary. A real knowledge of geography embraces at once a knowledge of the earth, and of the dwellings of man upon it; it stretches out one hand to history, and the other to geology and physiology: it is just that part in the dominion of knowledge where the students of physical and of moral science meet together.

And without denying the usefulness of that plan-like knowledge of geography of which I was just now speaking, it cannot be doubted that a far deeper knowledge of it is required by him who would study history effectively. And the deeper knowledge becomes far the easier to remember. For my own part I find it extremely difficult to remember the position of towns, when I have no other association with them than their situation relatively to each other. But let me once understand the real geography of a country, its organic structure if I may so call it: the form of its skeleton, that is, of its hills: the magnitude and course of its veins and arteries, that is, of its streams and rivers: let me conceive of it as of a whole made up of connected parts; and then the position of man's dwellings, viewed in reference to these parts, becomes at once easily remembered, and lively and intelligible besides.

I said that geography held out one hand to geology and physiology, while she held out the other to history. In fact, geology and physiology themselves are closely connected with history. For instance, what lies at the bottom of that question which is now being discussed everywhere, the question of the corn-laws, but the geological fact that England is more richly supplied with coal-mines than any other country in

the world? * What has given a peculiar interest to our relations with China, but the physiological fact, that the tea-plant, which is become so necessary to our daily life, has been cultivated with equal success in no other climate or country? What is it which threatens the permanence of the union between the northern and southern states of the American confederacy, but the physiological fact that the soil and climate of the southern states render them essentially agricultural; while those of the northern states, combined with their geographical advantages as to sea-ports, dispose them no less naturally to be manufacturing and commercial? The whole character of a nation may be influenced by its geology and physical geography.

* The importance of our coal-mines is so great, that I think it a duty to reprint here a note of Dr. Buckland's, which is to be found in p. 41 of his "Address delivered at the Anniversary Meeting of the Geological Society of London, 19th of February, 1841." What Dr. Buckland says on such a subject is of the very highest authority; and should be circulated as widely as possible.

"As no more coal is in process of formation, and our national prosperity must inevitably terminate with the exhaustion of those precious stores of mineral fuel, which form the foundation of our greatest manufacturing and commercial establishments, I feel it my duty to entreat the attention of the legislature to two evil practices which are tending to accelerate the period when the contents of our coal-mines will have been consumed. The first of these is the wanton waste which for more than fifty years has been committed by the coal-owners near Newcastle, by screening and burning annually in never-extinguished *fiery heaps* at the pits' mouth, more than one million of chaldrons of excellent small coal, being nearly one third of the entire produce of the best coal-mines in England. This criminal destruction of the elements of our national industry, which is accelerating by one third the not very distant period when these mines will be exhausted, is perpetrated by the colliers, for the purpose of selling the remaining two-thirds at a greater profit than they would derive from the sale of the entire bulk unscreened to the coal-merchant.

"The second evil is the exportation of coal to foreign countries, in some of which it is employed to work the machinery of rival manufactories, that in certain cases could scarcely be maintained without a supply of British coals. In 1839, 1,431,861 tons were exported, and in 1840, 1,592,283 tons, of which nearly one fourth were sent to France. An *increased duty* on coals exported to any country, excepting our own colonies, might afford a remedy. See note [a](#) this subject in my Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 535."

But for the sake of its mere beauty and liveliness, if there were no other consideration, it would be worth our while to acquire this richer view of geography. Conceive only the difference between a ground-plan and a picture. The mere plan-geography of Italy gives us its shape, as I have observed, and the position of its towns; to these it may add a semicircle of mountains round the northern boundary, to represent the Alps; and another long line stretching down the middle of the country, to represent the Apennines. But let us carry on this a little farther, and give life, and meaning, and harmony to what is at present at once lifeless and confused. Observe in the first place, how the Apennine line, beginning from the southern extremity of the Alps, runs across Italy to the very edge of the Adriatic, and thus separates naturally the Italy proper of the Romans from Cisalpine Gaul. Observe again, how the Alps, after running north and south where they divide Italy from France, turn then away to the eastward, running almost parallel to the Apennines, till they too touch the head of the Adriatic, on the confines of Istria. Thus between these two lines of mountains there is enclosed one great basin or plain; enclosed on three sides by mountains, open only on the east to the sea. Observe how widely it spreads itself out, and then see how well it is watered. One great river flows through it in its whole extent; and this is fed by streams almost unnumbered, descending towards it on either side, from the Alps on one side, and from the Apennines on the other. Who can wonder that this large, and rich, and well-watered plain should be filled with flourishing cities, or that it should have been contended for so often by successive invaders? Then descending into Italy proper, we find the complexity of its geography quite in accordance with its manifold political divisions. It is not one simple central ridge of mountains, leaving a broad belt of level country on either side between it and the sea;

nor yet is it a chain rising immediately from the sea on one side, like the Andes in South America, and leaving room therefore on the other side for wide plains of table-land, and for rivers with a sufficient length of course to become at last great and navigable. It is a back-bone thickly set with spines of unequal length, some of them running out at regular distances parallel to each other, but others twisted so strangely that they often run for a long way parallel to the back-bone, or main ridge, and interlace with one another in a maze almost inextricable. And as if to complete the disorder, in those spots where the spines of the Apennines, being twisted round, run parallel to the sea and to their own central chain, and thus leave an interval of plain between their bases and the Mediterranean, volcanic agency has broken up the space thus left with other and distinct groups of hills of its own creation, as in the case of Vesuvius and of the Alban hills near Rome. Speaking generally then, Italy is made up of an infinite multitude of valleys pent in between high and steep hills, each forming a country to itself, and cut off by natural barriers from the others. Its several parts are isolated by nature, and no art of man can thoroughly unite them. Even the various provinces of the same kingdom are strangers to each other; the Abruzzi are like an unknown world to the inhabitants of Naples, insomuch that when two Neapolitan naturalists not ten years since made an excursion to visit the Majella, one of the highest of the central Apennines, they found there many medicinal plants growing in the greatest profusion, which the Neapolitans were regularly in the habit of importing from other countries, as no one suspected their existence within their own kingdom. Hence arises the romantic character of Italian scenery; the constant combination of a mountain outline, and all the wild features of a mountain country, with the rich vegetation of a southern climate in the valleys: hence too the rudeness, the pastoral

simplicity, and the occasional robber habits, to be found in the population ; so that to this day you may travel in many places for miles together in the plains and valleys without passing through a single town or village : for the towns still cluster on the mountain sides, the houses nestling together on some scanty ledge, with cliffs rising above them and sinking down abruptly below them, the very "*congesta manu præruptis oppida saxis*" of Virgil's description, which he even then called "antique walls," because they had been the strongholds of the primeval inhabitants of the country, and which are still inhabited after a lapse of so many centuries, nothing of the stir and movement of other parts of Europe having penetrated into these lonely valleys, and tempted the people to quit their mountain fastnesses for a more accessible dwelling in the plain. I have been led on farther than I intended ; but I wished to give an example of what I meant by a real and lively knowledge of geography, which brings the whole character of a country before our eyes, and enables us to understand its influence upon the social and political condition of its inhabitants. And this knowledge, as I said before, is very important to enable us to follow clearly the external revolutions of different nations, which we want to comprehend before we penetrate to what has been passing within. (1)

• The undoubted tendency of the last three centuries has been to consolidate what were once separate states or kingdoms into one great nation. The Spanish peninsula, which in earlier times had contained many distinct states, came to consist as at present of two kingdoms only, Spain and Portugal, in the last ten years of the fifteenth century. France about the same period acquired Bretagne and Provence, but its acquisitions of Artois, of Franche Comté, of French Flanders, of Lorraine, and of Alsace, have been much later ; and Avignon and its territory were not acquired till the rev

olution. For a century after the beginning of our period, Scotland and England were governed by different sovereigns; for two centuries they remained distinct kingdoms; and the legislative union with Ireland is no older than the present century. Looking eastward, how many kingdoms and states have been swallowed up in the empire of Austria: Bohemia, and Hungary: the duchies of Milan and Mantua, and the republic of Venice. The growth of Prussia into a mighty kingdom, and Russia into the most colossal of empires, is the work of the last century or of the present. Even in Germany and Italy, where smaller states still subsist, the same law has been in operation; of all the free imperial cities of Germany four only are left, Frankfort, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubec; and not Prussia only, but Bavaria has grown into a great kingdom. So it has been in Italy; Venice and Genoa have both been absorbed in our own days into the monarchies of Austria and Sardinia; but the sixteenth century, and even the fifteenth had begun this work: Venice had extinguished the independence of Padua and Verona; Florence had conquered its rival Pisa: and at a later period the duchies of Ferrara and Urbino fell under the dominion of the popes. This then has been the tendency of things generally; but it has been a tendency by no means working unchecked; on the contrary, wherever it has threatened to lead to the universal or overbearing dominion of a single state, it has been strenuously resisted, and resisted with success; as in the case of Austria and Spain in the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth centuries, of France at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth; of England in some degree after the peace of Paris in 1763, and again of France in our own times. These successive excesses of the tendency towards consolidation, and the resistance offered to them, afford some of the most conve-

nient divisions for the external history of modern Europe, and as such I will briefly notice them.

We have seen that at the end of the fifteenth century, France and Spain had already become greatly consolidated within themselves; the former by the acquisition of the duchy of Burgundy, of Provence, and above all of Bretagne; the latter by the union of the kingdoms of Castile and Leon, and the destruction of the Moorish kingdom of Granada. But after the marriage of the heiress of Burgundy to Maximilian archduke of Austria had united the Netherlands and Franche Comté to the Austrian dominions, the subsequent marriage of the archduke Philip, Maximilian's son, with Joanna daughter and heiress of Ferdinand and Isabella, added to them besides in the beginning of the sixteenth century the whole inheritance of the crown of Spain. And as the kingdom of Naples had finally fallen into the hands of Ferdinand of Aragon, at the termination of the long struggle between the Aragoneze line and that of Anjou, Naples also was included in this inheritance. So that when Charles the Fifth, the archduke Philip's son, succeeded his grandfather Maximilian as emperor, in 1519, the mass of his dominions seemed to put him in the way of acquiring a universal empire. And this Austro-Spanish power is the first of those which going beyond the just limits of the law of consolidation of states, threatened to alter altogether the condition of Europe.

It was opposed principally by France, kept at bay by Francis the First throughout his reign, notwithstanding the defeats which he suffered; humbled by the successful alliance of his successor Henry the Second with the German Protestants in 1551, and finally dissolved by the abdication of Charles the Fifth, and the consequent division of his empire, his brother Ferdinand succeeding to his German dominions, whilst his son Philip inherited Spain, Naples, and

the Netherlands. This took place in 1555, the second year of the reign of our queen Mary.

But though deprived of his father's German dominions, yet the inheritance of Philip the Second was still so ample that the Spanish power itself overstepped its just bounds, and became a new object of alarm to Europe. The conquest of Portugal after the death of king Sebastian in Africa had given to Philip the whole Spanish peninsula; to this were added the Spanish discoveries and conquests in America, with the wealth derived from them; besides the kingdom of Naples, including the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, and the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands. There was this important circumstance in addition, that France, which had successfully resisted Charles the Fifth, was now distracted by its own religious wars, and in no condition to uphold the balance of power abroad. The dominion of Philip the Second was therefore a very reasonable cause of alarm.

But this too was resisted and dissolved; principally owing to the revolt of the Netherlands, the opposition of England, and the return of France to her proper place amongst European powers, when her religious wars were ended by Henry the Fourth. Philip lived to see the decline of his power, and the dismemberment of his empire was sanctioned by his successor Philip the Third, who virtually resigned his claim to the sovereignty of the seven united provinces of the Netherlands, the newly-formed republic of Holland. This great concession, expressed under the form of a truce for twelve years, was made in the year 1609, the sixth year of the reign of our James the First.

During the reign of Philip the Second, Austria had stood aloof from Spain; but in the reigns of his successors the two branches of the Austrian line were drawn more closely together, and their power was exerted for the same object. The conquest of the Palatinate by the emperor Ferdinand

the Second, in 1622, again excited general alarm, and resistance was organized once more against the dangerous power of the house of Austria. France, under Richelieu, was once more the principal bond of the union, but the power which acted the most prominent part was one which had not hitherto interfered in the general affairs of Europe, the northern kingdom of Sweden. Sweden, Holland, and the Protestant states of Germany, were leagued against the house of Austria under its two heads, the emperor and the king of Spain. Again the resisting power triumphed; the Austrian power in Germany was effectually restrained by the peace of Westphalia, in 1648; Spain saw Portugal again become an independent kingdom, and when she ended her quarrel with France by the peace of the Pyrenees, in 1659, she retired for ever from the foremost place amongst the powers of Europe.

Austria thus curbed, and Spain falling into decline, room was left for others to succeed to the highest place in Europe, now left vacant, and that place was immediately occupied by France. Louis the Fourteenth, Henry the Fourth's grandson, began to reign without governors in the year 1661, the year after our restoration, and for the next twenty or thirty years the French power became more and more formidable. Its conquests indeed were not considerable, when compared with those of a later period, yet were they in themselves of great and enduring importance. French Flanders gave to France the fortress of Lisle and the port of Dunkirk. Franche Comté extended its frontier to the eastern slope of the Jura, and the borders of Switzerland; Alsace carried it over the crest of the Vosges, and established it on the Rhine. But the power of France was not to be judged of merely by its territorial conquests. Its navy had arisen from nothing to the sovereignty of the seas; its internal resources were developed, the ascendancy of its arts, its fashions, and its

literature, was universal. Yet this fourth alarm of universal dominion passed away like those which had preceded it. And here the resisting power was England, which now for the first time since the reign of Elizabeth, took an active part in the affairs of Europe. This change was effected by the accession of William the Third, the stadtholder of Holland and the great antagonist of Louis the Fourteenth, to the throne of England; and by the strong national, and religious, and political feeling against France which possessed the English people. William checked the power of Louis the Fourteenth, Marlborough and Eugene overthrew it. Oppressed by defeats abroad, and by famine and misery at home, Louis was laid at the mercy of his enemies, and was only saved by a party revolution in the English ministry. But the peace of Utrecht in 1713, although it sanctioned the succession of the French prince Philip, grandson of king Louis, to the throne of Spain, yet by its other stipulations, and still more by the weakness which made France accept it, showed sufficiently that all danger of French dominion was effectually overpast. (2)

Then followed a period of nearly ninety years, during which the external order of Europe was not materially threatened. Had Frederic the Second of Prussia possessed greater physical resources, his personal qualities and dispositions might have made him the most formidable of conquerors; but as it was, his extraordinary efforts were essentially defensive; it was his glory at the end of the Seven Years' War that Prussia was not overwhelmed, that it had shattered the mighty confederacy which had assailed it, and that having ridden out the storm, the fiery trial left it with confirmed and proved strength, and protected besides by the shield of its glory. (3) England alone, by her great colonial and naval successes in the war of 1755, and by the high pretensions of her naval code, excited during this period the jeal-

ousy of Europe ; and thus not only France and Spain, but her old ally Holland, took part against her in the American war, and the northern powers showed that their disposition was equally unfriendly, by agreeing together in their armed neutrality. But in the loss of America, England seemed to have paid a sufficient penalty, and the spirit of jealousy and hostility against her did not appear to survive the conclusion of the peace of Paris in 1783.

Ten years afterwards there broke out by far the most alarming danger of universal dominion, which had ever threatened Europe. The most military people in Europe became engaged in a war for their very existence. Invasion on the frontiers, civil war and all imaginable horrors raging within, the ordinary relations of life went to wrack, and every Frenchman became a soldier. It was a multitude numerous as the hosts of Persia, but animated by the courage and skill and energy of the old Romans. One thing alone was wanting, that which Pyrrhus said the Romans wanted, to enable them to conquer the world, a general and a ruler like himself. There was wanted a master hand to restore and maintain peace at home, and to concentrate and direct the immense military resources of France against her foreign enemies. And such a one appeared in Napoleon. Pacifying La Vendée, receiving back the emigrants, restoring the church, remodelling the law, personally absolute, yet carefully preserving and maintaining all the great points which the nation had won at the revolution, Napoleon united in himself not only the power but the whole will of France, and that power and will were guided by a genius for war such as Europe had never seen since Cæsar. The effect was absolutely magical. In November, 1799, he was made First Consul ; he found France humbled by defeats, his Italian conquests lost, his allies invaded, his own frontier threatened. He took the field in May, 1800, and in June the

whole fortune of the war was changed, and Austria driven out of Lombardy by the victory of Marengo. Still the flood of the tide rose higher and higher, and every successive wave of its advance swept away a kingdom. Earthly state has never reached a prouder pinnacle, than when Napoleon in June, 1812, gathered his army at Dresden, that mighty host, unequalled in all time, of 450,000, not men merely but effective soldiers, and there received the homage of subject kings. And now what was the principal adversary of this tremendous power? by whom was it checked, and resisted, and put down? By none, and by nothing, but the direct and manifest interposition of God. I know of no language so well fitted to describe that victorious advance to Moscow, and the utter humiliation of the retreat, as the language of the prophet with respect to the advance and subsequent destruction of the host of Sennacherib. "When they arose early in the morning, behold they were all dead corpses," applies almost literally to that memorable night of frost in which twenty thousand horses perished, and the strength of the French army was utterly broken. Human instruments no doubt were employed in the remainder of the work, nor would I deny to Germany and to Prussia the glories of that great year 1813, nor to England the honour of her victories in Spain, or of the crowning victory of Waterloo. But at the distance of thirty years, those who lived in the time of danger, and remember its magnitude, and now calmly review what there was in human strength to avert it, must acknowledge, I think, beyond all controversy, that the deliverance of Europe from the dominion of Napoleon was effected neither by Russia, nor by Germany, nor by England, but by the hand of God alone. (4)

What I have now been noticing will afford one division which may be convenient for the student of modern history; one division, out of many which might be made, and purely

an external one. But for this purpose it may be useful, just as we sometimes divide Grecian history into the periods of the Lacedæmonian, the Athenian, the Theban, and the Macedonian ascendancy. It shows us how the centre of external movement has varied, round what point the hopes and fears of Europe have been successively busy, so far as concerns external dominion. You will observe, however, how strictly I have confined myself to the outward and merely territorial struggle; how entirely I have omitted all those other and deeper points which are in connection with the principles of internal life. I have regarded Austria, Spain, and France purely in one and the same light; that is, as national bodies occupying a certain space on the map of Europe, and endeavoring to spread themselves beyond this space, and so deranging the position of those other national bodies which existed in their neighbourhood. You know that this is a very imperfect representation of the great contests of Europe. You know that Austria and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not merely two nations governed by the same sovereign, or by sovereigns closely allied together, and which sought their own aggrandizement at the expense of their neighbours. They were a great deal more than this; they were the representatives, not purely but in a great measure, of certain political and religious principles; and the triumph of these principles was involved in their territorial conquests. So again, the resistance to them was in part also the resistance of the opposite principles; in part, but by no means purely. It is worth our while to observe this, as one instance out of thousands, how little any real history is an exact exemplification of abstract principles; how our generalizations—which must indeed be made, for so alone can history furnish us with any truths—must yet be kept within certain limits, or they become full of error. Thus, for instance, it is quite true to say that the struggle against

Austria and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not a mere resistance against territorial aggression : there were principles involved in the contest. Yet all concerned in this resistance did not feel it to be a contest of principle : France under Francis the First and Henry the Second, and again under Henry the Fourth, and lastly under Louis the Thirteenth, or rather under Richelieu, was most deeply engaged in the resistance to Austria and Spain ; yet certainly the French government at no one time was contending either for Christian truth or for civil freedom. With France it was a purely territorial and external contest ; and this was well shown by the conduct of Francis the First, who burnt French protestants at Paris, while he was allying himself with the protestants of Germany ; who opposed, accidentally indeed, the papal power and cause, but who did not scruple to form a league with the Turks. So again, in the Thirty Years' War, that very Richelieu who mainly contributed to the establishment of protestantism in Germany on a perfectly equal footing by the treaty of Westphalia, was the very man who threw his mole across the harbour of Rochelle, and conquered the great stronghold of protestantism in France.

These external movements, then, as we have now been contemplating them, involve no questions of political or religious principle. We may conceive of them as of a mere game of chess, where the pieces and pawns on both sides differ from each other only in being played from a different part of the board. What we have to consider in these contests are mostly economical questions and military : the purse and the sword were the powers which decided them. But is the study of such questions indifferent to us ? That surely it were most unwise to imagine. For in the first place, these very contests which we are now regarding as purely external, were really as we have seen contests of principle

also ; and thus the economical and military skill which determined their issue, were in fact the means by which certain principles were attacked or defended. Besides, economy and military virtues are the great supports of national existence, as food and exercise support our individual bodies. I grant that the existence so supported may be worthless, may be sinful : yet self-preservation is an essential condition of all virtue ; in order to do their duty both states and individuals must first live and be kept alive. But more than all this, economical and military questions are not purely external ; they are connected closely with moral good and evil ; a faulty political economy is the fruitful parent of crime ; a sound military system is no mean school of virtue ; and war, as I have said before, has in its vicissitudes, and much more in the moral qualities which it calls into action, a deep and abiding interest for every one worthy of the name of man.

Economical questions arise obviously out of the history of all wars, although careless readers are very apt to neglect them. They arise out of that simple law of our nature which makes it necessary for every man to eat and drink and be clothed. Common readers, and I am afraid I may add, many historians also, appear to write and read about military operations without recollecting this. We hear of armies marching, advancing, and retreating, besieging towns, fighting battles, being engaged actively for some weeks or months, and are apt to think of them solely as moving or fighting machines, whose success depends on the skill with which their general plays them, as if they were really so many chess-men. Yet one would think it was sufficiently obvious that these armies are made up of men who must eat and drink every day, and who wear clothing. Of the expense and difficulty of maintaining them it is not easy, I grant, for private persons in peace to form any adequate idea. (5) Yet here we may gain something more of a notion of it than

can be obtained readily in a private family. A college will contain perhaps seventy or eighty members; let any man but look round the hall at dinner; or let him go into the kitchen and see the number of joints at the fire, or let him ask the number of pounds of meat required for the daily consumption of the college, and see what the cost will amount to. Then he may think what it is to provide for the food, not of eighty or of ninety persons, but of twenty, or of forty, or of sixty, or even of a hundred thousand. All this multitude doing nothing to raise food or make clothing for themselves, must be fed and clothed out of the wealth of the community. Again this community may have to maintain, not one of these armies but several, and large fleets besides, and this for many years together; while it may often happen that its means of doing so are at the same time crippled: its foreign trade may be cut off, or large portions of its territory may be laid waste; while the event of the contest being uncertain, and defeat and ruin being a possible consequence of it, hope and confidence are checked, and with them credit perishes also. Is it then a light matter first to provide the necessary resources for such a contest, and next to see that they are not spent wastefully? With regard to providing them, there is first the great question between direct taxation and loans. Shall we lay the whole burden of the contest upon the present generation, or divide it between ourselves and posterity? Conceive now the difficulties, the exceeding temptations, which beset the decision of this question. In a free government it may be doubtful whether the people will consent to raise the money or no. But suppose that legally they have no voice in the matter, that the government may say on what taxes it will; still extreme discontent at home is not likely to be risked in the midst of foreign war; or if the people are willing to bear the burden still the power may be wanting. A tax may easily destroy itself: that is, sup

pose that a man's trade just yields him a profit which he can live upon, and a tax is laid upon him to the amount of a fourth part of his profit. If he raises the price of his commodity to the consumer, the consumer will either purchase so much the less of it, or will endeavour to procure it from other countries where the dealer being less heavily taxed can afford to sell on cheaper terms. Then the government interposes to protect the taxed native dealer by prohibiting the importation of the commodity of the untaxed foreigner. But such a prohibition running counter to a plain rule of common sense, which makes every man desire to buy a cheaper article rather than a dearer, when both are of equal goodness, it can only be maintained by force. Thence arises the necessity of a large constabulary or preventive force to put down smuggling, and, to say nothing of the moral evils produced by such a state of things, it is clear that the expense of the additional preventive force which the new tax rendered necessary, is all to be deducted from the profits of that tax; and this deduction, added to the falling off in its productiveness occasioned by the greater poverty of the tax-payer, may reduce its return almost to nothing. Suppose then that a statesman, appalled by all these difficulties, resolves to share the burden with posterity, and begins to raise money by loans. No doubt for the present his work is greatly facilitated; instead of providing for the principal of the money which he wants, he has only to provide for the interest of it. But observe what follows. In the first place, by an almost universal law of our nature, money lightly gained is lightly spent: a revenue raised at the expense of posterity is sure to be squandered wastefully. Waste as usual begetting want, the sums raised by loans will commonly be large. Now these large sums are a mortgage on all the property, on all the industry, on all the skill and ability of a country forever. Every acre of land from henceforth has not only to maintain its owner

and his family, and to answer the just demands of the actual public service, but it has also to feed one or more extraneous persons besides, the state's creditors or their heirs, who in times past lent it their money. Every man who would have laboured twelve hours for the support of his family and the public service of his own generation, must labour one or two hours in addition, for the support of a stranger, the state's creditor. So with all its property, with all its industry, with all its powers thus burdened, thus strained to the very extremity of endurance, the nation is committed to the vicissitudes of all coming time, to run in the race with other nations who are in the full freshness of their unstrained strength; to battle with occasional storms which would try the lightest and stoutest vessel, but in which one already overloaded till the timbers are well nigh starting, must necessarily expect to founder.

Such then being the financial or economical difficulties besetting every great contest, it is no mean wisdom to avoid them as far as is possible; to make the people so keenly enter into the necessity of the contest that they will make real sacrifices to maintain it; so to choose the subjects of taxation, and so to distribute its burden, as to make it press with the least possible severity, neither seriously impairing a people's resources, nor irritating their feelings by a sense of its inequality. If a statesman after all finds that he must borrow—and I am far from denying that such a necessity has sometimes existed—it is no mean administrative wisdom to enforce the strictest economy in his expenditure; rigorously to put down and punish all jobbing, whether in high quarters or in low, but more especially in the former; to resist the fatal temptation of having frequent recourse to an expedient promising present ease and only threatening future ruin; and to keep his eye steadily upon the payment within a definite time of the sums which he is obliged to borrow.

That this is a most rare and high wisdom we shall learn from history, by seeing the fatal consequences of the opposite follies: consequences wide, and deep, and lasting; and affecting not only a nation's physical welfare, but through it surely and fatally corrupting its higher welfare also.

One example of this sad truth may be taken from a foreign history; the other which I shall give affects us yet more closely. We know in how many wars France was engaged throughout the eighteenth century. We know that in the Seven Years' War her efforts were great and her defeats overwhelming, while her government was in the highest degree wasteful and unequal in its dealings towards the different classes of society. We know that about fifteen years afterwards France again engaged in our American war, and supported a very expensive contest, still aggravated as before by wastefulness, corruption, and injustice at home, for the space of five years. A general embarrassment in the finances was the consequence, and this brought the old and inveterate evils of the political and social state of France to a head. Both together led, not to the revolution, but to those tremendous disorders which accompanied and followed the revolution; disorders quite distinct from it, and which were owing mainly to the extremely unhealthy state of the social relations in France, to which unhealthy state wide-spreading distress, brought on by a most unequal and corrupt system of taxation, had largely contributed.

The other, and unhappily the nearer instance, is yet even more significant. Whatever distress or difficulty at this moment surrounds us, has its source in a very great degree in financial or economical causes. Of course I am not going to offer any opinion as to the present or future; I am merely referring to what is an historical fact belonging to the past. It is a fact beyond all controversy that the wars of the last century, and particularly that great war which raged during

the first fifteen years of the present century, were supported largely by loans ; it is no less certain a fact that of the debt thus contracted a sum amounting to above £700,000,000 is still unpaid, and that more than half of our yearly revenue, to say the least, is appropriated to paying the interest of it. That such a burden must be too much for the resources or industry of any country to bear without injury, would seem to be a proposition absolutely self-evident. Every interest in the country is subject to unfair disadvantages in the competition with foreigners ; every interest being heavily taxed is either unable, or able only by the most extraordinary exertions, to sustain itself in the market of the world against untaxed or lightly taxed rivals. Now the evils being enormous, and so far as we can see perpetual, it does become an important question to ask, whether they were also inevitable ? that is to say, whether, if the same circumstances were to occur again, which is a matter not within our control, we should have no choice but to adopt the very same financial expedients. It may be that the sums raised, and nothing less, were required by the urgency of the crisis ; it may be that no larger portion of them could have been raised by present taxation than was so raised actually ; it may be that nothing more could have been done to liquidate the debt when contracted than has been done actually. But where the measures adopted have been so ruinous, we must at least be disposed to hope that they might have been avoided ; that here, as in so many other instances, the fault rests not with fortune or with outward circumstances, but with human passion and human error.

Such is the importance and such the interest of the economical questions which arise out of the history of the great external contests of modern Europe. The military questions connected with the same history, will form our next subject of inquiry ; and on this I propose to enter in my next lecture.

NOTES

TO

LECTURE III.

NOTE 1.—Page 154.

In the Preface to the posthumous volume (vol. iii.) of the History of Rome, Archdeacon J. C. Hare, by whom it was edited, speaks of “the most remarkable among Dr. Arnold’s talents, his singular geographical eye, which enabled him to find as much pleasure in looking at a map, as lovers of painting in a picture by Raphael or Claude.” (p. viii.)

It may not, perhaps, be inappropriate here to direct attention to the *raised* maps as a new facility for the accurate study of geography, especially of mountainous regions: they give a notion, which it would be difficult to gain from the ordinary maps, of the complicated inequalities of Italy or Spain, for instance.

NOTE 2.—Page 159.

“Few events in modern times ever seemed so unfavourable to the balance of power as the union between the French and Spanish monarchies. The former, already too mighty from her increased dominions, her central situation, and her warlike and enterprising people, could now direct the resources of that very state which has formerly weighed the heaviest in the opposite scale. By her progressive encroachments most other states had been struck with dismay, not roused into resistance, and seemed more inclined to sue for her alliance than to dare her enmity. But happily for Europe, the throne of England at this period was filled by a prince of singular ability both in the council and the field. The first endeavours of William III. to oppose the succession of Philip, and from a

confederacy against France, had been thwarted as much by his parliament as by foreign powers, and he had prudently yielded to the tide, but foresaw and awaited its ebbing. He continued to keep his objects steadily in sight, and even their ostensible relinquishment was only one of his methods to promote them. By acknowledging the new king of Spain, and professing great desire for peace, he disarmed the French government of its caution, and led it to disclose more and more its ambitious and grasping designs.

“Nor were these long delayed. Within a few months Louis XIV. began to claim the privileges of the South American trade, struck several blows at British commerce, supplanted the Dutch in the Spanish *ASIENTO*, or contract for negroes, raised new works in the Flemish fortresses within sight of their frontier, and both increased and assembled his armies. Such conduct could not fail to provoke most highly the nations thus aggrieved; and the public indignation, improved by William to the best advantage, gradually grew into a cry for war. The rising discontent in Spain was another circumstance auspicious to his views. He spared no labor, no exertion; he went in person to the Hague, where he carried on the most active and able negotiations, foiled all the counter-intrigues of Louis, and at length succeeded in concluding the basis of the ‘Grand Alliance’ between England, Austria, and the States General, (Sept. 1701.) The public mind being yet scarcely ripe for the decisive principles afterwards avowed and acted on, this treaty was very guarded in its phrases, and confined in its extent. The rights of the Archduke Charles were not yet asserted, nor those of Philip denied; and the chief objects of the contracting parties seemed to be, that France might not retain its footing in the Netherlands, nor acquire any in the West Indies; and that its crown and that of Spain might never be united on the same head.”

LORD MAHON'S ‘*Hist. of the War of the Succession in Spain*,’

chap. ii., p. 41

* * * “France was now (1711) so much weakened, and so nearly overwhelmed, by the contest, that it seemed not only possible, but easy to reduce her overgrown possessions. Her fortresses taken—her frontiers laid bare—her armies almost annihilated—her generals disheartened and distrusted—her finances exhausted—her

people starving, she could no longer have defended the successive usurpations heaped up during the last half century ; and a barrier against their recurrence might now have been concerted, established, and maintained. It only remained for the allies to crown a glorious war by a triumphant peace. But all this fair prospect was overcast and darkened by a change in the government, and therefore in the policy, of England. Queen Anne, since the deaths of her only child and of her husband, had nourished a secret leaning to her exiled family, and maintained the Duke of Marlborough and his party more from their successes than her inclinations. The Duchess of Marlborough had, indeed, great influence over her majesty, and ruled her by the strong chains of habit ; but gradually lost her ascendancy by her own violent and overbearing temper, and especially her haughty jealousy of Mrs. Masham, a dependant cousin, whom she had placed about the Queen as a bedchamber woman, and whom she unexpectedly found distinguished by several marks of royal regard. A glass of water, thrown by the Duchess on the gown of Mrs. Masham, changed the destinies of Europe. An humble relation was transformed into an aspiring rival ; and the Queen, quite estranged from her former favourite, carried her fondness from the person to the politics of her new one. Thus she fell into the hands of the Tories, then guided mainly by the subtle cabals of Harley, and the splendid genius of St. John. They did not venture to assail at once the recent services and deeply-rooted reputation of Marlborough, and thought it safer to undermine than to overthrow. He was induced to retain the command of the army ; and the existing administration was broken only by degrees. In June (1710) fell the Earl of Sunderland, the Foreign Secretary ; in August the Lord Treasurer Godolphin ; and the rest followed in succession. By some the seals of office were resigned, from others they were wrested ; and before the close of the year, the Tories were completely and triumphantly installed in the place of the Whigs. . . .”

Id., chap. ix. p. 347.

After stating the result of the negotiations between England and France, Lord Mahon adds—

“ Such, in a very few words, is the substance of the celebrated peace of Utrecht, which has always been considered a blot on the

bright annals of England; and which one of her greatest statesmen, Lord Chatham, has pronounced 'the indelible reproach of the last generation.' We may, however, be allowed to think, that whilst the glory of the war belongs to the whole people,—whilst Blenheim and Ramillies were prepared by British treasure, and won by British skill and British bravery, the disgrace of the peace, that low and unworthy result of such great achievements, should rest on only a small knot of factious partisans. Let it rest, above all, on Lord Bolingbroke; whose genius, splendid as it was, seldom worked but for evil either in philosophy or politics."

Id., chap. ix. p. 370.

* * * "It is impossible," says Mr. Hallam, "to justify the course of that negotiation which ended in the peace of Utrecht. It was at best a dangerous and inauspicious concession, demanding every compensation that could be devised, and which the circumstances of the war entitled us to require. France was still our formidable enemy; the ambition of Louis was still to be dreaded, his intrigues to be suspected. That an English minister should have thrown himself into the arms of this enemy at the first overture of negotiation; that he should have renounced advantages upon which he might have insisted; that he should have restored Lille, and almost attempted to procure the sacrifice of Tournay; that throughout the whole correspondence, and in all personal interviews with Torcy, he should have shown the triumphant Queen of Great Britain more eager for peace than her vanquished adversary; that the two courts should have been virtually conspiring against those allies, without whom we had bound ourselves to enter on no treaty; that we should have withdrawn our troops in the midst of a campaign, and even seized upon the towns of our confederates while we left them exposed to be overcome by a superior force; that we should have first deceived those confederates by the most direct falsehood in denying our clandestine treaty, and then dictated to them its acceptance, are facts so disgraceful to Bolingbroke, and in somewhat a less degree to Oxford, that they can hardly be palliated by establishing the expediency of the treaty itself."

Constit. Hist. of England, chap. xvi. vol. iii. p. 294

NOTE 3.—Page 159.

The Peace of Hubertsburg, between the King of Prussia and Maria Theresa, being signed on the 15th of February, 1763—"Six weeks afterwards Frederick made a public entry into his capital, which he had not seen for six years; he sat in an open carriage with Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick at his side, and the people of Berlin, thinned as they were in numbers, and well nigh ruined in fortunes, by the long-protracted war, greeted with enthusiastic shouts the heroes of their country. Never had any sovereign waged so arduous a contest with more undeviating spirit or more varying success. Of ten pitched battles where he commanded in person, he had been worsted in three, and victorious in seven. Of six where other chiefs directed the Prussian armies, every one, except only Prince Henry's at Freyberg, had been a defeat. According to Frederick's own computation, he had lost in these terrible seven years 180,000 soldiers, while of Russians there had fallen 120,000, of Austrians 140,000, and of French 200,000. But such numbers, vast as they seem, give a most inadequate idea of all the misery, desolation, and havoc which this warfare had wrought. Pestilence had swept away many peaceful thousands; whole districts, especially in Brandenburg and Pomerania, were turned to wastes; all the best dwellings laid in ashes; the very seed-corn in part devoured, and none but women and children left to follow the plough! An officer reports that he rode through seven villages of Hesse in which he found only one single human being; a clergyman who was boiling horse-beans for his dinner! But no dangers could vanquish, no sufferings exhaust, the patriotic spirit of the Prussians. Seeing the independence of their country at stake, they scarcely even murmured or complained; they showed themselves ready in such a cause to encounter the worst perils with unshrinking courage, and endure the worst hardships with magnanimous patience. I have always thought their conduct as a people, during the two appalling struggles of 1756 and 1813, deserving of the highest admiration. From other countries and other ages History can show several chiefs as great as Frederick, and many chiefs greater than Blücher. How few, on the contrary, are

the nations that, like the Prussian at these two periods, have stood firm against foreign invaders with the utmost energy and the utmost moderation combined,—never relenting in their just hostility, and never venting it, like some southern races, in deeds of tumult and assassination,—proud of their martial renown yet not blindly relying upon it, and always vindicating that pride by fresh achievements and accumulated glories!”

Lord Mahon's Hist. of England, ch. xxxviii. vol. iv. p. 416.

NOTE 4.—Page 161.

It is indeed scarcely possible to speak with exaggeration of the pomp and pride of power displayed during Napoleon's short residence at Dresden, at the beginning of his Russian campaign; but if it become a question of substantial strength and of the durability of the imperial power, a just estimate can be formed only by taking into consideration what Dr. Arnold has elsewhere noticed, and which stands in very significant contrast with the pageantry at Dresden:

“When Napoleon saw kings and princes bowing before him at Dresden, Wellington was advancing victoriously in Spain.”

‘Life and Correspondence,’ Appendix C, ix. 19.

In the eloquent passage in this lecture, where Dr. Arnold speaks of the tremendous power of the French emperor being checked, resisted, and put down, “by none, and by nothing but the direct and manifest interposition of God,” he gives a view of the disastrous ending of the Russian campaign that is most impressive. It is a pity to suggest any thing that will weaken that impression, but when “direct and manifest interposition of God,” apart from human agency, is spoken of, it can be understood only of the destruction of the French soldiery by the severities of the Russian winter, and that to this alone is the catastrophe to be attributed. It can hardly now be considered a question whether or no the failure of the invasion was owing entirely to the destructive cold, or to that together with ruinous consequences from the burning of Moscow. It cannot with precision be said that it was by the elements alone—cold, or fire, or both—that such destructive havoc was made with

the French army ; nor is it necessary, for the purpose of strongly presenting the thought of Divine interposition, to disparage human agency. The fierce avenging courage of men may be an instrument, in the course of Providence, no less than the pitiless cold of a Siberian winter. A note, like one of these, is not an appropriate place to examine the various causes of the ruin of the expedition into Russia, nor would I presume to discuss the military questions respecting the campaign ; but when it is stated that the discomfiture is to be ascribed to nothing but the direct and manifest interposition of God, it might be thought that the calm judgment of history did not recognise the skill and foresight in planning and executing such an invasion, and justice would not be done to that indomitable bravery with which the injured nation withstood the invasion, and the energy with which the retreating army was harassed and destroyed during the disastrous retreat. It appears to be well established as an historical result, that Napoleon entered Moscow with an army so reduced in force, and beset with so many difficulties and dangers, as to render his position a desperate one—that he began the retreat most reluctantly, as a measure of inevitable necessity, about three weeks too before the intensely cold weather came on—that, after the bloody fight at Malo-Jaroslavetz, he was compelled to retreat by the worst route, the same by which he had advanced, and that the cold only rendered more destructive the destruction that had already been begun.

In the account of “the Campaign of 1812 in Russia,” written by the Prussian general Clausewitz, who was in the Russian service, he arrives at these conclusions, p. 100 :

“ 1. That the French army reached Moscow already too much weakened for the attainment of the end of its enterprise. For the facts that one third of its force had been wasted before reaching Smolensko, and another before Moscow, could not fail to make an impression on the Russian officers in command, the Emperor, and the ministry, which put an end to all notions of peace and concession.”

“ 2. That the actions at Wiazma, Krasnoi, and the Beresina, although no large bodies could be cited as cut off, occasioned enormous losses to the French ; and that, whatever critics may say of particular moments of the transaction, the entire destruction of the

French army is to be ascribed to the unheard-of energy of the pursuit, the results of which imagination could hardly exaggerate."

Impartial French opinion, and at the same time high military authority, may be cited to show that Moscow was considered untenable for the French army even before the conflagration: it will be found in the '*Souvenirs*' of his own life by General Dumas, who served with the invading army during the campaign, that he deplored the pertinacity with which Napoleon postponed the retreat, and even considered the conflagration of Moscow a fortunate event, inasmuch as it was the means of preventing farther delay and destruction still more disastrous

"The direct and manifest interposition of God," that Dr. Arnold here speaks of, had been the subject of some lofty strains of English poetry nearly contemporary with the events; and sometimes the poet, with his higher aims of imaginative truth, is found to reach also more accuracy of fact than the historic commentator. In the present instance it is the Poet, more than the Lecturer, who does justice to human agency—to the deeds and the sufferings of men in the crisis of a desperate conflict, while the presence of a Divine power of retribution is not less recognised. The comparison to the annihilation of the Assyrian host had already been present to the imagination of Southey in one of his impassioned lyrics:

" Witness that dread retreat,
When God and nature smote
The tyrant in his pride!
No wider ruin overtook
Sennacherib's impious host;
Nor when the frantic Persian led
His veterans to the Lybian sands;
Nor when united Greece
O'er the barbaric power that victory won
Which Europe yet may bless.
A fouler tyrant cursed the groaning earth,
A fearfuller destruction was dispensed.
Victorious armies follow'd on his flight;
On every side he met
The Cossacks' dreadful spear:
On every side he saw
The injured nation rise
Invincible in arms."

In that series of poems which Wordsworth has worthily inscribed as 'dedicated to Liberty,' the subject is so treated as to show the Divine interposition made manifest in human agency as well as in the power of the elements—the work of destruction begun by the self-devotion and the courage of men, and finished by 'famine, snow, and frost :—

* * * * *

"No pitying voice commands a halt,
No courage can repel the dire assault;
Distracted, spiritless, benumbed, and blind,
Whole legions sink—and, in one instant, find
Burial and death: look for them—and descry,
When morn returns, beneath the clear blue sky
A soundless waste, a trackless vacancy!"

—


"By Moscow self-devoted to a blaze
Of dreadful sacrifice; by Russian blood
Lavish'd in fight with desperate hardihood;
The unfeeling Elements no claim shall raise
To rob our Human Nature of just praise
For what she did and suffer'd. Pledges sure
Of a deliverance absolute and pure
She gave, if Faith might tread the beaten ways
Of Providence. But now did the Most High
Exalt his still small voice;—to quell that host
Gather'd his power, a manifest ally;
He, whose heap'd waves confounded the proud boast
Of Pharaoh, said to Famine, Snow, and Frost,
'Finish the strife by deadliest victory!'"

'Poetical Works,' vol. iii. pp. 238 and 240.

NOTE 5.—Page 164.

The best way, perhaps, to correct the inadequacy here alluded to in our ordinary notions of warfare, and to obtain a theoretical sense of the importance of the 'economics' of war, will be by the perusal of the correspondence of those who are in command—for example, the official military letters of Washington, or the dispatches of Wellington. From these the reader may form some conception of the difficulty of provisioning an army—of clothing and daily feeding a large assemblage of soldiers—of the care of the sick and wounded, &c. &c. I cannot dismiss a reference to the

military correspondence of Washington and Wellington without noticing how much each is characterized by the same qualities in the writers—of good sense, or (to use a more adequate term) the highest practical wisdom—of singleness of purpose—of heroism genuine and unostentatious—of integrity and an ever-present sense of duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice; and with these qualities a straight-forward simplicity of style—such as has been truly said to be the soldierly style—the style that is common to these great captains of modern times, and to Xenophon and Cæsar.



LECTURE IV.

At the very beginning of this lecture I must myself remind you, lest it should occur to your own minds if I were to omit it, of that well-known story of the Greek sophist who discoursed at length upon the art of war, when Hannibal happened to be amongst his audience. Some of his hearers, full of admiration of his eloquence and knowledge, for such it seemed to them, eagerly applied to the great general for his judgment, not doubting that it would confirm their own. But Hannibal's answer was, that he had met with many absurd old men in his life, but never with one so absurd as this lecturer. The recollection of this story should ever be present to unmilitary men, when they attempt to speak about war; and though there may be no Hannibal actually present amongst us, yet I would wish to speak as cautiously as if my words were to be heard by one as competent to judge them as he was.

But although the story relates to the art of war only, yet it is in fact universally applicable. The unprofessional man, *ιδιώτης*, must speak with hesitation in presence of a master of his craft. And not only in his presence, but generally, he who is a stranger to any profession must be aware of his own disadvantages when speaking of the subject of that profession. Yet consider, on the other hand, that no one man in the common course of things has more than one profession; is he then to be silent, or to feel himself incapable of passing a judgment upon the subjects of all professions except that

one ? And consider farther, that professional men may labor under some disadvantages of their own, looking at their calling from within always, and never from without ; and from their very devotion to it, not being apt to see it in its relations with other matters. Farther still, the writer of history seems under the necessity of overstepping this professional barrier ; he must speak of wars, he must speak of legislation, he must often speak of religious disputes, and of questions of political economy. Yet he cannot be at once soldier, seaman, statesman, lawyer, clergyman, and merchant. Clearly then there is a distinction to be drawn somewhere, there must be a point up to which an unprofessional judgment of a professional subject may be not only competent but of high authority ; although beyond that point it cannot venture without presumption and folly.

The distinction seems to lie originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing, and that of perceiving whether it be well done or not. He who lives in the house, says Aristotle, is a better judge of its being a good or a bad one, than the builder of it. He can tell not only whether the house is good or bad, but wherein its defects consist ; he can say to the builder, This chimney smokes, or has a bad draught : or this arrangement of the rooms is inconvenient ; and yet he may be quite unable to cure the chimney, or to draw out a plan for his rooms which would on the whole suit him better. Nay, sometimes he can even see where the fault is which has caused the mischief, and yet he may not know practically how to remedy it. Following up this principle, it would appear that what we understand least in the profession of another is the detail of his practice ; we may appreciate his object, may see where he has missed it, or where he is pursuing it ill ; nay, may understand generally the method of setting about it ; but we fail in the minute details. Applying this to the art of war, and we shall see, I

think, that the part which unprofessional men can least understand is what is technically called tactic, the practical management of the men in action or even upon parade ; the handling, so to speak, of themselves, no less than the actual handling of their weapons. Let a man be as versed as he will in military history, he must well know that in these essential points of the last resort he is helpless, and the commonest sergeant, or the commonest soldier, knows infinitely more of the matter than he does. But in proportion as we recede from these details to more general points, first to what is technically called strategy, that is to say, the directing the movements of an army with a view to the accomplishment of the object of the campaign ; and next to the whole conduct of the war, as political or moral questions may affect it, in that proportion general knowledge and powers of mind come into play, and an unprofessional person may without blame speak or write on military subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently. (1)

Thus much premised, we may venture to look a little at the history of the great external contests of Europe, and as all our historians are full of descriptions of wars and battles, we will see what lessons are to be gained from them, and what questions arise out of them.

The highest authority in such matters, the Emperor Napoleon, has told us expressly that as a study for a soldier there were only four generals in modern history whose campaigns were worth following in detail ; namely, Turenne, Monteculi, Eugene of Savoy, and Frederick of Prussia. (2) It was only an unworthy feeling which made him omit the name of Marlborough ; and no one could hesitate to add to the list his own. But he spoke of generals who were dead, and of course in adding no other name to this catalogue, I am following the same rule. Marlborough and Eugene, Frederick and Napoleon, are generals whose greatness the commonest

reader can feel, because he sees the magnitude of their exploits. But the campaigns of Turenne and Montecuculi on the Rhine, where they were opposed to each other, although Napoleon's testimony is quite sufficient to establish their value as a professional study for a soldier, are yet too much confined to movements of detail to be readily appreciated by others. Turenne's military reputation we must for the most part take upon trust, not disputing it, but being unable to appreciate it. On the other hand, the general reader will turn with interest to many points of military history which Napoleon disregarded: the greatness of the stake at issue, the magnitude of the events, the moral or intellectual qualities displayed by the contending parties, are to us exceedingly interesting; although I confess that I think the interest heightened when there is added to all these elements that of consummate military ability besides.

One of the most certain of all lessons of military history, although some writers have neglected it, and some have even disputed it, is the superiority of discipline to enthusiasm. Much serious mischief has been done by an ignorance or disbelief of this truth; and if ever the French had landed in this country in the early part of the late war, we might have been taught it by a bitter experience. The defeat of Cope's army by the Highlanders at Preston Pans is no exception to this rule, for it was not the enthusiasm of the Highlanders which won the day, but their novel manner of fighting which perplexed their enemies; and the Highlanders had besides a discipline of their own which made them to a certain degree efficient soldiers. But as soon as the surprise was over, and an officer of even moderate ability was placed at the head of the royal army, the effect of the higher discipline and superior tactic of one of the regular armies of Europe became instantly visible, and the victory at Culloden was won with no difficulty. Even in France, where the natural genius of the

people for war is greater than in any other country, and although the enthusiasm of the Vendéans was directed by officers of great ability, yet the arrival of the old soldiers of the garrison of Mentz immediately decided the contest, and gave them a defeat from which they could never recover. (3) On the other hand, while not even the most military nations can become good soldiers without discipline, yet with discipline even the most unmilitary can be made efficient; of which no more striking instance can be given than the high military character of our Sepoy army in India. The first thing then to be done in all warfare, whether foreign or domestic, is to discipline our men, and till they are thoroughly disciplined to avoid above all things the exposing them to any general actions with the enemy. History is full indeed of instances of great victories gained by a very small force over a very large one; but not by undisciplined men, however brave and enthusiastic, over those who were well disciplined, except under peculiar circumstances of surprise or local advantages, such as cannot affect the truth of the general rule.

It is a question of some interest, whether history justifies the belief of an inherent superiority in some races of men over others, or whether all such differences are only accidental and temporary; and we are to acquiesce in the judgment of king Archidamus, that one man naturally differs little from another, but that culture and training makes the distinction. There are some very satisfactory examples to show that a nation must not at any rate assume lightly that it is superior to another, because it may have gained great victories over it. Judging by the experience of the period from 1796 to 1809, we might say that the French were decidedly superior to the Austrians; and so the campaign of 1806 might seem to show an equal superiority over the Prussians. Yet in the long struggle between the Austrian and

French monarchies, the military success of each are wonderfully balanced ; in 1796, whilst Napoleon was defeating army after army in Italy, the archduke Charles was driving Jourdan and Moreau before him out of Germany ; and Frederick the Great defeated the French at Rosbach as completely and easily as Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Jena. The military character of the Italians is now low : yet without going back to the Roman times, we find that in the sixteenth century the inhabitants of the Roman states were reputed to possess in an eminent degree the qualities of soldiers, and some of the ablest generals of Europe, Alexander Farnese prince of Parma, Spinola, and Montecuculi, were natives of Italy. In our own contests with France, our superiority has not always been what our national vanity would imagine it ; Philip Augustus and Louis the Ninth were uniformly successful against John and Henry the Third ; the conquests of Edward the Third and Henry the Fifth were followed by periods of equally unvaried disasters ; and descending to later times, if Marlborough was uniformly victorious, yet king William when opposed to Luxembourg, and the duke of Cumberland when opposed to Marshal Saxe, were no less uniformly beaten. Such examples are, I think, satisfactory ; for judging calmly, we would not surely wish that one nation should be uniformly and inevitably superior to another ; I do not know what national virtue could safely be subjected to so severe a temptation. If there be, as perhaps there are, some physical and moral qualities enjoyed by some nations in a higher degree than by others, and this, so far as we see, constitutionally ; yet the superiority is not so great but that a little over presumption and carelessness on one side, or a little increased activity and more careful discipline on the other, and still more any remarkable individual genius in the generals or in the government, may easily restore the balance, or even turn it the other way. It is quite a different thing

and very legitimate to feel that we have such qualities as will save us from ever being despicable enemies, or from being easily defeated by others; but it is much better that we should not feel so confident, as to think that others must always be defeated by us. (4)

But the thoughtful student of military history will find other questions suggesting themselves of a deeper interest; he will consider whether the laws of war, as at present acknowledged, are not susceptible of further improvement; he will wish to make out the real merits of certain cases, which historians seem always to decide from mere partial feelings, according to the parties concerned, rather than by any fixed principle. For what is sometimes and by one party called an heroic national resistance, is by others called insurrection and brigandage; and what, according to one version, are but strong and just severities for the maintenance of peace, are, according to another, wholesale murders and military massacres. Now certainly, if there be no other rule in this matter than the justice of either party's cause, the case is evidently incapable of decision till the end of time; for in every war, whether civil or foreign, both sides always maintain that they are in the right. But this being a point always assumed by one party and denied by the other, it is much better that it should be put aside altogether, and that the merits or demerits of what is called a national war should be tried on some more tangible and acknowledged ground. Now it seems one of the greatest improvements of the modern laws of war, that regular armies are considered to be the only belligerents, and that the inhabitants of a country which shall happen to be the seat of war, shall be regarded as neutrals, and protected both in their persons and property. It is held that such a system does but prevent gratuitous horrors; a treacherous and assassinating kind of warfare on one side, and on the other cruelties and outrages of the worst description, in

which the most helpless part of the population, the sick and the aged, women and children, are the greatest sufferers. But it is quite essential that this system of forbearance should be equally observed by both parties ; if soldiers plunder or set fire to a village they cannot complain if the inhabitants cut off their stragglers, or shoot at them from behind walls and hedges ; and, on the other hand, if the inhabitants of a village will go out on their own account to annoy an enemy's march, to interrupt his communications, and to fire upon his men wherever they can find them, they too must be patient if the enemy in return burn their village, and hang them up as brigands. For it is idle to say that the mere circumstance that an army is invading its enemy's country, puts it out of the pale of civilized hostility ; or, at any rate, if this be maintained, it is worse than idle to say that it may not retaliate this system, and put out of the pale of civilized hostility those who have begun so to deal with them. The truth is, that if war, carried on by regular armies under the strictest discipline, is yet a great evil, an irregular partisan warfare is an evil ten times more intolerable ; it is in fact no other than to give a license to a whole population to commit all sorts of treachery, rapine, and cruelty without any restraint ; letting loose a multitude of armed men, with none of the obedience and none of the honourable feelings of a soldier ; cowardly because they are undisciplined, and cruel because they are cowardly. It seems then the bounden duty of every government, not only not to encourage such irregular warfare on the part of its population, but carefully to repress it, and to oppose its enemy only with its regular troops, or with men regularly organized, and acting under authorized officers, who shall observe the ordinary humanities of civilized war. And what are called patriotic insurrections, or irregular risings of the whole population to annoy an invading army by all means, ought impartially to be condemn-

ed, by whomsoever and against whomsoever practised, as a resource of small and doubtful efficacy, but full of certain atrocity, and a most terrible aggravation of the evils of war. Of course, if an invading army sets the example of such irregular warfare, if they proceed after the manner of the ancients to lay waste the country in mere wantonness, to burn houses, and to be guilty of personal outrages on the inhabitants, then they themselves invite retaliation, and a guerilla warfare against such an invader becomes justifiable. But our censure in all cases should have reference not to the justice of the original war, which is a point infinitely disputable, but to the simple fact, which side first set the example of departing from the laws of civilized warfare, and of beginning a system of treachery and atrocity.

As this is a matter of some importance, I may be allowed to dwell a little longer upon a vague notion not uncommonly, as I believe, entertained, that a people whose country is attacked, by which is meant whose territory is the seat of war, are sustaining some intolerable wrong which they are justified in repelling by any and every means. But in the natural course of things, war must be carried on in the territory of one belligerent or of the other ; it is an accident merely if their fighting ground happen to be the country of some third party. Now it cannot be said that the party which acts on the offensive, war having been once declared, becomes in the wrong by doing so, or that the object of all invasion is conquest. You invade your enemy in order to compel him to do you justice ; that is, to force him to make peace on reasonable terms. This is your theory of the case, and it is one which must be allowed to be maintainable just as much as your enemy's, for all laws of war waive and must waive the question as to the original justice of the quarrel ; they assume that both parties are equally in the right. But suppose invasion for the sake of conquest, I do not say of the

whole of your enemy's country, but of that portion of it which you are invading; as we have many times invaded French colonies with a view to their incorporation permanently with the British dominions. Conquests of such a sort are no violations necessarily of the legitimate object of war, they may be considered as a security taken for the time to come. Yet undoubtedly the shock to the inhabitants of the particular countries so invaded is very great; it was not a light thing for the Canadian, or the inhabitant of Trinidad, or of the Cape of Good Hope, to be severed from the people of his own blood and language, from his own mother state, and to be subjected to the dominion of foreigners, men with a strange language, strange manners, a different church, and a different law. That the inhabitants of such countries should enlist very zealously in the militia, and should place the resources of defence very readily in the hands of the government, is quite just and quite their duty; I am only deprecating the notion that they should rise in irregular warfare, each man or each village for itself, and assail the invaders as their personal enemies, killing them whenever and wherever they can find them. Or again, suppose that the invasion is undertaken for the purpose of overthrowing the existing government of a country, as the attempted French descents to co-operate with the Jacobites, or the invasion of France by the coalesced powers in 1792 and 1793, and again in 1814 and 1815. When the English army advanced into France in 1814, respecting persons and property, and paying for every article of food which they took from the country, would it have been for the inhabitants to barricade every village, to have lurked in every thicket and behind every wall to shoot stragglers and sentinels, and keep up night and day a war of extermination? (5) If indeed the avowed object of the invader be the destruction not of any particular government, but of the national existence altogether; if he

thus disclaims the usual object of legitimate war, a fair and lasting peace, and declares that he makes it a war of extermination, he doubtless cannot complain if the usual laws of war are departed from against him, when he himself sets the example. But even then, when we consider what unspeakable atrocities a partisan warfare gives birth to, and that no nation attacked by an overwhelming force of disciplined armies was ever saved by such means, it may be doubted even then whether it be justifiable, unless the invader drives the inhabitants to it, by treating them from the beginning as enemies, and outraging their persons and property. If this judgment seem extreme to any one, I would only ask him to consider well first the cowardly, treacherous, and atrocious character of all guerilla warfare, and in the next place the certain misery which it entails on the country which practises it, and its inefficacy, as a general rule, to conquer or expel an enemy, however much it may annoy him.

Other questions will also occur to us, questions I grant of some theoretical and much practical difficulty, yet which surely require to be seriously considered. I allude particularly to the supposed right of sacking a town taken by assault, and of blockading a town defended not by the inhabitants but by a garrison wholly independent of their control; the known consequences of such a blockade being the starvation of the inhabitants before the garrison can be made to suffer. The extreme hardness in such cases is that the penalty falls chiefly on the innocent. When a town is sacked we do not commonly hear of the garrison being put to the sword in cold blood, on the plea that they have no right to quarter. General Philippon and his garrison laid down their arms at Badajoz, and were treated as prisoners of war, whilst the houses of the Spanish inhabitants were plundered. And be it remembered, that when we speak of plundering a town after an assault, we veil under that softer name all crimes which man

in his worst excesses can commit, horrors so atrocious that their very atrocity preserves them from our full execration. because it makes it impossible to describe them. On this subject, on the abominable character of such scenes, and the possibility of preventing them, I will give you not my own crude opinion, who know nothing of the actual state of armies at such moments, but that of a veteran soldier, who knows well the horrors of war while he deeply feels its stirring power, and its opportunities of nobleness, the historian of the war in the Spanish peninsula. General Napier's language is as follows :

“It is a common but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies the place of honour ; as if the compatibility of vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian, there was not a man who being sane would for plunder only have encountered the danger of that assault, yet under the spell of discipline all rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline however has its root in patriotism, or how could armed men be controlled at all, and it would be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the stern bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was ; there is as much difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher ; the ancient warrior fighting with the sword and reaping his harvest of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal prowess. (6) Hence preserving his original feelings, his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of violence, he differs not from other men unless often engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity, lust, and

inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said that no soldier can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honour! Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay? Soldiers of all nations receive pay. At the period of this assault, a sergeant of the twenty-eighth regiment named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers. He placed the money he was intrusted with, two thousand dollars, in the hands of a commissary, and having secured a receipt, persuaded his party to join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these are the spirits, who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear. It is precisely fear to which they are most insensible.

“Undoubtedly if soldiers read and hear that it is impossible to restrain their violence, they will not be restrained. But let the plunder of a town after an assault be expressly made criminal by the articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to military honour and discipline as it is to morality; let a select permanent body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army, and be charged to follow storming columns to aid in preserving order, and with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary valour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance of the service, should be ensured to the successful troops, and always paid without delay. This money might be taken as ransom from enemies, but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor,

government should furnish the amount. With such regulations, the storming of towns would not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in the field.”*

The other case on which it seems desirable that the law of nations should either be amended, or declared more clearly and enforced in practice, is that of the blockade of towns not defended by their inhabitants, in order to force their surrender by starvation. And here let us try to realize to ourselves what such a blockade is. We need not, unhappily, draw a fancied picture; history, and no remote history either, will supply us with the facts. Some of you, I doubt not, remember Genoa; you have seen that queenly city with its streets of palaces, rising tier above tier from the water, girdling with the long lines of its bright white houses the vast sweep of its harbour, the mouth of which is marked by a huge natural mole of rock, crowned by its magnificent light-house tower. You remember how its white houses rose out of a mass of fig, and olive, and orange-trees, the glory of its old patrician luxury; you may have observed the mountains behind the town spotted at intervals by small circular low towers, one of which is distinctly conspicuous where the ridge of the hills rises to its summit, and hides from view all the country behind it. Those towers are the forts of the famous lines, which, curiously resembling in shape the later Syracusan walls enclosing Epipolæ, converge inland from the eastern and western extremities of the city, looking down, the western line on the valley of the Polcevera, the eastern on that of the Bisagno, till they meet as I have said on the summit of the mountains, where the hills cease to rise from the sea, and become more or less of a table-land running off towards the interior, at the distance, as well as I remember, of between two and three miles from the outside of the city. Thus a very large open space is enclosed within the lines, and Genoa

* History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. vi. p. 215

is capable therefore of becoming a vast entrenched camp, holding not so much a garrison as an army. In the autumn of 1799 the Austrians had driven the French out of Lombardy and Piedmont; their last victory of Fossano or Genola had won the fortress of Coni or Cuneo close under the Alps, and at the very extremity of the plain of the Po; the French clung to Italy only by their hold of the Riviera of Genoa, the narrow strip of coast between the Apennines and the sea, which extends from the frontiers of France almost to the mouth of the Arno. Hither the remains of the French force were collected, commanded by General Massena, and the point of chief importance to his defence was the city of Genoa. Napoleon had just returned from Egypt, and was become First Consul; but he could not be expected to take the field till the following spring, and till then Massena was hopeless of relief from without, every thing was to depend on his own pertinacity. The strength of his army made it impossible to force it in such a position as Genoa; but its very numbers, added to the population of a great city, held out to the enemy a hope of reducing it by famine; and as Genoa derives most of its supplies by sea, Lord Keith, the British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, lent the assistance of his naval force to the Austrians, and by the vigilance of his cruisers, the whole coasting trade right and left along the Riviera was effectually cut off. It is not at once that the inhabitants of a great city, accustomed to the daily sight of well-stored shops and an abundant market, begin to realize the idea of scarcity; or that the wealthy classes of society, who have never known any other state than one of abundance and luxury, begin seriously to conceive of famine. But the shops were emptied, and the store-houses began to be drawn upon; and no fresh supply or hope of supply appeared. Winter passed away, and spring returned, so early and so beautiful on that garden-like coast,

sheltered as it is from the north winds by its belt of mountains, and open to the full rays of the southern sun. Spring returned, and clothed the hill sides within the lines with its fresh verdure. But that verdure was no longer the mere delight of the careless eye of luxury, refreshing the citizens by its liveliness and softness when they rode or walked up thither from the city to enjoy the surpassing beauty of the prospect. The green hill-sides were now visited for a very different object; ladies of the highest rank might be seen cutting up every plant which it was possible to turn to food, and bearing home the common weeds of our road sides as a most precious treasure. The French general pitied the distress of the people, but the lives and strength of his garrison seemed to him more important than the lives of the Genoese, and such provisions as remained were reserved in the first place for the French army. Scarcity became utter want, and want became famine. In the most gorgeous palaces of that gorgeous city, no less than in the humblest tenements of its humblest poor, death was busy; not the momentary death of battle or massacre, nor the speedy death of pestilence, but the lingering and most miserable death of famine. Infants died before their parents' eyes, husbands and wives lay down to expire together. A man whom I saw at Genoa in 1825 told me that his father and two of his brothers had been starved to death in this fatal siege. So it went on, till in the month of June, when Napoleon had already descended from the Alps into the plain of Lombardy, the misery became unendurable, and Massena surrendered. But before he did so, twenty thousand innocent persons, old and young, women and children, had died by the most horrible of deaths which humanity can endure. Other horrors which occurred besides during this blockade I pass over; the agonizing death of twenty thousand innocent and helpless persons requires nothing to be added to it. (7)

Now is it right that such a tragedy as this should take place, and that the laws of war should be supposed to justify the authors of it? Conceive having been a naval officer in Lord Keith's squadron at that time, and being employed in stopping the food which was being brought for the relief of such misery. For the thing was done deliberately; the helplessness of the Genoese was known, their distress was known; it was known that they could not force Massena to surrender; it was known that they were dying daily by hundreds; yet week after week, and month after month, did the British ships of war keep their iron watch along all the coast: no vessel nor boat laden with any article of provision could escape their vigilance. One cannot but be thankful that Nelson was spared from commanding at this horrible blockade of Genoa.

Now on which side the law of nations should throw the guilt of most atrocious murder, is of little comparative consequence, or whether it should attach it to both sides equally; but that the deliberate starving to death of twenty thousand helpless persons should be regarded as a crime in one or both of the parties concerned in it, seems to me self-evident. The simplest course would seem to be that all non-combatants should be allowed to go out of a blockaded town, and that the general who should refuse to let them pass, should be regarded in the same light as one who were to murder his prisoners, or who were to be in the habit of butchering women and children. For it is not true that war only looks to the speediest and most effectual way of attaining its object, so that as the letting the inhabitants go out would enable the garrison to maintain the town longer, the laws of war authorize the keeping them in and starving them. Poisoning wells might be a still quicker method of reducing a place, but do the laws of war therefore sanction it? I shall not be supposed for a moment to be placing the guilt of the individuals

concerned in the two cases which I am going to compare, on an equal footing ; it would be most unjust to do so, for in the one case they acted, as they supposed, according to a law which made what they did their duty. But take the cases themselves, and examine them in all their circumstances ; the degree of suffering inflicted, the innocence and helplessness of the sufferers, the interests at stake, and the possibility of otherwise securing them ; and if any man can defend the lawfulness in the abstract of the starvation of the inhabitants of Genoa, I will engage also to establish the lawfulness of the massacres of September.

Other points of the received law of nations might be noticed, and more especially of maritime law, which require, to say the least, a full reconsideration. They will suggest themselves to the attentive reader of history, if his thoughts have been once turned in that direction. And, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, any defect in national law is surely no less important than a defect in civil law ; to lend a sanction to the passions and injustice of men where they operate most extensively, is a sad perversion of the nature of law ; it is that corruption of the noblest thing which is itself the vilest. But in these inquiries, amidst all our condemnation of a bad law, we must remember that its very evil consists mainly in this, that it throws its sanction over crime ; that is, that men commit crime as a thing lawful. The magnitude of the evil of a bad law is, I was almost going to say, the measure of the allowance to be granted to the individuals whom it misleads ; at any rate it greatly diminishes their guilt. And for this reason I chose in the instances which I gave of faulty national law, to take those in which our countrymen acted upon the bad law, rather than those in which it was acted upon by foreigners or enemies. In our own case we are willing enough to make that allowance which in the case of others we might be inclined to refuse.

Generally, however, I confess, that amongst ourselves, and when we are not concerned to establish our own just claims to the respect of others, I think that it is more useful to contemplate our own national faults and the worthy deeds of other nations, than to take the opposite course; or even to dwell singly upon our own glories, or on the dishonour of others. For there can be, I imagine, no danger of our admiring our neighbours too much, or ourselves too little. It cannot be necessary to enlarge before an English audience upon the greatness of England, whether past or present: it cannot be necessary for an Englishman to express in so many words his love and admiration for his country. It is because England is so great, and our love for our country is so deep and so just, that we can not only afford to dwell upon the darker spots in our history, but we absolutely require them, lest our love and admiration should become idolatrous; it is because we are only too apt to compare foreign nations with ourselves unfavourably, that it is absolutely good for us to contemplate what they have suffered unjustly or done worthily.

Connected with the last point which I have been noticing, is another which appears to me of importance in studying military or external history, and that is, to apprehend correctly in every war what are the merits of the quarrel. I do not mean only so far as such an apprehension is essential to our sympathizing rightly with either of the parties concerned in it, but with a higher object; that we may see, namely, what have been ordinarily the causes of wars, and then consider whether they have been sufficient to justify recourse to such an extreme arbitrament. For as I speak freely of the intense interest of military history, and the great sympathy due to the many heroic qualities which war calls into action, so we must never forget that war is after all a very great evil; and though I believe that theoretically the Quakers are wrong in pronouncing all wars to be unjustifiable, yet I con-

less that historically the exceptions to their doctrine have been comparatively few ; that is to say, as in every war one party I suppose must be to blame, so in most wars both parties have been blameable ; and the wars ought never to have taken place at all. Two cases of wars where both parties appear to me more or less to blame, I will now give by way of example. It sometimes happens, especially in the intercourse of a civilized nation with barbarians, that the subjects of one nation persist in a course of conduct at variance with the laws of the other ; and that the party thus aggrieved takes its redress into its own hands and punishes the offenders, summarily, with over severity perhaps, and sometimes mistakenly : that is, the individuals punished may in that particular case be innocent ; as it has often happened that when soldiers fire upon a riotous crowd, some harmless passers by are the sufferers, although they had no concern whatever in the riot. It cannot be denied that the party originally aggrieved has now given some just cause of complaint against itself ; yet it is monstrous in the original aggressor to prosecute his quarrel forthwith by arms, or to insist peremptorily on receiving satisfaction for the wrong done to him, without entering into the question of the previous and unprovoked wrong which had been done by him. For after all, the balance of wrong is not, when all things are taken into the account, so much as brought to a level : the original debtor is the debtor still ; some counter claims he has upon his creditor ; but the balance of the account is against him. Yet he goes to war as if it were not only in his favour, but as if his adversary had suffered no wrong at all, and he had done none.

The other case is one of greater difficulty, and has been the fruitful parent of wars continued from generation to generation. This is where nations suspect each other, and the suspicion has in the case of either enough to justify it. Thus what one party claims as a security, the other regards

as a fresh aggression; and so the quarrel goes on interminably. The Punic wars in ancient history are one instance of this: the long wars between France and the coalesced powers in our own times are another. At a given moment in the contest the government on one side may feel sure of its own honest intentions, and suspect with justice the hostile disposition of its rival. But in all fairness, the previous steps of the struggle must be reviewed; have our predecessors never acted in such a way as to inspire suspicion justly? We stand in their place, the inheritors of their cause, and the suspicions which their conduct occasioned still survive towards us. Our enemy is dealing insincerely with us, because he cannot be persuaded that we mean fairly by him. A great evil, and one almost endless, if each party refuses to put itself in the other's place, and presses merely the actual fact of the moment, that while it is dealing in all sincerity, its adversary is meditating only deceit and hostility. In such cases I cannot but think that the guilt of the continued quarrel must be divided, not equally perhaps, but divided, between both the belligerents.

And now coming to the mere history of military operations themselves, in what manner may a common reader best enter into them, and read them with interest? It is notorious, I believe, that our ordinary notions of wars are very much those which we find in the accounts of the Samnite wars in Livy. (8) We remember the great battles, sometimes with much particularity; but they stand in our memory as isolated events; we cannot connect them with each other, we know not what led to them, nor what was their bearing on the fate of the campaign. Sometimes, it is true, this is of no great consequence; for the previous movements were no more than the Homeric—

Οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἰόντες,

the armies marched out to meet each other, and the battle decided every thing. But in complicated wars it is very different. Take for instance the wars of Frederick the Great; we may remember that he was defeated at Kolin, at Hochkirchen, and at Cunersdorf; that he was victorious at Rosbach, at Lissa, at Zorndorf, and at Torgau; but how far are we still from comprehending the action of the war, and appreciating his extraordinary ability. To do this, a good map is essential; a map which shall exhibit the hills of a country, its principal roads, and its most important fortresses. To understand the operations of the Seven Years' War, we must comprehend the situation of the Prussian dominions with respect to those of the allies, and must know also their geographical character, as well as that of the countries immediately adjoining them. We must observe the importance of Saxony, as covering Prussia on the side of Austria; the importance of Silesia, as running in deeply within what may be called the line of the Austrian frontier, and flanking a large part of Bohemia. For these reasons Frederick began the war by surprising Saxony, and amidst all his difficulties clung resolutely to the possession of Silesia. His vulnerable side was on the east towards Russia; and had the Russian power been in any degree such as it became afterwards, he would have lost Berlin not once only, but permanently. But the Russian armies being better fitted for defence than offence, even their great victory of Cunersdorf was followed by no important consequences, and Frederick was able generally to leave the defence of his eastern frontiers to his generals, and to devote his own attention to the great struggle with Austria on the side of Saxony and Silesia.

Connected with the details of military history, and in itself in many respects curious, is the history, so far as it can be traced, of great roads and fortresses; for these, like all other earthly things, change from age to age, and if we do not

know or observe these changes, the military history of one period will be almost unintelligible, if judged of according to the roads and fortresses of another. For example, there are at present three great lines of communication between the northwest of Italy and the Rhone : one is the coast road from Nice to Marseilles, and Tarascon or Avignon ; another is the road over Mont Cenis upon Montmeillan, and so descending the valley of the Isere by Grenoble upon Valence ; a third is the road so well known to all travellers, from Montmeillan upon Chamberri, and from thence by Les Echelles upon Lyons. But in the early part of the sixteenth century, I find in the work of an Italian, named Gratarolo, who wrote a sort of guide for travellers, that the principal line of communication between Italy and the Rhone was one which it now requires a good map even to trace ; it crossed the Alps by the Mont Genève, descended for a certain distance along the valley of the Durance, and then struck off to the right, and went straight towards Avignon, by a little place called Sault, and by Carpentras. The abandonment in many instances of the line of the Roman roads in Italy is owing, as I have been informed, to the extreme insecurity of travelling during a long period ; so that according to the description of a similar state of things in Scripture, "the highways were unoccupied, and the travellers walked through by-ways." Merchants and those who were obliged to go from place to place followed by-roads, as nearly parallel as they could find them to the line of the great roads ; and when a better state of things returned, the by-roads were become so much in use, that they remained the ordinary lines of communication, and the great roads of the Roman time went to ruin. So again with fortresses ; when Charles the Fifth invaded Champagne in the sixteenth century, his army was resisted by the little town of St. Dizier, which is now perfectly open, and incapable of stopping an enemy for half an hour ; while

the fortresses which resisted the Prussians in 1792, Longwy and Verdun, seem to have been in Charles the Fifth's days of no consequence whatever. The great Piedmontese fortress at this day is Alessandria, which I think hardly occurs in the military history of Piedmont previously to the wars of the French revolution. On the other hand, Turin itself, which was besieged so elaborately by Marshal Marsin in 1706, and so effectually relieved by Prince Eugene's victorious assault on the besiegers' lines, and the citadel of which was a fortress of some importance so late as 1799, is now wholly an open town, and its ramparts are become a promenade.

When speaking of the altered lines of roads, one is naturally led to think of the roads over great mountain chains, of which so many have been newly opened in our own days; and a few words on mountain warfare, which has been called the poetry of the military art, shall conclude this lecture. But by mountain warfare I do not mean the mere attack or defence of a mountain pass, such as we read of in the Tyrolese insurrection of 1809; but the attack and defence of a whole mountain country, comprehending a line perhaps of eighty or a hundred miles. You have here almost all the elements of interest in war met together; the highest exercise of skill in the general in the combination of his operations; the greatest skill and energy in the officers and soldiers in overcoming or turning to account the natural difficulties of the ground; and the picturesque and poetical charm of the grouping together of art and nature, of the greatest works and efforts of man with the highest magnificence of natural scenery. One memorable instance of this grand mountain warfare was the contest in the Pyrenees in 1813; another may be found in Napoleon's operations in the Apennines, in the beginning of the campaign of 1796, and those in the valley of the Adige in January. 1797; a third, and in some re-

spects the most striking of all, was the struggle in Switzerland in 1799, when the eastern side of Switzerland was made as it were one vast fortress, which the French defended against the attacks of the allies. In such warfare, a general must bear constantly in mind the whole anatomy of the mountains which he is defending or attacking: the geographical distance of the several valleys and passes from each other, their facilities of lateral communication, their exact bearings and windings, as well as the details of their natural features, and resources. He must also conceive the disposition of his enemy's army, the force at each particular point, and the facilities of massing a large force at any one point in a given time. For a blow struck with effect at any one spot is felt along the whole line; and the strongest positions are sometimes necessarily abandoned without firing a shot, merely because a point has been carried at the distance of thirty or forty miles from them, by which the enemy may penetrate within their line and threaten their rear. And surely the moving forty or fifty thousand men with such precision, that marching from many different quarters they may be all brought together at a given hour on a given spot, is a very magnificent combination, if we consider how many points must be embraced at once in the mind, in order to its conception, and how many more are essential to its successful execution. But lest I should seem here forgetting my own caution, and imitating the presumption of Hannibal's sophist, I will only refer you to General Mathieu Dumas' History of the Campaigns of 1799 and 1800, in which, illustrated as it is by its notes, you will find a very clear account of the particular contest in Switzerland, and some general remarks on mountain warfare, very clear and very interesting. (9)

The subject is so vast that it would not be easy to exhaust it; but enough has been said perhaps to fulfil my immediate object, that of noticing some of the questions and difficulties

which occur in military history ; and I have lingered long enough upon ground on which my right as an unmilitary man to enter at all may possibly be questioned. Here then I shall end what I have to say with regard to external history . it follows that we should penetrate a little deeper, and endeavour to find some clue to guide us through the labyrinth of opinions and parties, political and religious, which constitute at once the difficulty and the interest of internal history.

NOTES

TO

LECTURE IV.

NOTE 1.—Page 183.

IN one of the prefaces to his History of Rome, Dr. Arnold writes :
* * “I am well aware of the great difficulty of giving liveliness to a narrative which necessarily gets all its facts at second-hand. And a writer who has never been engaged in any public transactions, either of peace or war, must feel this especially. One who is himself a statesman and orator, may relate the political contests even of remote ages with something of the spirit of a contemporary ; for his own experience realizes to him in a great measure the scenes and the characters which he is describing. And in like manner a soldier or a seaman can enter fully into the great deeds of ancient warfare ; for although in outward form ancient battles and sieges may differ from those of modern times, yet the genius of the general and the courage of the soldier, the call for so many of the highest qualities of our nature, which constitutes the enduring moral interest of war, are common alike to all times ; and he who has fought under Wellington has been in spirit an eye-witness of the campaigns of Hannibal. But a writer whose whole experience has been confined to private life and to peace, has no link to connect him with the actors and great deeds of ancient history, except the feelings of our common humanity. He cannot realize civil contests or battles with the vividness of a statesman and a soldier ; he can but enter into them as a man ; and his general knowledge of human nature, his love of great and good actions, his sympathy with virtue, his abhorrence of vice, can alone assist him in making himself as it were a witness of what he attempts to describe. But these even by

themselves will do much ; and if an historian feels as a man and as a citizen, there is hope that, however humble his experience, he may inspire his readers with something of his own interest in the events of his history."

History of Rome, vol. ii. Preface

NOTE 2.—Page 183.

"It is curious to observe how readily men mistake accidental distinctions for such as are really essential. A lively writer, the author of the 'Bubbles from the Brunnen of Nassau,' ridicules the study of what is called ancient history ; and as an instance of its uselessness, asks what lessons in the art of war can be derived from the insignificant contests which took place *before the invention of gunpowder*. Now it so happens that one who well knew what military lessons were instructive, the emperor Napoleon, has selected out of the whole range of history the campaigns of seven generals only, as important to be studied by an officer professionally in all their details ; and of these seven three belong to the times of Greece and Rome, namely, Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar. See Napoleon's 'Mélanges Historiques,' tome ii. p. 10."

Arnold's *Thucydides*, vol. iii. Preface, p. 20, note

NOTE 3.—Page 185.

When Mentz was taken by the allied army in 1793, the French garrison was allowed to march out, without being made prisoners of war, and only under a stipulation that they were not to serve against the allies for a year. The consequence of which was, that these disciplined veterans were afterwards hurried, under the command of Kleber, into La Vendée, and against them, as Dr. Arnold has observed, the heroism and enthusiasm of the Vendéans, before victorious, was quickly found an unequal match. Goethe, who was present with the Duke of Brunswick during the siege, has given a curious account of the personal appearance of the veterans by whom this important fortress of Mayence had been stoutly defended. On one occasion, riding over the ground after a bold sortie in the night by the besieged garrison, he says, "The sun rose with a dull light, and

the sacrifices of the night were lying side by side. Our German cuirassiers, men of gigantic stature and well clothed, presented a strange contrast with the dwarfish, insignificant-looking, tattered Sansculottes." When the garrison surrendered and marched out, he afterwards adds, "Never was any thing stranger than the way in which they came upon our sight; a column of Marseillois, all small and black-looking, and clad in particoloured rags, came pattering along, as if King Edwin had opened his mountain and sent forth his merry host of dwarfs. After these followed troops of a more regular description, with serious and dissatisfied visages, with no look however of being ashamed or out of heart. But what had the most striking appearance was when the *chasseurs à cheval* rode forward in their turn. They had advanced in silence to our station, when their band struck up the Marseillaise march. This revolutionary *Te Deum* has, under any circumstances, somewhat of a mournful expression, let it be played in ever so quick time, but on this occasion they gave it a slow movement, and so came slowly along. It was an impressive and fearful sight when the horsemen, long, lean men, all with a veteran look, rode slowly forward, with faces as solemn and mournful as the tones of their music. Individually they might have reminded one of Don Quixote, but as a body their appearance was such as to inspire awe." "*Belagerung von Maintz.*"

NOTE 4.—Page 187.

"I never felt more keenly the wish to see the peace between the two countries (England and France) perpetual; never could I be more indignant at the folly and wickedness which on both sides of the water are trying to rekindle the flames of war. The one effect of the last war ought to be to excite in both nations the greatest mutual respect. France with the aid of half Europe could not conquer England; England, with the aid of all Europe, never could have overcome France, had France been zealous and united in Napoleon's quarrel. When Napoleon saw kings and princes bowing before him at Dresden, Wellington was advancing victoriously in Spain; when a million of men in 1815 were invading France, Napoleon engaged for three days with two armies, each singly equal

to his own, and was for two days victorious. Equally and utterly false are the follies uttered by silly men of both countries, about the certainty of one beating the other. 'Οὐ πόλυ διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, is especially applicable here. When Englishmen and Frenchmen meet in war, each may know that they will meet in the other all a soldier's qualities, skill, activity, and undaunted courage, with bodies able to do the bidding of the spirit either in action or in endurance. England and France may do each other incalculable mischief by going to war, both physically and morally; but they can gain for themselves, or hope to gain, nothing. It were an accursed wish in either to wish to destroy the other, and happily the wish would be as utterly vain as it would be wicked." 1840.

Life and Correspondence, Appendix C, ix. 19

The allusion, both in the text and in the above extract, to King Archidamus, refers to some of the words of cautious counsel he gave to his countrymen in the public deliberations held at Sparta before the hostilities in the Peloponnesian War—πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐδεὶς νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαϊοτάτοις παίδεσθαι, *Thucydides*, i. 84; or in Dr. Arnold's paraphrase—"One man is practically much the same as another; or if there be any difference, it is that he who has been taught what is most needful, and has never troubled himself with superfluous accomplishments, is the best and most valuable."

General Dumas, in a note in the fourth volume of his "*Précis des Evénemens Militaires*," alludes to the peculiar vivacity of French character as an important element in sustaining the national spirit under the depression of military reverses, and gives a pleasant instance of the expression of such feeling:

"A l'époque de la paix de 1762, quand les Anglais parvinrent, par les malheurs de la guerre sur le continent, à humilier la marine française, Favart, connu seulement par quelques ouvrages dramatiques du genre le plus léger, mais pleins de grâce, inspiré cette fois par cet esprit public recélé dans le cœur des Français comme le feu dans le caillou, fit le couplet suivant, qui mérite d'être conservé, et ne saurait être reproduit plus à propos:

"Le coq français est le coq de la gloire ;
 Par les revers il n'est point abattu ;
 Il chante fort, s'il gagne la victoire ;
 Encor plus fort quand il est bien battu :
 Le coq français est le coq de la gloire ;
 Toujours chanter est sa grande vertu,
 Est-il imprudent, est-il sage ?
 C'est ce qu'on ne peut définir ;
 Mais qui ne perd jamais courage,
 Se rend maître de l'avenir."

Dr. Arnold has noticed the resemblance of Athenian and French vivacity, in preserving unbroken self-confidence amidst the greatest disasters, and that Favart's epigram is almost a paraphrase of the language of the Corinthians as applied to the Athenians—

"κρατοῦντες τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται, καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστοι
 ἀναπίπτουσιν." *Thucydides*, book i. 70, note.

NOTE 5.—Page 190.

In one of the Duke of Wellington's dispatches, dated at St. Jean de Luz, 1st Jan., 1814, he remarks to Earl Bathurst, "It is a curious circumstance that we are the protectors of the property of the inhabitants against the plunder of their own armies; and their cattle, property, etc., are driven into our lines for protection."

The difficulty in preventing plunder was chiefly felt with regard to the Spanish and Portuguese troops, who were under violent temptation, now they were on French ground, after having witnessed such havoc and desolation by pillaging in their own countries. The following characteristic letter of Wellington's was written on the occasion to the general of the Spanish forces.

"*St. Jean de Luz, 23d Decem., 1813.*

"TO GENERAL MORILLO—

"Before I gave the orders of the ———th, of which you and the officers under your command have made such repeated complaints, I warned you repeatedly of the misconduct of your troops, in direct disobedience of my orders, which I told you I could not permit; and I desired you to take measures to prevent it.

"I have sent orders to countermand those which I gave on the

18th; but I give you notice that whatever may be the consequence I shall repeat those orders, if your troops are not made, by their officers, to conduct themselves as well-disciplined soldiers ought.

"I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army under my command into the French territory, in order that the soldiers might plunder and ill-treat the French peasantry, in positive disobedience to my orders; and I beg that you and your officers will understand that I prefer to have a small army, that will obey my orders and preserve discipline, to a large one, that is disobedient and undisciplined; and that if the measures which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and good order, occasion the loss of men, and the reduction of my force, it is totally indifferent to me; and the fault rests with those who, by the neglect of their duty, suffer their soldiers to commit disorders which must be prejudicial to their country.

"I cannot be satisfied with professions of obedience. My orders must be really obeyed, and strictly carried into execution; and if I cannot obtain obedience in one way, I will in another, or I will not command the troops which disobey me."

In a letter to the Portuguese General Freyre, Wellington writes in French as characteristic as his English: * * "pour moi, je déclare que je ne désire pas un commandement, ni l'union des nations, si l'un ou l'autre doit être fondé sur le pillage. J'ai perdu 20,000 hommes dans cette campagne, et ce n'est pas pour que le Général Morillo, ni qui que ce soit, puisse venir piller les paysans Français; et, où je commande, je déclare hautement que je ne le permettrai pas. Si on veut piller, qu'on nomme un autre à commander, parceque, moi, je déclare que, si on est sous mes ordres, il ne faut pas piller.

"Vous avez des grandes armées en Espagne; et si on veut piller les paysans Français, on n'a qu'à m'ôter le commandement, et entrer en France. Je couvrirai l'Espagne contre les malheurs qui en seront le résultat; c'est à dire, que vos armées, quelques grandes qu'elles puissent être, ne pourront pas rester en France pendant 15 jours. * *

"Je pourrais dire quelque chose aussi en justification de ce que j'ai fait, qui regarderait la politique; mais j'ai assez dit, et je vous répète, qu'i. m'est absolument indifférent que je commande une

grande ou une petite armée; mais que, qu'elle soit grande ou petite, il faut qu'elle m'obéisse, et surtout *qu'elle ne pille pas.*"

Wellington's '*Dispatches and General Orders*,' 863.

NOTE 6.—Page 192.

* * "The manner of war, which affords most opportunity for personal prowess, and requires most individual exertion, calls forth more personal feeling, and, consequently, fiercer passions. How much more murderous would battles be, if they were decided by the sword and bayonet; how few prisoners would be taken, and how little mercy shown!

"*Montesinos*. In proof of this, more Englishmen fell at Towton, than in any of Marlborough's battles, or at Waterloo.

"*Sir Thomas More*. In war, then, it is manifestly better that men, in general, should act in masses as machines, than with an individual feeling.

"*Montesinos*. I remember to have read or heard of a soldier in our late war, who was one day told by his officer to take aim when he fired, and make sure of his man. 'I cannot do it, sir,' was his reply. 'I fire into their ranks, and that does as well; but to single out one among them, and mark him for death, would lie upon my mind afterwards.' The man who could feel thus, was worthy of a better station than that in which his lot had been assigned.

"*Sir Thomas More*. And yet, *Montesinos*, such a man was well placed, if not for present welfare, for his lasting good. A soul that can withstand the hearthardening tendencies of a military life, is strengthened and elevated by it. In what other station could he have attained that quiet dignity of mind, that consciousness of moral strength, which is possessed by those who, living daily in the face of death, live also always in the fear of God?"

Southey's '*Colloquies*,' vol. i., p. 210.

NOTE 7.—Page 196.

A detailed and graphic description of the sufferings and horrors of the siege of Genoa, is given in Botta's History of Italy, chapter 19.

NOTE 8.—Page 201.

* * “Of the Samnite people we can gain no distinct notions whatever. Unknown and unnoticed by the early Greek writers, they had been well nigh exterminated before the time of those Roman writers whose works have come down to us; and in the Augustan age, nothing survived of them but a miserable remnant, retaining no traceable image of the former state of the nation. Our knowledge of the Samnites is literally limited to the single fact, that they were a brave people, who clung resolutely to their national independence. * * The very story of their wars with Rome, having been recorded by no contemporary historian, has been corrupted, as usual, by the Roman vanity; and neither the origin of the contest, nor its circumstances, nor the terms of the several treaties which were made before its final issue, have been related truly.

* * “Every step in the Samnite and Latin wars has been so disguised by the Roman annalists, that a probable narrative of these events can only be given by a free correction of their falsifications. The case of Capua applying for aid to Rome against the Samnites, was exactly that of Corcyra asking help from Athens against Corinth. * * So truly is real history a lesson of universal application, that we should understand the war between Rome and Samnium far better from reading Thucydides’ account of the war between Corinth and Corcyra, than from Livy’s corrupted story of the very events themselves.

* * “Livy himself (viii. 40) deplores the want of all contemporary writers for the times of the Samnite wars, as one great cause of the hopeless confusion in which the story of those wars was involved.”

History of Rome, vol. ii., chap. xxviii.

NOTE 9.—Page 205.

“On s’étonnera que tant de barrières, qui passaient pour être des obstacles insurmontables à la marche d’une armée, aient été forcées, et que la défense opiniâtre et très active d’un nombre de troupes, que certainement on eût autrefois jugé surabondant pour fermer

tous ces passages, n'aient pas arrêté plus long-temps l'armée attaquante. On demandera s'il y avait plus d'ardeur dans l'attaque, moins de vigueur et de constance dans la défense ; si l'on employa de nouvelles armes, de nouveaux moyens dans les combats ; si les rapports et les applications des manœuvres des diverses armes aux différentes natures de pays et de terrain furent changés ? Non, sans doute, et très vraisemblablement l'art de la guerre avait déjà atteint, sous tous ces rapports, son plus haut période. Le César de notre âge, Frédéric II., avait laissé peu de découvertes à faire, ou à perfectionner dans la tactique moderne.

“ Mais à mesure que les combinaisons générales se sont étendues, il en a été des postes les plus forts, et des lieux réputés inexpugnables dans les pays de montagnes, comme des places dans les pays de plaine : si ces postes n'assurent la possession des sommités les plus hautes et les plus escarpées, s'ils ne sont la clef des moindres interstices dans la chaîne, celle des premiers passages ouverts par les eaux, et qui, s'agrandissant peu à peu, et s'aplanissant en suivant leur cours, donnent l'entrée des vallées fertiles et étendues ; ils n'ont qu'une importance relative et momentanée.

“ Depuis que les voyageurs ont frayé des sentiers à travers les abîmes de glaces, depuis que de nouvelles régions ont été explorées, l'art de la guerre, qui s'empare de tout, qui s'accroît de tous les progrès de l'esprit humain, a fait tenter de nouveaux hasards, a fait faire de nouvelles expériences ; et le talent et l'audace militaires n'ont pas dû exciter les hommes à des efforts moindres, que ceux qu'inspirait l'amour des sciences ou la simple curiosité des voyageurs.

“ Dès qu'on a su gravir les cimes glacées des Alpes, et porter des corps de troupes et de l'artillerie par des sentiers, à peine tentés par les plus intrépides chasseurs, on a bientôt formé de grands plans d'attaque et de défense, comme la nature avait elle-même lié les arêtes et les hauteurs moyennes aux chaînes et aux masses principales ; on a surpris ses secrets ; on a reconnu son ordre immuable jusque dans ses caprices les plus bizarres ; le chaos des grandes Alpes a été débrouillé, les cartes topographiques perfectionnées, les moindres détails recueillis ; on a figuré des reliefs avec un art et une précision inconnus jusqu'à nos jours. Cette connaissance exacte de la grande charpente, de *l'ostéologie* des montagnes, (si on veut nous permettre cette expression,) a inspiré aux

généraux et aux officiers d'état major des idées plus grandes et plus simples. Les communications plus pratiquées ont été examinées avec plus d'attention ; enfin, il s'est établi une nouvelle échelle pour les opérations dans la guerre de montagnes ; on a osé détacher des corps à de grandes distances, pour s'assurer du point qui rendait maître des grands intervalles.

“ Ces avantages furent si bien saisis de part et d'autre dans la guerre de Suisse, que les coups portés sur la frontière de Tyrol et des Grisons à trente et quarante lieues des positions centrales des armées, étaient ressentis à l'instant, obligeaient à faire des mouvemens, faisaient changer les desseins, comme si ces divisions séparées par tant de difficultés, par tant de retranchemens naturels, avaient été contiguës.

“ Aucun obstacle ne pouvant arrêter le mouvement général, du moins assez long-temps pour obliger le parti supérieur en force à se départir du plan simple d'opérations, qu'on pourrait appeler le plan naturel, et qui consiste à déborder les ailes de son ennemi, tourner et ruiner leurs appuis, il en est résulté que, dans la guerre de montagnes, la force des postes et des positions ne balance plus autant qu'autrefois la supériorité du nombre.

“ Nous pensons que le nouveau système de guerre de postes, dans les actions générales entre toutes les parties des armées opposées, a reçu un grand développement dans la guerre de Suisse, et qu'il est aussi utile qu'intéressant d'observer, sous ces rapports, les succès et les revers, les fautes commises et les traits d'habileté. Nous laissons à nos lecteurs le soin d'appliquer ces observations aux exemples qui les justifient ; les plus remarquables se trouvent dans la rapide invasion du pays des Grisons, dans les opérations du général Lecourbe, et dans celles des généraux Laudon et Bellegarde, que nous avons rapportées ; enfin, dans la première retraite du général Massena, forcé de concentrer ses forces sur Zurich, de replier sa droite en-deçà du Mont Saint-Gothard et des petits cantons, et de céder à l'Archiduc en moins de quinze jours, presque tout le cours du Rhin et la moitié du territoire de la Suisse.”

Dumas : “ Précis des Evénemens Militaires,” i. ch. 3me.

“ Comme les habitans des pays montagneux et sauvages sont ordinairement les plus courageux, et du moins les plus hardis, parce

qu'ils sont accoutumés à surmonter les obstacles que leur oppose l'asperité du sol, et qu'ils sont forcés à des marches pénibles, à des travaux souvent périlleux; on doit remarquer aussi que le courage s'exalte dans la guerre des montagnes, le génie semble être plus fécond en ressources, les obstacles irritent; quand tout est difficile, rien ne semble impossible; le soldat y devient plus audacieux, et chaque jour plus entreprenant; il acquiert aussi plus de constance et de confiance en sa propre valeur."

Idem, iii. ch. 2de, p. 40.

It is an interesting fact, that it was in this country that this distinguished military historian and soldier, General Mathieu Dumas, had his early service. He came when quite a young man, with the French troops to the United States, as one of the aids of Count Rochambeau, in 1780, and continued in the country till after the surrender of Yorktown, at which he was present. He has left "Recollections" of his life, which describe his service in America, the French revolutionary period, and his service under the French Empire. The more elaborate work, on which his reputation chiefly rests, is the "*Précis des Evénemens Militaires, ou Essais Historiques sur les Campagnes de 1799 à 1814.*" It is the work to which Dr. Arnold refers; it was completed down to the year 1807, in nineteen volumes. It sustains, I am informed, a high character as a military authority, and I can well believe that it is written in an admirable spirit, and with the genuine candour of an old soldier, well versed in the science of his profession, when I meet, in the preface, with such reflections as these, after an observation on the military pedantry of judging by a too rigid application of the principles of warfare: 'La critique austère et tranchante n'est pas toujours la plus instructive. Sans négliger de faire remarquer l'imprévoyance, la témérité, les faux calculs punis par des revers mérités, je m'en suis, je l'avoue, attaché davantage à faire ressortir les exemples contraires, ceux où le général n'a pas dû seulement la victoire aux fautes de son adversaire, mais bien plutôt à ses bonnes dispositions, à l'intelligence et à l'énergie de ses officiers et de ses soldats, ne laissant à la fortune que les chances qu'on ne peut garantir contre ses caprices.'



LECTURE V.

I PROPOSED that in the present lecture we should approach to the consideration of the internal history of the last three hundred or three hundred and forty years which have elapsed since the close of the middle ages. It is not without some peculiar apprehensions that I enter upon this part of my subject. Its difficulties are so great that I cannot hope to do more than partially remove them ; and still more, when we come to an analysis of opinions and parties, it is scarcely possible to avoid expressing, or at least implying some judgments of my own, which may be at variance with the judgments of many of my hearers. Yet with a full sense of all these impediments in my way, I yet feel that I must proceed, and that to turn aside from the straightforward road, would be an unworthy shrinking from one of the most important parts of my duty. For, as I said at the beginning, any thing of the nature of a calm analysis of that on which we have been accustomed to feel much more than to think, cannot but be useful to us. Nor will it be the least valuable part of it that it should teach us to disentangle principles first from parties, and again from one another ; first of all, as showing how imperfectly all parties represent their own principles, and then, how the principles themselves are a mingled tissue, the good and evil being sometimes combined together ; and practically, that which under some circumstances was good or evil, changing under different circumstances, and becoming the opposite.

Now here, at the outset of our inquiry, I must again dwell

for a moment on our peculiar advantages, in this place, it being made so familiar with the histories of Greece and of Rome. For in those histories is involved a great part of our own: they contain a view of our own society, only somewhat simplified, as befits an earlier and introductory study. And our familiarity with their details will be convenient on the present occasion, because they will furnish us with many illustrations familiar already to all my hearers. Besides this, he who has studied Thucydides and Tacitus, and has added to them, as so many of us have done, a familiar acquaintance with Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero, has already heard the masters of political wisdom, and will have derived from them some general rules to assist him in making his way through the thicket of modern history. (1)

When we surveyed the external history of the last three centuries, we found that there were at different times different centres of action; that at one time Austria was this centre, at another Spain, and at another France: so that if one were asked, quite generally, what was Europe doing externally at such or such a period, it might be answered, that it was engaged in favouring or in resisting one or other of these great powers. Now if we ask at any given period, what Europe was doing internally, can we give an answer equally simple? Has there been any principle predominant with respect to internal history, as successive nations have been in external matters, and has the advancing or putting down this principle been the great business of the mind of Europe, as the supporting or opposing Austrian or French dominion has been the business of her external policy and action?

Now, for the convenience of division, and as an aid to our examination, we may say perhaps that there was: and we may divide the three last centuries into two periods, the first extending from 1500 to the middle of the seventeenth century, and the second going on from 1650 or 1660 to nearly our

own times. And quite generally, we might answer, that in the first of these periods Europe was engaged in maintaining or opposing the protestant reformation; in the second, in maintaining or opposing a reformation, or to use a more neutral word, an alteration in matters political. Such a division, and such a view of each of the two parts of the division, would be allowable and just, I think, if made for the mere purpose of assisting our studies, while we were fully aware of its incompleteness. But if we believed it to be altogether correct, it would be sadly misleading; for in reality more than one principle has been contended for at one time: and what we call the protestant reformation, is itself a complex thing, embracing a great many points, theological, moral, and political: and these points may not have been all pressed by the same persons, nor at the same time; and political reformation also is very variously understood; some wishing for greater changes, others for less; and the points most passionately desired by some, being to others almost indifferent, or it may be, even objectionable. So that it becomes essential to carry our analysis a little farther, and to show in this way what a complicated subject we have to deal with.

Let us suppose for an instant that the whole struggle which has occupied the internal history of modern Europe, has been a political one: we will take nothing more into the account than those questions which are ordinarily called political. Now, then, what is the real political question which is at the bottom of all others, or in other words, what is the principle of all political divisions? Shall we say that it is this,—whether political power shall be vested in a greater or less number of hands, the old Greek question, in short, as to the ascendancy of the many or the few? Accordingly, they who take one side of this question, which we call the popular side, should advocate, we will say, the communication of political power as widely as possible; those who take the

anti-popular side, should wish it to be confined only to a few? A complete democracy would appear to be the consummation of the wishes of the former, a simple monarchy would most answer the views of the latter. And thus, if the contest be between a republic and an individual aiming at monarchy, men who espouse the popular party would wish well to the republic, their opponents would favour the attempt at monarchy. Accordingly, in the greatest heat of the French revolution, this was the view taken of the civil wars of Rome; and the popular party in France revered the memory, and on all occasions magnified the names of Cato and Brutus as true republicans, who were upholding the cause of liberty against a tyrant. Yet it is certain that this view was quite fallacious; that Cato and Brutus belonged not to the popular party at Rome, but to the aristocratical; they belonged to that party which had steadily opposed the agrarian laws, and the communication of the Roman franchise to the allies; to the party which had destroyed the Gracchi, and had recovered its ascendancy through the proscriptions of Sylla. And it is no less certain that Cæsar was supported by the popular party; and that when he marched into Italy at the beginning of the civil war, his pretext was, that he was come to uphold the tribunician power, and, in point of fact, the mass of the inhabitants of Italy regarded him with favour.

Here, then, the opposition of a republic to an individual aiming at monarchy, is not the opposition of a popular party to an antipopular one, but exactly the reverse. Again, a similar mistake has been committed with regard to parties in Carthage. Dr. Priestley, a most strenuous advocate of popular principles, in his *Lectures on History*, sympathizes entirely with Hanno's opposition to Hannibal; he is afraid that Hannibal's standing army might have overthrown the liberties of Carthage. Yet nothing is more certain than that

Hanno belonged to the high aristocratical party, that same party which never forgave Hannibal for his attempt to lessen the powers of their exclusive courts of judicature. So that it is very possible that, judging of political parties merely by their advocating the power of a greater or smaller number, we should estimate them quite erroneously.

Again, what is at the bottom of our preference of what is called the popular cause, or of the antipopular? Do we rest in the simple fact of the supreme power being vested in more hands or in fewer? or do we value this fact only as a means to some farther end, such as the liberty and happiness of the several individuals of the commonwealth? Do we, in short, most value political equality, or the absence of restraint from us as individuals? It is manifest that as we value the one or the other, our estimate of a pure democracy may greatly differ. If our great object be equality, then the equal enjoyment of political rights and honours by all will seem to us the perfection of government: if the absence of restraint on individuals be what we most desire, then we may complain of the tyranny of a majority, of a severe system of sumptuary laws, of hindrances thrown in the way of our unlimited accumulation of property, or of our absolute disposal of it, whether by gift or by will. (2)

Yet again, taking the mere ascendancy of the many or the few to be our object, without looking any farther, yet there arises a most important question, how many we comprehend in our division of many and few. Do we mean the many and the few of all the human beings within our territory, or of all the freemen, or of all the sovereign state, as opposed to its provinces, or of all the full citizens, as opposed to half-citizens and sojourners? According as we mean either the one or the other, the same party may be popular or antipopular: Are the southern states of the North American union, then, to be regarded as democratical or as oligarchical? In

the old constitution of Switzerland, what was the canton of Uri, as we regard it either with or without its Italian bailiwicks? In Spanish America what would have been a Creole democracy, as we either forgot or remembered the existence of the men of colour? So that our very principle of the mere ascendancy of the few or the many becomes complicated; and we very often regard a government, as popular when it might with justice, in another respect, be called antipopular.

Thus regarding the contests of Europe simply in a political light, and as they affect one single political question,—that of the ascendancy of the many or the few,—we do not find it easy to judge of them. Let us carry this on a little farther. Say that we do not regard the mere machinery of governments, but their results; we value that most which is best administered, and most promotes the good of the nation; our views are not so much popular as liberal. Have we arrived, therefore, at a greater simplification of the question? Shall we, as liberal men, agree in regarding the same government as deserving of our support or our opposition? Scarcely, I think, unless we are first agreed as to what the good of the nation is. The ancient commonwealths, for the most part, discouraged trade and manufactures as compared with agriculture. Were these governments promoting the public good, or no? Other nations have followed a different course; have encouraged trade and rejoiced in the growing wealth and comforts of their people. These, in their turn, are denounced by the principles and practice of others, who dread above all things the introduction of luxury. Again, we attach great importance to the cultivation of art and science; to all humanizing amusements; music, the theatre, dancing, &c. But when Lavoisier pleaded for his life to the French government of 1793, he was told that the republic had no need of chemists; (3) the Roman senate expelled the

rheticians from Rome; the early government of the state of Connecticut, one of the freest of commonwealths, would tolerate no public amusements, least of all the theatre. I might instance other differences in matters of a still higher character; as, for example, with regard to the expediency of a severe penal code or a mild one; to the establishment of one religion, or the extending equal favour to all. We see that the good government of one man is the bad government of another; the best results, according to one man's estimate, are in the eyes of his neighbour the most to be deprecated.

Now all these different views are found in connection with different views on questions purely political; so that the very same party may in some respects advocate what we approve of, and in others follow what we most dislike; and farther, it may often act inconsistently with itself, and pursue its principles, thus mingled as they are, imperfectly, or even may seem to act at variance with them. What, then, are we to judge of it, when we are studying past history; or how should we have to act, if a similar party were to exist in our own generation?

Such, we see, are the difficulties of our subject; and to illustrate them still farther, I will name one or two instances in which men may seem to have mistaken their own natural side, owing to the complicated character of actual parties; and from their keen perception of some one point, either as loving it or abhorring it, have for its sake renounced much that was congenial, or joined much that was unsuited to them. This was the case, I think, with the historian Hume. A man of his exceedingly inquiring and unrestrained mind, living in the midst of the eighteenth century, might have been expected to have espoused what is called the popular side in the great questions of English history, the side, in later language, of the movement. Yet we know that Hume's

leaning is the other way. Accidental causes may perhaps have contributed to this; the prejudice of an ingenious mind against the opinions which he found most prevalent around him; the resistance of a restless mind to the powers that be, as natural as implicit acquiescence in them is to an indolent mind. But the main cause apparently is to be sought in his abhorrence of puritanism, alike repugnant to him in its good and its evil. His subtle and active mind could not bear its narrowness and bigotry, his careless and epicurean temper had no sympathy with its earnestness and devotion. The popular cause in our great civil contests was in his eyes the cause of fanaticism; and where he saw fanaticism, he saw that from which his whole nature recoiled, as the greatest of all conceivable evils. (4)

I have spoken of the popular party in our great civil contest as being, in modern language, the party of the movement. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that a popular party and a movement party are always synonymous. A movement party is a very indefinite expression, applicable equally to very different things. It includes equally those who move with a clearly apprehended object, aware of the evil which they are leaving, and of the good towards which they are tending; and those who move from an impulse of intolerable suffering in their actual state, but are going they know not whither; and those who would move from mere restlessness; and those, lastly, who move as the instruments of a power which they serve unconsciously, altering the state of the world while they are thinking only of some object of personal ambition. In this latter sense, Philip of Macedon belonged to the party of the movement, while Demosthenes would have kept Greece in her old relations. We see, in this last instance, the popular party and the movement party directly opposed to one another, accidentally, however, as their coincidence also is accidental. We cannot but see that

the change which Philip wrought, caring only for his personal objects, was in fact an onward step in the scheme of God's providence, involving, as it did, that great spread of the Greek race and language over Asia, which was to serve such high purposes hereafter. To this Demosthenes was opposed; his object being only to maintain the old independence of Greece, and the old liberty and glory of Athens. (5) A hundred years earlier, Pericles, heading the same political party, if we look only to the political relations of Athens abroad and at home, had also headed the party of the movement; new dominion, new wealth, new glory, new arts, and a new philosophy, every thing in Pericles and his administration was a going onward from what had existed before. (6) So again, to take our examples from modern times, the great religious movement in England at the Reformation, was quite unconnected with popular principles in politics; and the same was the case in France in the wars of the League. The popular party in France, so far as either of the contending parties deserved that name, was opposed to Henry the Fourth, and in favour of the house of Guise. The burghers of Paris were as zealously attached to the Holy Catholic League as those of London, sixty years later, were devoted to the Solemn League and Covenant. The great movement, therefore, of the world is often wholly unconnected with the relations of the popular and antipopular parties in any one particular state,—it may be favoured or resisted by either of them.

Farther still, the mere change of time and circumstances may alter the character of the same party, without any change on its own part: its triumph may be at one time an evil, and at another time a good. This is owing to a truth which should never be forgotten in all political inquiries, that government is wholly relative; and that there is and can be no such thing as the best government absolutely, suited to

all periods and to all countries. It is a fatal error in all political questions to mistake the clock ; to fancy that it is still forenoon, when the sun is westering ; that it is early morning, when the sun has already mounted high in the heavens. No instance of this importance of reading the clock aright can be more instructive, than the great quarrel ordinarily known as that of the Guelfs and Ghibelins. I may remind you that these were respectively the parties which embraced the papal and the imperial cause, in the struggle between these two powers in Italy and Germany, from the eleventh century onwards to the fourteenth. Here, as in all other actual contests, a great variety of principles, and passions, and instincts, so to speak, were intermingled ; we must not suppose that it was any thing like a pure struggle on what may be called the distinguishing principle of the Guelf or Ghibelin cause. But the principle in itself was this : whether the papal or the imperial, in other words, the sacerdotal or the regal power, was to be accounted the greater. Now conceive the papal power to be the representative of what is moral and spiritual, and the imperial power to represent only what is external and physical ; conceive the first to express the ideas of responsibility to God and paternal care and guidance, while the other was the mere embodying of selfish might, like the old Greek tyrannies ; (7) and who can do other than wish success to the papal cause ? who can help being with all his heart a Guelf ? But in the early part of the struggle, this was to a great degree the state of it ; the pope stood in the place of the church, the emperor was a merely worldly despot, corrupt and arbitrary. (8) But conceive, on the other hand, the papacy to become the representative of superstition and of spiritual tyranny, while the imperial power was the expression and voice of law ; that the emperor stood in the place of the church, and the pope was the mere priest, the church's worst enemy ; and this was

actually the form which the contest between the sacerdotal and regal powers assumed at a later period ; then our sympathies are changed, and we become no less zealously Ghibelin than we before were Guelf. Now, so far at least as the papal power was concerned, the change was not in it, but in outward circumstances. In the beginning of the dispute, the papal claims were no less excessive than they became afterwards ; all the notions of priestly power were to be found in them, if not fully devoloped, yet virtually. But these claims are harmless when the church is asleep or inactive, except so far as they tend to prolong the sleep and inactivity. Setting aside this consideration, and supposing a state of ignorance and torpor not produced by the papacy, and likely to exist for a long time to come from other causes, independent of the papacy's control, and then the papal dominion may be no more than the natural and lawful authority of mature age over childhood, of the teacher over him who needs to be taught, of those who understand what Christianity is, over those who, professing to be Christians, yet know not what their principles are. But so soon as the child grew up into the man, that the sleeper was awakened, the inactive roused, the Christian taught to know his privileges and his duties—then the church being competent to do its own work, the claim of the pope to stand in its place became impertinent ; and when that claim was urged as one of divine right, for all times and circumstances, and men were required to acknowledge its validity, then having become as useless and mischievous practically, as it was and always had been false theoretically, it was rejected as it deserved to be, and was considered amongst the greatest obstacles to truth and to goodness.

This inattention to altered circumstances, which would make us be Guelfs in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries because the Guelf cause had been right in the eleventh or

twelfth, is a fault of most universal application in all political questions, and is often most seriously mischievous. It is deeply seated in human nature, being in fact no other than an exemplification of the force of habit. It is like the case of a settler landing in a country overrun with wood and undrained, and visited therefore by excessive falls of rain. The evil of wet, and damp, and closeness is besetting him on every side; he clears away the woods, and he drains his land, and he by doing so mends both his climate and his own condition. Encouraged by his success he perseveres in his system; clearing a country is with him synonymous with making it fertile and habitable; and he levels or rather sets fire to his forests without mercy. Meanwhile the tide is turned without his observing it; he has already cleared enough, and every additional clearance is a mischief; damp and wet are no longer the evils most to be dreaded, but excessive drought. The rains do not fall in sufficient quantity; the springs become low, the rivers become less and less fitted for navigation. Yet habit blinds him for a long while to the real state of the case; and he continues to encourage a coming mischief in his dread of one that is become obsolete. We have been long making progress on our present tack, yet if we do not go about now, we shall run ashore. Consider the popular feeling at this moment against capital punishments; what is it but continuing to burn the woods, when the country actually wants shade and moisture. Year after year men talked of the severity of the penal code, and struggled against it in vain. The feeling became stronger and stronger, and at last effected all and more than all which it had at first vainly demanded; yet still from mere habit it pursues its course, no longer to the restraining of legal cruelty, but to the injury of innocence and the encouragement of crime, and encouraging that worse evil, a sympathy with wickedness justly punished, rather than with the law, whether

of God or man, unjustly violated. (9) So men have continued to cry out against the power of the crown after the crown had been shackled hand and foot ; and to express the greatest dread of popular violence, long after that violence was exhausted, and the antipopular party was not only rallied, but had turned the tide of battle, and was victoriously pressing upon its enemy. (10)

I am not afraid after having gone thus far, to mention one consideration more, which, however over nice it may seem to some, appears to me really deserving to be taken into account. I mean that although the danger from any party in our own particular contest may seem to be at an end, and our alarms are beginning to be transferred to the opposite party, yet it is an important modification of the case, if in other countries the party which with us has just ceased to be formidable is still entirely predominant, and no opposition to it seems to be in existence. This would seem to show that the main current of our times is still setting in that direction, and that the danger is still where we at first apprehended it ; although in our own particular country, a local cross-current may seem to indicate the contrary. For example, any excesses of the popular party in England in 1642 and the subsequent years, were much less dangerous, because the same party in other parts of Europe was so completely powerless ; whereas in later years the triumph, first of the Americans, and afterwards of the French Revolution, would make an essential difference in the strength of popular principles in the world generally, and therefore would make their excess in any one particular country more really formidable.

If we take into consideration all that has been hitherto said, and remember besides how much national questions have been mixed up with those of a political or religious character, to say nothing of commercial or economical interests, or of the anomalies of individual caprice or passion,

we shall have some notion of the difficulty of our task to analyze the internal history of the last three centuries. And I have said nothing of philosophy, and nothing of religion, both of which have been very influential causes of action, and thus tend to complicate the subject still farther. Let us now see how far it is possible to separate a little this perplexed mass, and to arrive at some distinct views of the course of events and of opinions.

In order to do this, the most effectual way perhaps will be to select some one particular country, and make its internal history the subject of an analysis. But I should wish it to be understood that I am offering rather a specimen of the method to be pursued in analyzing history, than pretending to execute the analysis completely. In fact if there were no other obstacles in the way of such a complete work, the limits of these lectures would alone render it impracticable. And therefore if any of my hearers notice great omissions in the following sketch, he may suppose, at least in many instances, that they are made advisedly, that I am not attempting a complete historical view, but only exhibiting, in some very familiar instances, what I believe to be the method of studying internal history to the greatest advantage.

Availing myself then of the division which I have noticed above, and assuming for our present purposes that the three last centuries may be divided into two periods, the one of religious, the other of political movement, I will now endeavour to offer a specimen of the analysis of internal history, taking for my subject these two periods successively, as far as regards our own country; and beginning therefore with the sixteenth century.

It does not appear to me that there was at the beginning of this century any thing in England which deserves to be called either a political or a religious party. There were changes at work no doubt, social changes going on imper-

ceptibly which prepared the way for the development of parties hereafter ; but the parties themselves were not yet in existence. There was no party to assert the right of any rival claimant to the throne, there was no question stirring between the king and the nobility, or between the king and the commons, or between the nobility and commons. A more tranquil state of things politically could not well be found.

So it was also religiously. The great schism of the rival popes had been long settled, and Wickliffe's doctrines, although they could never have become extinct, did not gain strength visibly ; and those who held them were in no condition to form a party against the prevailing church doctrines or government. We start therefore upon our inquiry, with the whole matter of it before us, nothing of it has been already begun.

Neither do I think that any thing properly to be called a party showed itself till the reign of Elizabeth. I do not mean to deny that Cranmer and Gardiner, the Seymours and the Howards, may have had their adherents and their enemies, principally amongst those who were attached on the one hand to the Reformation, and on the other hand to the system which was being reformed. So again there were insurrections both in Henry the Eighth's reign and in Edward the Sixth's against the measures of the government, when it was assailing the ancient system. But none of these things seem to have had sufficient consistence or permanence to entitle them to the name of national parties. At any rate the reign of Elizabeth witnessed them in a much more formed state, and here therefore we will consider them.

Elizabeth ascended the throne in the year 1558 ; Charles the Fifth had died about two months before her accession ; Henry the Second was still reigning. Paul the Fourth, John Peter Caraffa, had been pope for the last three years : the Reformation, dating from Luther's first preaching, was

now about forty years old: the council of Trent was suspended; its third and final period began under Pius the Fourth, four years later. The Reformation after having been established fully in England under Edward the Sixth, and again completely overthrown under Mary, was now once more triumphant. But its friends were divided amongst themselves, and we can now trace two active and visible parties in England, with a third no longer combating in its own name in the front of the battle, but still powerful, and transferring some of its principles to one of the other two parties, whose triumph might possibly lead the way hereafter to its own. These three parties were the favourers of the church system as actually established, those who wished to reform it still more, and those who wished to undo what had been done to it already. But the Roman Catholics, who formed this last party, could not, as I have said, fight their battle openly, as both the government and the mass of the nation were against them.

It does not appear that these parties had as yet assumed a directly political form. They as yet involved no struggle between the crown and the parliament, or between the government and the nation. Of course they contained in them certain political tendencies, which were afterwards developed sufficiently; but they were as yet, in their form, of a religious, or at least of an ecclesiastical character. And like all other parties they represented each no one single principle, but several; and mixed with principles, a variety of interests and passions besides.

1st. The friends or supporters of the existing church system, however different in other respects, agreed in one great point; namely, in the exclusion of the papal power, and in asserting the national independence in things ecclesiastical and spiritual. Farther, they agreed in the main in regarding the national voice, whose independence they maintained, as

expressed by the national sovereign, in recognising the king or queen as the head of the church. In other matters they differed greatly, as was unavoidable; for thus far the most worldly men and the most religious might go along with each other, although in other things most at variance. It may be safely said that this point of the national religious independence, expressed by the royal supremacy, was the main bond which held Elizabeth to the Reformation; not that she was averse to it religiously, at least in its principal points; but that this threw her at once into its arms: she preferred that system which made her a queen altogether, to that which subjected her, in the most important of all human concerns, to the authority of an Italian priest. Elizabeth's own views were shared by a large portion of her people; they utterly abhorred the papal supremacy, with an English feeling quite as much as a religious one; it is not clear that they would have abhorred it equally had the papal see been removed forever from Rome to Canterbury, and the pope been necessarily an Englishman. But in proportion as religious questions had come to engage men's minds more generally, so they became desirous to have the power of deciding them for themselves. And no doubt mere political feelings had a great deal to do with the matter; the papacy was a government constantly varying in its foreign policy; French influence was at one time predominant at Rome, Spanish influence at another; but English influence was never powerful; and Englishmen did not wish to be in any degree subject to an authority which might be acting in the interests of their rivals or their enemies.

Again, the existing church system as opposed to the old one was upheld by a great number of persons throughout the country, because it was the relaxation of an irksome control. The Roman Catholic system, when enforced, does undoubtedly interfere considerably with men's liberty of thought and

action. Its ritual and ceremonial ordinances are very numerous, and may be compared to the minute details of military discipline in the bondage which they are felt to impose. Its requiring auricular confession, and its assumed right of exercising over men's minds and studies the same absolute authority which a parent claims over the mind and pursuits of a young child, were unendurable at a moment when the burst of mental vigour in England was so extraordinary as it was in the reign of queen Elizabeth. Let any man read Shakespeare and the other great dramatists of the period, and he will observe nothing more remarkable in them than their extreme freedom, I may almost call it, their license of thought. These dramatists were entirely men of the people; and other writers of the day belonging to the same class, show no less the same tendency. Men of various ranks and degrees, from the highest nobility to the humblest of that middle class which was now daily growing in numbers and importance, all loving their liberty of thought and action in their several ways, were averse to the return of a system which, whenever it was enforced, as it now seemed likely to be, exercised a constant control over both. (11)

To be classed in the same party, and yet very different in themselves from the division of it just noticed, were all those who out of sincere and conscientious feeling concurred heartily in the church system as it was established in the reign of Edward the Sixth, and from various motives were disposed to rest contented in it. Some thinking it a matter of wisdom and charity not to go farther from the old system than was necessary; some also, and this is a natural feeling in the leaders of a reforming party, esteeming very much what they had done already, and yielding to that desire of our nature which after work well done longs to rest. And these took it ill when they were told to think nothing accomplished, till they should have accomplished every thing; it seemed

like an unthankful disparagement of their past efforts, to be requiring of them immediately to exert themselves farther. Nor was it possible for the bishops and others of the high clergy to escape the influence of professional feelings; which would plead in favour of a system which, however much it subjected them to the control of the crown, gave them much authority and dignity with respect to the inferior clergy and to the laity.

2dly. Distinct from and soon to be strongly opposed to this first party, was the party which wished to carry the Reformation farther; that party which is commonly known by the name of Puritan. This was composed of less different elements than the church party, from the nature of the case; although in it too differences were in process of time observable. But at first it contained only those who in their main principle were agreed: they deemed the old church system to be utterly bad, so bad as to have defiled whatever it had touched, even things in their own nature indifferent; they wished therefore to reform it utterly, and abandoning every thing of man's device, to adopt nothing either in church doctrine or discipline which was not authorized directly by God's word. Being men of exceeding zeal and of a most stirring nature, they were anxious to do the work effectually, and would listen to no considerations which pleaded for compromise or for delay.

Familiarity with and love of the foreign protestant churches on the one hand, especially that of Geneva; an extreme veneration for what they found in the letter of the Scripture, and probably also certain notions of good and free government which the actual state of the English monarchy could not but shock; disposed the Puritans to regard with dislike the principle of the royal supremacy. They saw that practically the arbitrary power which they abhorred in the pope had been transferred in the lump to the queen; they saw no

such thing in the Christian church, as exhibited in the Scriptures; neither could they find there, as they thought, any like the English episcopacy and hierarchy; but the government of the church vested in a body of elders, and these not all members of the order of the clergy. What they thought they found in the Scriptures they believed to be of divine authority, not only when it was first instituted, but forever; and they wished therefore to substitute for the royal supremacy and hierarchy of the existing English church, that church government which alone, as they were persuaded, was ordained by God himself.

Furthermore, as men to whom religious questions were a great reality, and a matter of the deepest personal interest, they were in the highest degree impatient of all which seemed to them formalism. They conceived that amidst the prevailing ignorance and indifference on religious matters, a liturgical service was of much less consequence than a stirring preaching of the gospel; they complained, therefore, of the evil of an unpreaching ministry; for the mass of the clergy were so ignorant that they were unable, or could not be trusted to preach, and the homilies had been set forth by authority, to remedy, as far as might be, this defect. The puritans said that the liturgy might become a mere form, both in the minister and in the congregation, if it were not accompanied by an effective preaching; the minister, in their view, was not to be the mere instrument of the church services, but to be useful to the people by his own personal gifts; an ignorant or utterly vicious man might read a form prescribed by others; they wanted a man who should believe, and must therefore speak, not the words of others, but those of his own convictions and affections.

There was in the principles of the puritans nothing of philosophy, either in the good sense of the word or the bad. And it is also most unjust to charge them with irreverence or

want of humility. They received the Scriptures as God's word, and they followed them implicitly. Neither do they seem chargeable with establishing nice distinctions in order to evade their obvious meaning ; their fault seems rather to have lain in the other extreme ; they acquiesced in the obvious and literal meaning too unhesitatingly. Nor yet were they wanting in respect for all human authority, as trusting in their own wisdom and piety only. On the contrary, the decisions of the earlier church with respect to the great Christian doctrines, they received without questioning : they by no means took the Scriptures into their hands, and sat down to make a new creed of their own out of them. They disregarded the church only where the church departed from the obvious sense of Scripture ; I do not say the true sense, but the obvious one. The difference as to their moral character is considerable : because he who maintains another than the obvious sense of Scripture against other men, may indeed be perfectly right, but he is liable to the charge, whether grave or frivolous as it may be, of preferring his own interpretation to that of the church. But maintaining the obvious sense, even if it be the wrong one, he can hardly be charged himself with arrogance ; he may with greater plausibility retort the charge on his opponents, that they are substituting the devices of their own ingenuity for the plain sense of the word of God.

To say that the puritans were wanting in humility because they did not acquiesce in the state of things which they found around them, is a mere extravagance arising out of a total misapprehension of the nature of humility, and of the merits of the feeling of veneration. All earnestness and depth of character is incompatible with such a notion of humility. A man deeply penetrated with some great truth, and compelled as it were to obey it, cannot listen to every one who may be indifferent to it or opposed to it. There is a voice to which

he already owes obedience, which he serves with the humblest devotion, which he worships with the most intense veneration. It is not that such feelings are dead in him, but that he has bestowed them on one object, and they are claimed for another. To which they are most due is a question of justice; he may be wrong in his decision, and his worship may be idolatrous; but so also may be the worship which his opponents call upon him to render. If indeed it can be shown that a man admires and reverences nothing, he may justly be taxed with want of humility; but this is at variance with the very notion of an earnest character; for its earnestness consists in its devotion to some one object, as opposed to a proud or contemptuous indifference. But if it be meant that reverence in itself is good, so that the more objects of veneration we have, the better is our character, this is to confound the essential difference between veneration and love. The excellence of love is its universality; we are told that even the highest object of all cannot be loved, if inferior objects are hated. And with some exaggeration in the expression, we may admit the truth of Coleridge's lines,

He prayeth well, who loveth well
Both man, and bird, and beast;

insomuch that if we were to hear of a man sacrificing even his life to save that of an animal, we could not help admiring him. But the excellence of veneration consists purely in its being fixed upon a worthy object; when felt indiscriminately it is idolatry or insanity. To tax any one, therefore, with want of reverence, because he pays no respect to what we venerate, is either irrelevant, or is a mere confusion. The fact, so far as it is true, is no reproach, but an honour; because to reverence all persons and all things is absolutely wrong: reverence shown to that which does not deserve it, is no virtue, no, nor even an amiable weakness, but a plain

folly and sin. But if it be meant that he is wanting in proper reverence, not respecting what is really to be respected, that is assuming the whole question at issue, because what we call divine he calls an idol ; and as, supposing that we are in the right, we are bound to fall down and worship, so, supposing him to be in the right, he is no less bound to pull it to the ground and destroy it.

I have said thus much not only to do justice to the puritans, but because this charge of want of humility is one frequently brought by weaker and baser minds against the stronger and nobler ; not seldom by those who are at once arrogant and indifferent, against those who are in truth as humble as they are zealous. But returning to our immediate subject, we see that the puritans united in themselves two points which gave to their party a double appearance ; and at a later period, when the union between the two was no longer believed in, they excited in the very same minds a mingled feeling ; admiration as far as regarded one point, alienation as regarded the other. The puritans wished to alter the existing church system for one which they believed to be freer and better ; and so far they resembled a common popular party : but inasmuch as in this and all other matters their great principle was, conformity to the Scripture, and they pushed this to an extravagant excess, because their interpretation of Scripture was continually faulty, there was, together with their free political spirit, a narrow spirit in things religious, which shocked not only the popular party of the succeeding age, but many even in their own day, who politically entertained opinions far narrower than theirs. In Elizabeth's reign, however, they had scarcely begun to form a political party ; their views affected the church government only, and contemplated no alteration in the spirit of the monarchy, although it was evident, that if the crown continued to resist their efforts in church matters, they would end by resisting

not only its ecclesiastical supremacy, but its actual ascendancy in the constitution altogether.

3d. The Roman Catholic party could not, as I have said, act openly in their own name, because their system had been put down by law ; and, as they were at present regarded as far worse in themselves and far more dangerous than the puritans, all their movements and all expressions of their opinions were restrained with greater severity. Denying like the puritans the royal supremacy, and exposed for so doing to the heaviest penalties, their language sometimes assumed a strong political character, and they spoke freely of the duty of disobeying and deposing those tyrannical princes, on whom the church by the pope's voice had already pronounced its sentence of condemnation. It was the language of the old Guelf party, which some even to this hour regard as popular and liberal. But to oppose a lighter tyranny in the name of a heavier cannot be to serve the cause of good government ; and the moral and spiritual dominion of the papacy was now become the great evil of the world, as it was pressing upon those parts of man's nature which were stirring for themselves, and whose silence would be no longer sleep but death.

The language of the Roman Catholics did not mislead the mass of the English nation, but only made themselves more odious. The serpent's wisdom of Elizabeth cannot be denied by the bitterest of her enemies. With incomparable ability she made herself personally the darling of her people from the first year of her reign to the last. Her behaviour when she passed through the city in state on the day preceding her coronation, or when thirty years afterwards she visited and harangued her troops at Tilbury, or when at the very end of her reign she granted so gracefully the petition of the house of commons against monopolies, was all of the same character ; the frank and gracious and noble bearing of a sovereign

feeling herself at once beloved and respected, knowing the greatness of her place, and sincerely, if not habitually, appreciating its duties. Her personal qualities made her dear to her subjects, and assisted them in seeing clearly that her cause and theirs were one. Conspiracy at home and open war abroad, the excommunications of Rome, the Armadas of Spain, the assassination plots of the Catholics, only bound her people's love to her more firmly. Her arbitrary acts, and still more arbitrary language, the severities, illégalities, and cruelties of her government towards the parties who opposed her, the people at large forgot or approved of. Nothing was unjust, nothing was cruel, against the enemies of one whom the nation so loved; the almost universal voice of England called for the death of Mary Stuart, because the people believed her life to be incompatible with the safety of their beloved queen. Whilst Elizabeth lived, political parties, properly so called, were incapable of existing; it was the whole English nation on one side, and on the other a few conspirators.

But another scene was preparing, and when her successor came to the throne, the state of parties assumed a different aspect; and political elements were added to the religious, rivalling or surpassing them in the interest which they awakened. This later stage of what I have called the religious movement of modern English history will be considered in the following lecture.

NOTES

TO

LECTURE V.

NOTE 1.—Page 220.

“ * * * Still more precious is the story of his own time recorded by a statesman, who has trod the field of political action, and has stood near the source of events and looked into it, when he has indeed a statesman’s discernment, and knows how men act and why. Such are the great works of Clarendon, of Tacitus, of Polybius, above all of Thucydides. The latter has hitherto been, and is likely to continue unequalled. For the sphere of history since his time has been so manifoldly enlarged, it is scarcely possible now for any one mind to circumnavigate it. Besides, the more fastidious nicety of modern manners shrinks from that naked exposure of the character as well as of the limbs, which the ruder ancients took no offence at; and machinery is scarcely doing less toward superseding personal energy in politics and war, than in our manufactures; so that history may come ere long to be written without mention of a name. In Thucydides too, and in him alone, there is that union of the poet with the philosopher, which is essential to form a perfect historian. He has the imaginative plastic power, which makes events pass in living array before us, combined with a profound reflective insight into their causes and laws; and all his other faculties are under the dominion of the most penetrative practical understanding.”

J. C. HARE. “*Guesses at Truth*,” p. 339

NOTE 2.—Page 223.

“ Liberal principles and popular principles are by no means necessarily the same ; and it is of importance to be aware of the difference between them. Popular principles are opposed simply to restraint—liberal principles to unjust restraint. Popular principles sympathize with all who are subject to authority, and regard with suspicion all punishments ; liberal principles sympathize, on the other hand, with authority, whenever the evil tendencies of human nature are more likely to be shown in disregarding it than in abusing it. Popular principles seem to have but one object—the deliverance of the many from the control of the few. Liberal principles, while generally favourable to this same object, yet pursue it as a means, not as an end ; and therefore, they support the subjection of the many to the few under certain circumstances, where the great end, which they steadily keep in view, is more likely to be promoted by subjection than by independence. For the great end of liberal principles is indeed ‘ the greatest happiness of the greatest number,’ if we understand that the happiness of man consists more in his intellectual well-doing than in his physical ; and yet more in his moral and religious excellence than in his intellectual.

“ It must be allowed, however, that the fault of popular principles as distinguished from liberal, has been greatly provoked by the long-continued prevalence of principles of authority which are no less illiberal. Power has been so constantly perverted that it has come to be generally suspected. Liberty has been so constantly unjustly restrained, that it has been thought impossible that it should ever be indulged too freely. Popular feeling is not quick in observing the change of times and circumstances : it is with difficulty brought to act against a long-standing evil ; but, being once set in motion, it is apt to overshoot its mark, and to continue to cry out against an evil long after it has disappeared, and the opposite evil is become most to be dreaded. Something of this excessive recoil of feeling may be observed, I think, in the continued cry against the severity of the penal code, as distinguished from its other defects ; and the same disposition is shown in the popular clamour against

military flogging, and in the complaints which are often made against the existing system of discipline in our schools."

DR. ARNOLD's Letter '*On the Discipline of Public Schools*,' in the '*Quarterly Journal of Education*.' Vol. ix. p. 280. 1835.

In the same letter occurs the following remark, which, though referring only to the author's ideal of school discipline for young boys, admits of a much more enlarged application to men in their social and political relations :

" * * This would be a discipline truly generous and wise, in one word, truly Christian—making an increase of dignity the certain consequence of increased virtuous effort, but giving no countenance to that barbarian pride which claims the treatment of a freeman and an equal, while it cherishes all the carelessness, the folly, and the low and selfish principle of a slave," p. 285.

NOTE 3.—Page 224.

" * * The speech ascribed to Robespierre, when refusing to spare Lavoisier, 'the republic does not want chemists,' is just of the same character with the speeches of Cleon at Athens, and but expresses the indifference of the vulgar, whether aristocrats or democrats, for an eminence with which they have no sympathy." * *

ARNOLD's *Thucydides*. Note, B viii. 89.

NOTE 4.—Page 226.

There may be a doubt whether Hume's abhorrence of Puritanism is to be regarded as the sole or chief explanation of the political character of his history. But be that as it may, it is certain that his careless and epicurean temper was adverse not only to the earnestness and devotion of the Puritans, but to earnestness and devotion in any form. He was a cold-hearted unbeliever—self-satisfied in a shallow philosophy; and as an historian, indolent in research and insidiously unfair in every thing directly or remotely connected with the Church of Christ. It is inveterate hostility to religion that has engendered in his history, and that too under a deceptive outward decorum, not a few of an historian's worst vices—

sophistry, misrepresentation, suppression of the truth, falsification, malignant hatred of Christian faith and holiness; so that it has come to be said without exaggeration, "that there is less in the popular history of the Christian kingdom of England which implies the *reality* of religion,—less acknowledgment of the laws and agents of a Divine government, partly concealed and partly manifested, to which the temporal rulers of the world are even here amenable,—than in the legends, or even the political history of Greece and Rome."

Abundant proof of Hume's untrustworthiness may be found in an Article in the Quarterly Review for March, 1844, (No. 146,) in which many passages of his history are thoroughly discussed to exemplify his character as an historian.

NOTE 5.—Page 227.

"Aristophanes had to deal with Democracy, not when she was old, but when her heart was high and her pulse full, and when with some of the nobleness and generosity peculiar to youth, she had still more of its heat, impetuosity, and self-willedness. The old age of Athenian democracy (and a premature old age it necessarily was) must be looked for in the public speeches of Demosthenes, and in the warning voice of that eminent statesman, fraught with all that is great, holy, and commanding, yet powerless to put more than a momentary life into limbs paralyzed and effete with previous excesses. For her midday of life we must go to the intervening speeches of Lysias, a writer full of ability and talent, but a thorough son of democracy, and for which the calamities suffered by himself and his family under the oligarchal party form great excuse. The very pages of this writer smell, as it were, of blood and confiscation; nor does simple death always content him; thrice, sometimes, would he 'slay his slain!' In running down his prey, this orator shows a business-like energy, unexampled in any other Grecian advocate: none hangs a culprit, or one whom he would fain make appear as such, so cleverly on the horns of a dilemma, and his notions of time, when in pursuit of democratic vengeance, are truly royal:—'Nullum tempus Lysiæ occurrit.' 'Numbers' are his chief view of political society, and 'Your Manyship,' (τὰ

ἐμέτερον πλῆθος) his idol. Generous ideas of rank and birth, of the graces and accomplishments of society, seem utterly unknown to him: energy and business evidently comprise his vocabulary of excellence, while his stock in trade is all the gloomy images that pervade a disturbed state of society; strife, sedition, discord, continual fluctuation of government, addresses to the passions, not to the reason, the voice of law stifled, or silent, that of party and faction perpetually predominant; add exile, proscription, fine, hemlock and blood spilt upon the ground almost like water, and we have the ingredients of a Lysiac speech, and the corresponding events of his period of history, pretty well in our hands."

Mitchell's Note (*Aristophanes' 'Knights,'* v. 1062.)

NOTE 6.—Page 227.

When Pericles is spoken of as the leader of a party, it is proper to bear in mind the position which history describes him as having held in Athens, and the influence or rather control he exercised there over the people during his most remarkable administration. For his independence is described by Thucydides to have been such that he was the leader of the multitude but never led by them—that he could brave their anger and resist the popular will—and that, in short, the government, though called a democracy, was such only in name, for it was in one chief man:

“* * αἴτιον δ' ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὦν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, χρήματων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος, κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετα μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὗ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν. ὁπότε γοῦν αἰσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ το φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες, καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι, ἐγράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι.”

Thucydides, ii. 65

NOTE 7.—Page 228.

‘All the ancient writers, without exception, call the government of Dionysius a tyranny. This, as is well known, was with them

no vague and disputable term, resting on party impressions of character, and thus liable to be bestowed or denied according to the political opinions of the speaker or writer. It describes a particular kind of government, the merits of which might be differently estimated, but the fact of its existence admitted of no dispute. Dionysius was not a king, because hereditary monarchy was not the constitution of Syracuse; he was not the head of the aristocratical party, enjoying supreme power, inasmuch as they were in possession of the government, and he was their most distinguished member; on the contrary, the richer classes were opposed to him, and he found his safety in banishing them in a mass, and confiscating their property. Nor was he the leader of a democracy, like Pericles and Demosthenes, all-powerful inasmuch as the free love and admiration of the people made his will theirs; for what democratical leader ever surrounded himself with foreign mercenaries, or fixed his residence in the citadel, or kept up in his style of living, and in the society which surrounded him, the state and luxury of a king's court? He was not an hereditary constitutional king, nor the leader of one of the great divisions of the commonwealth; but he had gained sovereign power by fraud, and maintained it by force: he represented no party, he sought to uphold no ascendancy but that of his own individual self; and standing thus apart from the sympathies of his countrymen, his objects were essentially selfish, his own safety, his own enjoyments, his own power, and his own glory. Feeling that he had no right to be where he was, he was full of suspicion and jealousy, and oppressed his subjects with taxes at once heavy and capriciously levied, not only that he might enrich himself, but that he might impoverish and weaken them. A government carried on thus manifestly for the good of one single governor, with an end of such unmixed selfishness, and resting mainly upon the fear and not the love of its people; with whatever brilliant qualities it might happen to be gilded, and however free it might be from acts of atrocious cruelty, was yet called by the Greeks a tyranny."

* * * * *

"The Greeks had no abhorrence for kings: the descendant of a hero race, ruling over a people whom his fathers had ruled from time immemorial, was no subject of obloquy either with the people

or with the philosophers. But a tyrant, a man of low or ordinary birth, who by force or fraud had seated himself on the necks of his countrymen, to gorge each prevailing passion of his nature at their cost, with no principle but the interest of his own power—such a man was regarded as a wild beast, that had broken into the fold of civilized society, and whom it was every one's right and duty, by any means, or with any weapon, presently to destroy. Such mere monsters of selfishness Christian Europe has rarely seen. If the claim to reign 'by the grace of God' has given an undue sanction to absolute power, yet it has diffused at the same time a sense of the responsibilities of power, such as the tyrants, and even the kings of the later age of Greece, never knew. The most unprincipled of modern sovereigns would yet have acknowledged, that he owed a duty to his people, for the discharge of which he was answerable to God; but the Greek tyrant regarded his subjects as the mere instruments of his own gratification; fortune or his own superiority had given him extraordinary means of indulging his favourite passions, and it would be folly to forego the opportunity. It is this total want of regard for his fellow-creatures, the utter sacrifice of their present and future improvement, for the sake of objects purely personal, which constitutes the guilt of Dionysius and his fellow-tyrants. In such men all virtue was necessarily blighted: neither genius, nor courage, nor occasional signs of human feeling could atone for the deliberate wickedness of their system of tyranny." * *

History of Rome, i. ch. 21.

NOTE 8.—Page 228.

This subject of the relation of the papal power to the monarchies of Europe during the middle ages has, I presume, been adverted to by Dr. Arnold in two of his pamphlets also, which I have not had however the opportunity of referring to, one on the "Roman Catholic Claims" in 1828, and the other on "the Principles of Church Reform" in 1833. His biographer speaks of them as "earlier works in which he vindicated the characters of the eminent popes of the middle ages, Gregory VII. and Innocent III., long before that great change in the popular view respecting them, which in

this, as in many other instances, he had forestalled at a time when his opinion was condemned as the height of paradox."

(Chap. x. of "*Life and Correspondence.*")

A discussion of this subject will be found in an article on "Michelet's History of France," in No. 159, (January, 1844,) of the *Edinburgh Review*, an authority, certainly, as little likely as any to favour high views of church authority. The reviewer's purpose is to show, that "the popes were not so entirely in the wrong, as historians have deemed them, in their disputes with the emperors, and with the kings of England and France;" and that the church "was the great improver and civilizer of Europe." "It would," he observes, "do many English thinkers much good to acquaint themselves with the grounds on which the best continental minds, without disguising one particle of the evil which existed openly or latently, in the Romish church, are on the whole convinced that it was not only a beneficent institution, but the only means capable of being now assigned, by which Europe could have been reclaimed from barbarism."

"Who," it is asked, "in the middle ages were worthier of power than the clergy? Did they not need all, and more than all the influence they could acquire, when they could not be kings or emperors, and when kings and emperors were among those whose passion and arrogance they had to admonish and govern? The great Ambrose, refusing absolution to Theodosius until he performed penance for a massacre, was a type of what these men had to do. In an age of violence and *brigandage*, who but the church could insist on justice, and forbearance, and reconciliation? In an age when the weak were prostrate at the feet of the strong, who was there but the Church to plead to the strong for the weak? They were the depositaries of the only moral power to which the great were amenable; they alone had a right to remind kings and potentates of responsibility; to speak to them of humility, charity, and peace. Even in the times of the first ferocious invaders, the *Récits* of M. Thierry (though the least favourable of the modern French historians to the Romish clergy) show, at what peril to themselves, the prelates of the church continually stepped between the oppressor and his victim. Almost all the great social improve-

ments which took place were accomplished under their influence. They at all times took part with the kings against the feudal anarchy. The enfranchisement of the mass of the people from personal servitude, they not only favoured, but inculcated as a Christian duty."

"* * Now we say that the priesthood never could have stood their ground in such an age, against kings and their powerful vassals, as an independent moral authority, entitled to advise, to reprimand, and if need were, to denounce, if they had not been bound together into an European body under a government of their own. They must otherwise have grovelled from the first in that slavish subservience into which they sank at last. No local, no merely national organization, would have sufficed. The state has too strong a hold upon an exclusively national corporation. Nothing but an authority recognised by many nations, and not essentially dependent upon any one, could in that age have been adequate to the post. It required a pope to speak with authority to kings and emperors. Had an individual priest even had the courage to tell them that they had violated the law of God, his voice, not being the voice of the Church, would not have been heeded. That the pope, when he pretended to depose kings, or made war upon them with temporal arms, went beyond his province, needs hardly, in the present day, be insisted upon. But when he claimed the right of censuring and denouncing them with whatever degree of solemnity, in the name of the moral law which all recognised, he assumed a function necessary at all times, and which, in those days, no one except the Church could assume, or was in any degree qualified to exercise."

The view which Dr. Arnold appears to have taken of the great mediæval struggle, whether the religious or the military principle—the spirit of the Christian church or the arbitrary temper of lawless feudalism, should predominate, is also strongly presented in a valuable article, entitled, "St. Anselm and William Rufus," in the "British Critic," (No. 65, Jan., 1843,) on the controversy in England between that saintly and heroic primate, and the second of the Norman tyrants, of whom it was said, "Never a night came but he lay down a worse man than he rose; and never a morning, but he rose worse than he lay down."

“The great controversies of the early church, and those of the middle ages, differed in two points. Those of the first five centuries were for the most part carried on with persons out of the pale of the Church, and on points of faith and doctrine: those of the middle ages were mainly connected with life and morals, and were with men who knew no spiritual authority but hers. Her first opponents, quarrelling with her as a teacher of religion, broke off from her, and set up parallel and antagonist systems of their own; they were heretics and schismatics, self-condemned, and clearly marked out as such by their own formal and deliberate acts. There was no mistaking the grounds or the importance of the dispute. But in the eleventh century, these heresies were things of a past age in the west—lifeless and inoperative carcasses of old enemies, from whom the Church had little comparatively to fear for the present. She had living antagonists to cope with, but they were of a different sort. They were no longer the sophist and declaimer of the schools, but mail-clad barons. Just as she had subdued the intelligence and refinement of the old Roman empire, it was swept away, and she was left alone with its wild destroyers. Her commission was changed; she had now to tame and rule the barbarians. But upon them the voice which had rebuked the heretic fell powerless. While they pressed into her fold, they overwhelmed all her efforts to reclaim them, and filled her, from east to west, with violence and stunning disorder. When, therefore, she again roused herself to confront the world, her position and difficulties had shifted. Her enemy was no longer heresy, but vice,—wickedness which wrought with a high hand,—foul and rampant, like that of Sodom, or the men before the flood. It was not the Faith, but the first principles of duty—justice, mercy, and truth—which were directly endangered by the unbridled ambition and licentiousness of the feudal aristocracy, who were then masters of Europe. These proud and resolute men were no enemy out of doors; they were within her pale, professed allegiance to her, and to be her protectors; claimed and exercised important rights in her government and internal arrangements, plausible in their origin, strengthened by prescription, daily placed further out of the reach of attack by ever-extending encroachments, and guarded with the jealousy of men who felt that the restraints of church discipline, if ever they

closed round them, would be fetters of iron. And with this fierce nobility she had to fight the battle of the poor and weak ; to settle the question whether Christian religion and the offices of the Church were to be any thing more than names, and honours, and endowments, trappings of chivalry and gentle blood ; whether there were yet strength left upon earth to maintain and avenge the laws of God, whoever might break them. She had to stand between the oppressor and his prey ; to compel respect for what is pure and sacred, from the lawless and powerful.”—Vol. 33, p. 7.

NOTE 9.—Page 231.

* * “ Let me notice two or three things, in which the spirit of Christianity has breathed, and will, we may hope, continue to breathe more fully, through our system of law and government. First, let us notice our criminal law. Now, in unchristian countries, criminal law has mostly been either too lax or too bloody : too lax in a rude state of society, because the inconvenience of crimes was less felt, and their guilt was little regarded ; too bloody in a more refined state, strange as it may at first appear, because the inconvenience of crimes, and particularly of those against property, is felt excessively ; and the sacredness of human life, and the moral evil done to a people by making them familiar with bloody punishments, are not apt to be regarded by the mere spirit of worldly selfishness. Now, our laws for many years were, in these points, quite unchristian ; they were passed in utter disregard of our national pledges to follow Christ’s law ; but latterly a better spirit has been awakened ; and men have felt that it is no light thing to take away the life of a brother ; that it is more Christian to amend an offender, if possible, than to destroy him. Only let us remember that there is an error on the other side, into which a mere feeling of compassion, if unmixed with a true Christian sense of the evil of sin, might possibly lead us. There is a danger lest men should think punishment more to be avoided than crime ; lest they should exclaim only against the severity of the one, without a due abhorrence of the guilt of the other. This, however, is not the spirit of Christianity, but of its utter opposite—lawlessness.”

ARNOLD’S *Sermons*, vol. iv., “ *Christian Life, etc.*,”
Sermon XL.

“It is a melancholy truth,” says Blackstone, in his Commentaries, “that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty have been declared, by act of parliament, to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or in other words, to be worthy of instant death.”

This was written about the year 1760, and in 1809, when Sir Samuel Romilly devoted himself to the arduous and admirable labour of bringing about a reformation of the criminal law of England, it is stated by Mr. Alison, in his History of Europe, (chap. 60,) that the punishment of death was by statute affixed to the fearful and almost incredible number of above six hundred different crimes, “while the increasing humanity of the age had induced so wide a departure from the strict letter of the law, that out of 1872 persons capitally convicted at the Old Bailey in seven years, from 1803 to 1810, only *one* had been executed.” The enormous list of capital crimes was the result of what Mr. Alison well calls the ‘separate and selfish system’ pursued by the various classes of property-holders, whose influence was employed upon parliament in successive sessions, to obtain this inhuman safeguard for their respective interests. Well has Landor, in one of his ‘Imaginary Conversations,’ put these words into the mouth of Romilly: “I am ready to believe that Draco himself did not punish so many offences with blood as we do, although he punished with blood every one. * * * We punish with death certain offences which Draco did not even note as crimes, and many others had not yet sprung up in society.”

It is only lately that the reform begun by Romilly, but which the sad catastrophe of his life prevented his witnessing, has been completed so far as to limit capital punishment very much to crimes affecting directly or indirectly the security of life, instead of property. In 1837, Parliament (by the Acts of 7th Will. IV. and 1st Victoria) removed the punishment of death from about 200 offences, and it is now left applicable to treason, murder and attempts at murder, arson with danger to life, and to piracies, burglaries, and robberies, when aggravated by cruelty and violence.

The danger, which Dr. Arnold alludes to as an extreme reaction from an old abuse, is often the growth of a spurious, sentimental sympathy with guilt, which lessens the authority and power of Law, and causes low notions of the State by denying to it the

right to exact the forfeiture of life for any crime. The reader who feels an interest in these questions of jurisprudence, and who can comprehend how reasoning and imaginative wisdom may be aptly combined, will study with advantage the philosophical series of 'Sonnets on the Punishment of Death,' by Mr. Wordsworth, in the latest volume of his poems. An excellent commentary upon them is given in an article in the Quarterly Review, (No. 137, December, 1841,) written, I believe, by the author of 'Philip Van Artavelde.'

NOTE 10.—Page 231.

" * * * Who, if possess of that practical wisdom which commands us to urge on the sluggish and to rein in the impetuous, will go on singing the same song year after year? even when the generation he first endeavoured to arouse by it has passed away, and a new generation has sprung up in its place, altogether different from the first in its exigencies and its purposes, in the tone of its passions, the features of its understanding, and the energies of its will. Who is there who can always keep equally violent on the same side, except the slaves and minions of party, except those who are equally hostile to all governments, and those who are equally servile to all? The very principles which yesterday were trodden under foot, and therefore needed to be lifted up and supported, perhaps to-day, when they have risen and become predominant, may in their turn require to be kept in check by antagonist principles. And this is the great problem for political wisdom, the rock it is the most difficult for political integrity not to split on: to know when to stop; to withstand the precipitous seductions of success; to draw back from the friends by whose side one has been fighting, at the moment they have gained and are beginning to abuse their victory; to join those whom one has hitherto regarded with inevitable and perhaps well-deserved animosity; to save those who have been too strong from becoming too weak; and to rescue the abusers of power from being crushed by its abuse. This is no apology for a political turncoat: on the contrary, though there may be a semblance of similarity between the man who shifts his principles out of interest, and the man who modifies them out of principle, yet what the latter does is the very reverse of what the former does: the one turns his back on the

wind and runs along before it; the other faces and confronts it. Such, for example, was the conduct of that most philosophical and consistent statesman Burke; who has been vilified, because he did not, like some of his friends, blindly cling to the carcass of the Liberty he once had loved, when her spirit had passed away from it, and a foul fiend had seized on it in her stead * *."

JULIUS HARE'S '*Vindication of Niebuhr's History*.' p. 20

NOTE 11.—Page 236.

* * "Those who teach that the powers of man woke at once from a deep slumber just at the beginning of the fifteenth century, or somewhere in the course of the fourteenth, do indeed use strange and preposterous language. For all the seven centuries during which the Western people had been growing up, these powers had been most wonderfully developing themselves. In the conflicts of political parties, in the conflicts of the schools, in splendid enterprises and lonely watchings, the human faculties had been acquiring a strength and an energy which no sudden revolution, if it were the most favourable the imagination can dream of, ever could have imparted to them.

"But it is true also, that the consciousness of these powers, the feeling that they were within, and must come out, was characteristic of the new age. They had been exerted before in ascertaining the conditions and limitations to which they were subject, exerted with the pleasure which always accompanies the feeling of duty, but not from a mere joyous irrepressible impulse. Set free from the bandages of logic, yet still with that sense of subjection to law which was derived from the logical age, exercised under the sense of a spiritual Presence, without the cowardly dread of it; these faculties began to assert themselves in the sixteenth century with a gladness and freedom of which there was no previous, and perhaps there has been no subsequent example. In those countries which had effectually asserted a national position, and where theological controversies were so far settled, that they did not occupy the whole mind of thinking men, or require swords to settle them, this outburst of life and energy took especially the form of poetry. English poetry had from the first been connected with the feelings of Ref-

ormation and the rise of the new order ; Chaucer and Wickliff expound each other. And now Protestantism manifestly gave the direction to the thoughts of those who exhibited least in their writings of its exclusive influence. The high feeling of an ideal of excellence which had descended from the former age, and which in that age had not been able to express itself in words, now came in to incorporate itself with the sense of a meaning and pregnancy in all the daily acts and common relations of life, and the union gave birth to dramas as completely embodying the genius of modern Europe, as those of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Aristophanes embody the genius of Greece. Throughout Europe the influence was felt. The peculiar genius of Cervantes did not hinder him from expressing the feeling which we have designated as characteristic of the time, only as was natural from his circumstances with more of an apparent opposition to the older form of thought. And he as well as Ariosto and Tasso were able to bring forth in their works the national spirit of their respective countries, just as Shakspeare, with all his universality, exhibits so strikingly the life and character of England."

MAURICE'S '*Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*.'

Encyclopædia Metropolitana. Pure Sciences, vol. ii. p. 650.


In this extract Mr. Maurice views, as Dr. Arnold does in the Lecture, the Elizabethan literature in its relation to its own and a preceding age, while in the following passage in Mr. Keble's admirable Lectures, he contemplates it in its relation to a succeeding generation :

* * "Crediderim fore ut in singulis tum sæculis tum regionibus germana Poesis, tacito quodam testimonio, veram ac solidam Pietatem foveat. Nec facile invenias in ulla civitate, quæ quidem leges moresque habeat stabiles, mutari in gravius et sanctius rem sacram et religiosam, non ante mutato laudatorum carminum tenore. Nimirum, si ulla unquam ex parte fuerit labefactata religio, ea certe tenus erunt homines eadem conditione qua patres nostri nondum ad DEUM conversi. Nihil ergo vetat eos eadem ratione ac via, novo videlicet Poetarum ordine, sensim ad meliora erigi.

"Exempli gratia, (ut in domesticis maneam,) recordamini paulisper celeberrimam scriptorum familiam, qui apud nos viguerunt, Elisa-

betlæ tempore. Nonne ea fuit vatum et carminum indoles, quæ ipsis, qui scribebant, ignaris, optime conveniret cum saniore de rebus divinis sententia, qualis erat in honore futura, regnante Carolo? Quid? Shaksperus ille noster, deliciæ omnium, maxime Anglorum adolescentium, nihilne putandus est egisse, qui toties ridicule, toties acriter invectus est in illa præsertim vitia, quæ proxima ætate illatura erant reipublicæ nostræ tam grave detrimentum? qui semper frui videtur aura quadam propria, et sibi quidem gratissima quoties vapulant sive pietatem simulantes, sive regiam minuentes majestatem? Quid? Spenserum qui juvenes assidue in manibus cum amore et studio habuerant, quo tandem animo prælium erant inituri cum illo hoste, cui solenne fuerit omni convicio lacessere nunc regias fœminas, nunc sacrorum antistites?"

KEBLE, '*Prælectiones*,' p. 812



LECTURE VI.

OUR sketch of the English part of what I have called the religious movement of modern Europe has now arrived at the beginning of the seventeenth century. And I have said that the several parties as hitherto developed have been religious rather than political, but that they were soon to become political also. I have used these words "religious" and "political" in their common acceptation for the sake of convenience ; but it is quite necessary to observe the confusions which attend this use of them, as well as of the kindred words "church" and "state," "spiritual" and "secular," confusions of no slight importance, and perpetually tending, as I think, to perplex our notions of the whole matter to which the words relate.

I have called the puritans in the sixteenth century a religious party rather than a political, because it was the government of the church and not of the state, to use again the common language, which they were attempting to alter ; the government by bishops, archdeacons, &c., under the royal supremacy, not the government by king, lords, and commons. But if we examine the case a little more closely, we shall find that in strictness they were a political party, and that the changes which they wanted to introduce were political ; political, it may be said, even more than religious, if we apprehend the distinction involved in these words more accurately than seems to be done by the common usage of them.

I shall not, I trust, be suspected of wishing merely to bring

forward a startling paradox, when I say that in speaking of Christianity the word "church" is rather to be used as distinct from religion than as synonymous with it, and that it belongs in great part to another set of ideas, relating to things which we call political. Religion expresses the relations of man to God, setting aside our relations to other men: the church expresses our relations to God in and through our relations to other men; the state, in popular language, expresses our relations to other men without reference to our relations to God: but I have always thought that this notion is in fact atheistic, and that the truer notion would be that the state at least expresses our relations to other men according to God's ordinance, that is, in some degree including our relation to God. However, without insisting on this, we will allow that the term religion may have a meaning without at all considering our relations to other men, and that the word state may have a meaning without at all considering our relations to God; not its perfect meaning, but a meaning; whereas the word "church" necessarily comprehends both: we cannot attach any sense to it without conceiving of it as related to God, and involving also the relations of men to one another. It stands, therefore, according to this view of it, as the union of the two ideas of religion and the state, comprising necessarily in itself the essential points of both the others; and as being such, all church questions may be said to be both religious and political; although in some the religious element may be predominant, and in others the political, almost to the absorption of the other.

Now questions of church government may appear clearly to be predominantly political; that is, as regarding the relations of the members of the church to one another, whether one shall govern the rest, or the few the many, or the many themselves: and the arguments which bear upon all these points in societies merely political might seem the arguments

which should decide them here. But two other considerations are here to be added ; one, that in the opinion of many persons of opposite parties, all such arguments are barred by God's having expressly commanded a particular form of government ; so that instead of the general question, what is the best form of government under such and such circumstances, we have another, what is the particular form commanded by God as the best under all circumstances. This is one consideration, and according to this, it might no doubt happen that persons of the most opposite political opinions might concur in desiring the very same form of church government, simply as that which God had commanded. This is possible, and in individual cases I do not doubt that it has often actually happened. But as the question, what is the particular form divinely commanded, is open to manifold doubts, to say nothing of the farther question, "whether any particular form has been commanded or no ;" so practically amongst actual parties, men's opinions and feelings, political and others, have really influenced them in deciding the question of fact, and they have actually maintained one form or another to be the form divinely commanded, according to their firm belief of its superior excellence, or their sense of the actual evils of other forms, or their instinctive feeling in favour of what was established and ancient. And so we really should thus far reclaim questions on church government to the dominion of political questions ; political or moral considerations having really for the most part been the springs of the opinions of the several parties respecting them.

But I said that there were two considerations to be added, and I have as yet only mentioned one. The other is the belief entertained of the existence of a priesthood in Christianity, and this priesthood regulated by a divine law, and attached for ever to the offices which exercise government also. And this priesthood being, according to the opinion of those who

believe in it, of infinite religious importance, the question of church government becomes in their view much more religious than political ; religious, not only in this sense, that church government, whether we may think it good or bad, must be tried simply by the matter of fact, whether it is the government ordained by God ; but in another and stricter sense, that the priesthood implying also the government, and being necessary to every man's spiritual welfare, not through the governing powers attached to it, but in its own direct priestly acts which are quite distinct from government, church government is directly a matter of religious import, and to depart from what God has ordained respecting it is not merely a breach of God's commandments, but is an actual cutting off of that supply of spiritual strength by which alone we can be saved. So that in this view questions of church government, as involving more or less the priesthood also, must be predominantly religious.

Am I, then, contradicting myself, and were the parties of the sixteenth century purely religious, as I have called them religious in the popular sense of the word, and not at all, or scarcely at all political ? I think that the commonest reader of English history will feel that they were political, and that I was right in calling them so ; where, then, are we to find the solution of the puzzle ? In two points, which I think are historically certain : first, that the controversy about episcopacy was not held of necessity to involve the question of the priesthood, because the priestly character was not thought to be vested exclusively in bishops, nor to be communicable only by them ; so that episcopacy might be after all a point of government and not of priesthood : and secondly, in this, that the reformed churches, and the church of England no less than the rest, laid no stress on the notion of a priesthood, and made it no part of their faith ; so that questions of church government, when debated between protestants and

protestants, were debated without reference to it, and as questions of government only. Whereas amongst Roman Catholics, where the belief in a priesthood is at the bottom of the whole system, questions of church government have had no place, but the dispute has been *de sacerdotio et imperio*, respecting the limits of the church and the state; for the church being supposed identical with, or rather to be merged in the priesthood, its own government of itself was fixed irrevocably; and the important question was, how large a portion of human life could be saved from the grasp of this dominion, which was supposed to be divine, and yet by sad experience was felt also to be capable both of corruption and tyranny. So that there was no remedy but to separate the dominion of the state from that of the church as widely as possible, and to establish a distinction between secular things and spiritual, that so the corrupt church might have only one portion of the man, and some other power, not subject to its control, might have the rest.

Returning, then, to my original point, it is still, I think, true that the parties of the sixteenth century in England were in great measure political; inasmuch as they disputed about points of church government, without any reference to a supposed priesthood; and because even those who maintained that one or another form was to be preferred, because it was of divine appointment, were influenced in their interpretation of the doubtful language of the Scriptures by their own strong persuasion of what that language could not but mean to say. But being political even as we have hitherto regarded them, the parties become so in a much higher degree when we remember that, according to the theory of the English constitution in the sixteenth century, its church and its state were one.

Whether this identification be right or wrong, is no part of my present business to decide; but the fact is perfectly in-

disputable. It does not depend merely on the language of the act which conferred the supremacy on Henry the Eighth, large and decisive as that language is. (1) Nor on the large powers and high precedence, ranking above all the bishops and archbishops, assigned to the king's vicegerent in matters ecclesiastical, such vicegerent being a layman. (2) Nor yet does it rest solely on the fact of Edward the Sixth issuing an office for the celebration of the communion purely by his own authority, with the advice of his uncle the protector Somerset, and others of his privy council, without the slightest mention of any consent or advice of any bishop or clerical person whatsoever; the king declaring in his preface that he knows what by God's word is meet to be redressed, and that he purposes with God's grace to do it.* (3) But it is proved by this, that every point in the doctrine, discipline, and ritual of our church, was settled by the authority of parliament: the Act of Uniformity of the first of Elizabeth, which fixed the liturgy and ordered its use in all churches, being passed by the queen, lords temporal, and commons only; the bishops being Roman Catholics, and of course refusing to join in it; so that the very preamble of the act omits all mention of lords spiritual, and declares that it was enacted by the queen, with the advice and consent of the lords and commons, and by the authority of the same. (4) And it is proved again by the language of the prayer for the church militant, where the king's council and his ministers are undoubtedly regarded as being officers in the church by virtue of their offices in the state. (5) This being the fact, recognised on all hands, church government was no light matter, but one which essentially involved in it the govern-

* See Edward the Sixth's "Order of the Communion," "imprinted at London by Richard Grafton, 1547," and reprinted by Bishop Sparrow in his "Collection of Articles, Injunctions, Canons, Orders," &c., and again lately by Dr. Cardwell, as an Appendix to the Two Liturgies of Edward the Sixth. Oxford, 1841.

ment of the state ; and the disputing the queen's supremacy was equivalent to depriving her of one of the most important portions of her sovereignty, and committing half of the government of the nation to other hands. And therefore, when James the First used his famous expression of "no bishop, no king," (6) he spoke exactly in the spirit of the notion that an aristocracy is a necessary condition of a monarchy, unless it be a pure despotism, military or otherwise ; that where the people are free, if they have rejected an aristocracy, they will surely sooner or later reject a monarchy also.

But still, had Elizabeth's successor been like herself, the religious parties might have gone on for a long time without giving to their opposition a direct political form. Sir Francis Knollys, writing to Lord Burghley in January, 1592, (1591, O.S.,) wonders that the queen should imagine "that she is in as much danger of such as are called puritans as she is of the papists, and yet her majesty cannot be ignorant that the puritans are not able to change the government of the clergy, but only by petition at her majesty's hands. And yet her majesty cannot do it, but she must call a parliament for it ; and no act can pass thereof unless her majesty shall give her royal assent thereto."* (7) This shows that as yet no notion was entertained of parliament's taking up the cause of itself, and pressing it against the crown ; and indeed such was the mingled fear and love entertained for Elizabeth, that the mere notion of a strong party in parliament setting itself in opposition to her was altogether chimerical. But in the mean time the puritan party was gaining ground in the country ; its supporters in parliament were continually becoming more numerous ; and instead of the most able, the most respected, and the most beloved of queens, the sovereign of England was now James the First.

* *Queen Elizabeth and Her Times.* Edited by T. Wright, Trinity College, Cambridge. London, 1838. Vol. ii. p. 417.

At one stroke the crown became placed in a new position. Not less averse to the puritans than Elizabeth had been, King James met with none of that enthusiastic loyalty from the mass of the people which in the late reign had softened the opposition of the puritans, and if it had not softened it would have rendered it harmless. He abandoned Elizabeth's foreign policy, as he was incapable of maintaining either the dignity or the popularity of her personal character. The spell which had stayed the spirit of political party was broken, and the waters whose swelling had been held back as it were by its potent influence, now took their natural course, and rose with astonishing rapidity. (8)

The most disastrous revolutions are produced by the extreme of physical want; the most happy, by wants of a moral kind, physical want being absent. There are many reasons why this should be so: and this amongst others, that extreme physical want is unnatural: it is a disease which cannot be shaken off without a violent and convulsive struggle. But moral and intellectual cravings are but a healthful symptom of vigorous life: before they were felt, no wrong was done in withholding their appointed food, and if it be given them when they demand it, all goes on naturally and happily. Nay, even where it is refused, and a struggle is the consequence, still the struggle is marked with much less of bitterness, for men contending for political rights are not infuriated like those who are fighting for bread. Now at the beginning of the seventeenth century the craving for a more active share in the management of their own concerns was felt by a large portion of the English people. It had been suspended in Elizabeth's reign owing to the general respect for her government, and the growing activity of the nation found its employment in war, or in trade, or in writing; for the mass of writers in Elizabeth's time was enormous. (9) But when the government excited no respect, then the nation began to

question with itself, why in the conduct of its affairs such a government should be so much and itself so little.

No imaginary constitution floated before the eyes of the popular party in parliament, as the object towards which all their efforts should be directed. Their feeling was indistinct, but yet they seem to have acted on a consciousness that the time was come when in the government of the country the influence of the crown should be less, and that of the nation more. It appears to me that the particular matters of dispute were altogether subordinate; the puritan members of parliament pressed for the reform of the church; men who were keenly alive to the value of personal freedom, attacked arbitrary courts of justice, and the power of arbitrary imprisonment; those who cared for little else, were at least anxious to keep in their own hands the control over their own money. But in all the impulse was the same, to make the house of commons a reality. Created in the midst of regal and aristocratical oppression, and wonderfully preserved during the despotism of the Tudor princes with all its powers unimpaired because it had not attempted to exercise them unseasonably; an undoubted branch of the legislature,—the sole controller by law of the public taxation,—authorized even in its feeblest infancy to petition for the redress of national grievances and to impeach public delinquents in the name of the “Commons of England,”—recognised as speaking with the voice of the nation when the nation could do no more than petition and complain, the house of commons spoke that same voice no less now, when the nation was grown up to manhood, and had the power to demand and to punish. (10)

The greater or less importance of a representative assembly is like the quicksilver in a barometer; it rises or falls according to causes external to itself; and is but an index exhibited in a palpable form, of the more or less powerful pressure of the popular atmosphere. When the people at

large are poor, depressed, and inactive, then their representatives faithfully express their weakness ; nothing is so helpless as a house of commons, or a chamber of deputies, when their constituents are indifferent to or unable to support their efforts. But under opposite circumstances an opposite result is inevitable ; where the people are vigorous, powerful, and determined, their representatives, so long as they are believed to represent them faithfully, cannot but wield a predominant influence. Naturally then and unavoidably did the power of the house of commons grow in the seventeenth century, because, as I have said, they spoke the voice of the nation, and the nation was now become strong.

Under these circumstances there were now working together in the same party many principles which, as we have seen, are sometimes perfectly distinct. For instance the popular principle, that the influence of many should not be overborne by that of one, was working side by side with the principle of movement, or the desire of carrying on the work of the Reformation to the farthest possible point, and not only the desire of completing the Reformation, but that of shaking off the manifold evils of the existing state of things both political and moral. Yet it is remarkable that the spirit of intellectual movement stood as it were hesitating which party it ought to join : and as the contest went on, it seemed rather to incline to that party which was most opposed to the political movement. This is a point in the state of English party in the seventeenth century which is well worth noticing, and we must endeavour to comprehend it.

We might think, *a priori*, that the spirit of political, and that of intellectual, and that of religious movement, would go on together, each favouring and encouraging the other. But the spirit of intellectual movement differs from the other two in this, that it is comparatively one with which the mass of mankind have little sympathy. Political benefits all men

can appreciate ; and all good men, and a great many more than we might well dare to call good, can appreciate also the value not of all, but of some religious truth which to them may seem all : the way to obtain God's favour and to worship Him aright, is a thing which great bodies of men can value, and be moved to the most determined efforts, if they fancy that they are hindered from attaining to it. But intellectual movement in itself is a thing which few care for. Political truth may be dear to them, so far as it affects their common well-being ; and religious truth so far as they may think it their duty to learn it ; but truth abstractedly, and because it is truth, which is the object, I suppose, of the pure intellect, is to the mass of mankind a thing indifferent. Thus the workings of the intellect come even to be regarded with suspicion as unsettling : We have got, we say, what we want, and we are well contented with it ; why should we be kept in perpetual restlessness, because you are searching after some new truths, which when found will compel us to derange the state of our minds in order to make room for them. Thus the democracy of Athens was afraid of and hated Socrates (11) ; and the poet who satirized Cleon, knew that Cleon's partisans no less than his own aristocratical friends would sympathize with his satire, when directed against the philosophers. But if this hold in political matters, much more does it hold religiously. The two great parties of the Christian world have each their own standard of truth by which they try all things : Scripture on the one hand, the voice of the church on the other. To both therefore the pure intellectual movement is not only unwelcome, but they dislike it. It will question what they will not allow to be questioned ; it may arrive at conclusions which they would regard as impious. And therefore in an age of religious movement particularly, the spirit of intellectual movement soon finds itself proscribed rather than countenanced.

But still there remains the question why it should have shrunk from the religious party which was aiming at reform rather than from that which was opposed to it. And the explanation appears to be this. The Reforming party held up Scripture in all things as their standard, and Scripture according to its most obvious interpretation. Thus in matters of practice, such as church government, ceremonial, &c., they allowed of no liberty; Scripture was to be the rule positively and negatively; what was found in it was commanded; what it did not command was unlawful. Again, in matters of faith, what the Scripture taught was to be believed: believed actively, not submissively accepted. I instance the most startling points of Calvinism as an example of this. And this party knew no distinction of learned or unlearned, of priest or layman, of those who were to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God, and of those who were to receive the book sealed up, and believe that its contents were holy, because their teachers told them so. All having the full Christian privileges, all had alike the full Christian responsibilities. I have known a man of science, a Roman Catholic, express the most intolerant opinions as to dissenters from the Romish communion, and yet when pressed on the subject, declare that his business was science, and that he knew nothing about theology. But the religious reforming party of the seventeenth century would allow their men of science no such shelter as this. They were members of Christ's church, and must know and believe Christ's truth for themselves, and not by proxy. With such a party, then, considering that the truth for which they demanded such implicit faith, was their own interpretation of Scripture, formed on no very enlarged principles, the intellectual inquirer, who demanded a large liberty of thought, and to believe only what he could reasonably accept as true, could entertain no sympathy.

But with the party opposed to them it was different. To a man not in earnest the principle of church authority is a very endurable shackle. He does homage to it once for all, and is then free. In matters of church government, however, men in earnest no less than men not in earnest found that, intellectually speaking, the antipopular party dealt more gently with them than the puritans. For Hooker's principle being adopted, that the church had great liberty in its choice of a government, as well as of its ceremonial, the existing church government and ritual rested its claim not on its being essential always, and divinely commanded, but on being established by lawful authority. On this principle any man might obey it, without being at all obliged to maintain its inherent excellence: his conformity did not touch his intellectual freedom. With respect to doctrines, even to the honest and earnest believer there was in many points also allowed a greater liberty. Where the church did not pronounce authoritatively, the interpretation of Scripture was left free: and the obvious sense was not imposed upon men's belief as the true one. Thus the peculiar points of Calvinism were rejected by the antipopular party, the more readily no doubt because Calvin had taught them, but also by many because of their own startling character. But where there was an indifference to religious truth altogether, there the principle of church authority, and the strong distinctions drawn between the knowledge required of the clergy, and that necessary for the laity, offered a most convenient refuge. It cost such a man little not to attack opinions about which he cared nothing; it cost him little to say that he submitted dutifully to the authority of the church, being himself very ignorant of such matters, and unable to argue about them. His ignorance was really unbelief: but his profession of submission allowed him to inquire freely on other matters which he did care for, and there to assert principles which, if consis-

tently applied, might shake what the church most maintained. But he would not make the application, and like the Jesuit editors of Newton, he was ready if questioned to disclaim it. (12)

Thus up to the breaking out of the civil war in 1642, we find some of the most inquiring and purely intellectual men of the age, such as Hales and Chillingworth, strongly attached to the antipopular party. And it was his extreme shrinking from what he considered the narrow-mindedness of the puritans, which principally, I think, influenced the mind of Lord Falkland in joining at last the antipopular cause as the least evil of the two. But as the civil war went on, the popular party underwent a great change; a change which prepared the way for the totally new form in which it appeared in Europe in that second period of modern history which I have called the period of the political movement.

Before, however, we trace this change, let us consider generally the progress of the struggle in the first forty years of the seventeenth century. What strikes us predominantly is, that what in Elizabeth's time was a controversy between divines, was now a great political contest between the crown and the parliament. I have already observed that the growing vigour of the nation necessarily gave a corresponding vigour to the parliament: its greater ascendancy was in the course of things natural. And although the nation was growing throughout the forty years and more of Elizabeth's reign, yet of course the period of its after growth produced much greater results: the infant grows into the boy in his first ten years of life; but it is in the second ten years, from ten to twenty, that he grows up into the freedom of manhood. But yet it cannot be denied that had Elizabeth reigned from 1603 to 1642, the complexion of events would have been greatly different. A great sovereign might have either headed the

movement or diverted it. For instance, a sovereign who observing the strength of the national feeling in favour of the protestant Reformation had entered frankly and vigorously into the great continental struggle; had supported on principle that cause which Richelieu aided purely from worldly policy; had struck to the heart of Spain by a sustained naval war, and by letting loose Raleigh and other such companions or followers of Drake and Frobisher upon her American colonies; while he had combated the Austrian power front to front in Germany, and formed an army like Cromwell's in foreign rather than in domestic warfare, such a king would have met with no opposition on the score of subsidies; his faithful commons would have supported him as liberally and heartily as their fathers had supported Henry the Fifth's quarrel with France, or as their posterity supported the triumphant administration of the first William Pitt. And puritan plans of church reform would have been cast aside unheeded: the star-chamber would have remained unassailed, because it would have found no victims, or none whom the public mind would have cared for; and Hampden instead of resisting the tax of ship-money, would, like the Roman senators of old, have rather built and manned a ship at his own single cost; and commanding it in person for the cause of God and the glory of England, might have died like Nelson after completing the destruction of the Spanish navy, instead of perishing almost in his own native county, at that sad skirmish of Chalgrave field.

This might have been, had James the First been the very reverse of what he was; and then the contest would have been delayed to a later period, and have taken place under other circumstances. For sooner or later it could not but come, and the first long peace under a weak monarch would have led to it. For the supposed long course of foreign wars would have caused parliaments to have been continually

summoned, so that it would not have been possible afterwards to have discontinued them ; and whenever the parliament and a weak king had found themselves in presence of each other, with no foreign war to engage them, the collision was inevitable. We have rather therefore reason to be thankful that the struggle did take place actually, when no long war had brought distress upon the whole nation, and embittered men's minds with what Thucydides* calls its rude and violent teaching (13) ; but in a time of peace and general prosperity, when our social state was so healthy that the extreme of political commotion did not seriously affect it ; so that although a three or four years' civil war cannot but be a great calamity, yet never was there any similar struggle marked with so little misery, and stained with so few crimes, as the great English civil war of the seventeenth century.

Meantime, as I said, the character of the popular party underwent a change. For as the struggle became fiercer, and more predominantly political, and bold and active men were called forward from all ranks of society, it was impossible that the puritan form of church government, or their system of Scripture interpretation, should be agreeable to all the popular party. Some broke off therefore in one direction, others in another. In times when the masses were no longer inert, but individual character was everywhere manifesting itself, no system of centralization, whether in the hands of bishops or presbyters, was likely to be acceptable. Centralization and active life pervading the whole body are hard to reconcile : he who should do this perfectly, would have established a perfect government. For "*quot homines tot sententiæ*" holds good only where there is any thinking at all : otherwise there may be a hundred millions of men and only "*una sententia*," if the minds of the 99,999,999 are

wholly quiescent. And thus the Independent principle arose naturally out of the high excitement on religious questions which prevailed throughout the nation ; just as the multitude of little commonwealths in Greece, and in Italy in the middle ages, showed the stirring of political life in those countries. Each congregation was independent of other congregations ; each individual in the congregation, according to his gifts real or fancied, might pray, exhort, and interpret Scripture. Men so resolute in asserting the rights of the small society against the larger, and of the individual against the society, could not but recognise, I do not say the duty, so much as the necessity of toleration ; and thus the independents showed more mutual indulgence in this matter than any religious party had as yet shown in England. But such a system, to say nothing of its other defects, had in it no principle of duration ; for it seems a law that life cannot long go on in a multitude of minute parts without union, nay even without something of that very centralization which yet if not well watched is so apt to destroy them by absorbing their life into its own : there wants a heart in the political as in the natural body, to supply the extremities continually with fresh blood.

But I said that the popular party broke off from puritanism partly in one direction and partly in another. Some there were who set the religious part of the contest aside altogether ; esteeming the disputes about church government of no account, holding all the religious parties alike in equal contempt, as equally narrow-minded in their different ways. The good government of the commonwealth was their main object, with a pure system of divine philosophy. The eyes of such men were turned rather to Greece and Rome than to any nearer model ; there alone, as they fancied, was to be found the freedom which they desired. Others, who were incapable of any romantic or philosophical aspirations, desired simply such objects as have been expressed, in later times,

under the terms civil and religious liberty ; they deprecated unjust restraint, whether external or internal ; but with this negation their zeal seemed to rest contented. A great and fatal error, and which has done more than any thing else to make good men in later times stand aloof from the popular cause. For liberty, though an essential condition of all our excellence, is yet valuable because it is such a condition : I may say of it what I have said of actual existence, that the question may always be asked why we are free, and if the answer is, that we may do nothing, or that we may please ourselves, then liberty, so far as we are concerned, is valueless : its good is this only, that it takes away from another the guilt of injustice. But to speak of religious liberty, when we mean the liberty to be irreligious, or of freedom of conscience, when our only conscience is our convenience, is no other than a mockery and a profanation. It is by following such principles that a popular party justly incurs that reproach of ἀκολασία, which the ancient philosophers bestowed especially on democracies. (14)

I have tried to analyze the popular party : I must now endeavour to do the same with the party opposed to it. Of course an antipopular party varies exceedingly at different times ; when it is in the ascendant its vilest elements are sure to be uppermost : fair and moderate men,—just men, wise men, noble-minded men,—then refuse to take part with it. But when it is humbled, and the opposite side begins to imitate its practices, then again many of the best and noblest spirits return to it, and share its defeat though they abhorred its victory. We must distinguish, therefore, very widely between the antipopular party in 1640, before the Long Parliament met, and the same party a few years, or even a few months afterwards. Now taking the best specimens of this party in its best state, we can scarcely admire them too highly. A man who leaves the popular cause when it is tri-

unpliant, and joins the party opposed to it, without really changing his principles and becoming a renegade, is one of the noblest characters in history. He may not have the clearest judgment or the firmest wisdom ; he may have been mistaken ; but as far as he is concerned personally, we cannot but admire him. But such a man changes his party not to conquer, but to die. He does not allow the caresses of his new friends to make him forget that he is a sojourner with them, and not a citizen : his old friends may have used him ill ; they may be dealing unjustly and cruelly ; still their faults, though they may have driven him into exile, cannot banish from his mind the consciousness that with them is his true home ; that their cause is habitually just, and habitually the weaker, although now bewildered and led astray by an unwonted gleam of success. He protests so strongly against their evil that he chooses to die by their hands rather than in their company ; but die he must, for there is no place left on earth where his sympathies can breathe freely ; he is obliged to leave the country of his affections, and life elsewhere is intolerable. This man is no renegade, no apostate, but the purest of martyrs ; for what testimony to truth can be so pure as that which is given uncheered by any sympathy ; given not against enemies amidst applauding friends, but against friends amidst unpitying or half-rejoicing enemies. And such a martyr was Falkland ! (15)

Others who fall off from a popular party in its triumph, are of a different character ; ambitious men, who think that they are become necessary to their opponents, and who crave the glory of being able to undo their own work as easily as they had done it : passionate men, who, quarrelling with their old associates on some personal question, join the adversary in search of revenge : vain men, who think their place unequal to their merits, and hope to gain a higher on the opposite side : timid men, who are frightened as it were at the

noise of their own guns, and the stir of actual battle ; who had liked to dally with popular principles in the parade service of debating or writing in quiet times, but who shrink alarmed when both sides are become thoroughly in earnest : and again, quiet and honest men, who never having fully comprehended the general principles at issue, and judging only by what they see before them, are shocked at the violence of their party, and think that the opposite party is now become innocent and just, because it is now suffering wrong rather than doing it. Lastly, men who rightly understand that good government is the result of popular and antipopular principles blended together, rather than of the mere ascendancy of either ; whose aim, therefore, is to prevent either from going too far, and to throw their weight into the lighter scale : wise men and most useful, up to the moment when the two parties are engaged in actual civil war, and the question is, which shall conquer. For no man can pretend to limit the success of a party, when the sword is the arbitrator ; he who wins in that game does not win by halves : and therefore the only question then is, which party is on the whole the best, or rather, perhaps, the least evil ; for as one must crush the other, it is at least desirable that the party so crushed should be the worse.

Again, of the supporters of an antipopular party in its ordinary state, before it has received accessions from its opposite, there is also a considerable variety. Walton,* when describing the three parties of the reign of Elizabeth, speaks of them as “the active Romanists,” “the restless non-conformists,” and “the passive and peaceable Protestants.” This virtue of quietness, meekness, and peaceableness, the *ἀπραγμοσύνη* of the Athenians, has been ascribed to Walton himself, and is often claimed as the characteristic excellence of an antipopular party, and particularly of the

* Life of Hooker.

antipopular party of our English contests of the seventeenth century. Now it may be, though I do not think that it is made out clearly, that there existed at Athens a state of things so feverish—that a town life, surrounded by such manifold excitements as was that of the Athenians, had so overpowered the taste for quiet, that the ἀπραγμων, or the man who followed only his own domestic concerns, was a healthy rarity. (16) But in general, and most certainly with our country life, and our English constitutions, partaking something of the coldness of our northern climate, it is extraordinary that any should have regarded this ἀπραγμοσύνη as a rare virtue, and praised the meekness of those who, being themselves well off, and having all their own desires contented, do not trouble themselves about the evils which they do not feel; and complain of the noisy restlessness of the beggars in the street, while they are sitting at their ease in their warm and comfortable rooms. Isaac Walton might enjoy his angling undisturbed in spite of star-chamber, ship-money, high-commission court, or popish ceremonies; what was the sacrifice to him of letting the public grievances take their own way, and enjoying the freshness of a May morning in the meadows on the banks of the Lea? Show me a population painfully struggling for existence, toiling hard and scarcely able to obtain necessary food, and seeing others around them in the enjoyment of every luxury, and this population repelling all agitation, and going on peaceably and patiently under a system in which they and they alone are suffering; and I will yield to no man in my admiration, in my deep reverence for such quietness, or rather for such true meekness, such self-denying resignation. For there is not a living man on whom hunger and cold do not press heavily, if he has to bear them; and he who endures these is truly patient. But are all men keenly alive to religious error? to political abuses which do not touch them? to in-

justice from which others only are the sufferers? Or are our English minds so enthusiastic, that our most dangerous tendency is to forget our own private and personal concerns, to crave after abstract changes in church and state, and to rail against existing institutions with the certainty of meeting as our reward poverty and a jail? Generally, then, there is no merit in the acquiescence in existing things shown by the mass of the population whose physical comforts are not touched, nor their personal feelings insulted. There may be individuals, no doubt, whose submission is virtuous; men who see clearly what is evil, and desire to have it redressed, but from a mistaken sense of duty, and from that only, forbear to complain of it. But where the evil is one which the mass care little for, when to complain of it is highly dangerous, and there is enough of work and enjoyment in their own private concerns to satisfy all the wants of their nature, I know not how the political peaceableness of such persons can be thought in itself to be either admirable or amiable. It seems to me to be in itself neither admirable nor strongly blameable; but simply the following of a natural tendency; and of this sort was the dislike of the popular party entertained by the great majority of their opponents.

Others, however, there were who were opposed to the popular party, at least so long as it was predominantly religious, on more positive and earnest grounds. A vast multitude of principles and practices had been joined together in the Roman Catholic system, not all necessarily connected with each other. Of these, some desired to restore all, some loved peculiarly those which were most essential to the system really, though not in the eyes of the vulgar; others regretted only those which, having no necessary connection with it, were yet proscribed for its sake. To all of these, and to many more besides, which the church of England had actually adopted, the puritans professed the most uncompromis

ing hostility. Not only, therefore, were all those opposed to them who thought that the Reformation had gone too far, but many of those also who thought that it had gone far enough, and could not bear to go any farther. Men of taste, men who loved antiquity, men of strong associations which they felt almost sacred, were scandalized at the homeliness, the utter renunciation of the past, the rude snapping asunder of some of the most venerable usages, which were prominent parts of the puritan system. But along with these were others whose dislike to puritanism went deeper; some who dreaded their system of Scripture interpretation, and the doctrines which they deduced from it; a large party who believed the government by bishops to be divinely commanded, as firmly as the puritans believed the same of their presbyteries; but many also, and from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards continually becoming more active, and raised to higher dignities, who in their hearts hated the Reformation altogether—hated especially the foreign protestants—hated the doctrine of justification by faith, loved ceremonies and rites, idolized antiquity, preached up the priesthood, and, in the words of Lord Falkland, “laboured to bring in an English though not a Roman popery.” “I mean,” he goes on,* “not only the outside and dress of it,

* The Lord Falkland’s speech, Feb. 9th, 1641, O. S.—(*From Nalson’s Collections* :)

* * * “The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that as some ill ministers in our state first took away our money from us, and afterwards endeavoured to make our money not worth the taking, by turning it into brass by a kind of antiphilosopher’s stone; so these men used us in the point of preaching: first, depressing it to their power, and next labouring to make it such, as the harm had not been much if it had been depressed, the most frequent subjects even in the most sacred auditories, being the *jus divinum* of bishops and tithes, the sacredness of the clergy, the sacrilege of impropriations, the demolishing of puritanism and propriety, the building of the prerogative at Paul’s, the introduction of such doctrines as, admitting them true, the truth would not recompense the scandal; or of such as were so far false, that, as Sir Thomas More says of the *casuists*, their business was not to keep men from sinning, but to inform them,

but equally absolute ; a blind dependence of the people upon the clergy, and of the clergy upon themselves." All these several elements were found mixed up together in the anti-popular party of the first half of the seventeenth century.

Let us now pass abruptly from 1642 to 1660 ; when the long contest was ended, the old constitution restored, and the first period, which I have called the period of the religious movement, was brought to a close. Let us consider what the object of the movement had been, and what was its success. And first, as religious parties only, we have seen that there had been three, those who wished to maintain the system established at the Reformation, those who wished to alter it by carrying on the Reformation farther, and those who wished to undo it, and return to the system which it had superseded. We have seen that this last party could not act openly in its own name, and its own direct operations were therefore inconsiderable : but a portion of the established church party, in their extreme antipathy towards those who called for farther reform, did really labour in spirit to undo what had been effected already, serving the principles of the Roman Catholic party if not its forms. But the result of the contest was singularly favourable to the middle party, to the

Quam prope ad peccatum sine peccato liceat accedere ; so it seemed their work was to try how much of a papist might be brought in without popery, and to destroy as much as they could of the Gospel, without bringing themselves into danger of being destroyed by the law. * * Mr. Speaker, to go yet farther, some of them have so industriously laboured to deduce themselves from Rome, that they have given great suspicion that in gratitude they desire to return thither, or at least to meet it half way ; some have evidently laboured to bring in an English, though not a Roman popery : I mean not only the outside and dress of it, but equally absolute ; a blind dependence of the people upon the clergy, and of the clergy upon themselves ; and have opposed the papacy beyond the *seas* that they might settle one *beyond the water*. [i. e. trans Thamesin, at Lambeth.] Nay, common fame is more than ordinarily false, if none of them have found a way to reconcile the opinions of Rome to the preferments of England ; and be so absolutely, directly, and cordially papists, that it is all that £1500 a year can do to keep them from confessing it."

supporters of the Elizabethan reformation against the Roman Catholics on one side, and against the puritans on the other. It was decided that the church of England was to remain at once protestant and episcopal, acknowledging the royal supremacy and retaining its hierarchy; repelling alike Romanism and puritanism; maintaining the reform already effected, resisting any reform or change beyond it. This is the first and obvious impression which we derive from the sight of the battle-field when the smoke is cleared away; all other standards are beaten down, the standard of the protestant and episcopal church of England appears to float alone triumphant.

But on examining more closely the state of the conquerors, we find that their victory has not been cheaply won; that they do not leave the field such as they came upon it. And this is the important part of the whole matter, that the original idea of the church of England, as only another name for the state and nation of England, was now greatly obscured, and from this time forward was ever more and more lost sight of. Change in the government of the church had been successfully resisted; there the puritans had done nothing; but changes of the greatest importance had been wrought in the state, not in its forms indeed, for the alteration of these had been triumphantly repealed by the restoration, but in its spirit: the question whether England was to be a pure or mixed monarchy had been decisively settled; the ascendancy of parliament, which the revolution of 1688 placed beyond dispute, was rendered sure by the events of the preceding contest; the bloodless triumph of King William was purchased in fact by the blood shed in the great civil war. It was impossible then that that absoluteness of church government which had existed in the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors should be any longer tolerated; no high-commission court could be appointed now, nor would the license of the

crown be held sufficient to give the clergy a legislative power, and to enable them to make canons for the church at their discretion. The canons of 1640, passed by Laud in the plenitude of his power, were annulled by the parliament after the Restoration no less than they had been by the Long Parliament; the writ *De hæretico comburendo* was now for the first time abolished by law. The old forms of church government had been maintained against all change, but being ill suited to the advance which had been made in the spirit of the general government, they were not allowed to possess their former activity.

Whilst the identity of church and state was thus impaired on the one hand, it was also lessened in another way by the total defeat of the puritans, and by the ejection of such a multitude of their ministers by the new oaths imposed by the Act of Uniformity. Hitherto the puritans had been more or less a party within the church; the dispute had been whether the church itself should be modelled after the puritan rule or no; both parties as yet supposing that there was to be one church only as there was one nation. But first the growth of independency during the civil war, and now the vehement repulsion by the church of all puritan elements from its ministry, made it but too certain that one church would no longer be coextensive with the nation. The old idea was attempted to be maintained for a while by force; we had the Five-Mile Act and the Conventicle Act, (17) and such men as John Bunyan and William Penn were subjected to legal penalties; but to maintain an idea which was now contradicted by facts, became as impossible as it was unjust; and the Toleration Act, recognising the legal existence of various bodies of dissenters from the church, was at least a confession that the great idea of the English Reformation could not be realized in the actual state of things; its accomplishment must be reserved for happier and better times.

The church, or religious movement, having thus ended satisfactorily to the principles of neither party, the religious elements on both sides retired as it were into the background, and the political elements were left in the front rank of the battle alone. We cannot wonder, therefore, that the next great period of movement should have been predominantly political. The composition and vicissitudes of parties during this second period will form the subject of the next lecture.

NOTES

TO

LECTURE VI.

NOTE 1.—Page 266.

THE course of argument and historical reference in this paragraph must be taken in connection with Dr. Arnold's idea of a Christian state—what may be called his high-State theory. If on the contrary the reader should connect it with the more common opinion respecting the functions of the State—‘the low Jacobinical notion,’ as Arnold was in the habit of stigmatizing the Warburtonian and Utilitarian theory, that the only object of the State is the conservation of body and goods, he will receive an impression from this passage widely different from the thoughts that were in the mind of the Lecturer, and which he would have been the last to sanction. In establishing the identification of Church and State, according to the theory of the English constitution in the sixteenth century, Dr. Arnold adopts a course of historical argument which gives great prominence to the influence of parliamentary legislation and civil authority upon ecclesiastical affairs,—indeed this is so strongly stated that his real object might be mistaken for an intention to establish the supremacy of the State over the Church,—considered as distinct and even opposite, and thus to fasten an Erastian character upon the English Church. It is however enough to show that such was not the drift of his reasoning, to observe that it would be rather indirect and indeed insidious argumentation, different from the purpose he has expressed, and altogether at variance with the upright and candid habit of his mind. Dr. Arnold was not a man to strike a secret or even a side blow.

The supremacy of the Crown was, in truth, a favourite idea with

him, not, however, according to the common acceptation of the phrase, but because considering Church and State to be identical, and 'the Christian nation of England to be the Church of England,' he therefore considered the 'head of that nation the head of the Church.' In one of his letters (No. 246) he speaks of 'the doctrine of the Crown's Supremacy having been vouchsafed to the English Church by a rare blessing of God, and containing in itself the true idea of the Christian perfect Church,—the Kingdom of God.' In another letter (No. 216) he writes more at length :

“ * * I look to the full development of the Christian Church in its perfect form, as the Kingdom of God, for the most effective removal of all evil, and promotion of all good ; and I can understand no perfect Church, or perfect State, without their blending into one in this ultimate form. I believe, farther, that our fathers at the Reformation stumbled accidentally, or rather were unconsciously led by God's Providence, to the declaration of the great principle of this system, the doctrine of the King's Supremacy ; which is, in fact, no other than an assertion of the supremacy of the Church or Christian society over the clergy, and a denial of that which I hold to be one of the most mischievous falsehoods ever broached,—that the government of the Christian Church is vested by divine right in the clergy, and that the close corporation of bishops and presbyters, whether one or more makes no difference,—is and ever ought to be the representative of the Christian Church. Holding this doctrine as the very corner-stone of all my political belief, I am equally opposed to Popery, High Churchism, and the claims of the Scotch Presbyteries on the one hand ; and to all the Independents, and advocates of the separation, as they call it, of Church and State on the other ; the first setting up a Priesthood in the place of the Church, and the other lowering necessarily the objects of Law and Government, and reducing them to a mere system of police, while they profess to wish to make the Church purer.”

In letter 187 he writes, “ * * I want to know what principles and objects a Christian State can have, if it be really Christian, more or less than those of the Church. In whatever degree it differs from the Church, it becomes, I think, in that exact proportion unchristian. In short, it seems to me that the State must be 'the world,' if it be not 'the Church ;' but for a society of Christians to be

'the world' seems monstrous. * * Again, the *ἔργον* of a Christian State and Church is absolutely one and the same : nor can a difference be made out which shall not impair the Christian character of one or both ; as, e.g., if the *ἔργον* of the State be made to be merely physical or economical good, or that of the Church be made to be the performing of a ritual service."—And in letter No. 79 he states his theory "that the State, being the only power sovereign over human life, has for its legitimate object the happiness of its people, —their highest happiness, not physical only, but intellectual and moral ; in short, the highest happiness of which it has a conception."

Now it is this conception which Dr. Arnold had of what he called "the highest duty and prerogative of the Commonwealth," that must be taken in connection with the paragraph in the Lecture. The same legislation, in English history, is also referred to in one of his letters, (No. 84,) where he expresses the opinion that "the statutes passed about the Church in Henry the Eighth's and Edward the Sixth's reigns are still the *ἀρχαὶ* of its constitution, if that may be said to have a constitution which never was constituted, but was left as avowedly unfinished as Cologne Cathedral, where they left a crane standing on one of the half-built towers. three hundred years ago, and have renewed the crane from time to time, as it wore out, as a sign not only that the building was incomplete, but that the friends of the Church hoped to finish the work whenever they could. Had it been in England, the crane would have been speedily destroyed, and the friends of the Church would have said that the Church was finished perfectly already, and that none but its enemies would dare to suggest that it wanted any thing to complete its symmetry and usefulness."

Entertaining the theory of the State which Dr. Arnold did, he naturally expressed himself in strong and unqualified language respecting the regal supremacy—language the unmodified force of which might mislead others, setting out from different principles of the functions of government, into the opinion that this supremacy prostrated the Church beneath a royal papacy. An additional explanation, therefore, may not be inappropriate in this and the following notes on the same paragraph.

"In considering the title of supreme head of the Church of Eng-

land, given to Henry VIII. by the clergy of England, we must be careful to distinguish the sense in which they allowed it to the king, from any exaggerated and unsound meaning which may have been affixed to it by courtiers or lawyers: for the former only is the Church of England responsible; the latter she is not concerned with.

“When it was proposed to the clergy of the Convocation of Canterbury, to acknowledge the King supreme head of the church and clergy of England, they refused to pass this title simply and unconditionally; and after much discussion, the King was at last obliged to accept it with a *proviso*, introduced by the clergy, to the following effect: ‘*Ecclesiæ et cleri Anglicani singularem protectorem et unicum et supremum dominum, et (quantum per Christi legem licet) etiam supremum caput, ipsius majestatem recognoscimus.*’”

PALMER’S ‘*Treatise on the Church*,’ vol. i. part ii. ch. 3.

“The clergy of England, in acknowledging the supremacy of the King, A. D. 1534, did so, as Burnet proves, with the important proviso, ‘*quantum per Christi legem licet*;’ which *original condition is ever to be supposed* in our acknowledgment of the royal supremacy. Consequently we give no authority to the prince, except what is consistent with the maintenance of all those rights, liberties, jurisdictions, and spiritual powers which ‘the law of Christ’ confers on his Church.”

Ib. Part I. ch. 10.

NOTE 2.—Page 266.

“The first act of the King was to appoint Cromwell, in 1535, his Vicar-General and Visitor of Monasteries. The former title was certainly novel, and sounded ill, but there being no evidence that it was intended in a heterodox sense, the church was not bound to resist the title or office. * *

“The claim advanced by Cromwell as the King’s vicegerent to the *first seat* in convocation was *indisputable*. As the representative of the prince, he could not be refused a position which the œcumenical synods allotted to the Christian emperors.”

PALMER’S ‘*Treatise, &c.*,’ vol. i. part ii ch. 3.

NOTE 3.—Page 266.

“It is alleged, that in the time of Edward VI. all the most important changes in the form of ordinations, the public service, the body of the canons, &c., were regulated by the King or parliament, to the annihilation of the church’s power. This is far from the truth. The parliament only added the force of the temporal law to the determinations of convocations or bishops, or at least its regulations were confirmed by ecclesiastical authority. Thus, in 1547, an act passed for communion in both kinds, and against private masses, on the ground of Scripture and primitive practice, but the convocation also agreed to it.”

PALMER’S ‘*Treatise, &c.*,’ vol. i. part ii. ch. 3.

NOTE 4.—Page 266.

“It is admitted that the parliament passed acts for abolishing the papal jurisdiction and establishing the regal supremacy, with an oath to that effect; and also for establishing the English ritual. But these acts were merely confirmatory of the laws and institutions made by the church of England during the reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI., which had been indeed disobeyed by the schismatics in the reign of Mary, and annulled by the civil power, but which had never been annulled by any legitimate authority of the church. These acts were simply revivals of laws which had been formerly made with the concurrence of the church of England: they only gave the temporal sanction to institutions which had always remained in their full spiritual force and obligation.”

PALMER’S ‘*Treatise,*’ vol. i. part ii. ch. 5.

NOTE 5.—Page 266.

In this proof of the identification of Church and State, it is not clear whether Dr. Arnold intended to limit the argument to the King’s council. There seems to be no reason for such a limit, for the argument admits of just the same application to “all that are put in authority under him,” (the king,) and also to “all Christian Kings, Princes, and Governors,” or in the language of the prayer in the American liturgy, “all Christian rulers.”

NOTE 6.—Page 267.

King James's use of the expression is thus set forth in the witty church-historian, Fuller's dramatically told account of the Hampton court conference :

“HIS MAJESTY.—Why, then, I will tell you a tale : After that the religion restored by King Edward VI. was soon overthrown by Queen Mary here in England, we in Scotland felt the effect of it. For, thereupon, Mr. Knox writes to the queen regent, a virtuous and moderate lady ; telling her that she was the supreme head of the church, and charged her, as she would answer it to God's tribunal, to take care of Christ's Evangel, in suppressing the popish prelates, who withstood the same. But how long, trow you, did this continue ? Even till, by her authority, the popish bishops were repressed, and Knox, with his adherents, being brought in, made strong enough. Then began they to make small account of her supremacy, when, according to that *more light* wherewith they were illuminated, they made a further reformation of themselves. How they used the poor lady my mother, is not unknown, and how they dealt with me in my minority. I thus apply it : my lords the bishops, (this he said, putting his hand to his hat,) I may thank you that these men plead thus for my supremacy. They think they cannot make their party good against you, but by appealing unto it. But if once you were out and they in, I know what would become of my supremacy ; for, ‘No bishop, no king !’”

Book x. sect. 1.

NOTE 7.—Page 267.

In considering the authority of this quotation from Knollys's letter to Cecil, it is to be judged not merely as correspondence from one of Queen Elizabeth's privy-counsellors to another, but it must be remembered that the writer was one of those public men who sympathized strongly with the favourable feeling for the Puritan party, which was entertained both in the parliaments and the Queen's cabinet, during at least more than the first half of that reign. Mr. Hallam speaks of Knollys as one of “the powerful friends at court” of the Puritans, and calls him “the staunch enemy of episcopacy,”

though in this there is probably something of that exaggeration into which this historian is occasionally led by some intemperance of feeling. (*Const. Hist.*, vol. i. ch. 4.) Collier, in his '*Ecclesiastical History*,' (part ii. book 6,) speaks of "Leicester, Knowlis, and Walsingham," as "either puritans, or abettors of that party." With more moderation than either, Mr. Keble, in his preface to '*Hooker's Eccles. Polity*,' (p. 57,) speaks of "such persons as Knolles and Milmay, and others, who were Calvinists and Low Churchmen on principle." The editor of the book Dr. Arnold has quoted from, calls Knollys "a zealous puritan."

Indeed the very letter from Sir Francis Knollys that Dr. Arnold has quoted, shows the feeling with which he appears through the reign to have been in the habit of regarding respectively the influence of the opposite parties of 'purytanes' and 'papysts.' It is a letter interceding to obtain fair dealing and equal justice for Cartwright, and the other early non-conformists: after the sentence quoted, it goes on—"And as touching their seditious going aboute the same, if the byshoppes, or my Lord Chancelor, or any for them, could have proved *de facto* that Cartewrighte and his fellow prisoners had gone aboute any such matter seditiously, then Cartewrighte and his followers had been hanged before this tyme. But her Majestie must keepe a forme of justyce, as well against Purytanes as any other subjectes, so that they may be tryed in tyme convenient, whether they be suspected for sedition or treason, or whatever name you shall give unto it, being purytanisme or otherwyse."

Knollys appears to have been unable to apprehend any danger to the Church of England from the Puritan party in his day—then only a party within the communion of the English Church, and the danger that, to his eye, was always darkening the horizon, was the papal power. There was indeed a combination of many causes which made it then appear the most imminent and present peril. The date of the letter quoted was, it will be observed, a short time only after England had been threatened by the Spanish Armada—and it was not many years before that, that all protestant Europe had been horror-struck with the atrocities of the massacre of St. Bartholomew's—Burleigh himself having been invited to the bloody marriage festivities. Going back a little earlier, the recollection

was fresh of the Marian persecutions—the fires at Smithfield had not been very long extinguished—and another cause of the feeling alluded to is to be found in the state of feverish apprehension produced by the papal bull of Pius V., dethroning Queen Elizabeth, and by the intrigues for the succession of Mary Queen of Scots—appeased only by the perpetration of that great national crime, the tragic judgment executed at Fotheringay Castle. The Puritan movement was therefore countenanced, not only by the encouragement, from worthless motives, of that weak and wicked favourite the Earl of Leicester, but also conscientiously by such as Knollys, who were impelled by the dread of the papacy. With these feelings it appears that Knollys was active in interposing to thwart the ecclesiastical measures to enforce conformity. That Roman Catholic dominion was the one danger which filled his vision, is shown yet more conclusively by another letter of his in this same collection of the correspondence of the Elizabethan statesmen. It is in January, 1576, (1577, O. S.,) that he writes as follows: “If her Majestie wol be safe, she must comforte the hartes of those that be her most faythfull subjects, even for conscyence sake. But if the Bishopp of Canterburye shall be deprived, then up startes the pryde and practise of the papistes, and downe declyneth the comforte and strengthe of her Majestie’s safety.” (Vol. ii. p. 75.) The primate referred to is Grindal, who, it will be remembered, incurred the queen’s displeasure, suspension from his ecclesiastical functions, and other penalties, in consequence of refusing to exercise them for the suppression of the new puritan practice of “*exercises of prophesying*,” which he desired rather to regulate than to suppress. Whatever may be thought by persons of different ecclesiastical principles, of Archbishop Grindal’s indulgence to the non-conformists, and (as Collier expresses it) “too kind an opinion of the Calvinistic scheme—warping a little to an over-indulgence”—whatever estimate may be formed of the fitness of a primacy so gentle as Grindal’s for the times, coming as it did between the firmness of Parker’s primacy and the vigour of Whitgift’s, he will be remembered as one who was not intimidated by the malignity of the mean and unprincipled Leicester, as one to whom, in the exercise of his powers in the church, the voice of conscience and of his God spake louder than the voice of his queen, and who for his piety and vir-

tues is commemorated as the "good Grindal," of the historian Fuller, and as "the good shepherd, Algrind," by the poet Spenser, with oft-repeated affection in his allegorical pastorals. .

NOTE 8.—Page 268.

Sir Egerton Brydges, in his 'Memoirs of the Peers of England during the reign of James the First,' passionately describes the fallen condition of the nobility at this period of English history :

"What was the character of the nobility during this inglorious and disgraceful reign, that, by alternate acts of tyranny and pusillanimous concession, sowed those seeds of civil war which a few years afterwards overturned the monarchy, and brought the King to the scaffold ? We see the ancient, illustrious, and gallant family of Vere, Sir Francis and Sir Horace, with their cousins Henry and Robert, Earls of Oxford, incapable of dozing away their lives on the bed of sloth, seeking those scenes of action abroad which their own timid Prince could not afford them, and carrying arms to the powers contending on the continent. * * *

"James, on his arrival in England, was both too fond of his amusements, and too ignorant of business, to take much of the management of public affairs on himself ; while the dependents and companions he brought with him were equally incompetent, being men of pleasure, inexperienced, in concerns of state, and intent only on gathering the golden harvests of private fortune, which they saw within their grasp. The government of the nation, therefore, was suffered for some time to continue in the hands of the former ministry. Lord Buckhurst remained at the head of the treasury ; that able politician Cecil kept his post of secretary of state ; and Egerton still presided over the court of chancery. The last luckily survived through the greater part of this reign, to preserve the fame and integrity of that sacred Bench. But the two former died earlier ; and as James was now grown more confident, and his favourites more daring, the post which was vacated by the death of one of the most efficient and long-exercised statesmen in Europe, was filled in succession by those minions, Carr and Villiers. It is apparent that the old nobility fled for the most part from a court of

needy, gaping, and upstart dependents, of splendid poverty, coarse manners, and lazy and inglorious amusements."

Preface, p. 18.

NOTE 9.—Page 268.

"Every thing concurred, in the Elizabethan era, to give a vigour and a range to genius, to which neither prior nor subsequent times have been equally propitious. An heroic age, inflamed with the discovery of new worlds, gave increased impulse to fancies enriched by access both to the recovered treasures of ancient literature, and the wild splendours of Italian fiction. A command of language equal to the great occasion was not wanting. For what is there in copiousness or force of words, or in clearness of arrangement, or in harmony or grandeur of modulation, which Spenser at least has not given proofs that that age could produce?"

SIR EGERTON BRYDGES' *"Excerpta Tudoriana."*

* * "There was much in the times of Queen Elizabeth that was propitious to great intellectual development. The English language was then well-grown; it was not only adequate to the common wants of speech, but it was affluent in expressions, which had become incorporated into it from the literature of antiquity. Ancient learning had been made, as it were, part of the modern mind of Europe; and in England, under Elizabeth, the great universities, which during the reigns immediately before, had suffered from violence that penetrated even those tranquil abodes, were gathering anew their scattered force. There was scattered, too, through the realm the popular literature of the minstrelsy, familiar, in its various forms, upon the highways and in the thoroughfares, and by the fireside in the long English winter evening. The language was not only enriched by phraseology of ancient birth, but it had also gained what was more precious than aught that could come from the domains of extinct paganism—for the word of God had taken the form of English words, and thus a sacred glory was reflected upon the language itself. The civil and ecclesiastical condition of the country was also favourable to intellectual advancement, for there was in abundance all that could cheer and animate a nation's

heart. There was the romantic enthusiasm of early expeditions to remote and unexplored regions; there was repose after the agony of ecclesiastical bloodshedding; and whatever feverish apprehension remained of foreign aggression or domestic discord, there was the proud sense of national independence and national power; the moral force greater even than the physical. Spiritual subserviency to Rome was at an end, and England was once more standing upon the foundations of the ancient British Church. It was the meet glory of such an age, that there arose upon it, as the sixteenth century was drawing to a close, in succession, the glory of the genius of Edmund Spenser and of William Shakspeare. The intellectual energy of the times is shown by the large company of the poets: a list of two hundred English poets assigned to what is usually styled the Elizabethan age, is thought by Mr. Hallam (*History of Literature*) not to exceed the true number. What is yet more characteristic of an age of thought and of action, is the fertility of dramatic literature. In a quotation from Heywood, one of Shakspeare's contemporaries, given by Charles Lamb, (in his '*Specimens*,') it appears that Heywood had 'either an entire hand, or at the least a main finger' in 220 plays, much the greater number of which has perished. Such was one of the ways in which, as in the palmy age of the Athenian drama, the activity of the times was finding at once utterance and relief."

MS. Lectures on English Poetry.

NOTE 10.—Page 269

* * "So it is that all things come best in their season; that political power is then most happily exercised by a people, when it has not been given to them prematurely, that is, before, in the natural progress of things, they feel the want of it. Security for person and property enables a nation to grow without interruption; in contending for this, a people's sense of law and right is wholesomely exercised; meantime, national prosperity increases, and brings with it an increase of intelligence, till other and more necessary wants being satisfied, men awaken to the highest earthly desire of the ripened mind—the desire of taking an active share in the great work of government. The Roman commons abandoned the high-

est magistracies to the patricians for a period of many years; but they continued to increase in prosperity and in influence, and what the fathers had wisely yielded, their sons in the fulness of time acquired. So the English house of commons, in the reign of Edward III., declined to interfere in questions of peace and war, as being too high for them to compass; but they would not allow the crown to take their money without their own consent; and so the nation grew, and the influence of the house of commons grew along with it, till that house has become the great and predominant power in the British constitution."

History of Rome, vol. i., 343.

Dr. Arnold, in one of his letters, speaks of the historical Essay in his Thucydides, (Appendix No. 1,) as "a full dissertation on the progress of a people towards liberty, and their unfitness for it at an earlier stage." (No. 25.)

NOTE 11.—Page 271.

"The aristocratical hatred against Socrates is exhibited in the Clouds of Aristophanes; and the famous speech of Cleon on the question of the punishment of the revolted Mytileneans, shows the same spirit in connection with the strong democratical party. Political parties are not the ultimate distinction between man and man; there are higher points, whether for good or evil, on which a moral sympathy unites those who politically are most at variance with each other; and so the common dread and hatred of improvement, of truth, of principle—in other words, of all that is the light and life of man, has, on more than one occasion, united in one cause all who are low in intellect and morals, from the highest rank in society down to the humblest."

History of Rome, vol. i., p. 346, note.

NOTE 12.—Page 274.

"The Jesuits cannot be accused of neglecting to give information on physical subjects to their scholars. Nor does it appear that they attempted to restore old theories on these matters, or to teach any

other opinions than those which had the general sanction of philosophers in their day. As the Dominicans and the Franciscans were the means of reversing the papal decree against Aristotle, so it seems as if the Jesuits had practically reversed the decree against Galileo. rather eagerly availing themselves of the direction which men's minds were taking towards physical inquiries, to turn them away from inquiries into subjects more immediately concerning themselves. Here as elsewhere, their instruction proceeded upon one principle, and in one regular, coherent system. Teach every thing, be it physics, history, or philosophy, in such wise that the student shall feel he is not apprehending a truth, but only receiving a maxim upon trust, or studying a set of probabilities. Acting upon this rule, they could publish an edition of the 'Principia,' mentioning that the main doctrine of it had been denounced by the Pope, and was therefore to be rejected; but, at the same time, recommending the study of the book as containing a series of very ingenious arguments and apparent demonstrations. There was no curl of the lip in this utterance, strange as it may seem to us, nor, in the sense we commonly give to the word, any dishonesty. The editors did not believe that Newton *had* proved his point. They had not enough of the feeling of certainty in their minds, to think that any thing could be proved. All is one sea of doubts, perplexities, possibilities; the great necessity is to feel that we cannot arrive at truth, and that therefore we must submit ourselves to an infallible authority. This was the habit of their mind; whether it was a true one or no the religious man will be able to resolve when he has considered its effects in producing the scepticism of the eighteenth century; the scientific man, when he thinks how hopeless of progression those who cherish it must be."

MAURICE'S '*Kingdom of Christ*,' part ii. ch. v sect. 5.

The following is the remarkable note, which Professor Maurice alludes to, and which was prefaced by the Jesuit Commentators on the 'Principia,' to the Edition published by them in 1742:

"PP. LE SEUR ET JACQUIER

DECLARATIO.

Newtonus in hoc tertio Libro Telluris motæ hypothesim assumet. Autoris Propositiones aliter explicari non poterant nisi eâdem quo-

quæ factâ hypothesi. Hinc alienam coacti sumus gerere personam. Cæterum latis a summis Pontificibus contrâ Telluris motum Decretis nos obsequi profitemur."

NOTE 13.—Page 276.

* * "ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ αγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμελῶντες τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφέλων τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῦ."

"War," (in Dr. Arnold's version of the last phrase,) "makes men's tempers as hard as their circumstances." Hist. of Rome, ch. 21.

In the historical Essay appended to his Edition of Thucydides, Dr. Arnold remarks, "that the great enemy of society in its present stage is war: if this calamity be avoided, the progress of improvement is sure; but attempts to advance the cause of freedom by the sword are incalculably perilous. War is a state of such fatal intoxication, that it makes men careless of improving, and sometimes even of repairing their internal institutions; and thus the course of national happiness may be cut short, not only by foreign conquest, but by a state of war poisoning the blood, destroying the healthy tone of the system and setting up a feverish excitement, till the disorder terminates in despotism." Vol I. p. 522. Appendix I

NOTE 14.—Page 278.

The mind of Arnold was so deeply imbued with the Greek philosophy, that in following his thoughts in this Lecture, it is necessary to understand what was the nature of that democratic ἀκολασία, which he and the best of those ancient philosophers abhorred no less than tyranny in its other forms of selfish aristocracy or oligarchy. With his favourite Aristotle Arnold sympathized strongly in aversion to *absolutism*, whether it be the uncontrolled power of one or of a few, or of the many, and in the deep reverence for the supremacy of law over will.

The nature of ἀκολασία as a vicious condition of individual life, is discussed with characteristic precision by Aristotle, (*Ethic. Nic.*

Book VII. in several chapters.) It is the very opposite of that well-regulated, disciplined, and wisely-tempered condition of mind described by the term *σωφροσύνη*. The *ἀκολασία* is also, with the finest precision of ethical science, distinguished from the *ἀκρασία*, moral *powerlessness*, want of self-command; the *ἀκρατος* is feeble or helpless in resisting passions—in withstanding temptation—a fool of passion or of impulse, while the *ἀκόλαστος*, the *unchastened*, is wicked willingly—he goes wrong, not by the mere sway of passion or the negative absence of moral principle, but knowingly, habitually, purposely: he marks out for himself a course of vicious pleasure or excessive indulgence, and then as a matter of deliberate choice he follows it up for its own sake, even more than for any return it brings him in the way of sensual gratification—*ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων, ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς, ἢ διὰ προαιρέσιν καὶ δι' αὐτὰς, καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαίνειν, ἀκόλαστος*. To apply to this pagan ethical term words that a Christian poet has put into the mouth of Archbishop Chichely, the *ἀκολασία* is the '*unwhipt* offending Adam.*' The *ἀκολασία* is viciousness deliberate and of choice, while the *ἀκρασία* is rather without any settled principle of vice—*το μὲν γὰρ, παρὰ προαίρεσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐστίν*. In the character of Falstaff, for instance, that which is erroneously regarded as cowardice, is a complete illustration of *ἀκολασία* in one of its forms, while the genuine cowardice of Pistol or Parolles is *ἀκρασία*. Of this latter quality the character of Macbeth is also a specimen, at least during the early part of his depravity: the character of Iago, on the other hand, is 'one of the most intense exhibitions ever given by poetic invention, of the *ἀκολασία*—that corruption of conscience denounced in the prophet's words: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness!" This wilful perversion of principle—moral disorganization—was signally shown in many of the prominent men in the French Revolution, and it was after being an eye-witness of the advance of that convulsion to its extreme of wickedness, that the character of 'Oswald' in Wordsworth's tragedy of "The Borderers" was conceived, under a deep sense of 'the awful truth that there are no limits to the hardening of the heart, and the perversion

* "Consideration like an angel came,
And whipped the offending Adam out of him."

Henry the Fifth. Act I. 1

of the understanding to which sin and crime may carry their slaves.' The condition of the ἀκόλαστος was regarded as desperate too by the Greek moralist—ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει—the disease is 'incurable, for 't is inveterate by lack of discipline, and by choice and habit—ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν· ὥστ' ἀνίατος—remorse and reformation are impossible, for the vice is not mere passion, but it is a principle; it is cold-blooded iniquity, Παντὶ δὲ ἂν δοξείε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν, ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρον ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτῃ, ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· . . . διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς, ('*Ethic. Nic.*' Book VII. ch. 8.) This utter hopelessness of restoration, while it shows the strong view which the Greek moralist took of the ἀκολασία, illustrates also how the highest heathen philosophy in its ethics reaches limits which are transcended by Christian morals.

Now let us pass to the political ἀκολασία, and the reproach on this account to which Dr. Arnold alludes as having been cast by Greek writers on the democracies. His favourite Herodotus ('*Thalia*,' 80–83) relates a discussion concerning the form of government to be established when the Persian throne became vacant by the death of Cambyses: Otanes proposes a democracy, but Megabyzus replies that to transfer the power to the multitude—τὸ πλῆθος—would be missing the wisest plan, for that nothing is more empty of understanding—ἀξυνετώτερον—or more full of outrageous insolence—ἰβριστότερον—than the good-for-nothing crowd—δμήλου ἀχρηίου—and that it was not at all to be tolerated that, when men escape from the violence of a despot, they should fall upon that of the licentious people—δήμου ἀκολάστου. Again, this vice is brought into close connection with the democracies by Xenophon—if the author of this treatise—(*Rep. Ather*, i. 5,) where he speaks of the contrast between the government by the better sort and that by the common people—ἐν γὰρ τοῖς βελτίστοις ἐνὶ ἀκολασία τε ὀλιγίστη καὶ ἀδικία, ἀκρίβεια δὲ πλείστη καὶ εἰς τὰ χρηστά· ἐν δὲ τῷ δήμῳ ἀμαθία τε πλείστη καὶ ἀταξία καὶ πονηρία—licentiousness (ἀκολασία) being in contrast with 'scrupulous regard for what is right.' Plato, (*Rep.* viii.) without perhaps using the term ἀκολασία throughout the whole book, is yet describing the thing itself, as existing in a democracy which gives indiscriminate license—ἐξουσία ποιεῖν ὅ τι τις βουλεται—where there is great talk about liberty—and the *acolastic* defilement of the conscience manifests itself in moral misnomer—the calling evil good—ἀναρχίαν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καλοῦν—

res, ἀναίδειαν δέ, ἀνδρίαν κ. τ. λ., lawlessness liberty, and impudence manliness, &c.—where there is a want of respect for age, and authority, and station—the son making himself equal to the father, neither honouring nor fearing—μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι—his parents—the pupil treating the teacher with contempt—and the resident alien—μέτοικος—putting himself on a level with the citizen—and where the father is under the controul of his boys—and the teacher stands in awe of his scholars, and pays court to them, and old men play the young man, for fear of seeming strict and authoritative—ἀηδέϊς μηδὲ δεσποτικοί—Aristotle describes in various passages the kinds of democracy in which the ἀκολασία prevails—when for instance the multitude has the mastery over the laws—ἔπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων—and the equality is by numbers and not by worth—κατ' ἀριθμὸν and not κατ' ἀξίαν—and justice is made to mean whatever the majority please—καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσι, τουτ' εἶναι το δίκαιον—whenever the supremacy of the constitution is made to yield to mere votes or decrees, which is brought about by the demagogue who corrupts the popular government as the flatterer spoils a king—ἔταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἤ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος . . . ἔπον δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί—the supremacy of the multitude over the law being encouraged for selfish purposes by the demagogue, who makes every thing a subject of direct appeal to the people, whose opinion at the same time he can fashion or controul—ἄιτιοι δὲ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τα ψηφίσματα κύρια, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς νόμοις, οὗτοι, παντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον . συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γένεσθαι μεγάλοις, διὰ τὸ, τὸν μὲν δῆμον εἶναι κύριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης, τούτοις . πείθεται γὰρ το πλῆθος τούτοις. (*Polit.* iv. 4.) This is that absence of law which destroys a polity—ἔπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσι, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. In the fifth book, (ch. 7,) Aristotle shows that the character of the polity is preserved only by the presence of law, and that it may be destroyed when the principal element of it is pushed to excess—τολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκοῦντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρατίας . . . Οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρέτην, ἔλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, and it is of this that the Stagyrite gives his homely illustration of the nose, which may deviate somewhat from the most perfect form—the straightness of which is most beautiful, (the Grecian,)—τὴν εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλιστην—and become a little curved or depressed—πρὸς το γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμὸν—without losing its beauty and grace, but it may become such a beak, or so flat, as not to look like a nose at all—ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ποιήσαι φαίνεσθαι. This is

just what happens, adds Aristotle, in governments, when their due proportions are lost, and the predominant element is carried to excess, so that whether it be lawless oligarchy or lawless democracy, it is hideous political deformity. In another passage Aristotle has shown how when a popular government becomes extravagantly democratic, intractable licentiousness will surely engender tyranny—ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης . . . γίνεται τυραννίς. (Book iv. ch. 9.)

The ἀκολασία that Dr. Arnold refers to as the vice of the ancient democracies, appears then to have been the undisciplined, ungovernable condition of deliberate and habitual *lawlessness*, taking this word, however, not in a mere negative sense, but rather as describing that state of things where men make a law of their own passions—impatient of authority, human or divine—what Milton calls the “senseless mood that bawls for freedom,” but meaning “license when they cry liberty.” The democratic ἀκολασία that is referred to in the text, can be briefly and fitly defined, only with an anachronism, as unchastized, systematic *Jacobinism*.

NOTE 15.—Page 279.

In connection with this eloquent passage, there should be read, for either original or renewed enjoyment of one of the noblest pieces in English historical literature, the well-known character of Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland—“the incomparable,” in Clarendon’s history. Dr. Arnold’s biographer has well shown the peculiar sympathy that was felt with Falkland by Arnold, and indeed for any one who can find in history something more than a record of national events—of the aggregate action of courts and armies—something to feed the sense of admiration with, there is in the character of Falkland, dying young as he did in battle, and in a disastrous cause, a combination of worth that has given an almost romantic glory to his name: the Christian statesman, scholar, and soldier—a loyalist in the true and noblest sense of the title, upholding the law against the monarch and with the monarch—his short life, a sad and strenuous one, has left the memory of heroism and martyrdom. It is a martyr’s glory that Arnold gives to the memory of Falkland; and what he thought of that glory, he has elsewhere said with fervid eloquence.

"The conqueror and the martyr are alike God's instruments; but it is the privilege of his conscious and willing instruments to be doubly and merely blessed; the benefits of their work to others are unalloyed by evil, while to themselves it is the perfecting and not the corrupting of their moral being; when it is done, they are not cast away as instruments spoiled and worthless, but partake of the good which they have given, and enjoy forever the love of men, and the blessing of God."

History of Rome, chap. xxxviii.

NOTE 16.—Page 281.

There is not in these Lectures a passage more strikingly characteristic of the author, than this in which he expresses his doubt respecting the Athenian ἀπαργμόσυνη, and does not spare a rebuke to that meek citizen, good Isaac Walton. Indeed, it is hardly possible, without a smile, to consider the contrast of the various virtues of the head-master of Rugby, and of the no less well-honoured angler—opposite merits which it will be better to comprehend under the charity of uncensorious, catholic judgment, than to set in opposition. It would be a pity too to discover asperity in Dr. Arnold's allusion to Walton, against whose inoffensive and sweet-spirited character the only writer who has ever uttered a harsh or unkind word was that fierce polemic Bishop Warburton. The contrast is indeed most remarkable—Arnold's impetuous temperament and undaunted, unflinching energy—painfully alive to what he regarded as social, or political, or ecclesiastical evil, and, though despondent of the power to remove or mitigate it, always earnest, prompt, and strenuous in putting into action all the ability he had at command: in the familiarity of correspondence with one of his family, he exclaims, "I must write a pamphlet in the holidays, or I shall burst." When Isaac Walton's lot was cast upon more troubled and evil days—when the church and the state he was loyal to were tumbling down in the civil war, he appears to have shut up his shop in London and gone fishing. In revolutionary times, it was his vocation to suffer rather than to act. When the Covenanters marched into England in 1643, he writes, "This I saw, and suffered by it." He was faithful to the afflicted cause, and, powerless in helping or re-

trieving it, he was uncomplaining. The good work he was reserved for was to record the "lives" of those pious men whose names still cluster round his memory.

The ἀπραγμάδουνη of the Athenians, spoken of in the lecture, must be considered in its relation peculiarly to the national character of that people, and their political and social condition. The Corinthians described them (Thucydides, b. i. 70) as a race of men who look upon quiet with nothing to do, as no less an affliction than hard-working business, so that if any one were to sum up their character by saying that they were born, neither to have any enjoyment of repose themselves, nor to let anybody else have it, he would say truly—*ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ' ἔσσαν ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐκίπονον ὥστε ἔι τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελῶν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μῆτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἔαν, ὁρῶς ἂν ἔποιι.* And Pericles, in his funeral oration, makes it the peculiar glory of the Athenians, that they held the retiring citizen, the man who abstained from public and political work, to be not merely one who does not busy himself about matters—ἀπράγμονα—but downright good-for-nothing—ἀχρεῖον.

When this propensity of Athenian character and society went on increasing, a different estimate began to be entertained of the retiring citizen, both by poet and philosopher, who with sarcastic or grave reproof did not fail to condemn the morbid excitement, the turmoil, the restless activity, the πολυπραγμοσύνη of political life; and, indeed, the judgment to be pronounced upon the ἀπραγμοσύνη must after all be only a relative one—relative chiefly to the state of society from which escape is sought. When the inordinate increase and corruption of the Athenian courts, with the six thousand 'dicastrs,' and three hundred court-days in the year, developed the full force of such a system, with a people who had a passion for litigation, and for whom the administration of law had a sort of dramatic interest, then seclusion became almost the only security—an imperfect one—for property, or liberty, or life. In his Aristophanes, in the introduction to 'The Knights,' Mr. Mitchell gives this account of the ἀπράγμονες—"While the poor, the idle, and the vicious, pour in by crowds for a gratuity thus easily obtained, (pay for attendance in the courts,) those of better circumstances either withdraw from the assembly altogether, or, if they take part in its deliberations, form so inconsiderable a minority, that all meas-

ures are carried by mere numbers, without any reference to intelligence or property; hence they say that those best qualified for the management of public affairs, finding that they can neither initiate what their own wisdom would suggest, nor pursue what the prudence of others would recommend, retire in disgust, leaving the conduct of public affairs to men the least competent to direct them." p. xxviii. And at v. 259 of the same play, he remarks, "Persons of a quiet unintermeddling disposition in Athens, had but one of three resources: to consent to be despised and trampled on; to quit the place altogether, like the two fugitives in our author's 'Birds'—*ζητοῦντε τόπον ἀπράγμονα*; or to console themselves with a quotation from some satiric comedian.

*ἀπραγμόνως ζῆν, ἡδὲ. μακάριος βίος,
καὶ σεμνὸς, ἐὰν ἢ μεθ' ἑτέρων ἀπραγμόνων. Apollodorus "*

He describes them elsewhere (note, 'Wasps,' 1042) as 'that small portion of the Athenian populace, who, shunning law and politics, wished to pursue quietly their own occupations,' and when the Poet promises, as a reward for the virtuous citizen, the odour of *ἀπραγμοσύνη*—('Clouds,' v. 1007,) '*δζων καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνης*' Mr. Mitchell adds, "To live in the odour of *ἀπραγμοσύνη* at Athens must have been almost as fortunate as dying in the odour of sanctity in the papal church."

In his 'Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato,' Mr. Sewell, who has no disposition to extenuate the evils of the Greek democracies, says, "No privacy of life, no innocence, no abstinence from public business, (*ἀπραγμοσύνη*), not even poverty, could guarantee an Athenian gentleman in the land of liberty from being dragged at any moment before a tribunal of his fellow-townsmen, and there compelled to plead his own cause *in person*, with fines, imprisonment, and death, staring him in the face; and neither laws, oaths, evidence, nor records, affording him any solid ground on which to rest his defence." (Chap. 17.) In an admirable chapter (the 32d) in his 'History of Greece,' Bishop Thirlwall, with no disposition to magnify the evils of the ancient popular systems, shows how the retired citizen was the victim of judicial persecution, when the government was deeply corrupt, the tone of morals low, when litigation was an epidemic disease, and the trade of the informer was

rife: "The opulent citizens of timid natures and quiet habits, who were both unable to plead for themselves and shrank from a public appearance, were singled out as the objects of attack by the sycophants who lived by extortion." . . . "Some were prevented by timidity, or by their love of quiet, or by want of the talents, or the physical powers required for appearing as speakers in the assembly, or the tribunals, from taking a part in public business. Many, irritated or disheartened by their political disadvantages, kept sullenly or despondingly aloof from the great body of their fellow-citizens, nourishing a secret hatred to the Constitution, and anxiously waiting for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and avenging themselves for past injuries and humiliation." It is of the judicial abuse that Xenophon ('Mem. Soc.' ii. 9) represents the complaints of Crito—a citizen wishing to mind his own business, 'βουλομένα ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν,' but beset by the informers, who thought he would pay his money for the sake of a quiet life—ἡδίων ἂν ἀργύριον τελέσαι, ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν: Socrates advises defence by making reprisals—by retaliating in the way of 'information.'

A curious expression of feeling respecting these opposite habits of ἀπραγμοσύνη and πολυπραγμοσύνη occurs in a fragment of the Prologue to Euripides's 'Philoctetes': the words are in the mouth of Ulysses, whose wisdom is reduced *apud tragicos* from the epic elevation to sheer, selfish cunning—he questions, with vexation, his own claim to the character of sagacity, considering how active and busy he had been, when he might have fared as well as the best, and yet lived 'ἀπραγμόνως.' And in the myth which Plato introduces at the close of the tenth book of 'the Republic,' symbolizing the immortality of the soul by the doctrine of transmigration, the soul of Ulysses is represented as chancing to get the last right of making choice of its new life, but remembering its former toils, and having lost all ambition, it goes about for a long while in search of the life of a private man, who kept himself from public affairs—βίων ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος—and when at last, after a great deal of difficulty, it found one, lying any where and disregarded by every other soul of them, it gladly took this life for itself, and said that this was the very thing it would have chosen, if it had had the first choice. The fable seems then to teach that a life of ἀπραγμοσύνη was so rare that only one could be found—so little valued that it was sought for

only by one—and that one the last chooser—and that chooser Ulysses, of all souls in the (other) world!

The ἀπραγμοσύνη (or ἀπολίτεια) of Socrates was of another and higher kind than that which has been spoken of. He was withheld from taking his part in the Assembly and courts by the intimations of his *Dæmon*, (Plato, *Ap. Soc.* ch. 19,) and because he believed it to be his proper vocation to prepare others for performing their political duties with intelligence and integrity. And this kind of ἀπραγμοσύνη he declared was such an object of admiration in the eyes of the three Judges of the Dead, that when they encountered the soul of a private man—ἀνδρὸς ιδιώτου, who had lived with integrity and truth—or especially that of a philosopher, who had heeded his own business, and not been universally and restlessly officious, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος, παῖ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, they sent it applaudingly to the “Islands of the Blest.” (Plato, ‘*Gorgias*,’ ch. 82.) In the ‘*Memorabilia*,’ (book iii. ch. 11.) Socrates is represented as playfully alluding to his own ἀπραγμοσύνη, (ἐπισκώπτων τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην)—when Theodota (a woman whose morals were not as pure as her name) solicits a farther conference, the philosopher replies, that no leisure is left him by his public and private engagements—ἴδια πρᾶγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημόσια—meaning, however, his business as a moral teacher.

The habit of retirement from public life may, therefore, be justifiable when it is prompted by a sense of higher duty—by the conviction that it may give to a man better opportunity of benefiting his fellow-men—of preserving his power of doing good to his country permanently. It may give rise to nice questions of duty, especially in popular governments, where every citizen has his political duties, though looking at them perhaps more in the light of privileges, he may lose the sense of obligation in them. The retirement, instead of being dutiful, may in some cases be proof rather of timidity, of effeminacy, or of selfishness. There may be a shrinking from public cares, for the sake of gratifying private indolence or pleasures, or from sheer indifference to national concerns. Horace Walpole in one of his letters tells a story of an English squire, who went out with his hounds during the battle of Edgehill. It is told of Goethe, I believe, that he was busy studying Chinese during the battle of Leipsic: he is, however, vindica-

ted by his admirers from the imputation of indifference to national interests, by reference to his indefatigable zeal in the arts of peace, and the fidelity to his high functions as an artist. Another form of the ἀπαγορεύη, excusable at least, if not justifiable, is the seclusion from political life that has become desperately vicious, though there is higher virtue in that better spirit which, whether in hope or despair, falters not, as standing "ever in the great Taskmaster's eye"—such dutifulness as Thirlwall in his History (chap. 32) worthily applauds in Nicias, who, "though he saw and suffered from the defects of the government, served his country zealously and faithfully." Let me only add to a note which has already reached too great a length, that, on the subject of participation in public affairs or seclusion from them, there is no name suggesting so much food for reflection as that of Milton. There is much, too, in the career of Walter Scott, and in the animating strains that burst from Southey and from Wordsworth, in their mountain-homes, during a trying period of their country's history.

NOTE 17.—Page 286.

"Rumours of conspiracy and insurrection, sometimes false, but gaining credit from the notorious discontent, both of the old commonwealth's party and of many who had never been on that side, were sedulously propagated, in order to keep up the animosity of parliament against the ejected clergy; and these are recited as the pretext of an act passed in 1664, for suppressing seditious conventicles, (the epithet being in this place wantonly and unjustly insulting,) which inflicted on all persons above the age of sixteen, present at any religious meeting in other manner than is allowed by the practice of the Church of England, where five or more persons besides the household should be present, a penalty of three months' imprisonment for the first offence, of six for the second, and of seven years' transportation for the third, on conviction before a single justice of peace. This act, says Clarendon, if it had been vigorously executed, would no doubt have produced a thorough reformation. Such is ever the language of the supporters of tyranny; when oppression does not succeed, it is because there has been too little of it. But those who suffered under this statute report very

differently as to its vigorous execution. The gaols were filled, not only with ministers who had borne the brunt of former persecutions, but with the laity who attended them; and the hardship was the more grievous, that the act being ambiguously worded, its construction was left to a single magistrate, generally very adverse to the accused.

“It is the natural consequence of restrictive laws to aggravate the disaffection which has served as their pretext; and thus to create a necessity for a legislature that will not retrace its steps, to pass still onward in the course of severity. In the next session, accordingly, held at Oxford in 1665, on account of the plague that ravaged the capital, we find a new and more inevitable blow aimed at the fallen church of Calvin. It was enacted that all persons in holy orders, who had not subscribed the act of uniformity, should swear that it is not lawful, upon any pretence whatsoever, to take arms against the King; and that they did abhor that traitorous position of taking arms by his authority against his person, or against those that are commissioned by him, and would not at any time endeavour any alteration of government in church or state. Those who refused this oath, were not only made incapable of teaching in schools, but prohibited from coming within five miles of any city, corporate town, or borough sending members to parliament.”

HALLAM'S '*Const. History of England*,' vol. ii. 472.

* * “After the Restoration, Bunyan was one of the first persons who was punished for non-conformity. The nation was in a most unquiet state. There was a restless, rancorous, implacable party who would have renewed the civil war, for the sake of again trying the experiment of a Commonwealth, which had so completely and miserably failed when the power was in their hands. They looked to Ludlow as their General; and Algernon Sidney took the first opportunity of soliciting for them men from Holland and money from France. The political enthusiasts who were engaged in such schemes, counted upon the sectaries for support. Even among the sober sects there were men who at the cost of a rebellion would gladly have again thrown down the Church Establishment, for the hope of setting up their own system during the anarchy that must ensue. Among the wilder some were eager to proclaim King Jesus,

and take possession of the earth as being the Saints to whom it was promised ; and some, (a few years later,) less in hope of effecting their republican projects than in despair and vengeance, conspired to burn London : they were discovered, tried, convicted, and executed ; they confessed their intention ; they named the day which had been appointed for carrying it into effect, because an astrological scheme had shown it to be a lucky one for this design ; and on that very day the fire of London broke out. In such times the Government was rendered suspicious by the constant sense of danger, and was led, as much by fear as by resentment, to severities which are explained by the necessity of self-defence—not justified by it when they fall upon the innocent, or even upon the less guilty.”

SOUTHEY'S '*Life of Bunyan*'

LECTURE VII.

IN attempting to analyze the parties of our history, I have purposely omitted, for the most part, the names of the individuals who headed them. By so doing we keep the subject clear at any rate of mere personalities, and avoid shocking that large portion of our political feelings which consists of personal likings or dislikings. But still how to describe even the abstract principles of two parties without indicating which on the whole we prefer, I confess I know not. For these principles are so closely connected with points of moral character, that I do not see how we can even wish to be indifferent to them. I have endeavoured to show how in both parties they were mixed up together, partly good and partly evil, and if I have not done this faithfully in point of fact, then my statement is so far partial and unjust. But that certain principles in politics are in themselves good as the rule, and that others are bad as the rule, although not perhaps absolutely without exception, I can no more wish to doubt, than I would doubt in reading the contest between Christianity and heathenism, on which side lay the truth.

Therefore in speaking of the Revolution of 1688, I can imply no doubt whatever as to its merits. I grant that, descending to personal history, we should find principles sadly obscured ; much evil must be acknowledged to exist in one party, much good or much that claims great allowance on

the other. But to doubt as to the character of the Revolution itself, is to doubt as to the decision of two questions, which speaking to Englishmen, and to members of the church of England, I have no right, as I certainly have no inclination, to look upon as doubtful. I have no right to regard it as doubtful, whether our present constitution be not better than a feudal monarchy; and whether the doctrine and discipline of our protestant church of England be not truer and better than those of the church of Rome. (1)

We will suppose then the Revolution accomplished. King William and Queen Mary seated on the throne; the Bill of Rights and the Toleration Act passed; England and Scotland mostly at peace under the government of King William; the party of King James still predominant in Ireland. What were now the principal parties in the kingdom, and what were their objects?

With one king on the throne in England and Scotland, and with another ruling in Ireland, and trying to recover the throne of Great Britain also, the main question at issue, and one to which all others were necessarily subordinate, was the maintenance or the overthrow of the Revolution. Judging from the extraordinary fact that the Revolution had been effected almost, literally speaking, without bloodshed, we should have expected that the nation would have been almost unanimous in supporting it. But the debates in the convention which had preceded the recognition of William had made it plain that this was not the case; and as every month which James passed in exile weakened the impression of his faults and increased the pity for his misfortunes, so his cause after the Revolution gained strength rather than lost it. The party which had been foremost in placing William on the throne, united in itself all the remains of the ancient puritans, and of all those who had formed the popular party in Charles the Second's time, together with many of those persons who

are the great disgrace of this period of our history, persons who joined either party from motives of interest or ambition, when their opinions led them naturally the other way. The motto of all this party may be said to have been civil and religious liberty; their object was the maintenance of the power of parliament, and through it of the liberty of the subject; the putting down popery, and the allowing liberty of worship to those dissenters who differed from the church on points of government or discipline. Beyond this, as is well known, the notion of religious liberty was not then carried: and it is remarkable, that at this very time an act of parliament was passed making the profession of unitarianism in all its forms penal; so that it was not popery only which remained exposed to the severities of the law.

The party opposed to the one just described, contained within itself two remarkable divisions, which practically made such a difference as to constitute rather two distinct parties. For although both divisions looked upon the Revolution with dislike, yet one of them having a sincere love for the real protestant doctrine of the church of England, regarded the return of a Roman Catholic king as a greater evil than the maintenance of the Revolution; and besides, a large proportion of these, like the better part of the Royalists in the civil war, were no friends to absolute monarchy, and wished the parliament to exist, and to be powerful. The other party, or division of the party, whichever we choose to call it, was anxious at any risk to restore James; the nominal protestants among them being in fact at the best such men as Lord Falkland had described in his days as labouring to bring in an English though not a Roman popery, men whose whole sympathies were with the Romish system in doctrine and ritual, though they had not yet resolved to place the head of their church at Rome. Their political principles were as highly Ghibelin as their religious were Guelf: the

divine right and indefeasible authority of kings stood in their belief side by side with the divine right and indefeasible authority of priests ; and had these two powers again come into conflict, half of the Jacobites probably would have stood by the one, and half by the other.

Under these circumstances the maintenance of the Revolution was no doubt effected by this, that so far one division of the antipopular party went along with their opponents. But this was not only owing to the sincere and zealous protestantism of this division ; it was owing also to another point, which, whether we call it the wisdom or the happiness of the Revolution, is at any rate one of its greatest excellencies and best lessons for all after ages. I mean that the Revolution preserved the monarchy, with all its style and dignity untouched : it made William king, and not protector. The great seal was the same, the national colours remained the same, all writs ran in the same terms, all commissions were in the same form ; as far as all the common business of life was concerned, it was simply like the accession of a new king in natural succession, whose name was William instead of James. Now this is not a little matter. In France some years since the outward signs of Revolution were visible everywhere : old names of streets were hastily painted over, and might still be traced through the new names which had been written upon them : on all government offices, and on many shops and other buildings the fresh colour of the word *royale* showed that it had been but recently substituted for *imperiale*, as that had a little before succeeded to *nationale*. By all this the continuity of a nation's life is broken, and the deep truth conveyed in those beautiful lines of Mr. Wordsworth,—

“The child is father of the man,
And I would wish my days to be,
Bound each to each by natural piety,”

a truth almost more important to be observed by nations than by individuals, is unhappily neglected. (2) But it is the blessing of our English history that its days are thus bound each to each by natural piety : the child has been the father of the man. And thus the old loyalist, whose watchword was church and king, saw that after the Revolution no less than before, the church and king were left to him : the church untouched in its liturgy, in its articles, in its government, in its secular dignity, and in its wealth : the king sitting on the throne of his predecessors, unchanged in semblance, unchanged in the possession of his legal prerogatives : still the sovereign of a kingdom, and not merely the first magistrate in the commonwealth. Nor can we doubt that this operated powerfully to reconcile men's minds to the settlement of the Revolution, theirs especially who are influenced mainly by what strikes them outwardly, and who found that the outward change was so little.

The outward change was little, and yet what was gained by the Revolution and by the Act of Settlement which was passed a few years afterwards, was in importance incalculable. The reigning sovereign was bound to the cause of free and just government, by the consideration that his title to the crown rested on no other foundation ; that there was a competitor in existence whose right on high monarchical principles was preferable to his own. Now, as the whole temptation of kings must necessarily be to magnify their own authority, any thing which counteracts this tendency in them must be good alike for their people and for themselves. And this was the case, except during the reign of Queen Anne, from the Revolution to the middle of the eighteenth century ; if the king forgot the principles of the Revolution, he condemned himself and denied his own title to the throne. Nor was it a little thing to have established once for all as the undoubted doctrine of the constitution, that the rule of hereditary suc

cession, like all others, admits occasionally of exceptions ; rare, indeed,—it is to be desired that they should be very rare,—one or two scattered up and down in the history of centuries,—but yet clear and undoubted, and to the full as legitimate when they do occur as the rule which they set aside. The exception made at the Revolution and confirmed by the Act of Settlement is in force to this very hour ; for I need not say that if the rule of hereditary succession be in all cases binding, the house of Brunswick is at this moment usurping the rights of the houses of Savoy or of Modena ; for the princes of the house of Brunswick are descended only from a daughter of James the First, and except by virtue of the Act of Settlement they could not succeed to the throne whilst the heirs of a daughter of Charles the First were still living ; and such heirs exist, I believe, in more than one royal house in Italy ; to maintain whose rights to the British crown would be, notwithstanding, treason.

A few years after the Revolution, King James's party was utterly put down in Ireland, and the three kingdoms were united under the authority of King William. The conquest of Ireland, for such it might almost be called, was followed by that famous penal code against the Roman Catholics, which was designed to keep them for ever in a state of subjection and humiliation. It is curious to observe one of the most oppressive of all codes enacted by a popular party, whose watchword, as I have said, was civil and religious liberty. It is curious, yet ought not for a moment to puzzle any one who is familiar with ancient history. The democracy of Athens put to death a thousand Mytilenæans of the oligarchical party, and confiscated the lands of the whole people. The injustice of the Athenian dominion over Lesbos may be questioned, or we may complain of the excessive severity of their treatment of the Mytilenæans ; but not surely of its inconsistency with a sincere love of democratical prin-

principles of government. For the Mytilenæans in the one case, like the Irish Catholics in the other, had been the declared enemies of the popular cause; the one in Athens, the other in England: and their treatment was that of vanquished enemies and rebels, not of citizens. And as after the Mytilenæan revolt the people of Methymna were alone regarded by the Athenians as the free inhabitants of Lesbos; so the Irish protestants were regarded by the English as the only Irish people: the Roman Catholics were looked upon altogether as an inferior caste. The whole question, in fact, relates to the treatment of enemies or subjects, and not to that of citizens: and unjust wars or conquests or dominions are not more inconsistent with a popular government than with any other: because the popular principle is understood to be maintained only with regard to those within the commonwealth, and not to those who are without. They are not more inconsistent with one form of government than another, but I hope I shall not be supposed, therefore, to deny their guilt; that remains the same, and is not affected by the question of consistency or inconsistency.

Greek history will enable us also to comprehend the feelings with which the popular and antipopular parties respectively regarded the great French war. The popular party felt towards France as the same party in Athens regarded Lacedæmon; not merely as towards a national rival, but as towards a political enemy, who was leagued with their political enemies at home to effect the overthrow of their actual free constitution. And as Thucydides* says of the aristocratical party of the Four Hundred, that although they would have been glad to have preserved, if possible, the foreign dominion and the political independence of Athens, yet they were ready to sacrifice these to Sparta rather than fall under

* VIII. 91.

the power of their own democracy; (3) so we can understand what otherwise would be incredible and monstrous, the desertion of the alliance, the putting Ormona into Marlborough's place, and the separate negotiations with France in 1713. And, on the other hand, that the enmity of the popular party was directed not against France nationally, but against the supporter of their domestic enemies, was shown by the friendly relations which subsisted between the two countries in the reign of George the First, when Philip of Orleans was at the head of the French government, and France was no longer in league with the partisans of James. The war which afterwards broke out in 1740, appears to have arisen solely from national and European causes; and the support which the French then afforded to the insurrection of 1745, was merely given as an effectual means of annoying a foreign enemy, and diverting the attention of the English from the great military struggle in the Netherlands. Accordingly, we do not find that any party in England regarded France with favour in that war, or complained of the government except for a want of vigour and ability in their military and naval operations.

The cause of the Revolution in France never at any time, I believe, was otherwise than popular with the poorer classes; the peasantry no less than the poor of the towns were, with a few local exceptions, such as La Vendee and Bretagne, its zealous supporters. In England it was otherwise; the strength of the friends of the Revolution lay in the middle classes, in the commercial class, and in the highest class of the aristocracy; the lower class of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the poorer classes, were ranged together on the opposite side. The main cause of this difference is to be found in the fact that the French Revolution was social quite as much as political: (4) ours was political only. The abolition of the Seigneurial dominion in France, and the making

all Frenchmen equal before the law, were benefits which the poorest man felt daily : but the English Revolution had only settled great constitutional questions—questions of the utmost importance, indeed, to good government, and affecting in the end the welfare of all classes of the community, but yet working indirectly, and in their first and obvious character little concerning the poor ; while, on the other hand, the wars which followed the Revolution had led to an increased taxation. To this it must be added, that the mere populace is at all times disposed to dislike the existing government, be it what it will : and as the popular party retained the government in its hands for many years, the habitual feeling against all governments happened to turn against them. In country parishes the peasantry went along with the country gentlemen and clergy from natural feelings of attachment ; feelings which distress had not as yet shaken : while the town populace, and the country populace also, so far as they knew them, disliked the dissenters both socially and morally ; socially, from the same feeling which at this moment makes it easier to excite the populace against the great manufacturers than against the old nobility : jealousy, namely, against those nearer to themselves in rank, yet raised by circumstances above them ; and morally, from a dislike of their strictness and religious profession : the same feeling which urged the mob to persecute the first Methodists, and which is curiously blended with the social feeling. For religious language, even when amounting to rebuke of ourselves, is borne more readily, to say the least, when it proceeds from those who seem authorized to use it. Thus it gives less offence when coming from a clergyman than from a layman ; and to a poor man it comes more naturally from one whom he feels to be his superior in station, than from one more nearly his equal. Partly in connection with this, is the greater toleration shown by the Roman world to the Jews than to the

Christians ; the Jews seemed to have a right to believe in one God, because it was their national religion ; but what right had one Roman citizen to pretend to be wiser than his neighbours, and to profess to worship one God, because that and that alone was the truth ? From such feelings, good and bad together, the populace in Queen Anne's reign, and in that which followed, were generally averse to the dissenters and the popular party, and friendly to the clergy, and to the party opposed to the Revolution.

Meanwhile years passed on, and the house of Hanover was firmly seated on the throne ; on the death of George the First his son George the Second succeeded him without the slightest opposition ; a larger portion of the clergy, and a very large majority of the nation had learnt not only to acquiesce in, but to approve heartily of the principles of the Revolution ; the victory of civil and religious liberty, as it was called, was completely won. Now, then, considering, as I have said before, that we have a right to ask for the fruits of liberty, just as we may ask for the fruits of health ; (for while we are ill we give up our whole attention to the getting the better of our sickness ; and health is then reasonably our great object ; but when we are well, if instead of using our health to do our duty, we go on idly talking about its excellence, and think of nothing but its preservation, we become ridiculous valetudinarians ;) even so, having a right to demand of men, when their liberty is secured, what fruits they have produced with it, let us even put this question to the triumphant popular party of the eighteenth century. And if we hear no sufficient answer, but only a mere repetition of phrases about the excellence of civil and religious liberty, then we shall do well not indeed to fall in love with the anti-popular party, and say that sickness is better than health, but to confess with shame that the popular party has neither practised nor understood its duty ; that they laboured well

to clear the ground for their building, but when it was cleared they built nothing.

Here seems to me to be the great fault of the last century : as in the eyes of many it is its great excellence ; that it was for letting things alone. (5) In some respects, indeed, it stopped its own professed work too soon ; for trade was not free, but burdened with a great variety of capricious restrictions : sinecure places, and these granted in reversion, were exceedingly numerous : the press, had the disposition of the government been jealous of it, was still greatly at its mercy ; for as yet it remained with the judges only to decide whether a publication was or was not libellous : the business of the jury was merely to decide on the fact, whether the defendant had published it. (6) But with regard to institutions of the greatest importance, the neglect was extreme. The whole subject of criminal law and prison discipline was either left alone, or touched only for mischief. The state of the prisons, both physically and morally, was as bad as it had been in the preceding century ; the punishment of death was multiplied with a fearful indifference ; education was everywhere wanted, and scarcely anywhere to be found. Persons are now living who remember the old state of things in this university, when a degree might be gained without any reading at all : and the introduction of Sunday schools is also within living memory. It is not to be wondered at that attention should not have been turned immediately to these and many other points ; but still the principle of the age had no tendency to them : in political and ecclesiastical matters the work had been so long to get rid of what was bad, that it seemed to be forgotten that it was no less important to build up what was good ; and men's positive efforts seemed to run wholly in another direction, towards physical and external advancement. (7)

Then there arose in England, for I am now looking no farther, a new form of political party. It is well known that

the administration of the first William Pitt was a period of unanimity unparalleled in our annals; popular and antipopular parties had gone to sleep together: the great minister wielded the energies of the whole united nation; France and Spain were trampled in the dust; protestant Germany saved; all North America was the dominion of the British crown; the vast foundations were laid of our empire in India. (8) Of almost instantaneous growth, the birth of two or three years of astonishing successes, the plant of our power spread its broad and flourishing leaves east and west, and half the globe rested beneath its shade. Yet the worm at its root was not wanting. Parties awoke again, one hardly knows how or why, and their struggle during the early part of the reign of George the Third was of such a character, that after studying it attentively, we turn from it as from a portion of history equally anomalous and disagreeable. Yet its uninstruction in one sense is instructive in another; and I will venture to call your attention to that period in which the most prominent names—alas! for the degraded state of English party—are those of John Wilkes and of Junius.

For the first time for nearly fifty years the king was supposed to be disinclined to the principles of the Revolution; the great popular minister, Pitt, had resigned, and the minister who was believed to be the king's personal favourite, was believed also to be strongly attached to the principles of the old antipopular party. (9) These circumstances, together with some dissatisfaction at what were called the inadequate terms of the peace with France and Spain, revived party feelings in a portion of the community with much warmth. (10) The press became violent, and Wilkes's famous attack on the king's speech in No. 45 of the North Briton, drew down a prosecution from the government. He happened at that time to be a member of the house of commons; and the house expelled him. I will not detain you with the detail

of his case ; it is enough to say that having been elected as member for Middlesex after his expulsion, the house of commons would not allow him to sit : and when he again offered himself as a candidate, and had obtained an enormous majority of votes over his competitor, the house of commons nevertheless resolved that his competitor was duly elected, and he took his seat for Middlesex accordingly.

The striking point in this new state of parties cannot fail to have attracted your notice : namely, that the house of commons is no longer on the popular but on the antipopular side ; and that the popular party speaks no longer by the voice of any legally constituted authority, but by that of individuals, self-appointed to the service, and through the press. This was a great change, and, as I think, a change in some respects for the worse. But it is very important to dwell upon, because it is the result of a natural law, and therefore is constantly to be looked for, unless steps are taken to prevent it. We have noticed an instance of the same thing in our religious Reformation ; no sooner had the leaders of the English church made good their cause against Rome, than they became engaged in disputes with their own followers who wanted to carry on the Reformation still farther. But what was a reformation yesterday is become an establishment to-day ; and the reformer of yesterday is to-day the defender of an establishment, opposed in his turn to those who by wishing for farther reformation necessarily assail the reformation already effected. So when the house of commons had established the ascendancy of parliament against the crown, and through that ascendancy had no doubt secured also the liberties of the nation, they naturally stopped and thought that their work was done. Besides, for the last fifty years the crown had headed the popular party, and the efforts which the popular leaders had made, through the influence of the crown, to secure a majority against the influence of

their opponents, had thus been all directed, whatever be thought of the means used, towards securing the triumph of popular principles, the principles, that is, of the Revolution. Things were wonderfully changed, when the crown was supposed to have gone over to the opposite side, and when its influence was acting in concurrence with that very party which it had long been accustomed to combat. The popular party therefore no longer had the majority of the commons in its favour; but on the contrary received from the house of commons its immediate reproof. Now while the house clearly led the popular cause, its acts of authority excited no ill will; soldiers will bear any strictness of discipline from officers whom they thoroughly trust, and who are in the habit of leading them on to victory. But let it be once whispered that these officers are traitors, or that they are even lukewarm and inefficient merely against the enemy, and any severity of discipline is then resented as tyranny. So it was with the popular party out of doors, when the house of commons, now as they thought inclined to the interest of their opponents, began to set up their power of expulsion as controlling the elective franchise of their constituents. The representatives were thus placed in opposition to their constituents, as the antipopular party opposed to the popular: but the constituents were no legally organized body; they were undistinguished, except by their right of voting, from the whole mass of the nation; nor was there in existence any constitutional power lower than the house of commons, which in this new struggle might be against the house of commons itself what that house had formerly been against the crown. The corporation of London attempted to supply this want, but in vain: it could not pretend to be a national, but merely a local body; and London has never exercised such an influence over the country, as that the chief magistrate of London should be recognised as the popular leader of England. The popular party then, as

. have said before, having no official organ, spoke as it best could through self-appointed individuals, and through the press. (11)

This changed state of things is one with which we are very familiar: a strong popular party out of parliament, and that great power of the public press, which with much truth as well as humour has been called the fourth estate of the realm, are two of the most prominent features of these later times. Both undoubtedly have their evils, but both are the natural and unavoidable consequence of the changed position of the house of commons on one side, and of the growth of the mass of the nation in political activity on the other. For there being, as I have said, no lower constitutional body which could be the heart as it were of the popular party, now that the house of commons had ceased to be so, it was a matter of plain necessity that the opposition should be carried on from the ranks of the people itself, in aid of that portion of the house of commons which upheld the same principles, but was, within the walls of parliament, a minority. And as for the press, reading in our climates so naturally takes the place of hearing, and is so indispensable where the state is not confined within the walls of a single city but is spread over a great country, that it could not but increase in power as the number of those who took an interest in public affairs became daily greater. True it is that its power, as actually exercised, was liable to enormous abuse. The writers in the public journals were anonymous, and although the printer and publisher were legally responsible for the contents of their papers, yet the bad tendencies of anonymous writing are many more than the severest law of libel can repress. The best of us, I am afraid, would be in danger of writing more carelessly without our names than with them. We should be tempted to weigh our statements less, putting forward as true what we believe indeed, but have no sufficient

grounds for believing, to use sophistical arguments with less scruple, to say bitter and insulting things of our adversaries with far less forbearance. But then the writers for the public journals have the farther disadvantage of always writing hastily, and in many instances of writing for their bread, so that whatever other qualities their articles may have or not have, it is necessary that they should be such as will make the paper sell. Again, a journal is a property; like other property it may be bequeathed, bought, and sold, and may thus pass into hands totally indifferent to all political principles, and only anxious to make the property profitable. Instead of guiding public opinion, such a proprietor will think it better policy to follow it and encourage it; well knowing that to praise and agree with a man's opinions is a surer way of pleasing him than to attempt to teach him better. Even where this is not the case, and a journal is honestly devoted to the maintenance of a certain set of political principles, yet the writers in it, over and above the disadvantages already noticed, of haste and of writing anonymously, are many times persons ill fitted by education or by station in society to form the wisest judgments on political questions; they have not knowledge sufficient to be teachers. All this is true; and journalism accordingly has pandered abundantly to men's evil passions, has misled the public mind, many times, instead of leading it aright. And farther, there is always a danger that popular principles, when advocated spontaneously by individuals, and not by a regular constitutional body, should become somewhat in excess, should respect actual institutions too little, and should savour too much of individual extravagance or passion. So that it would be an enormous evil if ever the popular party in the house of commons was so weak, that the main stress of the contest should be carried on out of parliament, by speakers at public meetings or by the press. There is no question that something of this evil was felt in

the latter part of the eighteenth century, too much devolved on the popular party out of doors and on the press, because of the vast superiority of the antipopular party in parliament. But with all the evils of a political press, the question still recurs, What should we be without it? Or how would it be possible otherwise to satisfy the natural desire of an active-minded people, to know the state of their own affairs? And there is no question that reading is a less exciting process than hearing; sophisms read quietly in our own house are less likely to mislead, than when commended by the eloquence of a popular speaker and the sympathy of a vast multitude, his hearers: what there is of mischief does less harm, while what there is of true information is better digested and better remembered. Again, whatever of sophistry and virulence there is in the public journals, yet this is partly neutralized as to its effects by their opposition to each other; and while we allow for the existence of those faults, it is impossible to deny that the consequence of the system of extreme publicity is to communicate a great mass of real information, that the truth after all is more widely known and with less scandalous corruptions than it could be under any other system conceivable.

The evil of the public journals of the eighteenth century was that of the political writing of the time generally, and it arose out of that fault to which I have already alluded, when I said that the mere notion of civil and religious liberty was too exclusively worshipped by the popular party, to the neglect of the moral end which lay beyond it. And this unhappy separation of politics from morals, and from the perfection of morals, Christianity, was by no means peculiar to the popular party, nor to the eighteenth century; its causes lay deeper, and their consequences have been but too durable. In this respect, the existence of a church which was supposed to include the whole nation within its pale, and to take

effectual care of their highest interests, was in some respects absolutely mischievous, when that church in practice was inefficient and disorganized. For as if the state were thus relieved from all moral responsibility, it took less care, by its own regulations, for the moral excellence of its magistrates, than was taken by many a heathen commonwealth. The Roman censors expelled from the senate any man of scandalous life ; and though their sentence was reversible, yet a *judicium turpe*, or being found guilty, by a court of law, of any one out of a great variety of specified disgraceful offences, deprived a man of his political privileges irrevocably ; he lost even his vote as a member of the comitia. (12) How different was the state of feeling in England, was but too clearly shown in the dispute as to the re-election of Wilkes, after the house of commons had expelled him. Politically, the subsequent decision of the house of commons, which is now considered to have settled the question, seems perfectly just : the choice of a representative seems to belong to his constituents, within the bounds fixed by law ; and the judgment of his fellow representatives against him is not so much to the purpose as the renewed decision of those who are more immediately concerned, given in his favour. (13) Yet was the scandal extreme when a man of such moral character as Wilkes was made a popular leader, and when a great political principle seemed involved in choosing him to be a legislator. True it is that the opposite party had no right to complain of him, for the candidate whom they supported against him was in moral character nothing his superior ; it is a curious fact that both were members together in private life of that scandalous society whose meetings at Medmenham Abbey, between Henley and Marlow, were the subject at the time of many a disgraceful story. (14) But it was and is one of the evils of our state, that personal infamy is no bar to the exercise of political rights ; that a man may walk out

of jail and take his seat in the highest places, even as a legislator. And this same moral insensibility makes us tolerate the defects of the press in these points, when we sympathize with it politically; because we are all accustomed too much to separate moral and political matters from each other; one party thinking of liberty only, and another of authority; but each forgetting what is the true fruit and object of both.

As Wilkes was one of the worst specimens of a popular leader, so was Junius of a popular political writer. One is ashamed to think of the celebrity so long enjoyed by a publication so worthless. No great question of principle is discussed in it; it is remarkable that on the subject of the impressment of seamen, which is a real evil of the most serious kind, and allowed to be so even by those who do not believe that it is altogether remediable, Junius strongly defends the existing practice. All the favourite topics of his letters are purely personal or particular; his appeals are never to the best part of our nature, often to the vilest. If I wished to prejudice a good man against popular principles, I could not do better than to put into his hands the letters of Junius. (15)

But I have dwelt too long on this period of our history, and must hasten to conclude this sketch. The disputes about Wilkes's election were soon lost in a far greater matter, the contest with America. In that contest the questions of our own former history were virtually reproduced; for it is quite manifest that the British parliament stood to the American colonies in precisely the same relation in which the crown had formerly stood towards the people of England; every argument for or against ship-money might have been pleaded for and against the Stamp Act. This Lord Chatham clearly perceived, and so far he was in agreement with the rest of the popular party. His opposition to the in-

dependence of the colonies belonged to the personal character of the man, to his invincible abhorrence of yielding to the house of Bourbon, to his natural unwillingness to divide that great American empire which his administration had founded. But he struggled against a law altogether distinct from the question about taxation, a law of nature herself, which makes distance an insuperable obstacle to political union; and when the time arrives at which a colony is too great to be dependent, distance making union impossible with a mother country at the end of the earth, the only alternative is complete separation. (16)

In the various contests which followed, to the end of the century, the character of the popular party remained pretty nearly the same: its object might still be said to be civil and religious liberty; the difference was that these objects were now often contended for for the sake of others, with whom Englishmen had no personal connection. And so paramount are political principles, when they seem really at stake, to any national sympathies or antipathies, that at the end of the century the feelings of our two great political parties with regard to France were exactly reversed from what they had been at the beginning of it, because France was become the representative of exactly opposite political principles. With perfect consistency therefore did the popular party deprecate and the antipopular party support the war with France in 1793, as in 1703 the antipopular party had opposed it, and the popular party had been zealous in its favour. (17)

It marks also the truth of the description which I gave of the later movement of Europe, calling it the political, as distinguished from the religious movement of the preceding period, that political consistency led parties to alter their feelings towards the same religious party; the popular party being zealous to undo that very penal code which their political ancestors had imposed on the Roman Catholics of Ireland,

the antipopular party on the other hand vigorously maintaining it. Neither party were in the least inconsistent with their inherent political principles ; and the religious feelings which in the case of the Roman Catholics had a century earlier modified the political feeling, were now on both sides greatly weakened.

The struggle then in this latter period of modern history, so far as England has been concerned, may be called a struggle for civil and religious liberty ; understanding liberty in a perfectly neutral sense, and not as a deliverance from evil and unjust restraint, but from restraint simply. And taking the word in this meaning, it seems to me that the statement cannot be disputed, that the object of one party during the eighteenth century was to unloose, the object of the other to hinder such unloosing ; it being a distinct question whether the bands thus sought to be taken off or retained, were just or unjust, useful or mischievous. And I think it is also certain that this object in the preceding period of modern history was combined with another of a more specific character, namely, the attainment of religious truth, which was on both sides a more positive object than the simply unloosing or holding fast, and one more certainly to be called good.

What has been exemplified from our own history, holds true I think no less with respect to Europe at large. Unquestionably whatever internal movement there has been on the continent since 1648, has been predominantly political ; undoubtedly also the object of that movement has been generally to unloose, to remove certain restraints external or internal ; and the object of those opposed to that movement has been to maintain these restraints or to add to them.

It would appear that this view of the question will enable us easily enough to account for the disappointment with which, whatever be our political opinions, we must rise from

the study of this period of political movement. Disappointment, because evils great and unquestioned still exist abundantly, evils which both parties have failed to prevent. Those who advocate the side of the movement, when taunted with the little good which has resulted from their political successes, besides being at issue with their opponents as to the amount of good produced, might fairly acknowledge that the movement was essentially defective, that its object ought not to have been merely negative, that although to do away evil and unjust restraints is good, yet that our views should be carried much farther ; we are unjust to our own work if we take no care that liberty shall be to all men's eyes the mother of virtue. And on the other hand they who sympathize with the party which strove to hold fast the restraints, if they say that the mischief has resulted wholly from their own defeat, are yet required to account for the very fact of that defeat ; and they too may acknowledge that to restrain a child or to confine a lunatic is not all that their cases need : that restraint is but a means no less than liberty ; and that when man exercises it upon man, he is bound to show that it is a means to work the good of the person restrained, or else it is an injustice and a sin. Now it is past all doubt that the antipopular party, both religious and political, have here greatly failed ; considering the people as children, they have restrained the child, but they have not educated him ; considering them even as lunatics, they have confined the lunatic, but have often so irritated him with their discipline as to make his paroxysms more violent and more incurable.

Farther also, as to the judgment we should form of the struggle of the last three centuries, it is manifest that it depends in some measure on our judgment of the centuries preceding them. If all was well in those preceding centuries, the movement, whether religious or political, must have been undesirable ; for certainly all is not well now. If all was ill

in those preceding centuries, then certainly the movement has been a great blessing; for our present state is blessed with very much of good. But it was neither all well nor all ill; so much the most superficial knowledge may teach us: the question to decide our judgment is, whether it was ill or well predominantly.

In most other places it would be considered extraordinary to represent such a question as doubtful for a moment. But here there is always a tendency to magnify the past: five-and-twenty years ago I can remember that it was the fashion to exalt the seventeenth century at the expense of the eighteenth: now I believe many are disposed to depreciate both, and to reserve their admiration for times still more remote, and more unlike our own. It is very well that we should not swim with the stream of public opinion: places like this are exceedingly valuable as temples where an older truth is still worshipped, which else might have been forgotten: and some caricature of our proper business must at times be tolerated, for such is the tendency of humanity. But still if we make it our glory to run exactly counter to the general opinions of our age, making distance from them the measure of truth, we shall at once destroy our usefulness and our real respectability. And to believe seriously that the movement of the three last centuries has been a degeneracy; that the middle ages were wiser, or better, or happier than our own, seeing truth more clearly and serving God more faithfully; would be an error so extravagant that no amount of prejudice could excuse us for entertaining it. (18)

It has been my object in this and in my last lecture to exemplify from that history which is most familiar to us all, the method of historical analysis; by which we endeavour to discover the key as it were to the complicated movement of the world, and to understand the real principles of opposite parties amidst much in their opinions and conduct that is

purely accidental. I believe that the result of the analysis now made, is historically correct ; if it be otherwise, I have managed the experiment ill, and it has failed in this particular instance ; but the method itself is no less the true one, and you have only to conduct it more carefully in order to make it completely answer. In a brief review of a period of three centuries, I have made so many omissions that my sketch may seem to be superficial ; and I grant that this is always the danger to be apprehended in our generalizations, and one which when speaking of a period so busy it is not easy to avoid. To be acquainted with every existing source of information illustrative of the last three centuries is of course physically impossible, while human life is no longer than it is : the only question is, or else all our reading must be useless, whether by a tolerably large and comprehensive study of a variety of sources we may not gain a notion substantially correct, which a still more extensive study, if such were practicable, would confirm and enrich, but would not materially alter.

What I have now attempted to do briefly for a long and very busy period, I shall endeavour to do next year, if God shall permit, at greater length for a shorter period, namely, for the fourteenth century. Whoever has already made that period his study, or shall do so in the course of this year, may find it not uninteresting to compare the result of his inquiries with mine, and if he shall learn any thing from me he may be sure also that he might impart something to me in return, of which I was ignorant. For in this wide field there is full work for many labourers, and it is my hope that many of us may thus co-operate, and by our separate researches collect what no one man could have collected alone. In the mean while, my next and last lecture will be devoted to one or two more general matters ; such particularly as the criteria of historic credibility, a question naturally of great import

ance, because unless we can discriminate between a credible testimony and a suspicious one, we shall never be able to avoid the evil either of unreasonable scepticism or of unreasonable credulity. And the result of such an inquiry will be what we could most wish ; that there is an historical truth attainable by those who truly desire it, however easily and indeed inevitably missed by the unfair or even the careless historian, whatever may be his external advantages. This question, with one or two points connected with it, will be almost more than sufficient to occupy the time which we shall be able to afford to them.

NOTES

TO

LECTURE VII.

NOTE 1.—Page 316.

Coleridge has spoken of “the revolution” as “wise and necessitated confirmation and explanation of the law of England, erroneously entitled *the English Revolution of 1688*.”—‘*The Friend*,’ iii. p. 130; and again, in the ‘*Table Talk*,’ ii. p. 172: “The great reform brought into act by and under William the Third, combined the principles truly contended for by Charles the First and his Parliament respectively.”

NOTE 2.—Page 319.

* * “It is the misfortune of France that her ‘past’ cannot be loved or respected; her future and her present cannot be wedded to it; yet how can the present yield fruit, or the future have promise, except their roots be fixed in the past? The evil is infinite, but the blame rests with those who made the past a dead thing, out of which no healthful life could be produced.”

‘*Life and Correspondence*,’ Appendix C, x. 7.

In his ‘Vindication of Niebuhr’s History,’ Archdeacon Hare quotes the following passage from the *first* edition, with the remark that in it “the author seems almost to have snatched a feather out of Burke’s plumage:”

“Notwithstanding that they established the festival of the *Regifugium*, and abolished the name of King for ever, the Romans were very far from looking back with any ferocity of hatred at the times of their monarchical government. The statues of the Kings, that of the last Tarquinius himself, it would seem among the rest,

were preserved, and probably even multiplied; their laws and institutions in civil as well as ceremonial matters were maintained in full force. The change in the constitution did not at first go beyond this single branch; and never did it enter the heads of the Romans to beggar themselves of their rich inheritance of laws and recollections. It was reserved for our days to see the fruits of that madness, which led our fathers, with an unexampled kind of arrogance, to brand themselves falsely with being a degraded and slavish race, at the same time that they falsely asserted they were called to an unparalleled degree of perfection; of that madness which bragged it would form a new earth by demolishing the old one: only once has the world beheld—and we have been the spectators—universal contempt invoked upon the whole of the past, and people proud of the title of slaves broken loose. Something similar, indeed, and attended with similar results, had been experienced in religious revolutions: the protestant communities have cast away the saints and fathers of the church, and they have not done so with impunity: it has been the same in the revolutions of science and literature. On the other hand, the lessons of all experience teach us, that a nation cannot possess a nobler treasure than the unbroken chain of a long and brilliant history. It is the want of this that makes all colonies so sickly. Those of the Greeks indeed seldom cut off their recollections altogether from the root of their mother city: modern colonies have done so: and this unnatural outrage has perhaps operated still more than other circumstances to plunge them into a state of incorrigible depravity.”

NOTE 3.—Page 322.

This was the feeling when Theramenes separated from the oligarchical party that had set up the government of the ‘Four Hundred,’ and just before the counter-revolution which overturned it, when Phrynichus was assassinated, in the 92d Olympiad, A. C. 411. The words of Thucydides referred to are—“ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ μάλιστα μὲν ἐβούλοντο ὀλιγαρχούμενοι ἄρχειν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰς τε ναῦς καὶ τὰ τείχη ἔχοντες αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἐξειργόμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτου μὴ οὖν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου γε αὐθις γενομένου αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα διαφθαρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν εἰ τοῦ γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.”

NOTE 4.—Page 322.

Speaking of Arthur Young's Travels in France, Dr. Arnold writes: "He shows how deadly was the hatred of the peasantry towards the lords, and how in 1789 the châteaux were destroyed and the families of the gentry insulted from a common feeling of hatred to all who had made themselves and the poor *two orders*, and who were now to pay the penalty of having put asunder what God had joined."

'*Life and Correspondence*,' Letter Dec. 24, 1830.

NOTE 5.—Page 325.

A forcible illustration of the evils of the false 'Conservatism' involved in the maxim Dr. Arnold is alluding to, is given by a writer in a late number of the '*English Review*,' (Dec. 1844.) He speaks of "an oracular maxim most usually expressed in the French language, France having been the scene of its most prodigal application. *Laissez faire* are the words of potency which, from one generation to another, have formed the chief trust and confidence of rulers, and statesmen, and economists. . . . Still, for the most part, revolution is one legitimate result of the long and undisturbed predominance of *laissez faire*. Witness that terrific convulsion, actually seen, throughout the whole course of its development, by many men now living, and which made History stand aghast at the sore and frightful task which it has laid upon her. For what was that explosion but the inevitable issue of a thousand years of selfish, ignorant, heartless, and we might justly add, godless *non-interference*. A considerable portion of the preceding century more especially, was the very riot and revelry of the grand master-principle of '*Let alone*.' Its influence pervaded all ranks of the community. Let the philosophers and atheists write and talk as they list; let the wits point slanderous epigrams and licentious *vers de société*; let the court dance minuets, give *petits soupers*; let the King quarrel with his parliaments, and take the occasional diversion of a *lettre de cachet*; above all, let his majesty provide himself with that one thing needful, a *parc aux cerfs*; and all this while, *let the people live as they please and as they can!* What could be more

captivating than the seeming liberality of this very comfortable doctrine? And yet, some how or other it proved, after all, to be a most destructive imposture. It was truly remarked by Charles Fox, that the government and aristocracy of France seemed to have been long smitten by it, with a judicial infatuation. They had eyes, and would not see; they had ears, and would not hear. They were surrounded with degraded and almost famishing millions, but they would behold nothing but princes and nobles. At length the measure of iniquity was complete. The phials of wrath were filled to the very brim; and at the fated moment their fury was poured out. The issue is known to all. First, the *sans-culotterie*, with its September massacres, and its reign of terror; then the conscription, and the empire; and lastly, all Europe on the verge of ruin!"—Vol. ii. p. 257.

NOTE 6.—Page 325.

* * "Meanwhile the judges naturally adhered to their established doctrine; and in prosecutions for political libels were very little inclined to favour what they deemed the presumption, if not the licentiousness of the press. They advanced a little farther than their predecessors; and, contrary to the practice both before and after the revolution, laid it down at length as an absolute principle, that falsehood, though always alleged in the indictment, was not essential to the guilt of the libel; refusing to admit its truth to be pleaded, or given in evidence, or even urged by way of mitigation of punishment. But as the defendant could only be convicted by the verdict of a jury, and jurors both partook of the general sentiment in favour of free discussion, and might in certain cases have acquired some prepossessions as to the real truth of the supposed libel, which the court's refusal to enter upon it could not remove, they were often reluctant to find a verdict of guilty; and hence arose by degrees a sort of contention, which sometimes showed itself upon trials, and divided both the profession of the law and the general public. The judges and lawyers for the most part, maintained that the province of the jury was only to determine the fact of publication; and also whether what are called the *inuendoes* were properly filled up, that is, whether the libel meant that *which*

it was alleged in the indictment to mean, not whether such meaning were criminal or innocent, a question of law which the court were exclusively competent to decide. That the jury might acquit at their pleasure was undeniable; but it was asserted that they would do so in violation of their oaths and duty, if they should reject the opinion of the judge by whom they were to be guided as to the general law. Others of great name in our jurisprudence, and the majority of the public at large, conceiving that this would throw the liberty of the press altogether into the hands of the judges, maintained that the jury had a strict right to take the whole matter into their consideration, and determine the defendants' criminality or innocence according to the nature of the circumstances of the publication. This controversy, which perhaps hardly arose within the period to which the present work relates, was settled by Mr. Fox's libel bill in 1792. It declares the right of the jury to find a general verdict upon the whole matter; and though, from causes easy to explain, it is not drawn in the most intelligible and consistent manner, was certainly designed to turn the defendant's intention, as it might be laudable or innocent, seditious or malignant, into a matter of fact for their inquiry and decision."

HALLAM'S *Const. Hist.* vol. iii. p. 229

NOTE 7.—Page 325.

"* * In many parts of Europe (and especially in our own country) men have been pressing forward for some time, in a path which has betrayed by its fruitfulness; furnishing them constant employment for picking up things about their feet, when thoughts were perishing in their minds. While Mechanic Arts, Manufactures, Agriculture, Commerce, and all those products of knowledge which are confined to gross, definite, and tangible objects, have, with the aid of Experimental Philosophy, been every day putting on more brilliant colours; the splendour of the Imagination has been fading: Sensibility, which was formerly a generous nursling of rude Nature, has been chased from its ancient range in the wide domain of patriotism and religion, with the weapons of derision, by a shadow calling itself Good Sense: calculations of presumptuous Expediency—groping its way among partial and temporary

consequences—have been substituted for the dictates of paramount and infallible Conscience, the supreme embracer of consequences : lifeless and circumspect Decencies have banished the graceful negligence and unsuspecting dignity of Virtue.” p. 164 of Wordsworth’s Tract ‘*On the Convention of Cintra*,’ written in 1808–9—which Southey, at the time of the publication, justly said was “in that strain of political morality to which Hutchinson, and Milton, and Sidney, could have set their hands.” Though composed only as an occasional pamphlet, it abounds with admirable and abiding political wisdom, uttered with fervid eloquence. Never having been reprinted, it has become very rare.

NOTE 8.—Page 326.

“Such then were the principal foreign transactions of the year 1759—the most glorious, probably, that England ever yet had seen. That it was the most glorious was apparently proclaimed or acknowledged by all parties at the time, nor will History find much to detract from that contemporary praise. In Asia, Africa, America, Europe, by land and sea, our arms had signally triumphed. Every ship from India came fraught with tidings of continued success to the British cause. In January we received the news of the capture of Goree, in June, of the capture of Guadaloupe. In August came the tidings of the victory at Minden, in September, of the victory off Lagos, in October, of the victory at Quebec, in November, of the victory at Quiberon. ‘Indeed,’ says Horace Walpole, in his lively style, ‘one is forced to ask every morning what victory there is, for fear of missing one!’ Another contemporary, Dr. Hay, exclaimed, in no liberal spirit of triumph, that it would soon be as shameful to beat a Frenchman as to beat a woman! With better reason we might have claimed to ourselves the arrogant boast of the Spaniards only one hundred and fifty years before, that there were not seas or winds sufficient for their ships. Nor did our trade and manufactures languish amidst this blaze of military fame. It is the peculiar honour of Chatham—as may yet be seen inscribed on the stately monument which the citizens of London have raised him in Guildhall—that under his rule they found COMMERCE UNITED

WITH AND MADE TO FLOURISH BY WAR. Still less can it be said that these wonders had grown altogether from harmony and concord at home. It was the just vaunt of Chatham himself in the House of Commons, that success had given us unanimity, not unanimity success. Never yet had there been a more rapid transition from languor and failure to spirit and conquest. Never yet had the merits of a great Minister in producing that transition been more fully acknowledged in his lifetime. The two Houses, which re-assembled in November, met only to pass Addresses of Congratulation and Votes of Credit. So far from seeking to excuse or to palliate the large supplies which he demanded, Pitt plumed himself upon them; he was the first to call them enormous, and double any years of Queen Anne. 'To push expense,' he said openly upon the Army Estimates, 'is the best economy'—a wise doctrine in war, which, perhaps, no statesman since his son has had the courage to avow."

LORD MAHON'S *History of England*, vol. iv. p. 277.

* * "Such then was the close of Pitt's justly renowned administration. Even amidst the full blaze of its glory there arose some murmurs at its vast expense—the only objection of any weight, I think, that has ever been urged against it. Yet, as a shrewd observer writes at the time, 'It has cost us a great deal, it is true, but then we have had success and honour for our money. Before Mr. Pitt came in, we spent vast sums only to purchase disgrace and infamy.' What number, I would ask, of pounds, of shillings, or of pence, could fairly represent the value of rousing the national spirit, and retrieving the national honour? Is it gold that can measure the interval between the lowest pitch of despondency and the pinnacle of triumph—between the England of 1756 and the England of 1761?

"Let me add, that in the closing act of this administration—in proposing an immediate declaration of war against Spain—Pitt did not urge any immature or ill-considered scheme. His preparations were already made to strike more than one heavy blow upon his enemy—to capture the returning galleons—and to take possession of the Isthmus of Panama, thus securing a port in the Pacific, and cutting off all communication between the Spanish provinces

of Mexico and Peru. Nor did his designs end here : these points once accomplished—as they might have been with little difficulty—he had planned an expedition against the Havana, and another, on a smaller scale, against the Philippine islands. In none of these places could the means of resistance be compared to those of the French in Canada, while the means of aggression from England would be the same. Yet a few months, and the most precious provinces of Spain in the New World, the brightest gems of her colonial empire, might not improbably have decked the British Crown ! In reviewing designs so vast, pursued by a spirit so lofty, I can only find a parallel from amongst that nation which Pitt sought to humble ; I can only point to Cardinal Ximenes. This resemblance would be the less surprising, since Pitt, at the outset of his administration, had once, in conversation with Fox, talked much of Ximenes, who, he owned, was his favourite character in History.”

Id. chap. xxxvii. *ad fin.*

NOTE 9.—Page 326.

John Stuart, Earl of Bute, ‘the favourite,’ as Horace Walpole styles him in his ‘Memoirs of the Reign of George III.,’ and ‘*the Scotch favourite*,’ as the London Mob called him, was sworn into the first Privy Council of George III., and as a member of the Cabinet. Early in the next year, 1761, he succeeded the Earl of Holderness as one of the Secretaries of State, and when Mr. Pitt resigned from the Ministry in October, and was followed by Lord Temple, the ascendancy of Lord Bute became complete. In 1762, on the resignation of the Duke of Newcastle, he was declared First Lord of the Treasury.

NOTE 10.—Page 326.

Lord Mahon, in the fourth volume of his History, after referring to the contemporary opinion of Lord Granville, who, when the preliminaries of the Treaty of Paris were submitted to him, gave it his approbation, as that “of a dying statesman on the most glorious war and the most honourable peace the nation ever saw”—adds,

"The calm reflections of posterity will not, I think, confirm this partial judgment. To them the terms obtained will appear by no means fully commensurate to the conquests that we had made, nor to the expectations which had been, not unreasonably, raised." At the same time he regards it still farther removed from the violent reproaches which were cast upon it by party hatred. "The misrepresentations," he remarks, "against this treaty were undoubtedly far greater than even its defects." IV. pp. 408-9, ch. xxxviii. The debate on the Preliminaries was the occasion, it will be remembered, of one of Pitt's remarkable efforts in the House of Commons, when his elaborate eloquence was exerted, but without effect, against the Treaty.

NOTE 11.—Page 329.

"The publication of regular newspapers, partly designed for the communication of intelligence, partly for the discussion of political topics, may be referred, upon the whole, to the reign of Anne, when they obtained great circulation, and became the accredited organs of different factions. The tory ministers, towards the close of that reign, were annoyed at the vivacity of the press both in periodical and other writings, which led to a stamp duty, intended chiefly to diminish their number, and was nearly producing more pernicious restrictions, such as renewing the licensing act, or compelling authors to acknowledge their names.* These however did not take place, and the government more honourably coped with their adversaries in the same warfare; nor with Swift and Bolingbroke on their side could they require, except indeed through the badness of their cause, any aid from the arm of power."†

HALLAM'S *Constit. Hist.*, vol. iii. p. 396.

* "A bill was brought in for this purpose in 1712, which Swift, in his *History of the Last Four Years*, who never printed any thing with his name, naturally blames it miscarried, probably on account of this provision." * * *

† "Bolingbroke's letter to the Examiner, in 1710, excited so much attention, that it was answered by lord Cowper, then chancellor, in a letter to the Tatler. Somers' Tracts, xiii. 75; where Sir Walter Scott justly observes, that the fact of two such statesmen becoming the correspondents of periodical publications, shows the influence they must have acquired over the public mind."

“Ce fut le cardinal Mazarin qui s’avisa le premier de faire un instrument politique des feuilles qui, à l’imitation de la *gazetta* de Venise, se publiaient en Italie. Ce ministre astucieux y faisait insérer des bulletins de la guerre d’Espagne, et des nouvelles politiques sur les événemens intérieurs de la France, auxquels il donnait la couleur qui convenait à ses vues et favorisait ses intrigues. Cet exemple ne manqua pas d’imitateurs.”

DUMAS: ‘*Précis des Evénemens Militaires*,’ tome ix. notes, p. 435.

NOTE 12.—Page 332.

“The censorship was an office so remarkable, that however familiar the subject may be to many readers, it is necessary here to bestow some notice on it. Its original business was to take a register of the citizens and of their property; but this, which seems at first sight to be no more than the drawing up of a mere statistical report, became in fact, from the large discretion allowed to every Roman officer, a political power of the highest importance. The censors made out the returns of the free population; but they did more; they divided it according to its civil distinctions, and drew up a list of the senators, a list of the equites, a list of the members of the several tribes, or of those citizens who enjoyed the right of voting, and a list of the *ærarrians*, consisting of those freedmen, naturalized strangers, and others, who being enrolled in no tribe, possessed no vote in the *comitia*, but still enjoyed all the private rights of Roman citizens. Now the lists thus drawn up by the censors were regarded as legal evidence of a man’s condition: the state could refer to no more authentic standard than to the returns deliberately made by one of its highest magistrates, who was responsible to it for their being drawn up properly. He would, in the first place, be the sole judge of many questions of fact, such as whether a citizen had the qualifications required by law or custom for the rank which he claimed, or whether he had ever incurred any judicial sentence which rendered him infamous; but from thence the transition was easy, according to Roman notions, to the decision of questions of right; such as whether a citizen was really worthy of retaining his rank, whether he had not committed some act as justly degrading as those which incurred the sentence of the

law ; and in this manner the censor gave a definite power to public opinion, and whatever acts or habits were at variance with the general feeling, he held himself authorized to visit with disgrace or disfranchisement. Thus was established a direct check upon many vices or faults which law, in almost all countries, has not ventured to notice. Whatever was contrary to good morals, or to the customs of their fathers, Roman citizens ought to be ashamed to practise : if a man behaved tyrannically to his wife or children, if he was guilty of excessive cruelty even to his slaves, if he neglected his land, if he indulged in habits of extravagant expense, or followed any calling which was regarded as degrading, the offence was justly noted by the censors, and the offender was struck off from the list of senators, if his rank were so high ; or if he were an ordinary citizen, he was expelled from his tribe, and reduced to the class of the *ærarians*. Beyond this the censor had no power of degradation ; for the private rights of Roman citizens could not be taken away by any magistrate ; the sentence could only affect his honours, or such privileges as were strictly political.”*

History of Rome, vol. i. 348, chap. xvii.

NOTE 13.—Page 332.

In May, 1770, the Earl of Chatham brought in a bill, in the House of Lords, to reverse the proceedings of the House of Commons on the Middlesex election—his intention, as he declared, being to give the people a strong and thorough sense of the great violation of the constitution, by those unjust and arbitrary proceedings. It was entitled “ A Bill for reversing the Adjudications of the House of Commons, whereby John Wilkes, Esq. has been adjudged incapable of being elected a member to serve in this Parliament, and the Freeholders of the County of Middlesex have been deprived of one of their legal representatives.” It sets forth the rights of the Commons to elect their representatives ; and after reciting the several

* “ This was called a ‘ *judicium turpe*,’ and this was incurred in various actions, which are specified by the lawyers ; as, for instance, if a man were cast in an *actio furti*, or *vi bonorum raptorum*, or *tutelæ*, or *mandati*, or *pro socio*, etc. See *Gaius, Institutes*, iv. § 182. And the disqualification thus incurred was perpetual, and could not be reversed by the censors. See *Cicero pro Cluentio*, 42 ”

elections of Wilkes, and the action of the House of Commons, declares their adjudications arbitrary and illegal. Lord Chatham spoke on the Bill, which was, however, rejected.

Wilkes was an instance of a worthless and profligate man becoming, by chance or management, the representative of a popular principle, and thus acquiring an importance he was utterly unworthy of. He was upheld and caressed, because it was conceived that in the measures directed against him the Constitution itself was assailed; the consequence of which was that, as Horace Walpole said, he was elected as often as Marius was chosen consul. He escaped too in some measure moral reprobation in the defence against political persecution. In after years, when the causes of his accidental consequence had passed away, he sank to his real level.

NOTE 14.—Page 332.

Wilkes's opponent was Col. Luttrell, and the profligate society which Dr. Arnold alludes to, is said to have originated with Sir Francis Dashwood—the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Bute Ministry. Horace Walpole—perhaps sufficient authority in the gossip of history—gives the following account of the society and its projector. “Sir Francis Dashwood had long been known by his singularities and some humour. In his early youth, accounted like Charles XII., he had travelled to Russia in hopes of captivating the Czarina; but neither the character nor dress of Charles were well imagined to catch a *woman's* heart. In Italy, Sir Francis had given into the most open profaneness; and at his return, had assembled a society of Young Travellers, (they called themselves the Dilettanti,) to which a taste for the arts and antiquity, or merely having travelled, were the recommendatory ingredients. Their pictures were drawn, ornamented with symbols and devices; and the founder, in the habit of St. Francis, and with a chalice in his hand, was represented at his devotions before a statue of the Venus of Medicis, a stream of glory beaming on him from behind her lower hand. These pictures were long exhibited in their club-room at a tavern in Palace Yard; but of later years Saint Francis had instituted a more select order. He and some chosen friends had hired the ruins of Meden-

ham Abbey, near Marlow, and refitted it in a conventual style. Thither at stated seasons they adjourned; had each their cell, a proper habit, a monastic name, and a refectory in common—besides a chapel, the decorations of which may well be supposed to have contained the quintessence of their mysteries, since it was impenetrable to any but the initiated. Whatever their doctrines were, their practice was rigorously pagan: Bacchus and Venus were the deities to whom they almost publicly sacrificed. Yet their follies would have escaped the eye of the public, if Lord Bute from this seminary of piety and wisdom had not selected a Chancellor of the Exchequer. But politics had no sooner infused themselves amongst these rosy anchorites, than dissensions were kindled, and a false brother arose, who divulged the arcana and exposed the good Prior, in order to ridicule him as Minister of the Finances.”

‘Memoirs of the Reign of George the Third,’ chap. xi

NOTE 15.—Page 333.

By way of confirmation of a right judgment upon a writer such as Junius, the opinion of Coleridge may aptly be added:

* * “The great art of Junius is never to say too much, and to avoid with equal anxiety a commonplace manner, and matter that is not commonplace. If ever he deviates into any originality of thought, he takes care that it shall be such as excites surprise for its acuteness rather than admiration for its profundity. . . . The Letters are plain and sensible whenever the author is in the right, and whether right or wrong, always shrewd and epigrammatic, and fitted for the coffee-house, the exchange, the lobby of the House of Commons, and to be read aloud at a public meeting. When connected, dropping the forms of connection, desultory without abruptness or appearance of disconnection, epigrammatic and antithetical to excess, sententious and personal, regardless of right or wrong, yet well skilled to act the part of an honest, warm-hearted man, and even when he is in the right, saying the truth but never proving it, much less attempting to bottom it,—this is the character of Junius;—and on this character, and in the mould of these writings must every man cast himself, who would wish in factious times to be the important and long-remembered agent of a faction.”

‘Literary Remains of S. T. C.,’ i. 249

NOTE 16.—Page 334.

“The most splendid passage in Lord Chatham’s public life was certainly the closing one: when on the 7th of April, 1778, wasted by his dire disease, but impelled by an overruling sense of duty, he repaired for the last time to the House of Lords, tottering from weakness, and supported on one side by his son-in-law Lord Mahon, on the other by his second son William, ere long to become like himself the saviour of his country. Of such a scene even the slightest details have interest, and happily they are recorded in the words of an eye-witness. Lord Chatham, we are told, was dressed in black velvet, but swathed up to the knees in flannel. From within his large wig little more was to be seen than his aquiline nose and his penetrating eye. He looked, as he was, a dying man; ‘yet never,’ adds the narrator, ‘was seen a figure of more dignity; he appeared like a being of a superior species.’ He rose from his seat with slowness and difficulty, leaning on his crutches and supported by his two relations. He took his hand from his crutch and raised it, lifting his eyes towards Heaven, and said,—‘I thank God that I have been enabled to come here this day,—to perform my duty, and to speak on a subject which has so deeply impressed my mind. I am old and infirm—have one foot, more than one foot in the grave. I am risen from my bed, to stand up in the cause of my country—perhaps never again to speak in this House.’ The reverence, the attention, the stillness of the House were here most affecting; had any one dropped a handkerchief the noise would have been heard. At first he spoke in the low and feeble tone of sickness, but as he grew warm, his voice rose in peals as high and harmonious as ever. He gave the whole history of the American war, detailing the measures to which he had objected, and the evil consequences which he had foretold, adding, at the close of each period, ‘and so it proved.’ He then expressed his indignation at the idea, which he heard had gone forth, of yielding up the sovereignty of America; he called for vigorous and prompt exertion; he rejoiced that he was still alive, to lift up his voice against the first dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy. After him, the Duke of Richmond attempted some explanations and defence on the part of the government. Lord Chatham heard him with attention, and when his

Grace had concluded, eagerly rose to reply. But this last exertion overcame him, and after repeated attempts to stand firm, he suddenly pressed his hand to his heart, and fell back in convulsions. The Duke of Cumberland, Lord Temple, and other Peers, caught him in their arms, and bore him to a neighbouring apartment, while the Lords left in the House, immediately adjourned in the utmost confusion and concern. He was removed to Hayes, and lingered till the 11th of May, when the mighty spirit was finally released from its shattered frame. Who that reads of this soul-stirring scene—who that has seen it portrayed by that painter, whose son has since raised himself by his genius to be a principal light and ornament of the same assembly—who does not feel that were the choice before him, he would rather live that one triumphant hour of pain and suffering, than through the longest career of thriving and successful selfishness?"

LORD MAHON'S '*Hist. of England*,' vol. iii. p. 60.

This famous scene has suggested a passage in Dr. Arnold's *History of Rome*, which may be quoted here as a specimen not only of historic style, but also of the skill with which he frequently renders ancient and modern story illustrative of each other :

Pyrrhus had formed his Italian alliances against Rome—a consular army had been defeated—Cineas, the favourite minister of the King of Epirus, had arrived as ambassador to the City with terms of peace, which it was apprehended many of the Senators might be awed into favouring :

"Appius Claudius, the famous censor, the greatest of his countrymen in the works of peace, and no mean soldier in time of need, was now, in the thirtieth year after his censorship, in extreme old age, and had been for many years blind. But his active mind triumphed over age and infirmity; and although he no longer took part in public business, yet he was ready in his own house to give answers to those who consulted him on points of law, and his name was fresh in all men's minds, though his person was not seen in the forum. The old man heard that the Senate was listening to the proposals of Cineas, and was likely to accept the King's terms of peace. He immediately desired to be carried to the Senate-house, and was borne in a litter by his slaves through the forum. When

it was known that Appius Claudius was coming, his sons and sons-in-law went out to the steps of the Senate-house to receive him, and he was by them led into his place. The whole Senate kept the deepest silence as the old man arose to speak.

“No Englishman can have read thus far without remembering the scene, in all points so similar, which took place within our fathers’ memory in our own house of parliament. We recollect how the greatest of English statesmen, bowed down by years and infirmity like Appius, but roused like him by the dread of approaching dishonour to the English name, was led by his son and son-in-law into the House of Lords, and all the peers with one impulse arose to receive him. We know the expiring words of that mighty voice, when he protested against the dismemberment of this ancient monarchy, and prayed that if England must fall, she might fall with honour. The real speech of Lord Chatham against yielding to the coalition of France and America, will give a far more lively image of what was said by the blind Appius in the Roman Senate, than any fictitious oration which I could either copy from other writers, or endeavour myself to invent; and those who would wish to know how Appius spoke, should read the dying words of the great orator of England.”—II. ch. xxxvii. p. 496.

NOTE 17.—Page 334.

The adverse feeling to the war with France in 1793, and the subsequent change in the popular mind, are thus spoken of by Wordsworth, in the Tract ‘on the Convention of Cintra:’

* * “This just and necessary war, as we have been accustomed to hear it styled from the beginning of the contest in the year 1793, had, some time before the Treaty of Amiens, viz., after the subjugation of Switzerland, and not till then, begun to be regarded by the body of the people, as indeed both just and necessary; and this justice and necessity were by none more clearly perceived, or more feelingly bewailed, than by those who had most eagerly opposed the war in its commencement, and who continued most bitterly to regret that this nation had ever borne a part in it. Their conduct was herein consistent: they proved that they kept their eyes steadily fixed upon principles, for though there was a shifting or transfer

of hostility in their minds as far as regarded persons, they only combated the same enemy opposed to them under a different shape ; and that enemy was the spirit of selfish tyranny and lawless ambition. . . . The people now wished for war, as their rulers had done before, because open war between nations is a defined and effectual partition, and the sword, in the hands of the good and the virtuous, is the most intelligible symbol of abhorrence. . . . There are promptings of wisdom from the penetralia of human nature, which a people can hear, though the wisest of their practical Statesmen be deaf towards them. This authentic voice the people of England had heard and obeyed ; and in opposition to French tyranny, growing daily more insatiate and implacable, they ranged themselves zealously under their government ; though they neither forgot nor forgave its transgressions, in having first involved them in a war with a people then struggling for its own liberties under a twofold affliction—confounded by inbred faction, and beleagured by a cruel and imperious external foe.”—p. 6.

NOTE 18.—Page 337.

The cultivation of historical study is so much regulated by a right habit of opinion respecting past ages, especially in their relation to the age that is present, that I think it important here to illustrate the text by some selections, not only from Dr. Arnold's other writings, but from some other thoughtful authors who have touched upon this subject. History loses half its value if it teaches only what we are to shun, and nothing to admire and imitate : it loses all its value, when an age “refuses to allow its own temper and judgment to be at all controlled by those of antiquity.”

“It is absurd to extol one age at the expense of another, since each has its good and its bad. There was greater genius in ancient times, but art and science come late. But in one respect it is to be feared we have degenerated—what Tacitus so beautifully expresses, after telling a story of a man, who, in the civil war in Vespasian's time, had killed his own brother, and received a reward for it ; and then relates that the same thing happened before in the civil war of Sylla and Marius, and the man when he found it out killed

himself from remorse : and then he adds, ‘Tanto major apud antiquos ut virtutibus gloria, ita *flagitiis pœnitentia* erat.’ The deep remorse for crime is less in advanced civilization. There is more of sympathy with suffering of all kinds, but less abhorrence of what is admitted to be crime.”

Life and Correspondence : Appendix C., ix. 3

“There are few stranger and sadder sights” (writes Dr. Arnold, in the ‘Introduction’ to the fourth volume of his Sermons—1841) “than to see men judging of whole periods of the history of mankind with the blindness of party spirit, never naming one century without expressions of contempt or abhorrence, never mentioning another but with extravagant and undistinguishing admiration.”—p. 8.

And in the same ‘Introduction :’

* * “In philosophy and general literature, there have been sufficient proofs that the pendulum, which for nearly two hundred years had been swinging one way, was now (‘in the last ten years of the last century’) beginning to swing back again ; and as its last oscillation brought it far from the true centre, so it may be, that its present impulse may be no less in excess, and thus may bring on again, in after ages, another corresponding reaction.

“Now, if it be asked what, setting aside the metaphor, are the two points between which mankind has been thus moving to and fro ; and what are the tendencies in us which, thus alternately predominating, give so different a character to different periods of the human history ; the answer is not easy to be given summarily, for the generalization which it requires is almost beyond the compass of the human mind. Several phenomena appear in each period, and it would be easy to give any one of these as marking its tendency ; as, for instance, we might describe one period as having a tendency to despotism, and another to licentiousness : but the true answer lies deeper, and can be only given by discovering that common element in human nature which, in religion, in politics, in philosophy, and in literature, being modified by the subject matter of each, assumes in each a different form, so that its own proper nature is no longer to be recognised. Again, it would be an error to suppose that either of the two tendencies which so affect the course of human affairs were to be called simply bad or good

Each has its good and evil nicely intermingled ; and taking the highest good of each, it would be difficult to say which was the more excellent ; taking the last corruption of each, we could not determine which was the more hateful. For so far as we can trace back the manifold streams, flowing some from the eastern mountains, and some from the western, to the highest springs from which they rise, we find on the one side the ideas of truth and justice, on the other those of beauty and love—things so exalted, and so inseparably united in the divine perfections, that to set either two above the other were presumptuous and profane. Yet these most divine things separated from each other, and defiled in their passage through this lower world, do each assume a form in human nature of very great evil : the exclusive and corrupted love of truth and justice becomes in man selfish atheism ; the exclusive and corrupted worship of beauty and love becomes in man a bloody and lying idolatry.

“ Such would be the general theory of the two great currents in which human affairs may be said to have been successively drifting. But real history, even the history of all mankind, and much more that of any particular age or country, presents a picture far more complicated. First, as to time : as the vessels in a harbour, and in the open sea without it, may be seen swinging with the tide at the same moment in opposite directions ; the ebb has begun in the roadstead, while it is not yet high water in the harbour ; so one or more nations may be in advance of or behind the general tendency of their age, and from either cause may be moving in the opposite direction. Again, the tendency or movement in itself is liable to frequent interruptions, and short counter-movements : even when the tide is coming in upon the shore, every wave retires after its advance ; and he who follows incautiously the retreating waters, may be caught by some stronger billow, overwhelming again for an instant the spot which had just been left dry. A child standing by the sea-shore for a few minutes, and watching this, as it seems, irregular advance and retreat of the water, could not tell whether it was ebb or flood : and we, standing for a few years on the shore of time, can scarcely tell whether the particular movement which we witness is according to or against the general tendency of the whole period. Farther yet, as these great tendencies are often in-

interrupted, so are they continually mixed : that is, not only are their own good and bad elements successively predominant, but they never have the world wholly to themselves : the opposite tendency exists, in an under-current it may be, and not lightly perceptible ; but here and there it struggles to the surface, and mingles its own good and evil with the predominant good and evil of its antagonist. Wherefore he who would learn wisdom from the complex experience of history, must question closely all its phenomena, must notice that which is less obvious as well as that which is most palpable, must judge not peremptorily or sweepingly, but with reserves and exceptions ; not as lightly overrunning a wide region of truth, but thankful, if after much pains he has advanced his landmarks only a little ; if he has gained, as it were, but one or two frontier fortresses, in which he can establish himself forever.”—p. iii.

“I confess, that if I were called upon to name what spirit of evil predominantly deserved the name of Antichrist, I should name the spirit of chivalry—the more detestable for the very guise of the ‘Archangel ruined,’ which has made it so seductive to the most generous spirits—but to me so hateful, because it is in direct opposition to the impartial justice of the Gospel, and its comprehensive feeling of equal brotherhood, and because it so fostered a sense of honour rather than a sense of duty.”

Life and Correspondence—Letter, March 30, 1829.

In his letter “on the Discipline of Public Schools,” (Quar. Journal of Education, vol. ix. p. 281—1835,) Dr. Arnold, speaking of the opinion that ‘corporal punishment is degrading,’ remarks : “I well know of what feeling this is the expression ; it originates in that proud notion of personal independence, which is neither reasonable nor Christian, but essentially barbarian. It visited Europe in former times with all the curses of the age of chivalry, and is threatening us now with those of Jacobinism. For so it is, that the evils of ultra-aristocracy and ultra-popular principles spring precisely from the same source—namely, from selfish pride—from an idolatry of personal honour and dignity in the aristocratical form of the disease—of personal independence in its modern and popular form. It is simply impatience of inferiority and submission—a feeling which must be more frequently wrong or right, in propor-

tion to the relative situation and worthiness of him who entertains it, but which cannot be always or generally right, except in beings infinitely more perfect than man. Impatience of inferiority felt by a child towards his parents, or by a people towards its instructors, is merely wrong, because it is at variance with the truth: there exists a real inferiority in the relation, and it is an error, a fault, a corruption of nature, not to acknowledge it."

These are strong expressions of condemnation of that element in the middle ages, which Dr. Arnold termed 'chivalry,' or more justly, 'feudality.' If it is to be spoken of as 'chivalry,' then, unless we mean vainly to entangle our thoughts in a mere verbal discussion, it should be remembered that it had a side of truth as well as of error—a bright side as well as a dark one—and this, its glory, Arnold himself saw when his spirit was glowing with the fervent admiration which he habitually professed for the hero-saint, the Ninth Louis of France. Looking, however, chiefly at the evils of the system, and its abuses during a certain period of history, he came to look upon chivalry as the lawless, tyrannical selfishness of mediæval feudality, while another author, looking from another point of view, contemplates it as a thing, in some form or other, coeval with human society, and infinitely ennobled under the influence of the Christian religion, and hence a widely different definition of the term: "Chivalry is only a name for that general spirit or state of mind which disposes men to heroic and generous actions, and keeps them conversant with all that is beautiful and sublime in the intellectual and moral world."—'*The Broad Stone of Honour, or the True Sense and Practice of Chivalry*,' by Kenelm Henry Digby, Esq. In referring to this volume, I feel that this is one of the cases—alas! too many—where we are constrained to seek for truth in the study of extremes; and I am not willing that the reference should be made unaccompanied with explanation of the character of the book. In the '*Guesses at Truth*,' amid more of enthusiastic eulogy, and more, too, of earnest and reluctant censure than I have room to quote, '*The Broad Stone of Honour*' is spoken of as "a book, fitted, above almost all others, to inspire youthful minds with the feelings befitting a Christian gentleman," and as "rich in magnanimous and holy thoughts, and in tales of honour and of piety. . . . The author identifies himself, as few have ever

done, with the good, and great, and heroic, and holy in former times, and ever rejoices in passing out of himself into them: he loves to utter his thoughts and feelings in their words, rather than his own: and the saints, and philosophers, and warriors of old join in swelling the sacred consort which rises heavenward from his pages. Nevertheless, it is not a book which can be recommended without hesitation to the young. The very charm which it is sure to exercise over them, hightens one's scruples about doing so. For in it the author has come forward as a convert and champion of the Romish Church, and as the implacable enemy of Protestantism. . . He culls the choicest and noblest stories out of fifteen centuries,—and not merely out of history, but out of poetry and romance,—and the purest and sublimest morsels of the great religious writers between the time of the Apostles and the Reformation: and this magnificent spiritual hierarchy he sets before us as a living and trustworthy picture of what the Ages of Faith, as he terms them, actually were. On the other hand, shutting his eyes to what is great and holy in later times, he picks out divers indications of baseness, unbelief, pusillanimity, and worldlymindedness, as portraying what Europe has become, owing to the dissolution of the unity of the Church.”—p. 206.

* * * “The present time is distinguished beyond any that have preceded it, not merely by the neglect, but by the dislike of antiquity. All the world appears bent upon ‘laying again the foundation’ of all things. Customary usage, far from being a recommendation, is taken as argument either of folly or of fraud. To plead length of prescription in favour of an existing practice, or an established right, is to confess that no better reason can be urged in its defence. A remote origin affords, it is argued, a presumption, not in favour of a given institution, but against it; because length of years are likely to have occasioned a change of circumstances, and what may have been right and fitting long ago, can hardly fail of being obsolete and unsuitable now.

“Thus, whatever is ancient is presumed to be antiquated, more especially in an enlightened age, preceded by centuries of comparative darkness, when the human mind, freeing itself from the restraints by which it was formerly fettered, has sprung forward with

a sudden and unexampled bound. That such has been for some time the tone of public feeling, is testified, not only in the course of political events, or in the conduct of a political party, but in the literature, habits, and manners of the people at large. It may be regarded as a moving principle in the formation of popular opinion ; a principle sometimes nearly dormant, and overborne by a dead weight of custom ; sometimes nicely balanced by counter influences, and tending to progressive improvement ; sometimes acquiring a rapid and uncontrollable development, and menacing total destruction.

“That this way of thinking, like every other that obtains widely and forcibly among mankind, has a side of truth, and when properly limited, has been productive of good ; nay, that at certain periods it has been usefully called forth into unusual energy in the service of religion, need not be denied : but that, as at present exhibited, it is mischievous, extravagant, and unreasonable, is felt by all sober-minded persons, and scarcely requires proof.

“And, first, it greatly overestimates, not merely the superiority of the present over past ages, in substantial wisdom, and that knowledge, of whatever kind, upon which it is founded, but even the difference in kind, existing between our times and those of our ancestors. It is not asserted that there has been no advance in useful knowledge, or that no real variation in the actual state of things has taken place, but only that the *degree* is vastly overrated.

“In regard to the first, the supposed superiority of the present age, the mistake arises in various ways. A part of knowledge, perhaps the least important, is put for the whole. No balance is struck between what is gained in one department, and what is lost in another. The worthiness of the end pursued is not considered in determining the value of the means. Thus science, the doctrine of means, usurps the place of philosophy, the doctrine of ultimate ends. The economy of wealth is taken as the measure of national welfare ; legislation passes for jurisprudence. So again, the study of nature may have flourished, the study of mind may have drooped ; the arts of life may have advanced, domestic wisdom may have lost ground ; education may have been diffused, scholastic learning may have declined. All our gains are counted, but our losses are not set against them. And again, personal comfort, convenience, or

luxury, mental or bodily, is openly proposed, not only as the best, but as the only object of intellectual pursuit ; whereas formerly, the search of truth was supposed to bring its own recompense. Thus a lower end is substituted for a higher ; and by overstating the claims of our fellow-creatures, once too much neglected in these studies, we forget the more sublime relation between the human spirit and the God who gave it. The effect which has resulted to the religion of the day is very striking, and far from unmingled good. It is the recoil of monastic piety in matters of devotion, as of monastic philosophy in the pursuit of intellect." * * *

"In a word, the contempt of antiquity, so commonly manifested, places the age in a false position, more especially in ecclesiastical affairs. A single generation is drawn up in array against all that have preceded it, and has to make good its pretensions, not only with no assistance from the great and good men that 'sleep in the Lord,' but against their united forces. Covenant is broken with the mighty dead ; and they, whose everliving wisdom, whether it speak to us in books, or yet more impressively in the institutions which they have contributed to form, to sanction, to improve, are set aside to make room for the new, capricious, dogmatical, untried authorities of the day ; for partial interests, sectarian prejudice, and temporary fashion ; for the despotic sway and idolatrous worship of the present ; as if there were neither voice nor vision in the oracular past."

DERWENT COLERIDGE : '*Scriptural Character of the Church*,' p. 80.

* * "Far from adopting an opinion which was prevalent at least till very recently, that the questions which occupied the schools were trivial, senseless, and now wholly obsolete, we think it is difficult to overrate their intrinsic value, or the influence which they are exercising upon ourselves at the present moment. The persons who use the words Ontology or Nominalism and Realism with a sneer, little know how much those difficulties of which Ontology treats are besetting their own path ; with what vehemence the controversy between Nominalism and Realism is carried on within their own minds and in the minds of all about them. We do not gain much by speaking contemptuously of our progenitors ; we only contrive that we should suffer all the perplexities which they suf-

ferred without the same consciousness of them which they had, and without their help in extricating ourselves from them. The mistake has been owing, we fancy, in a great measure to a confused apprehension that the schools and the world have in all times, and had at this time especially, very little to do with each other. The fashion of scorning the active life of the middle ages is passing away; nay, is just at present giving place to a sentimental admiration. Men have discovered that something was done in this so-called dark time which we in our bright time could not well dispense with. But unless the speculative life of that period, besides obtaining the courteous treatment which it is likely to meet with under such a reaction, be viewed in connection with this practical life and shown to be inseparable from it, there is no chance, we think, of either being dealt with clearly and justly. A history which should do this would far more effectually expose the real evils of the middle ages, and show whence those evils flowed, than all vehement party declamations against them, which being written without sympathy for the right, are very seldom successful in detecting the wrong."

* * p. 640.

* * "Through terrible conflicts, in spite of fearful sins, this age (of the schoolmen) had been really effecting its work, and was to leave imperishable tokens for the generations to come. The first period after Christianity had left the form of a universal polity; had left ordinances, creeds, ecclesiastical institutions, the witnesses of this universal polity, the powers by which it was upheld, and by which men were enabled to possess and enjoy its benefits; it had left records of the oppositions through which transcendent and universal truths had been maintained and confirmed; it had left a literature connecting itself with the former literature of the world, and showing that what therein had been foretold or wished for had come to pass. If these deposits remained and remain to this day, is it not equally true that those middle ages have left their deposits? National societies grown up from infancy to manhood; the forms of law established; languages created and defined; new forms invented in which the conceptions of men could clothe themselves--forms of architecture, of poetry, and finally of painting; last, and we are bound to say not least, the full power and dimensions of the logical faculty in man ascertained by a series of precious experi

ments determining what it can and what it cannot achieve. For let no one say that the scholastic philosophy is obsolete in its effects, because the volumes which contain it are seldom read, and because it has been found to have failed in much that it hoped to do. Not the feeblest newspaper scribe, who writes praises of the nineteenth century, and talks about the discoveries of Bacon, and the vain squabbles by which men were distracted till his time, could cast even these empty phrases into a coherent and intelligible shape, if those schoolmen whom he abuses had not lived. As truly as we owe our laws and ecclesiastical buildings to the middle ages, so truly do we owe to them our forms of thought and language. We are very unhappy if we have not learnt much since that time, and we shall presently have to show in what direction that learning has been won. But in fixing the terms and conditions of human thought, we are bold to say, that men have only done any thing by going back to these schoolmen, and using the fresh light that may have fallen upon us to the more effectual consideration of the questions which they raised.

“When one reflects on these facts, men may surely be well content that what is called the revival of letters came when it did, and not four or five centuries earlier. Most sad would it have been for the world, if the western nations, instead of being left to work out a cultivation for themselves with only such helps from ancient lore as best suited the thoughts which were awakening in them, had been overlaid with heaps of books, in which their circumstances gave them no interest, which they could not interpret livingly, and which would therefore have crushed all sparks of native and original speculation. When that revival did come, the inhabitants of western Europe were in some way prepared for it—prepared at least, by their own sense of a national position, to enter into the national feelings, and the thoughts and inquiries accompanying them, whereof Grecian books are the exposition.” * * * p. 64.”

‘*Encyclopædia Metropolitana*,’ vol. ii. of ‘*Pure Sciences* :’ ‘*Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*,’ by the Rev. FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE, Professor of English Literature and History, in King’s College London.

“ * * In dealing with ancient institutions which appear to have lost their efficacy, there are two courses. The narrow-minded, the

men of mere practical understanding, without imagination to call up those manifold relations which lie beyond the span of the understanding,—they who see one thing clearly and distinctly, and who straightway conclude that it is the only thing to be seen, who walk between two high walls, and suppose that the whole world is included between them,—they who have no reverence for antiquity, no faith in a higher spirit guiding and shaping the actions of men, and pervading their institutions,—they who trust in their own wisdom and in their own will, and who desire to see that wisdom and that will reflected in every thing around them,—will destroy the decayed institution as worthless to set up some creation of their own in its stead. They on the other hand who have learnt to distrust their own wisdom, and to suspect their will,—who have discovered the limits of their faculties, and how narrow they are,—who have perceived how far the largest part of what is valuable in their minds is owing to the unnoticed influences of the thoughts and principles and institutions amid which they have grown up,—they who have discerned that in nations also, and in other bodies corporate, there is a kind of instinct, whereby they seek and assimilate what is suitable and healthful, rejecting what is noxious,—who have discerned that in nations also ‘the child is father of the man,’ and that the only sure progress of national life lies in expansion and transfiguration, not in transmigration,—will always be anxious to preserve the institutions which their fathers have left them, not however in their worn-out, dilapidated state, but restored to completeness and vigour, with a new spirit of life kindled in them.”

Archdeacon JULIUS CHARLES HARE's 'Charge.' 1840.

LECTURE VIII.

WE have now for some time been engaged in analyzing the statements of history, in order to the more clear understanding of them ; and particularly we have been considering the forms of political party in our own country, with a view to discover what in them has been accidental and what essential. I have assumed certain facts as unquestionably true, and have made them the groundwork of what I have said, either to account for them, or to point out their consequences. But what are we to say, if these facts themselves are disputed ; if we are taunted with the known exaggerations and falsehoods of human testimony ; with the difficulties surrounding all investigation of human actions, even if most ably and fairly conducted ; and with the many defects of individual writers, which have made them, as investigators, neither able nor fair ? Or are these objections to be met by saying, that although the truth relating to past ages be difficult to discover, yet that contemporary history is at any rate entitled to confidence ; that men cannot misrepresent in the face of detection ; that in this case truth may be discovered, and cannot but be declared ? Or is any other answer to be given, maintaining any other criterion ; or shall we be obliged to confess the unsoundness of all our goodly fabric ; and to compare historical deductions, however logical, to the elephant in the well-known apologue, which rested upon a tortoise, and the tortoise rested upon a stone, and the stone rested upon nothing ?

The question now before us is clearly of considerable im-

portance. If historical testimony be really worth nothing, it touches us in one of the very divinest parts of our nature, the power of connecting ourselves with the past. For this we do and can do only through knowledge which we must call historical. Without such knowledge, what would the ancient buildings of this place be but monuments more unmeaning than the Pictish towers of Scotland and Ireland? They would not tell their own story alone; they would only show that they were not new, and by examining their stones we might tell out of what quarries it had been hewn: but as to all that constitutes their real charm, as representing to us first the times of their founders, and then with wonderful rapidity the successive ages which have since passed, amidst how different a world their inmates have, generation after generation, trod their courts, and studied in their chambers, and worshipped in their chapels,—all this would be utterly lost to us. Our life would be at once restricted to the span of our own memory; nay, I might almost say, to the span of our own actual consciousness. For if no other man's report of the past is to be credited, I know not how we can defend the very reports of our own memories. They, too, unquestionably are fallible; they, too, very often are perplexed by vague or conflicting recollections; we cannot tell whether we remember or no; nor whether we remember correctly. And if this extreme scepticism be, as it clearly is, absurd even to insanity, yet we want to know what abatements are to be made from it; where it not only ceases to be insane, but becomes reasonable and true; there being no question at all that we have been often deceived with false accounts of the past; that human testimony is the testimony of those who are often deceived, who often endeavour to deceive, and who perhaps more often still are both in the one predicament and the other; not loving truth sincerely, and at the same time really unable to discern it.

Now, in an inquiry into the credibility of history in the largest sense of the word, the first question which we will consider is, whether any composition bearing more or less of an historical form, be really historical or no, in the intention of its author. For if it be not, then if we accept it ignorantly as such, we are in the condition of those persons on whom a trick has been played; our belief has in it something ludicrous, like theirs who innocently fall into a mischievous boy's snare on the first of April; and although in this case there was probably no mischief intended, yet that makes our mistake only the more ridiculous, if we went wrong when no one endeavoured to mislead us. Conceive one of the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott surviving alone amongst its companions to some very remote age, when the greatest part of our literature should have perished, and all knowledge of Scott as a novelist should be utterly lost. Suppose that of all his numerous works there should exist only his *Life of Napoleon*, *Paul's Letters to his Kinsfolk*, and his novel of *Woodstock*. Conceive posterity taking all the three works as equally historical; in the one, it might be said we have an elaborate narrative, in a regular historical form, of the life of the Emperor Napoleon; in the second we have a most lively account of the principal events of his second reign, given in letters written at the time and from the very scene of action; while in the third we have a narrative, taken probably from some ancient chronicle, and therefore much more dramatic and more full of minute details, of some passages in the life of Charles the Second, including the story of his wonderful concealment and escape after the battle of Worcester. It would then be received as fact, that Charles, after his escape from the battle, was sheltered and concealed at Woodstock, and that Cromwell himself came down to Woodstock, and, guided by the information of a pretended royalist, had nearly succeeded in surprising him.

There is nothing in the book, it would be urged, that declares it to be a fiction ; it is a narrative about real historical persons ; why should we doubt its accuracy ? So men might argue, and might be led into a mistake which to us appears altogether ridiculous, because we know that Woodstock is a novel ; but which is not at all inconceivable in those who centuries afterwards should find it in company with other works of the same author, which they supposed equally to be historical, and one of which in fact is so. Now there are times and writings in which all narrative bears more or less the character of an historical novel ; it may contain truth, and often does so : but this is merely accidental ; the writer's object is merely to amuse, and whether his story happens to be authentic or not gives him no sort of concern. Sometimes there seems to be absolutely an intention to mislead the simple reader ; not a malicious or fraudulent intention, for any grave ends of falsehood, but, as appears, only for the mere joke's sake ; for the pleasure of imposing on the unsuspecting. Now, wherever this spirit may at all be supposed to exist, we are completely falling into the writer's trap if we really take him at his word, as if he were in earnest ; and our error is not less, if, not understanding the character of narration, whether in verse or prose, at the particular period, or in writers of a certain sort, we conceive exactness of fact to be its object, instead of amusement, or possibly some moral or religious lesson which the story was framed to inculcate. And therefore our first question with respect to a story or narrative should be, was the writer in earnest or in jest ? and if in earnest, was he in earnest as to the facts or as to the moral conveyed by the facts ? For he may have been very earnest indeed as a poet, or as a moral teacher, or as inculcating some deep religious truth under a symbolical veil, and yet not at all in earnest as a matter-of-fact historian. This question is one of great im-

portance to put, and unhappily it is not always easy to find the answer to it.

You will see where the difficulty lies, if you consider the case which I supposed, of some future age mistaking Woodstock for an authentic history. We do not mistake it, chiefly I think for certain external reasons; that it is published as a novel, and has always been received as such; and farther, because we are familiar with many other works of the same sort, so that the notion of an historical novel is one which readily occurs to us. But ancient books do not tell us the story of their publication; we do not know how they were received by their original readers, nor are specimens of the literature of the time sufficiently numerous to enable us to conceive readily what form they would be likely to assume. It does not seem possible, therefore, always to have a sure criterion whether a given narrative be historical or no; or at any rate, to have such a criterion as may be applied by ordinary readers; such as is palpable and tangible, or to use the German expression, *handgreiflich*. A criterion there is indeed, not of course unerring, yet generally to be relied upon, in the instinctive tact of those who are much conversant with the narratives of early times, and with the character of undoubted history, and who feel at once where they have history, and where they have poetry, or apologue, or allegory, or a story careless of fact and aiming only at truth, or it may be, seeking neither fact nor truth, but simply to amuse and astonish its readers. This feeling in a sensible man is, I believe, very much to be relied upon; but you cannot justify it to those who dispute it; you cannot establish it upon tangible evidence, appreciable by the ignorant no less than by the wise.

For the greater part of modern history, however, the question which we have now been considering will not give us any trouble. Yet it presents itself, I think, in some of the

ecclesiastical biographies, where we find not unfrequently grotesque touches, to say nothing of other matters, such as leave great room for doubting whether their authors ever meant them to be taken as simple matter-of-fact narratives. The human mind so shrinks from undisguised and unpalliated falsehood, that it is generally safer as well as more charitable, when we are reading a narrative which it is impossible to believe, to suppose that the writer himself did not mean it to be taken seriously ; regarding the facts at best as the ornament, or, if you will, as a sort of conventional expression of what he did believe to be a truth, namely, the sanctity of the subject of his biography. We may call this, if we will, a species of pious fraud ; but at any rate, its guilt is much less than it would be now, inasmuch as it would not be equally regarded as a bringing forward false evidence to establish a conclusion. The moment that facts come to be regarded in the light of essential evidence, without which our conclusion falls, then all tampering with or exaggerating them is a gross fraud, to be condemned with no qualification whatever. (1) But I should doubt whether the spirit of the well-known story of the man who, when told that the facts were wholly at variance with his theory, replied, *Tant pis pour les faits*, was not very generally prevalent before the time of Bacon, in more matters than in natural philosophy. (2) Principles of science were assumed on *a priori* reasoning ; and opinions in theology were held in the same manner, not indeed upon reasoning of any kind so much as upon authority, but yet independently of any supposed proof to be looked for from particular miracles. This consideration is perhaps worth attending to, as it may in some measure account for a carelessness as to the truth of facts which otherwise would be merely scandalous ; and allows us to qualify as fictions what we otherwise should be obliged to call falsehoods.

Passing on, then, to narratives which propose to be histori

cal, that is, where stress is understood to be laid upon the facts, and it is the writer's avowed object to represent these faithfully, and we ask under what circumstances and to what degree can we maintain their credibility. And first, let us consider what are the claims of a writer upon our belief, merely on the strength of his being contemporary with the events which he relates.

That a contemporary writer cannot avoid giving us some correct and valuable impressions of his times, is evident. For such points of detail as an antiquarian delights in, he may be fully relied upon; and he himself is at any rate an authentic portrait; his own mind, with its peculiar leanings, his own language, with its peculiar style and forms of words, these must certainly be drawn faithfully, because drawn unconsciously; and we cannot doubt their witness. But beyond this, and for historical facts properly so called, the value of a contemporary historian is often greatly overrated. No man sees the whole of his own times, any more than an officer in action sees the whole of the battle. Some are too busy to contemplate society in all its relations; others are too abstracted from it altogether. With regard to public events, ordinary men are but in a very slight degree witnesses of them: the councils of governments, the secret springs of parties, are known only to a few; military and naval events take place publicly indeed, but often at a great distance, and though they may happen in our time, yet our knowledge of them only comes from the reports of others. Again, it should be remembered, that many things which we have seen and heard we forget afterwards: that although we were contemporary with the events which took place ten years ago, yet that we are not perhaps contemporary with them when we relate them; even what we ourselves said and did is no longer present to us; our witness is that of one living after the event. (3) To this must be added disadvan-

ages which are generally recognised ; the livelier state of passion to which a contemporary is liable, the veil hanging over many characters and over the causes of many actions which only after-ages will see removed. So that on the whole, it is by no means sufficient to know that a history was written by a contemporary : it may have been so, and yet may be of very little value ; full of idle reports and unexamined stories, giving the first obvious view of things, which a little more observation would have shown to be far from the true one.

Ascending a step higher, and supposing an historian to be not merely contemporary with the events which he relates, but an actual witness of them, his credibility no doubt becomes much greater. We must distinguish, however, between what I may call an active and a passive witness. I call a passive witness one who was present, but took no part in the actions described ; as for instance, Edward the Fourth's chaplain, who has left us an account of King Edward's landing in England after Warwick had obliged him to fly, of his march towards London, and of the decisive battle of Barnet. This is a witness in the lowest degree, from which we ascend, according as the direct interest and share in the transactions related is greater, up to the highest sort of witness ; namely, the main agent and director of the actions. Here we have knowledge as nearly perfect as possible ; a full understanding of the action in all its bearings, a view of its different parts in connection with each other ; and a clear perception and recollection of each, because our knowledge of one helps us to remember another, and because we ourselves directed them. And thus in the case of Cæsar and the Emperor Napoleon we have witnesses, to whose knowledge of the actions which they relate, nothing, as it seems, could be added. Yet we should not be justified in viewing the Commentaries of the one or the Memoirs of the other as

perfectly trustworthy histories; on the contrary, few narratives require to be read with more constant and vigilant suspicion. For unhappily a knowledge of the truth does not imply an intention of uttering it; it may be, on the contrary, that he who knows perfectly the real state of the case should find it to his interest to represent it altogether differently, and his knowledge then does but enable him to misrepresent more artfully. And as in the infirmity of human nature no man's actions are always what he likes to look back upon, as there are points in which he would wish that he had acted otherwise; so every man who tells his own story is under a temptation more or less to disguise the truth: and the more, in proportion as his actions have been upon a larger scale, and his faults or mistakes therefore have been more flagrant. Yet do we not lose entirely the benefit of a writer's knowledge, even when his honesty is most questionable. He who always can tell the truth when he has a mind to do so, will tell it very often, because in a great many instances he has no conceivable interest in departing from it. Thus Cæsar's descriptions of countries have always been held to be of high value; for in them we have all the benefit of his intelligence, with nothing to be deducted on account of his want of principle. And so again in relating his own military conduct, as it was mostly so admirable that to relate it most truly was to praise it most eloquently, his knowledge gives us every thing that we can desire. The same may be said of Napoleon: his sketch of the geography of Syria, and of that of Italy, his account of Egypt, and his detail of his proceedings at the siege of Toulon, are all most excellent. The latter in particular, his account of the siege of Toulon, is a complete specimen of what is valuable and what is suspicious in his narratives. His description of the topography of Toulon, and of his own views in recommending the attack on Fort Malbosquet, as the point where the enemy's operations might

be impeded most effectually, is all clear and admirable ; but his statement of the enemy's force in Fort Malbosquet, and of the assault itself, is to be regarded with suspicion ; because his object not being truth, but his own glory, he never puts himself for an instant in the place of an impartial spectator, to consider what were the disadvantages of his enemy, but rather is inclined to exaggerate and multiply all his advantages, in order to represent the victory over him as more honourable. (4)

Thus neither is perfect knowledge a guarantee for entire trustworthiness. Still let us consider for how much it is a guarantee, namely, for truth in all indifferent matters, indifferent I mean to the writer or to his party ; and for much truth easily to be discerned from its colourings, in matters that concern him nearly. And so again, a writer's nearness to the times of which he treats is a warrant, not for his complete trustworthiness, but yet for accurate painting of the outsides of things, at any rate ; he cannot help telling us much that we can depend on, whatever be his own personal qualifications. So in all historians, the mere outline of events is generally credible, and speaking of modern history, we can always also, or almost always, trust to the dates. We get everywhere therefore a certain portion of truth, only more or less corrupted ; but what we want to know is, whether there be any qualification in an historian which will give us more than this ; which will enable us to trust to him all but implicitly ; without any one positive deduction from his credibility, but merely with an acknowledgment that being human he is therefore fallible, and that if sufficient reasons exist for doubting his authority in any one point, we should not insist at all hazards on maintaining it.

Now this one great qualification in an historian is an earnest craving after truth, and utter impatience not of falsehood merely but of error. This is a very different thing, be

it observed, from a mere absence of dishonesty or partiality. Many minds like the truth a great deal better than falsehood when the two are set before them; they will tell a story fairly with great pleasure, if it be told fairly to them. But not being impatient and intolerant of error, they suffer it to exist undiscovered when no one points it out to them: not having a deep craving after truth they rest easily satisfied with truth's counterfeit. This is the ἀταλαιπωρία πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς ἀληθείας of which Thucydides complains so truly, and which, far more than active dishonesty, is the source of most of the error that prevails in the world. (5) And this fault in some degree is apt to beset us all; for it is with truth as with goodness, none of us love it so heartily as to be at all times ready to take any pains to arrive at it, as to question its counterfeit when it wears an aspect of plausibility. For example, there is a story which has become famous all over Europe, repeated from one historian to another, and from one country to another, which is yet totally untrue. I mean the famous story of the crew of the French ship *Le Vengeur* in the action of the first of June, 1794, refusing to strike their colours, and fighting their ship till she went down, and at the very moment that she was sinking shouting with one voice, *Vive la République!* Even Mr. Carlyle repeated this story in his history of the French Revolution, and I have seen it within the last month in a very able German* work published only last year, given as a remarkable instance of the heroism of the French sailors no less than of their soldiers during the war of the Revolution. Not for one moment would I deny the conclusion; the heroic defence of the *Guillaume Tell* against a British squadron off Malta in 1800, and of the *Redoutable* in the battle of Trafalgar, throw a glory on the courage of French seamen, which needs not to be heightened.

* Der zweite Punische Krieg und der Kriegsplan der Carthager. Von Ludwig, Freiherrn von Vincke. Berlin, 1841.

by apocryphal instances of their self-devotion. But when Mr. Carlyle's book appeared, one of the surviving British officers who were in the action of the first of June wrote to him to assure him that the story was wholly without foundation. Upon this Mr. Carlyle commenced a careful inquiry into it, and the point which is encouraging is this, that although the story related to an event nearly fifty years old, still the means were found, when sought, of effectually disproving it; for the official letter of the French captain of *Le Vengeur* to the Committee of Public Safety still exists, and on reference to it, it appeared that it was written on board of a British ship; that the *Vengeur* had struck,* and that her captain and some of her men had been removed out of her, and some British seamen sent on board to take possession. She sank, it is true, and many of her crew were lost in her; but she sank as a British prize, and the British party who had taken possession of her were unhappily lost in her also. The fictitious statement was merely one of Barrere's accustomed flourishes, inserted by him in his report of the action, and from thence copied by French writers first, and afterwards by foreigners. Now here was a case where the truth was found with perfect ease as soon as it was sought after; and the story might have been suspected from the quarter in which it originally appeared, as also from its internal character; for although cases of the most heroic self-devotion in war are nothing strange or suspicious, yet there was a theatrical display about

* It so happened that I had been myself aware of the falsehood of the common story for many years, and was sorry to see it repeated by Mr. Carlyle in his *History of the French Revolution*. It is more than thirty years since I read a MS. account of the part taken by H. M. S. Brunswick, Captain John Harvey, in the action of the first of June. The account was drawn up by one of the surviving officers of the Brunswick, Captain Harvey having been mortally wounded in the action, and was in the possession of Captain Harvey's family. It was very circumstantial, and as the *Vengeur* was particularly engaged with the Brunswick, it necessarily described her fate, and effectually contradicted the story invented by Barrere.

this story which did call for examination. And as in this instance,* so it is I think generally : that where there is not merely a willingness to receive the truth, but a real earnest desire to discover it, the truth may almost surely be found.

I suppose then that what is wanted to constitute a trustworthy historian, is such an active impatience of error and desire of truth. And it will be seen at once that these qualities are intellectual as well as moral, and are as incompatible with great feebleness of mind as they are with dishonesty. For a feeble mind, and the same holds good also of an ignorant mind, is by no means impatient of error, because it does not readily suspect it ; it may reject it when it is made to notice it, but otherwise it suffers it patiently and confounds it with truth. Now if this love of truth will make a trustworthy historian, so it will enable us no less to judge of what is trustworthy history ; and to suspect error on the one hand, and to appreciate truth on the other ; and if it will not enable us to discover what the truth is, supposing that it has nowhere been given, for then it can only be discovered by direct historical researches of our own, yet to miss the truth where it really is not, is in itself no mean knowledge, and the same

* The interest which we all feel in every thing relating to Nelson will be a sufficient excuse for my inserting in this place a correction of a statement in Southey's *Life of him*, which, as there given, imputes a very unworthy and childish vanity to him, of which on that particular occasion he was wholly innocent. It is said that Nelson wore on the day of the action of Trafalgar, "his admiral's frock coat, bearing on the left breast four stars," that his officers wished to speak to him on the subject, but were afraid to do so, knowing that it was useless ; he having said on a former occasion, when requested to change his dress or to cover his stars, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." The truth is, that Nelson wore on the day of Trafalgar the same coat which he had commonly worn for weeks, on which the order of the Bath was embroidered, as was then usual. Sir Thomas Hardy did notice it to him, observing that he was afraid the badge might be marked by the enemy ; to which Nelson replied, "that he was aware of that, but that it was too late then to shift a coat." This account rests on the authority of Sir Thomas Hardy, from whom it was heard by Captain Smyth, and by him communicated to me.

power which enables us to do this will enable us also, to a considerable degree, to discern where the truth lies hid, if we have not ourselves the time or the opportunity to bring it to light.

First of all then, in estimating whether any history is trustworthy or no, I should not ask whether it was written by a contemporary, or by one engaged in the transactions which it describes, but whether it was written by one who loves the truth with all his heart, and cannot endure error. For such a one, we may be sure, would never attempt to write a history if he had no means of writing it truly; and therefore although distant in time or place, or both, from the events which he describes, yet we may be satisfied that he had sources of good information at his command, or else that he would never have written at all.

Such an historian is not indeed infallible, or exempt from actual error, but yet he is deserving of the fullest confidence in his general narrative; to be believed safely, unless we happen to have very strong reasons for doubting him in any one particular point. But such historians are in the highest degree rare; and the question practically is, how can we supply their want, and by the same qualities of mind in ourselves, can extract a trustworthy history from that which in itself is not completely trustworthy; setting aside the rubbish and fastening upon the fragments of precious stone which may be mixed up with it. Let the historian be whoever he may, and if he does not appear to belong to the class of those who are essentially trustworthy, let us subject him to some such examination as the following.

His date, his country, and the circumstances of his life, may be easily learned from a common biographical dictionary; and though these points are not of the greatest importance of all, yet they are useful as intimating what particular influences we may suspect to have been at work

upon his mind, and where therefore we should be particularly upon our guard. But the main thing to look to is of course his work itself. Here the very style gives us an impression by no means to be despised. If it is very heavy and cumbrous, it indicates either a dull man, or a pompous man, or at least a slow and awkward man; if it be tawdry and full of commonplaces enunciated with great solemnity, the writer is most likely a silly man; if it be highly antithetical, and full of unusual expressions, or artificial ways of stating a plain thing, the writer is clearly an affected man. If it be plain and simple, always clear, but never eloquent, the writer may be a very sensible man, but is too hard and dry to be a very great man. If, on the other hand, it is always eloquent, rich in illustrations, full of animation, but too uniformly so, and without the relief of simple and quiet passages, we must admire the writer's genius in a very high degree, but we may fear that he is too continually excited to have attained to the highest wisdom; for that is necessarily calm. (6) In this manner the mere language of an historian will furnish us with something of a key to his mind, and will tell us, or at least give us cause to presume, in what his main strength lies, and in what he is deficient. (7)

The style of a book impresses us immediately; but proceeding to the matter, it is of importance to observe from what sources the historian has derived his information. This we ought always to be able to discover, by looking at the authorities referred to in the margin or at the bottom of the page; it is a most unpardonable fault if these are omitted. We should consider these authorities as to quantity and quality; as to quantity, for if they are but few, we may feel sure that the historian's knowledge is meagre: the materials for modern history are ample, and if only a few out of so many have been consulted, the historian is not equal to his task.

Consider the richness and variety of Gibbon's references, and of Niebuhr's even more, when we know how few the obvious sources were for the period with which he was engaged. (8) Then as to quality, we should observe, first, whether they consist of writers of one country or of several, of all the countries, that is, to which the history directly relates; secondly, whether they consist of historians only, or whether more miscellaneous sources of information have been referred to; thirdly, what is the character of the authorities most relied on. Are they really the best that could have been found or no? and if they are, then what are their particular qualities and tendencies? was the historian aware of these, and on his guard against them, or no? By this process we shall be enabled to estimate the depth and richness of our historian's knowledge, and also in some measure his judgment as shown in the choice of his authorities, and in his appreciation of their just value, knowing where they might be trusted implicitly and where suspected.

We may now carry our judgment a little farther, by examining an historian in greater detail; by observing him as a military historian, we will say, as an historian of political contests, as an historian of church matters, and so on. In military history, for instance, there is first the question, Is he a good geographer? for if not, he cannot be a good military historian. (9) Next let us observe his temper; Does he love exaggerations, does he give us accounts of a handful of men defeating a multitude; is one side always victorious and always heroic, is the other always defeated, always cruel, or blundering, or cowardly? (10) Or is he an unbeliever in all heroism, a man who brings every thing down to the level of a common mediocrity; to whose notions, soldiers care for nothing but pay or plunder, and war is an expensive folly, with no fruit but an empty glory? (11) Depend upon it that he truth has not been found by writers of either of these two

classes. And so in political history. Is the historian a master of his science, can he separate the perpetual from the temporary, the essential from the accidental ; in the strife of parties, does he understand the game or describe the moves at random ? Party partialities, if they do not agree with our own, we are apt enough to suspect, and even to exaggerate ; but do we rightly know what partiality is ? Do we confound a decided preference for one cause above another, with a misrepresentation of the acts and characters of the men engaged ; and think that a writer cannot be impartial unless he is really ignorant or indifferent ? It is partiality if our love of the cause blind us to the faults of its supporters, or our hatred of the cause make us unjust to the virtues of its advocates. But it is not partiality to say that the support of a bad cause is itself evil, the support of a good cause is itself good. It is not partiality to say, that the self-same political acts, as for example acts of sovereign power exercised beyond the ordinary law, are, according to the cause for which they are done, either to be justified or condemned ; and the actor is to be justified or condemned personally, according to the cause for which he acted, and the purity of his own motives in acting, as shown by his subsequent conduct. Of course this does not in the least degree apply to actions morally wrong, such as falsehood, or individual injustice, or cruelty ; for to make the end justify such, were to hold that evil may be done that good may come. But in political actions the moral character of the act depends mainly on the object and motive of it ; the written law may yield to the higher unwritten law, but not to selfish tyranny or injustice. Undoubtedly in such cases the temptations to the actor and to the historian are obvious ; injustice in deed and in judgment lie with both close at the door. Nevertheless if there be such a thing as political truth, a good and an evil in the internal contests of parties, it seems certain that what would

pretend to be impartiality is very often ignorance or indifference, and that an historian may be called partial by the vulgar, when he is in fact only seeing more clearly and weighing more evenly the respective claims of truth and falsehood, good and evil. (12)

Such an examination will enable us, I think, sometimes to discover with certainty, and always to suspect with probability, where an historian's narrative is untrustworthy. And where it seems to be so, there we should compare it with some other narrative, written, if it may be, by an author of opinions very unlike those of our first historian. If the suspected defect relate to some particular matter of fact, then to check it is of course easy ; if it consist in general meagerness or poverty of information, another history by a different writer will most probably make up its deficiencies ; if it consist in a wrong and narrow judgment of the whole state of things described, an opposite view may in part at least correct this also. But it should be remembered that for the mere outline of events, which is all that we need for many portions of history, all historians are trustworthy ; the difficulty does but relate to details, and occurs therefore but rarely ; for, as I have said before, it is absolutely impossible to study the mass of history in detail, we must be contented to know the mere heads of it, and to reserve minute inquiries into it for the time when we shall have some particular call to study it.

After all, history presents to many minds an unsatisfactory aspect, because it is a perpetual study of particulars, without any certainly acknowledged law ; and though our knowledge of general laws may here, as well as in natural science, be drawn from an induction of particular instances, yet it is not in natural science required of every student to go through this process for himself ; the laws have been found out for him by others, and to these his attention is

directed. Whereas in history, the laws of the science are kept out of sight, perhaps are not known, and he is turned adrift, as it were, on a wide sea, to navigate it as he best can, and take his own soundings and make his own surveys.

Now allowing the great beauty and interest of history as a series of particular pictures, not *by* any means barren in matter for reflection, but in the highest degree rich and instructive ; transcending all the most curious details of natural history, in the ratio of man's superiority over the brute creation ; yet I think that we must confess and deplore that its scientific character has not been yet sufficiently made out ; there hangs an uncertainty about its laws which to most persons is very perplexing. Why is it for example that we here, holding in common, as we certainly do, our principles of religious and moral truth, should yet regard political questions so differently ? that the history of our own great civil war, for instance, reads to different persons so different a lesson, so that we cannot touch upon it without being sure to encounter a strong opposition to whatever opinions we may maintain respecting it ? (13) It is very true that some of this opposition may arise from simple ignorance, and then the study of the history may modify or remove it ; but let a man read, if it be possible, every existing document relating to the facts of those times, and is it quite certain that his conclusions will be precisely the same with those of another man who may have gone through the same process ? History, therefore, does not seem to be sufficient to the right understanding of itself ; its laws, which, as it seems, ought to be established from its facts, appear, even with a full knowledge of the facts before us, to be yet infinitely disputable.

I confess that if I believed them to be as really disputable as they have been disputed, the pain of such a conviction would be most grievous to bear. I am firmly persuaded, on

the contrary, that setting out with those views of man which we find in the Scriptures, and with those plain moral notions which the Scriptures do not so much teach as suppose to exist in us, and sanction; the laws of history, in other words, the laws of political science, using "political" in the most exalted sense of the term, as expressing the highest πολιτικὴ of the Greek philosophers, may be deduced, or, if you will, may be confirmed from it with perfect certainty, with a certainty equal to that of the most undoubted truths of morals. (14). And if in this or in any former lectures I have seemed to express or to imply a very firm conviction on points which I well know to be warmly disputed, it is because these laws being to my own mind absolutely certain, the lessons of any particular portion of history, supposing that the facts are known to us, appear to be certain also; and daily experience can scarcely remove my wonder at finding they do not appear so to others.

That they do not appear so, however, is undoubtedly a phenomenon to be accounted for. And hard as it is, almost I think impossible, to doubt conclusions which seem both in the way by which we arrived at them originally, and in their consistency with one another, and in their offering a key to all manner of difficulties, and in their never having met with any objection which we could not readily answer, to command absolutely our mind's assent; still I allow, that if they convinced no minds but ours, or if being generally disputed or doubted, we could in no way account satisfactorily for the fact of such a doubt respecting them, we should be driven to the extremity of scepticism; truth would appear indeed to be a thing utterly unreal or utterly unattainable. Now on the contrary, what appear to me to be the laws of history, contain in them no single paradox; there is no step in the process by which we arrive at them which is not absolutely confirmed by the sanction of the highest authorities; and the

doubt respecting them appears to arise partly because men have not always viewed them in combination with one another, in which state one modifies another, and removes or lessens what might appear strange in each separately ; and partly because in regarding any one period of history, our perception of the general law is obscured by circumstances which interfere with its regular operation, and thus lead many to doubt its existence.

But in speaking of the certainty of the laws of political science I mean only that there are principles of government, undoubtedly good in themselves, and tending to the happiness of mankind ; and that whenever these principles appear not to have produced good, it is owing to some disturbing causes which may be clearly pointed out, or to the absence of something which was their proper consequence, and the omission of which in its season left them without their natural fruit ; but that although the principles may thus be impeded by untoward circumstances, or fail to bring forth their consequences in any given case, as it is not every blossom which is succeeded by its fruit, yet they are an essential condition of the birth of fruit, and to oppose them, instead of furthering and perfecting their work, and helping to make them fruitful, is merely to uphold what is bad ; so that there is on one side, it may be, an ineffectual, or even an abused good, on the other hand there is a positive evil.

But one great question still remains ; if history has its laws, as I entirely believe ; if theoretically considered it is not a mere aggregation of particular actions or characters, like the anecdotes of natural history, but is besides this the witness to general moral and political truths, and capable, when rightly used, of bringing to our notice fresh truths which we might not have gained by *a priori* reasoning only ; still, it may be asked, is this theoretical knowledge available ? Can the truths which it teaches us to value be really carried

into effect practically, or are we rather cursed with that bitter thing, a powerless knowledge, seeing an evil from which we cannot escape, and a good to which we cannot attain ; (15) being in fact embarked upon the rapids of fate, which hurry us along to the top of the fall, and then dash us down below ; while all the while, there are the banks on the right and left close in sight, an assured and visible safety if we could but reach it, but we try to steer and to pull our boat thither in vain ; and with eyes open, and amidst unavailing struggles, we are swept away to destruction ? This is the belief of some of no mean name or ability ; who hold that the destiny of the present and future was fixed irrevocably by the past, and that the greatest efforts of individuals can do nothing against it, nay, that they are rather disposed by an overruling power to be apparently the instruments in bringing it to pass. While others hold that great men can control fate itself, that there is an energy in the human will which can as it were restore life to the dead ; and snap asunder the links of the chain of destiny, even when they have been multiplied around us by the toil of centuries.

Now practically there is an end of this question altogether, if the power of this supposed fate goes so far as to make us its willing instruments ; I mean, if the influences of our time, determined themselves by the influence of a past time, do in their turn determine our characters ; if we admire, abhor, hope, fear, desire, or flee from, the very objects and no others which an irresistible law of our condition sets before us. For to ask whether a slave who loves his chains can break them, is but an idle question ; because it is certain that he will not. And if we in like manner think according to a fixed law, viewing things in our generation as beings born in such a generation must view them, then it is evident that our deliverance must proceed wholly from a higher power ; before the outward bondage can be broken, we must be set at

liberty within. The only question which can be of importance to us is this, whether, if our minds be free, our actions can compass what we desire ; whether, perceiving the influence of our times, and struggling against it, we can resist it with success ; whether the natural consequences of the misdoings of past generations can be averted now, or whether such late repentance be unavailing.

And here surely the answer is such as we should most desire to be the true one ; an answer encouraging exertion, yet making the responsibility of every generation exceedingly great, and forbidding us to think that in us or in our actions is placed the turning power of the fortunes of the world. I do not suppose that any state of things can be conceived so bad as that the efforts of good men, working in the faith of God, can do nothing to amend it ; yet on the other hand, the evil may be far too deeply rooted to be altogether removed ; nor would it be possible for the greatest individual efforts to undo the effect of past errors or crimes, so that it should be the same thing whether they had ever been committed or no. It has been said, Conceive Frederick the Great in the place of Louis the Sixteenth on the morning of the 10th of August, 1792, and would not the future history of the Revolution have been altogether different ? But the more reasonable case to conceive would be rather, that Louis the Sixteenth had been endowed, not on that one day of the 10th of August, but from his early youth, with the virtue and firmness of Louis the Ninth, together with the genius of Frederick or of Napoleon. What would have been the difference in the history of France then ? That there would have been a great difference I doubt not, yet were the evils such as no human virtue and wisdom could have altogether undone. No living man could have removed that deep suspicion and abhorrence entertained for the existing church and clergy which made the people incredulous of all virtue in an individual priest,

because they were so fully possessed with the impression of the falsehood and evil of the system. Nor, in like manner, could any one have reconciled the peasants throughout France to the landed proprietors; the feeling of hatred was become too strong to be appeased, because here too it was mixed with intense suspicion, the result inevitably of suffering and ignorance, and nothing but the overthrow of those against whom it was directed, could have satisfied it. (16) Yet high virtue and ability in the king would have in all probability both softened the violence of the convulsion, and shortened its duration; and by saving himself from becoming its victim, there would have been one at hand with acknowledged authority and power to reconstruct the frame of society not only sooner but better than it was reconstructed actually; and the monarchy at least, among the old institutions of France, would have retained the love of the people, and would have been one precious link to connect the present with the past, instead of all links being severed together, and old France being separated by an impassable gulf from the new.

A greater accuracy as to the determining of this question, does not seem to be attainable. We know that evil committed is in certain cases, and beyond a certain degree, irremediable; I do not say, not to be palliated or softened as to its consequences, but not to be wholly removed. And we know also that the blessing of individual goodness has been felt in very evil times, not only by itself, but by others. What, or what amount of evil is incurable, or how widely or deeply individual good may become a blessing amidst prevailing evil, we are not allowed to determine or to know. God's national judgments are spoken of in Scripture both as reversible and irreversible; for Ahab's repentance the threatened evil was delayed, yet afterwards the cup of Judah's sin was so full, that the reward of Josiah's goodness was his own

being early taken away from the evil to come, not the reversal nor even the postponement of the sentence against his country. Surely it is enough to know that our sin now may render unavailing the greatest goodness of our posterity ; our efforts for good may be permitted to remove, or at any rate to mitigate, the curse of our fathers' sin.

Here then the present introductory course of lectures shall close. There is in all things a compensation whether of good or evil ; and as the subject of modern history is of all others to my mind the most interesting, inasmuch as it includes all questions of the deepest interest relating not to human things only, but to divine, so the intermixture of evil is, that for this very reason it is of all subjects the most delicate to treat of before a mixed audience. Sharing thus much in common with religious subjects, that no man feels himself to be a mere learner in it, but also in many respects a judge of what he hears, it has this farther difficulty, that the preacher speaking to members of the same church with himself speaks necessarily to men whose religious opinions in the main agree with his own ; but he who speaks on modern history, even to members of the same nation and commonwealth, speaks to those whose political opinions may differ from his own very deeply, who therefore are sure not only to judge what they hear, but to condemn it. And however much, when provoked by opposition, we may even feel pleasure in stating our opinions in their broadest form, yet he must be of a different constitution of mind from mine, who can like to do this unprovoked, who can wish, in the discharge of a public duty in our own common University, to embitter our academical studies with controversy, to excite angry feelings in a place where he has never met with any thing but kindness, a place connected in his mind with recollections, associations, and actual feelings, the most prized and most delightful. Only, it must be remembered, that if modern history be studied at all, he who

speaks upon it officially, must speak as he would do on any other matter, simply and fully ; expounding it according to his ability and convictions ; not disguising or suppressing what he believes to be necessary to the right understanding of it, although it may sometimes cost him a painful effort. But in the lectures which I would propose to deliver next year, our business will be less embarrassing. We shall then be engaged with a remote period, where the forms of our present parties were unknown ; and our object will be to endeavour to represent to ourselves the England of the fourteenth century. To represent it, if we can, even in its outward aspect ; for I cannot think that the changes in the face of the country are beneath the notice of history : what supplied the place of the landscape which is now so familiar to us ; what it was before five hundred years of what I may call the wear and tear of human dominion ; when cultivation had scarcely ventured beyond the valleys, or the low sunny slopes of the neighbouring hills ; and whole tracts now swarming with inhabitants, were a wide solitude of forest or of moor. To represent it also in its institutions, and its state of society ; and farther, in its individual men and in their actions ; for I would never wish the results of history to be separated from history itself : the great events of past times require to be represented no less than institutions, or manners, or buildings, or scenery : we must listen to the stir of gathering war ; we must follow our two Edwards, the second and third, on their enterprises visited with such different fortune ; we must be present at the route and flight of Bannockburn, and at the triumph of Crecy. (17) Finally, we must remember also not so to transport ourselves into the fourteenth century as to forget that we belong really to the nineteenth ; that here, and not there, lie our duties ; that the harvest gathered in the fields of the past, is to be brought home for the use of the present ; avoiding the fault of that

admirable painter of the middle ages, M. de Barante, who, having shown himself most capable of analyzing history philosophically, and having described the literature of France in the eighteenth century in a work not to be surpassed for its mingled beauty and profoundness, (18) has yet chosen in his history of the Dukes of Burgundy, to forfeit the benefits of his own wisdom, and has described the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries no otherwise than might have been done by their own simple chroniclers. An example, one amongst a thousand, how men in their dread of one extreme, the extreme in this case of writing mere discussions upon history instead of history itself, are apt to fall into another not less distant from the true mean.

The experience of this year has given me the most encouraging assurance that the subject of modern history is felt to be full of interest. Those who study it for themselves, will certainly find its interest grow upon them; it will not then be perilled, to apply an expression of Thucydides,* upon the capacity of a lecturer, according as he may lecture with more or less of ability and knowledge. (19) For we here are not likely to run away with the foolish notion, that lectures can teach us a science without careful study of our own. They can but excite us to begin to work for ourselves; possibly they may assist our efforts; they can in no way supersede them.

* II. 25.

NOTES
TO
LECTURE VIII.

NOTE 1.—Page 372.

IN the History of Rome, Dr. Arnold writes as follows, on the difference between the poetical legends and the wilful falsehoods of the Roman family memoirs :

* * “ But before we finally quit the poetical legends of the early Roman history, the last of them and not the least beautiful, that which relates to the fall of Veii, must find its place in this narrative. In the life of Camillus there meet two distinct kinds of fiction, equally remote from historical truth, but in all other respects most opposite to one another, the one imaginative but honest, playing it is true with the facts of history, and converting them into a whole different form, but addressing itself also to a different part of the mind ; not professing to impart exact knowledge, but to delight, to quicken, and to raise the perception of what is beautiful and noble : the other, tame and fraudulent, deliberately corrupting truth in order to minister to national or individual vanity, pretending to describe actual events, but substituting in the place of reality the representations of interested or servile falsehood. To the former of these classes belongs the legend of the fall of Veii ; to the latter the interpolation of the pretended victory of Camillus over the Gauls. The stories of the former kind, as innocent as they are delightful, I have thought it an irreverence to neglect : the fabrications of the latter sort, which are the peculiar disgrace of Roman history, it is best to pass over in total silence, that they may if possible be consigned to perpetual oblivion ”

Vol. i. ch. xviii. p. 395.

A train of thought somewhat similar to that which occurs in the first part of the text of this Lecture, and which had elsewhere been

a subject of reflection to Dr. Arnold in his study of the legends of Roman History, will be found in the following passages from the 'Lives of the English Saints:'

* * When "so much has been said and believed of a number of Saints with so little historical foundation. It is not that we may lawfully despise or refuse a great gift and benefit, historical testimony, and the intellectual exercises which attend on it, study, research, and criticism; for in the hands of serious and believing men they are of the highest value. We do not refuse them, but in the cases in question, we have them not. The bulk of Christians have them not; the multitude has them not; the multitude forms its view of the past, not from antiquities, not critically, not in the letter; but it develops its small portion of true knowledge into something which is like the very truth though it be not it, and which stands for the truth when it is but like it. Its evidence is a legend; its facts are a symbol; its history a representation; its drift is a moral.

"Thus then is it with the biographies and reminiscences of the Saints. 'Some there are which have no memorial, and are as though they had never been;' others are known to have lived and died, and are known in little else. They have left a name but they have left nothing besides. Or the place of their birth, or of their abode, or of their death, or some one or other striking incident of their life, gives a character to their memory. Or they are known by martyrologies or services, or by the traditions of a neighbourhood, or by the title or the decorations of a Church. Or they are known by certain miraculous interpositions which are attributed to them. Or their deeds and sufferings belong to countries far away, and the report of them comes musical and low over the broad sea. Such are some of the small elements which, when more is not known, faith is fain to receive, love dwells on, meditation unfolds, disposes, and forms; till by the sympathy of many minds, and the concert of many voices, and the lapse of many years, a certain whole figure is developed with words and actions, a history and a character—which is indeed but the *portrait* of the original, yet is, as much as a portrait, an imitation rather than a copy, a likeness on the whole, but in its particulars more or less the work of imagination. It is but collateral and parallel to the truth; it is the truth under assumed conditions; it brings out a true idea, yet by inaccurate or defective

means of exhibition, it savours of the age, yet it is the offspring from what is spiritual and everlasting. It is the picture of a saint, who did other miracles if not these; who went through sufferings, who wrought righteousness, who died in faith and peace—of this we are sure; we are not sure, should it so happen, of the when, the where, the how, the why, and the whence. * * *

* * “The author of a marvellous Life may be proved to a demonstration to be an ignorant, credulous monk, or a literary or ecclesiastical gossip; to be preaching to us his dreams, or to have saturated himself with popular absurdities; he may be cross-examined, and made to contradict himself; or his own story, as it stands, may be self-destructive; and yet he may be the index of a hidden fact, and may symbolize a history to which he does not testify.

* * “The Lives of the Saints are not so much strict biographies as myths, edifying stories compiled from tradition, and designed not so much to relate facts, as to produce a religious impression on the mind of the hearer. Under the most favourable circumstances, it is scarcely conceivable that uninspired men could write a faithful history of a miraculous life. Even ordinary history, except mere annals, is all more or less fictitious; that is, the facts are related, not as they really happened, but as they appeared to the writer; as they happened to illustrate his views or support his prejudices. And if this is so of common facts, how much more so must it be when all the power of the marvellous is thrown in to stimulate the imagination. But to see fully the difficulties under which the writers of these Lives must have laboured, let us observe a few of the ways in which we all, and time for us, treat the common history and incidents of life.

“First; we all write legends. Little as we may be conscious of it, we all of us continually act on the very same principle, which made the Lives of Saints such as we find them; only perhaps less poetically.

“Who has not observed in himself, in his ordinary dealings with the facts of every day life, with the sayings and doings of his acquaintance, in short, with every thing which comes before him as a *fact*, a disposition to forget the real order in which they appear, and re-arrange them according to his theory of how they ought to be? Do we hear of a generous self-denying action in a short time

the real doer and it are forgotten; it has become the property of the noblest person we know: so a jest we relate of the wittiest person, frivolity of the most frivolous, and so on; each particular act we attribute to the person we conceive most likely to have been the author of it. And this does not arise from any wish to leave a false impression, scarcely from carelessness; but only because facts refuse to remain bare and isolated in our memory; they will arrange themselves under some law or other; they must illustrate something to us—some character, some principle—or else we forget them. Facts are thus perpetually, so to say, becoming unfixed and re-arranged in a more conceptional order. In this way, we find fragments of Jewish history in the legends of Greece, stories from Herodotus become naturalized in the tradition of early Rome; and the mythic exploits of the northern heroes, adopted by the biographers of our Saxon kings. So, uncertain traditions of miracles with vague descriptions of name and place, are handed down from generation to generation, and each set of people, as they pass into their minds, naturally group them round the great central figure of their admiration or veneration, be he hero or be he saint. And so with the great objects of national interest. Alfred—‘England’s darling’—the noblest of the Saxon kings, became mythic almost before his death; and forthwith, every institution that Englishmen most value, of law or church, became appropriated to him. He divided England into shires; he established trial by jury; he destroyed wolves and made the country so secure, that golden bracelets hung untouched in the open road. And when Oxford was founded, a century was added to its age; and it was discovered that Alfred had laid the first stone of the first college, and that St. Neot had been the first Professor of Theology.”

Lives of the English Saints, No. IV., ‘Hermit Saints,’ pp. 3, 62, and 74

NOTE 2.—Page 372.

The story is told, I believe, of the Abbé Vertot. Southey, in one of his Essays, tells it of a “French historian,” without giving a name. It may be that Vertot gets the credit of it from the other story told of him—that when offered some additional and unpublished materials for his History of the Siege of Rhodes, he replied, ‘Mon siège est fait.’

NOTE 3.—Page 373.

* * “Time in another way plays strange tricks with facts, and is ever altering, shifting, and even changing their nature in our memory. Every man’s past life is becoming mythic to him; we cannot call up again the feelings of our childhood, only we know that what then seemed to us the bitterest misfortunes, we have since learnt by change of character or circumstance, to think very great blessings; and even when there is no change, and were they to recur again, they are such as we should equally repine at, yet by mere lapse of time sorrow is turned to pleasure, and the sharpest pang at present becomes the most alluring object of our retrospect. The sick-bed, the school trial, loss of friends, pain and grief of every kind, become rounded off, and assume a soft and beautiful grace. ‘Time dissipates to shining æther the hard angularity of facts;’ the harshest of them are smoothed and chastened off in the past like the rough mountains and jagged rocks in the distant horizon. And so it is with every other event of our lives; read a letter we wrote ten years ago, and how impossible we find it to recognise the writer in our altered selves. Incident after incident rises up and bides its day, and then sinks back into the landscape. It changes by distance, and we change by age. While it was present it meant one thing, now it means another, and to-morrow perhaps something else on the point of vision alters. Even old Nature, endlessly and patiently reproducing the same forms, the same beauties, cannot reproduce in us the same emotions we remember in our childhood. Then all was Fairy-land: now time and custom have deadened our sense, and

The things which we have seen, we now can see no more.

This is the true reason why men people past ages with the superhuman and the marvellous. They feel their own past was indeed something miraculous, and they cannot adequately represent their feelings except by borrowing from another order of beings.

“Thus age after age springs up, and each succeeds to the inheritance of all that went before it; but each age has its own feelings, its own character, its own necessities; therefore, receiving the accumulations of literature and history, it absorbs, and fuses, and re-

models them to meet the altered circumstances. The histories of Greece and Rome are not yet exhausted ; every new historian finds something more in them. Alcibiades and Catiline are not to us what they were to Thucydides and Sallust, even though we use their eyes to look at them. So it has been with facts, and so it always shall be. It holds with the lives of individuals ; it holds with histories, even where there is contemporary writing, and much more than either, where, as with many of the Lives of the Saints, we can only see them as they appeared through the haze of several generations, with no other light but oral tradition.”

Lives of the English Saints, No. IV.. ‘Hermit Saints,’ p. 78.

NOTE 4.—Page 376.

The want of trustworthiness in the two great military *auto-historians* of ancient and modern times, Cæsar and Napoleon, has been strongly commented on in the ‘*Histoire de l’Art Militaire*,’ by Carrion-Nisas, an officer who served with considerable distinction in the French cavalry in the Peninsular war, and whose work, I am informed, is esteemed for its professional value. He places the fairness of Turenne’s military memoirs in fine contrast with those of both Cæsar and Napoleon :

“On admire surtout dans les Mémoires de Turenne la candeur de ses aveux ; c’est surtout en ce point qu’il diffère de César ; et il est effectivement curieux de voir avec quel détail Turenne semble se plaire à faire remarquer toutes ses fautes et les positions dangereuses où elles le jeterent. Dans le récit de l’affaire malheureuse de Mariendhal, tantôt il s’accuse de trop de *facilité* à permettre une mesure qui rendoit les cantonnemens de la cavalerie plus commodes, mais plus hasardeux ; tantôt il dénonce sa propre résolution prise *malapropos* ; il ne dissimule pas que *toute son infanterie étoit perdue* ; il se peint comme réduit, par sa faute, à fuir presque seul, et sur le point d’être pris. Au milieu de ce désordre naïvement raconté, il excuse M. de Rosen d’avoir engagé l’affaire, et ne manqua pas de dire que ce général, qui fut fait prisonnier, avoit très-bien fait son devoir ; enfin, il se charge seul de tout le blâme d’une affaire désastreuse.” To this the author adds, in a note,—“Quelle différence de cette franchise, de cette naïveté de Turenne, de cet amour de la vérité sans bornes et sans réticence, avec la subtile ar-

gumentation, l'égoïsme opiniâtre, les tours de force de Napoléon, pour persuader au monde ce qui n'a jamais été vrai d'aucun mortel, en aucun temps ; savoir, qu'il n'a jamais commis une faute dans ce qu'il a fait, une erreur dans ce qu'il a dit ! On trouve bien quelque chose de cette intention de Napoléon dans les Commentaires de César, mais avec bien plus d'art, de gout et de sobriété."

Tome II., p. 101-2

Again, in the same volume, p. 645, with reference to the St. Helena Memoirs, the author remarks : " Napoléon dénature tellement les faits, qu'il faut attribuer sa manière de les présenter ou à une présomption extrême, et qui est la *folie* même dont il étoit affecté, ou à un pur mensonge qui seroit trop au-dessous de Napoléon."

An earlier writer on military science, Puységur, in his '*Art de la Guerre*,' (a work in which there is much solicitude to refute the error noticed by Arnold, that the lessons of ancient warfare are useless to the modern soldier,) draws the same contrast between Cæsar and Turenne ; and it is remarked in the treatise quoted above. " Il n'est pas étonnant que Puységur, si bien fait pour apprécier la véracité et la candeur de Turenne, ait été un peu repoussé par les artifices continuels de César, que sous leur voile de simplicité Puységur apercevoit très bien." I. 604. And in the Appendix (ii. 615) he dwells upon this admirable integrity and candour of Lewis the Fourteenth's great Marshal : " On ne sauroit trop revenir sur ce trait singulier de son caractère. Turenne disoit de Rithel et de Mariendhal, ' J'y fus battu par ma faute,' et entrant sans répugnance dans ses détails, ' Si je voulais,' écrit il, ' me faire justice un peu sévèrement, je dirois que l'affaire de Mariendhal est arrivée pour m'être laissé aller mal-a-propos à l'importunité des Allemands, qui demandoient des quartiers ; et que celle de Rithel est venue pour m'être trop fié à la lettre du gouverneur, qui promettoit de tenir quatre jours la veille même qu'il se rendit. Je fus, dans ces occasions, trop crédule et trop facile ; mais *quand un homme n'a pas fait de fautes à la guerre*, il ne l'a pas faite long-temps.' Ainsi cette admirable franchise étoit encore de la profondeur d'observation."

The best reputation which has since been gained by a soldier and historian, for that historic truthfulness and candour in the narrative

of his own campaigns, which appears to have distinguished Turenne, is that which has been secured by the Archduke Charles. Mr. Alison, speaking of the history of the German campaigns, remarks: "Military history has few more remarkable works of which to boast. Luminous, sagacious, disinterested, severe in judging of himself, indulgent in criticising the conduct of others; liberal of praise to all but his own great achievements, profoundly skilled in the military art, and gifted with no common powers of narrative and description, his work is a model of candid and able military disquisition. Less vehement and forcible than Napoleon, he is more circumspect and consistent; with far inferior genius, he is distinguished by infinitely greater candour, generosity, and trustworthiness. On a fact stated by the Archduke, whether favourable or adverse to his reputation, or a criticism made by him on others, the most perfect reliance may be placed." '*Hist. of Europe*,' ch. 29, note. Of the high merit of the military authorship of the Archduke still more substantial proof is found in the impartial respect rendered to his works by such eminent professional French authority as Jomini and Dumas; the former having considered it an honourable task to translate and annotate them, and the latter recognising their standard authority.—Appendix to the 5th vol. of the '*Précis des Evénemens Militaires*.'

As one of the class of military histories, referred to in this note, the Duke of Berwick's Memoirs ('*Mémoires de Berwick*') may also be mentioned as an accurate and trusty record of his own campaigns. I state this character of the work, not from my own knowledge, but because it is so spoken of by Lord Mahon in his '*History of the War of the Succession in Spain*.' He frequently cites the Memoirs among his authorities, and refers to them (chap. iii.) as 'written with great frankness and simplicity, and affording some of the best materials for the War of the Succession.'

NOTE 5.—Page 377.

In the sketch of the state of Greece in early times, with which Thucydides introduces his history, he laments the uncertainty that is produced by the facility with which men receive traditional hearsay without putting the truth of it to the test—*ἀπασις*. After

citing several examples of historical errors, he deplores that there should be so great and so general *indolence*—*carelessness* in the search after truth, such reluctance to have any trouble about it, and the readiness with which men betake themselves, with lazy credulity and want of earnestness, to whatever chances to be ready for them—οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται.

NOTE 6.—Page 381.

This sentence appears to me so completely to describe the style of Mr. Macauley, that his brilliant review-essays may be said to exemplify Dr. Arnold's reflection. It is the predominance of such a style that has exposed him to this criticism by a fellow-reviewer—"Mr. Macauley, pointed and brilliant, but sacrificing every thing to the object of immediate display, insomuch that one would hardly gather from his writings that he believed truth to have existence" *Brit. Critic*: Article on Mill's Logic.

NOTE 7.—Page 381.

Coleridge has insisted upon "the importance of accuracy of style as being near akin to veracity and truthful habits of mind." *Lit. Remains*, i. 241. And of the author of these Lectures it has been well said, "Arnold's style is worthy of his manly understanding, and the noble simplicity of his character." *'Guesses at Truth,'* p. 289.

NOTE 8.—Page 382.

* * "What his (Arnold's) general admiration for Niebuhr was as a practical motive in the earlier part of his work, that his deep aversion to Gibbon, as a man, was in the latter part. 'My highest ambition,' he said, as early as 1826, 'and what I hope to do as far as I can, is to make my history the very reverse of Gibbon in this respect,—that whereas the whole spirit of his work, from its low morality, is hostile to religion, without speaking directly against it; so my greatest desire would be, in my History, by its high morals and its general tone, to be of use to the cause, without actually bringing it forward.'"

'Life and Correspondence,' chap. iv.

NOTE 9.—Page 182.

“Nothing shows more clearly the great rarity of geographical talent, than the praise which has been commonly bestowed on Polybius as a good geographer. He seems indeed to have been aware of the importance of geography to history, and to have taken considerable pains to gain information on the subject: but this very circumstance proves the more the difficulty of the task; for his descriptions are so vague and imperfect, and so totally devoid of painting, that it is scarcely possible to understand them. For instance, in his account of the march of the Gauls into Italy, and of the subsequent movements of their army and of the Romans, there is an obscurity which never could have existed, had he conceived in his own mind a lively image of the seat of war as a whole, of the connection of the rivers and chains of mountains with each other, and of the consequent direction of the roads and most frequented passes. * * *

“The question in what direction this famous march (Hannibal’s passage across the Alps) was taken, has been agitated for more than 1800 years, and who can undertake to decide it? The difficulty to modern inquirers has been chiefly from the total absence of geographical talent in Polybius. That this historian indeed should ever have gained the reputation of a good geographer, only proves how few there are who have any notion what a geographical instinct is. Polybius indeed laboured with praiseworthy diligence to become a geographer; but he laboured against nature; and the unpoetical character of his mind has in his writings actually lessened the accuracy, as it has totally destroyed the beauty of history. To any man who comprehended the whole character of a mountain country, and the nature of its passes, nothing could have been easier than to have conveyed at once a clear idea of Hannibal’s route, by naming the valley by which he had ascended to the main chain, and afterwards that which he followed in descending from it. Or admitting that the names of barbarian rivers would have conveyed little information to Greek readers, still the several Alpine valleys have each their peculiar character, and an observer with the least power of description could have given such lively touches of the varying scenery of the march, that future travellers must at once

have recognised his description. Whereas the account of Polybius is at once so unscientific and so deficient in truth and liveliness of painting, that persons who have gone over the several Alpine passes for the very purpose of identifying his descriptions, can still reasonably doubt whether they were meant to apply to Mont Genève, or Mont Cenis, or to the Little St. Bernard."

History of Rome, vol. iii, notes F and L.

* * * "How bad a geographer is Polybius, and how strange that he should be thought a good one! Compare him with any man who is really a geographer, with Herodotus, with Napoleon,—whose sketches of Italy, Egypt, and Syria, in his memoirs, are to me unrivalled,—or with Niebuhr, and how striking is the difference. The dullness of Polybius's fancy made it impossible for him to conceive or paint scenery clearly, and how can a man be a geographer without lively images of the formation and features of the country which he describes? How different are the several Alpine valleys, and how would a few simple touches of the scenery which he seems actually to have visited, yet could neither understand nor feel it, have decided for ever the question of the route! (Hannibal's.) Now the account suits no valley well, and therefore it may be applied to many." * * *

'Life and Correspondence,' letter cx., Septem. 21, 1835

NOTE 10.—Page 382.

"Nothing shows more forcibly the unrivalled truth of the narrative of Thucydides than to contrast it, as we have here an opportunity of doing, with that of an ordinary historian such as Diodorus Siculus. For instance, Thucydides, well aware of the studied secrecy observed in such matters by the Lacedæmonian government, does not pretend to state the number of the Spartan land forces employed at the siege of Pylus. Diodorus, however, states it without hesitation, at 'twelve thousand.' The soldiers sent over to Sphacteria were, according to Thucydides, drafted by lot from the several Lochi; Diodorus, to enhance the glory of the Athenians, represents them as 'picked men, chosen for their valour.' The siege of Pylus, Thucydides tells us, lasted during one whole day

and part of the next : Diodorus carries it on through 'several days.' Lastly, the heroic courage of Brasidas, and his bold though unsuccessful attempt to force a landing, are told by Thucydides with equal force and simplicity ; while Diodorus, in his clumsy endeavours to exalt the effect of the story, makes it only ridiculous : for he describes Brasidas as repelling a host of enemies, and killing many of the Athenians in single combat, before he was disabled. No wonder that we hear complaints of the uncertainty of history, when such a writer as Diodorus is only a fair specimen of by far the majority of those whom the world has been good-natured enough to call historians."

ARNOLD'S '*Thucydides*,' vol. ii. p. 15. *Note*.

* * "This simple statement, when contrasted with the exaggeration of Cornelius Nepos, serves admirably to show the difference between a sensible man who loved truth, and the careless folly of that most worthless class of writers, the second and third-rate historians of Greece and Rome. Thucydides says that 'Themistocles learnt as much of the Persian language as he could ;' Cornelius Nepos tells us, that he became so perfectly master of it, 'ut multo commodius dicatur apud regem verba fecisse, quam hi poterant qui in Perside erant nati.'"

Ib. vol. i. p. 165. *Note*.

"The whole of this chapter (on the Battle in the Harbour of Syracuse and defeat of the Athenians) has been copied by Dion Cassius nearly word for word, and applied to his own account of the naval victory gained by M. Agrippa, over the fleet of Sex. Pompeius in Sicily, in the year of Rome 718. It was a strange taste to embellish a history with borrowed descriptions, which of course could only suit in their general outline the actions to which they were thus transferred. But this indifference to fidelity of detail, and this habit of dressing up an historical picture, as some artists dress up their sketches from nature, has produced effects of no light importance in corrupting first history itself, and then the taste of readers of history."

Ib. vol. iii. p. 235. *Note*

NOTE 11.—Page 382.

* * “I hold the lines, ‘Nil admirari, &c.,’ to be as utterly false as any moral sentiment ever uttered. Intense admiration is necessary to our highest perfection, &c.”

‘*Life and Correspondence*,’ Letter lxxvii. July 15, 1833.

“* * “I believe that ‘Nil admirari,’ in this sense, is the Devil’s favourite text; and he could not choose a better to introduce his pupils into the more esoteric parts of his doctrine. And therefore I have always looked upon a man infected with this disorder of anti-romance, as on one who has lost the finest part of his nature, and his best protection against every thing low and foolish.” * *

Ib. Letter c. March 30, 1835

NOTE 12.—Page 384.

“It might seem ludicrous to speak of impartiality in writing the history of remote times, did not those times really bear a nearer resemblance to our own than many imagine; or did not Mitford’s example sufficiently prove that the spirit of modern party may affect our view of ancient history. But many persons do not clearly see what should be the true impartiality of an historian. If there be no truths in moral and political science, little good can be derived from the study of either; if there be truths, it must be desirable that they should be discovered and embraced. Scepticism must ever be a misfortune or a defect: a misfortune, if there be no means of arriving at truth; a defect, if while there exist such means we are unable or unwilling to use them. Believing that political science has its truths no less than moral, I cannot regard them with indifference, I cannot but wish them to be seen and embraced by others.

“On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that these truths have been much disputed; that they have not, like moral truths, received that universal assent of good men which makes us shrink from submitting them to question. And again, in human affairs, the contest has never been between pure truth and pure error. Neither then may we assume political conclusions as absolutely certain; nor are political truths ever wholly identical with the professions or practice of any party or individual. If for the sake of

recommending any principle, we disguise the errors or the crimes with which it has been in practice accompanied, and which in the weakness of human nature may perhaps be naturally connected with our reception of it, then we are guilty of most blameable partiality. And so it is no less, if for the sake of decrying an erroneous principle, we depreciate the wisdom, and the good and noble feelings with which error also is frequently, and in some instances naturally joined. This were to make our sense of political truth to overpower our sense of moral truth ; a double error, inasmuch as it is at once the less certain ; and to those who enjoy a Christian's hope, by far the less worthy.

“While then I cannot think that political science contains no truths, or that it is a matter of indifference whether they are believed or no, I have endeavoured also to remember, that be they ever so certain, there are other truths no less sure ; and that one truth must never be sacrificed to another. I have tried to be strictly impartial in my judgment of men and parties, without being indifferent to those principles which were involved more or less purely in their defeat or triumph. I have desired neither to be so possessed with the mixed character of all things human, as to doubt the existence of abstract truth ; nor so to dote on any abstract truth, as to think that its presence in the human mind is incompatible with any evil, its absence incompatible with any good.”

History of Rome, Preface, vol. i. p. x.

“ * * *History*, a science, whose real difficulties, uncertainties, and perplexities are every day more clearly seen, and of which we predict that it will be one triumph achieved by the present generation, that its real nature will be more fully understood. It is getting more and more to be perceived, that the historian requires not merely a profound, accurate, and most miscellaneous knowledge of facts ; not merely a great measure of what is commonly called ‘knowledge of the world,’ by which is meant an ever-energizing insight into the motives of action, the sentiments, the habits, the tendencies of the crowd of ordinary men, (though this is indeed indispensable ;) if he is to be really such, he needs much more than this ; he needs even more absolutely a deep and penetrating knowledge of the innermost recesses of the human heart. The real movers of great events are

ordinarily great men; he must have then a glowing appreciation and hearty sympathy for greatness; he must be able to recognise, understand, and assign to its due place in the scene of life the eccentricities of genius, the waywardness of keen sensibility. Then the subtle influence of mind upon mind, the process whereby national character is formed, or again whereby each several age is distinguished by that assemblage of notions and instincts peculiar to itself, which by so universal and felicitous a figure is called its atmosphere; this is closely connected with the deepest metaphysical problems, and yet meets the historian at every step, as one of the very principal facts which claim his recognition, comprehension, and explanation. But in ecclesiastical history, the powers of mind he requires are even rarer, by how much he has to do with a more unfathomable element, and with phenomena less open to the ordinary view. Who shall analyze the secret communings of the holy and mortified soul with its God? Yet of this kind are the materials which have even the principal share in those events, which are the objects of his science."

'British Critic,' vol. xxxiii. p. 217. Jan. 1843.

NOTE 13.—Page 385.

Yet of that period of history Coleridge was able to take a more catholic view, when he said, "I know of no portion of history which a man might write with so much pleasure as that of the great struggle in the time of Charles I., because he may feel the profoundest respect for both parties. The side taken by any particular person was determined by the point of view which such person happened to command at the commencement of the inevitable collision, one line seeming straight to this man, another line to another. No man of that age saw *the* truth, the whole truth; there was not light enough for that. The consequence, of course, was a violent exaggeration of each party for the time." *'Table Talk,'* ii. 171. May, 1833.

NOTE 14.—Page 386.

It is remarked by Aristotle (*'Æcon.'* ch. 1) that some arts are

wholly distinct, with reference to construction and use, such as the making a musical instrument and the performing on it; but that politics comprehends both the framing a constitution, and the administration of it—τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ πολὺν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σιστησασθαι, καὶ ὑπαρχούση χρησασθαι καλῶς. And again, (*'Polit.'* iii. 9,) that political society is not mere living together, but communion for happiness and virtue—τὸ ζῆν ευδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς· τῶν καλῶν ἀρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν.

See also note to 'Appendix to Inaugural Lecture,' p. 90.

NOTE 15.—Page 388.

Dr. Arnold here gives the substance of that 'saying of the Persian fatalist'—ἐχθίστη δὲ δόβνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν—which was so often in his mouth, and which expressed a solicitude so habitual and characteristic, that his biographer remarks that it "might stand as the motto of his whole mind," (ch. ix.) It is found in Herodotus, (*'Calliope'* 16,) who relates that when Mardonius was encamped in Bœotia, before the battle of Plataea, he and fifty of his officers were invited to meet the same number of Thebans at a banquet, at which they reclined in pairs, a Persian and a Theban upon each couch. During the entertainment one of the Persians with many tears predicted to his Theban companion the speedy and utter destruction of the invading army; and, when asked why he used no influence with Mardonius to avert it, he answered—"That which God hath determined, it is impossible for man to turn aside; for when one would give faithful counsel, nobody is willing to believe him. Although many of us Persians are aware of the end we are coming to, we still go on, because we are bound to our destiny; and this is the very bitterest of a man's griefs, to see clearly but to have no power to do any thing at all."

NOTE 16.—Page 390.

* * "It has been well said that long periods of general suffering make far less impression on our minds, than the short sharp struggle in which a few distinguished individuals perish; not that we over-estimate the horror and the guilt of times of open bloodshed.

ding, but we are much too patient of the greater misery and greater sin of periods of quiet legalized oppression ; of that most deadly of all evils, when law, and even religion herself, are false to their divine origin and purpose, and their voice is no longer the voice of God, but of his enemy. In such cases the evil derives advantage, in a manner, from the very amount of its own enormity. No pen can record, no volume can contain the details of the daily and hourly sufferings of a whole people, endured without intermission, through the whole life of man, from the cradle to the grave. The mind itself can scarcely comprehend the wide range of the mischief : how constant poverty and insult, long endured as the natural portion of a degraded caste, bear with them to the sufferers something yet worse than pain, whether of the body or the feelings ; how they dull the understanding and poison the morals ; how ignorance and ill-treatment combined are the parents of universal suspicion : how from oppression is produced habitual cowardice, breaking out when occasion offers into merciless cruelty ; how slaves become naturally liars ; how they, whose condition denies them all noble enjoyments, and to whom looking forward is only despair, plunge themselves, with a brute's recklessness, into the lowest sensual pleasures ; how the domestic circle itself, the last sanctuary of human virtue, becomes at length corrupted, and in the place of natural affection and parental care, there is to be seen only selfishness and unkindness, and no other anxiety on the part of the parents for their children, than that they may, by fraud or by violence, prey in their turn upon that society which they have found their bitterest enemy. Evils like these, long working in the heart of a nation, render their own cure impossible : a revolution may execute judgment on one generation, and that perhaps the very one which was beginning to see and to repent of its inherited sins ; but it cannot restore life to the morally dead ; and its ill success, as if in this line of evils no curse should be wanting, is pleaded by other oppressors as a defence of their own iniquity, and a reason for perpetuating it for ever."

History of Rome, vol. ii., p. 19.

NOTE 17.—Page 392.

"The siege of Orleans is one of the turning points in the history

of nations. Had the English dominion in France been established, no man can tell what might have been the consequence to England, which would probably have become an appendage to France. So little does the prosperity of a people depend upon success in war, that two of the greatest defeats we ever had have been two of our greatest blessings, Orleans and Bannockburn. It is curious, too, that in Edward II.'s reign the victory over the Irish proved our curse, as our defeat by the Scots turned out a blessing. Had the Irish remained independent, they might afterwards have been united to us, as Scotland was; and had Scotland been reduced to subjection, it would have been another curse to us, like Ireland."*

* "Bannockburn," Dr. Arnold used to say, "ought to be celebrated by Englishmen as a national festival, and Athunree lamented as a national judgment."


'Life and Correspondence,' Appendix C, No. IX.

NOTE 18.—Page 393.

The little volume on the literature of France during the eighteenth century, by M. de Barante, appears to have been a favourite book with Dr. Arnold: he made some use of it as a text-book in Rugby School. The other reference in the Lecture is to the *'Mélanges Historiques et Littéraires,'* of the same author.

NOTE 19.—Page 393.

It is the expression put into the mouth of Pericles, when, in the exordium of his funeral oration, he speaks of the risk in honouring the dead by words—that the memory of their virtues may be endangered—depending for fame or discredit upon one man, whether he speak well or ill,—μη ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ πολλῶν ἀρετᾶς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι.



APPENDIX.

No. 1.

(See p 63, Note 14 to 'Inaugural Lecture.')

Mr. Stanley has given, in chapter iv. of the '*Life and Correspondence*,' a faithful and judicious character of Dr. Arnold as an historian—a student and writer of history, and I introduce it here, in illustration of these Lectures :

“ His early fondness for history grew constantly upon him : he delighted in it, as feeling it to be ‘ simply a search after truth, where, by daily becoming more familiar with it, truth seems for evermore within your grasp :’ the images of the past were habitually in his mind, and haunted him even in sleep, with a vividness which would bring before him some of the most striking passages in ancient history—the death of Cæsar, the wars of Sylla, the siege of Syracuse, the destruction of Jerusalem—as scenes in which he was himself taking an active part. What objects he put before him, as an historian, may best be judged from his own view of the province of history. It was, indeed, altogether imperfect, in his judgment, unless it was not only a plan but a picture ; unless it represented ‘ what men thought, what they hated, and what they loved ;’ unless it ‘ pointed the way to that higher region, within which she herself is not permitted to enter ;’* and in the details of geographical or military descriptions he took especial pleasure, and himself remarkably excelled in them. Still it was in the dramatic faculty on the one hand, and the metaphysical faculty on the other hand, that he felt himself deficient ; and it is accordingly in the political rather than in the philosophical or biographical department of history—in giving a combined view of different states or of different periods—in analyzing laws, parties, and institutions, that his chief merit consists.

* History of Rome, vol. i. p. 98 ; vol. ii. p. 173.

“What were his views of Modern History will appear in the mention of his Oxford Professorship. But it was in ancient history that he naturally felt the greatest delight. ‘I linger round a subject, which nothing could tempt me to quit but the consciousness of treating it too unworthily,’ were his expressions of regret, when he had finished his edition of Thucydides; ‘the subject of what is miscalled ancient history, the really modern history of the civilization of Greece and Rome, which has for years interested me so deeply, that it is painful to feel myself, after all, so unable to paint it fully.’ His earliest labours had been devoted not to Roman but to Greek history; and there still remains amongst his MSS. a short sketch of the rise of the Greek nation, written between 1820 and 1823, and carried down to the time of the Persian wars. And in later years, his edition of Thucydides, undertaken originally with the design of illustrating that author rather historically than philologically, contains in its notes and appendices, the most systematic remains of his studies in this direction, and at one time promised to embody his thoughts on the most striking periods of Athenian history. Nor, after he had abandoned this design, did he ever lose his interest in the subject; his real sympathies (if one may venture to say so) were always with Athens rather than with Rome; some of the most characteristic points of his mind were Greek rather than Roman; from the vacancy of the early Roman annals he was forever turning to the contemporary records of the Greek commonwealths, to pay ‘an involuntary tribute of respect and affection to old associations and immortal names, on which we can scarcely dwell too long or too often;’ the falsehood and emptiness of the Latin historians were for ever suggesting the contrast of their Grecian rivals; the two opposite poles in which he seemed to realize his ideas of the worst and the best qualities of an historian, with feelings of personal antipathy and sympathy towards each, were Livy and Thucydides.

“Even these scattered notices of what he once hoped to have worked out more fully, will often furnish the student of Greek history with the means of entering upon its most remarkable epochs under his guidance. Those who have carefully read his works, or shared his instructions, can still enjoy the light which he has thrown on the rise and progress of the Greek commonwealths, and their

analogy with the States of modern Europe; and apply, in their manifold relations, the principles which he has laid down with regard to the peculiar ideas attached in the Greek world to race, to citizenship, and to law. They can still catch the glow of almost passionate enthusiasm, with which he threw himself into the age of Pericles, and the depth of emotion with which he watched, like an eye-witness, the failure of the Syracusan expedition. They can still trace the almost personal sympathy with which he entered into the great crisis of Greek society, when 'Socrates, the faithful servant of truth and virtue, fell a victim to the hatred alike of the democratical and aristocratical vulgar;' when 'all that audacity can dare, or subtlety contrive, to make the words of 'good' and 'evil' change their meaning, was tried in the days of Plato, and by his eloquence, and wisdom, and faith unshaken, was put to shame.' They can well imagine the intense admiration, with which he would have dwelt in detail, on what he has now left only in faint outline. Alexander at Babylon impressed him as one of the most solemn scenes in all history; the vision of Alexander's career, even to the lively image which he entertained of his youthful and god-like beauty, rose constantly before him as the most signal instance of the effects of a good education against the temptations of power; as being beyond any thing recorded in Roman history, the career of 'the greatest man of the ancient world;' and even after the period, when Greece ceased to possess any real interest for him, he loved to hang with a melancholy pleasure over the last decay of Greek genius and wisdom—'the worn-out and cast-off skin, from which the living serpent had gone forth to carry his youth and vigour to other lands.'

"But, deep as was his interest in Grecian history, and though in some respects no other part of ancient literature derived so great a light from his researches, it was to his History of Rome that he looked as the chief monument of his historical fame. Led to it partly by his personal feeling of regard towards Niebuhr and Chevalier Bunsen, and by the sense of their encouragement, there was, moreover, something in the subject itself peculiarly attractive to him, whether in the magnificence of the field which it embraced—('the History of Rome,' he said, 'must be in some sort the History of the World,')—or in the congenial element which he naturally

found in the character of a people, 'whose distinguishing quality was their love of institutions and order, and their reverence for law.' Accordingly, after approaching it in various forms, he at last conceived the design of the work, of which the three published volumes are the result, but which he had intended to carry down, in successive periods, to what seemed to him its natural termination in the coronation of Charlemagne. (Pref. vol. i. p. vii.)

"The two earlier volumes occupy a place in the History of Rome, and of the ancient world generally, which in England had not and has not been otherwise filled up. Yet in the subjects of which they treat, his peculiar talents had hardly a fair field for their exercise. The want of personal characters and of distinct events, which Niebuhr was to a certain extent able to supply from the richness of his learning and the felicity of his conjectures, was necessarily a disadvantage to an historian whose strength lay in combining what was already known, rather than in deciphering what was unknown, and whose veneration for his predecessor made him distrustful not only of dissenting from his judgment, but even of seeing or discovering more than had been by him seen or discovered before. 'No man,' as he said, 'can step gracefully or boldly when he is groping his way in the dark,' (Hist. Rome, i. p. 133,) and it is with a melancholy interest that we read his complaint of the obscurity of the subject: 'I can but encourage myself, whilst painfully feeling my way in such thick darkness, with the hope of arriving at last at the light, and enjoying all the freshness and fulness of a detailed contemporary history.' (Hist. Rome, ii. p. 447.) But the narrative of the second Punic war, which occupies the third and posthumous volume, both as being comparatively unbroken ground, and as affording so full a scope for his talents in military and geographical descriptions, may well be taken as a measure of his historical powers, and has been pronounced by its editor, Archdeacon Hare, to be the first history which 'has given any thing like an adequate representation of the wonderful genius and noble character of Hannibal.' With this volume the work was broken off: but it is impossible not to dwell for a moment on what it would have been had he lived to complete it.

"The outline in his early articles in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, of the later history of the Civil Wars. 'a subject so glorious,

he writes in 1824, 'that I groan beforehand when I think how certainly I shall fail in doing it justice,' provokes of itself the desire to see how he would have gone over the same ground again with his added knowledge and experience—how the characters of the time, which even in this rough sketch stand out more clearly than in any other English work on the same period, would have been reproduced—how he would have represented the pure* character and military genius of his favourite hero, Pompey—or expressed his mingled admiration and abhorrence of the intellectual power and moral degradation of Cæsar; how he would have done justice to the coarseness and cruelty of Marius, 'the lowest of democrats'—or amidst all his crimes, to the views of 'the most sincere of Aristocrats,' Sylla. And in advancing to the farther times of the Empire, his scattered hints exhibit his strong desire to reach those events, to which all the intervening volumes seemed to him only a prelude. 'I would not overstrain my eyes or my faculties,' he writes in 1840, 'but whilst eyesight and strength are yet undecayed, I want to get through the earlier Roman History, to come down to the Imperial and Christian times, which form a subject of such deep interest.' What his general admiration for Niebuhr was as a practical motive in the earlier part of his work, that his deep aversion to Gibbon, as a man, was in the latter part. 'My highest ambition,' he said, as early as 1826, 'and, what I hope to do as far as I can, is to make my history the very reverse of Gibbon in this respect—that whereas the whole spirit of his work, from its low morality, is hostile to religion, without speaking directly against it; so my greatest desire would be, in my History, by its high morals and its general tone, to be of use to the cause, without actually bringing it forward.'

* It may be necessary (especially since the recent publication of Niebuhr's Lectures, where a very different opinion is advocated) to refer to Dr. Arnold's own estimate of the moral character of Pompey, which, it is believed, he retained unaltered, in the *Encyc. Metrop.* ii. 252. The following extract from a letter of General Napier may not be without interest in confirmation of an opinion which he had himself formed independently of it. "Tell Dr. Arnold to beware of falling into the error of Pompey being a bad general; he was a very great one, perhaps in a purely military sense greater than Cæsar." At the same time it should be observed, that his admiration of Cæsar's intellectual greatness was always very strong, and it was almost with an indignant animation that, on the starting of an objection that Cæsar's victories were only gained over inferior enemies, he at once denied the inference, and instantly recounted campaign after campaign in refutation.

“There would have been the place for his unfolding the rise of the Christian Church, not in a distinct ecclesiastical history, but as he thought it ought to be written, in conjunction with the history of the world. ‘The period from Augustus to Aurelian,’ he writes as far back as 1824, ‘I will not willingly give up to any one, because I have a particular object, namely, to blend the civil and religious history together more than has ever yet been done.’ There he would, on the one hand, have expressed his view of the external influences, which checked the free growth of the early Church—the gradual revival of Judaic principles under a Christian form—the gradual extinction of individual responsibility, under the system of government, Roman and Gentile in its origin, which, according to his latest opinion, took possession of the Church rulers from the time of Cyprian. There, on the other hand, he would have dwelt on the self-denying zeal and devotion to truth, which peculiarly endeared to him the very name of *Martyr*, and on the bond of Christian brotherhood, which he delighted to feel with such men as Athanasius and Augustine, discerning, even in what he thought their weaknesses, a signal testimony to the triumph of Christianity, unaided by other means, than its intrinsic excellence and holiness. Lastly, with that analytical method, which he delighted to pursue in his historical researches, he would have traced to their source ‘those evil currents of neglect, of uncharitableness, and of ignorance, whose full streams we now find so pestilent,’ first, ‘in the social helplessness and intellectual frivolousness’ of the close of the Roman empire; and then, in that event which had attracted his earliest interest, ‘the nominal conversion of the northern nations to Christianity—a vast subject, and one of the greatest importance both to the spiritual and temporal advancement of the nations of Europe, (Serm. vol. i. p. 88,) as explaining the more confirmed separation of clergy and laity in later times, and the incomplete influence which Christianity has exercised upon the institutions even of Christian countries.’ (Serm. vol. ii. pref. p. xiv)”

No. II.

(See p. 63, note 14 to 'Inaugural Lecture.')

ON HISTORICAL INSTRUCTION.

“ * * * In the statement of the business of Rugby school which has been given above, one part of it will be found to consist of works of modern history. An undue importance is attached by some persons to this circumstance, and those who would care little to have their sons familiar with the history of the Peloponnesian war are delighted that they should study the Campaigns of Frederic the Great or of Napoleon. Information about modern events is more useful, they think, than that which relates to antiquity; and such information they wish to be given to their children.

“ This favourite notion of filling boys with useful information is likely, we think, to be productive of some mischief. It is a caricature of the principles of inductive philosophy, which, while it taught the importance of a knowledge of facts, never imagined that this knowledge was of itself equivalent to wisdom. Now it is not so much our object to give boys ‘useful information,’ as to facilitate their gaining it hereafter for themselves, and to enable them to turn it to account when gained. The first is to be effected by supplying them on any subject with a skeleton which they may fill up hereafter. For instance, a real knowledge of history in after life is highly desirable; let us see how education can best facilitate the gaining of it. It should begin by impressing on a boy’s mind the names of the greatest men of different periods, and by giving him a notion of their order in point of time, and the part of the earth on which they lived. This is best done by a set of pictures bound up together in a volume, such, for instance, as those which illustrated Mrs. Trimmer’s little histories, and to which the writer of this article is glad to acknowledge his own early obligations. Nor could better service be rendered to the cause of historical instruction than by publishing a volume of prints of universal history, accompanied with a very short description of each. Correctness of costume in such prints, or good taste in the drawing, however desirable if they can be easily obtained, are of very subordinate importance; the great matter is that the print should be striking, and full enough to

excite and to gratify curiosity. By these means a lasting association is obtained with the greatest names in history, and the most remarkable actions of their lives : while their chronological arrangement is learnt at the same time from the order of the pictures ; a boy's memory being very apt to recollect the place which a favourite print holds in a volume, whether it comes towards the beginning, middle, or end, what picture comes before it, and what follows it. Such pictures should contain as much as possible the poetry of history ; the most striking characters, and most heroic actions, whether of doing or of suffering ; but they should not embarrass themselves with its philosophy, with the causes of revolutions, the progress of society, or the merits of great political questions. Their use is of another kind, to make some great name, and great action of every period, familiar to the mind ; that so in taking up any more detailed history or biography, (and education should never forget the importance of preparing a boy to derive benefit from his accidental reading,) he may have some association with the subject of it, and may not feel himself to be on ground wholly unknown to him. He may thus be led to open volumes into which he would otherwise have never thought of looking : he need not read them through—indeed it is sad folly to require either man or boy to read through every book they look at, but he will see what is said about such and such persons or actions ; and then he will learn by the way something about other persons and other actions ; and will have his stock of associations increased, so as to render more and more information acceptable to him.

“ After this foundation, the object still being rather to create an appetite for knowledge than to satisfy it, it would be desirable to furnish a boy with histories of one or two particular countries, Greece, Rome, and England, for instance, written at no great length, and these also written poetically much more than philosophically, with much liveliness of style, and force of painting, so as to excite an interest about the persons and things spoken of. The absence of all instruction in politics or political economy, nay even an absolute erroneousness of judgment in such matters, provided always that it involves no wrong principle in morality, are comparatively of slight importance. Let the boy gain, if possible, a strong appetite for knowledge to begin with ; it is a later part of education

which should enable him to pursue it sensibly, and to make it, when obtained, wisdom.

“But should his education, as is often the case, be cut short by circumstances, so that he never receives its finishing lessons, will he not feel the want of more direct information and instruction in its earlier stages? The answer is, that every thing has its proper season, and if summer be cut out of the year, it is vain to suppose that the work of summer can be forestalled in spring. Undoubtedly, much is lost by this abridgement of the term of education, and it is well to insist strongly upon the evil, as it might, in many instances, be easily avoided. But if it is unavoidable, the evil consequences arising from it cannot be prevented. Fulness of knowledge and sagacity of judgment are fruits not to be looked for in early youth; and he who endeavours to force them does but interfere with the natural growth of the plant, and prematurely exhaust its vigour.

“In the common course of things, however, where a young person’s education is not interrupted, the later process is one of exceeding importance and interest. Supposing a boy to possess that outline of general history which his prints and his abridgements will have given him, with his associations, so far as they go, strong and lively, and his desire of increased knowledge keen, the next thing to be done is to set him to read some first-rate historian, whose mind was formed in, and bears the stamp of some period of advanced civilization, analogous to that in which we now live. In other words, he should read Thucydides or Tacitus, or any writer equal to them, if such can be found, belonging to the third period of full civilization, that of modern Europe since the middle ages. The particular subject of the history is of little moment, so long as it be taken neither from the barbarian, nor from the romantic, but from the philosophical or civilized stage of human society; and so long as the writer be a man of commanding mind, who has fully imbibed the influences of his age, yet without bearing its exclusive impress. And the study of such a work under an intelligent teacher becomes indeed the key of knowledge and of wisdom: first it affords an example of good historical evidence, and hence the pupil may be taught to notice from time to time the various criteria of a credible narrative, and by the rule of contraries to observe what are the indications of a testimony questionable, suspicious, or worthless. Un-

due scepticism may be repressed by showing how generally truth has been attained when it has been honestly and judiciously sought ; while credulity may be checked by pointing out, on the other hand, how manifold are the errors into which those are betrayed whose intellect or whose principles have been found wanting. Now too the time is come when the pupil may be introduced to that high philosophy which unfolds the 'causes of things.' The history with which he is engaged presents a view of society in its most advanced state, when the human mind is highly developed, and the various crises which affect the growth of the political fabric are all overpast. Let him be taught to analyze the subject thus presented to him ; to trace back institutions, civil and religious, to their origin ; to explore the elements of the national character, as now exhibited in maturity, in the vicissitudes of the nation's fortune, and the moral and physical qualities of its race ; to observe how the morals and the mind of the people have been subject to a succession of influences, some accidental, others regular ; to see and remember what critical seasons of improvement have been neglected,—what besetting evils have been wantonly aggravated by wickedness or folly. In short, the pupil may be furnished as it were with certain formulæ, which shall enable him to read all history beneficially ; which shall teach him what to look for in it, how to judge of it, and how to apply it.

" Education will thus fulfil its great business, as far as regards the intellect, to inspire it with a desire of knowledge, and to furnish it with power to obtain and to profit by what it seeks for. And a man thus educated, even though he knows no history in detail but that which is called ancient, will be far better fitted to enter on public life, than he who could tell the circumstances and the date of every battle and every debate throughout the last century ; whose information, in the common sense of the term, about modern history, might be twenty times more minute. The fault of systems of classical education in some instances has been, not that they did not teach modern history, but that they did not prepare and dispose their pupils to acquaint themselves with it afterwards ; not that they did not attempt to raise an impossible superstructure, but that they did not prepare the ground for the foundation, and put the materials within reach of the builder.

“That impatience, which is one of the diseases of the age, is in great danger of possessing the public mind on the subject of education; an unhealthy restlessness may succeed to lethargy. Men are not contented with sowing the seed, unless they can also reap the fruit; forgetting how often it is the law of our condition,—‘that one soweth, and another reapeth.’ It is no wisdom to make boys prodigies of information; but it is our wisdom and our duty to cultivate their faculties each in its season—first the memory and imagination, and then the judgment; to furnish them with the means, and to excite the desire, of improving themselves, and to wait with confidence for God’s blessing on the result.”

Dr. ARNOLD’s Description of Rugby School,

‘*Journal of Education*,’ vol. vii. pp. 245-9.

No. III.

(See p. 142, note 1 to Lecture II.)

ON TRANSLATION.

“* * * All this supposes, indeed, that classical instruction should be sensibly conducted; it requires that a classical teacher should be fully acquainted with modern history and modern literature, no less than with those of Greece and Rome. What is, or perhaps what used to be, called a mere scholar, cannot possibly communicate to his pupils the main advantages of a classical education. The knowledge of the past is valuable, because without it our knowledge of the present and of the future must be scanty; but if the knowledge of the past be confined wholly to itself; if, instead of being made to bear upon things around us, it be totally isolated from them, and so disguised by vagueness and misapprehension as to appear incapable of illustrating them, then indeed it becomes little better than laborious trifling, and they who declaim against it may be fully forgiven.

“To select one instance of this perversion, what can be more absurd than the practice of what is called construing Greek and Latin, continued as it often is even with pupils of an advanced age? The study of Greek and Latin considered as mere languages, is of importance, mainly as it enables us to understand and employ well

that language in which we commonly think, and speak, and write. It does this, because Greek and Latin are specimens of language at once highly perfect and incapable of being understood without long and minute attention: the study of them, therefore, naturally involves that of the general principles of grammar; while their peculiar excellences illustrate the points which render language clear, and forcible, and beautiful. But our *application* of this general knowledge must naturally be to our own language, to show us what are its peculiarities, what its beauties, what its defects; to teach us by the patterns or the analogies offered by other languages, how the effect which we admire in them may be produced with a somewhat different instrument. Every lesson in Greek or Latin may and ought to be made a lesson in English. The translation of every sentence in Demosthenes or Tacitus is properly an exercise in extemporaneous English composition; a problem, how to express with equal brevity, clearness, and force, in our own language, the thought which the original author has so admirably expressed in his. But the system of construing, far from assisting, is positively injurious to our knowledge and use of English; it accustoms us to a tame and involved arrangement of our words, and to the substitution of foreign idioms in the place of such as are national; it obliges us to caricature every sentence that we render, by turning what is, in its original dress, beautiful and natural, into something which is neither Greek nor English, stiff, obscure, and flat, exemplifying all the faults incident to language, and excluding every excellence.

“The exercise of translation, on the other hand, meaning, by translation, the expressing of *an entire sentence* of a foreign language by an entire sentence of our own, as opposed to the rendering separately into English either every separate word, or at most only *parts of the sentence*, whether larger or smaller, the exercise of translation is capable of furnishing improvement to students of every age, according to the measure of their abilities and knowledge. The late Dr. Gabell, than whom in these matters there can be no higher authority, when he was the under-master of Winchester College, never allowed even the lowest forms to *construe*, they always were taught, according to his expression, to *read into English*. From this habit even the youngest boys derived several

advantages ; the meaning of the sentence was more clearly seen when it was read all at once in English, than when every clause or word of English was interrupted by the intermixture of patches of Latin ; and any absurdity in the translation was more apparent. Again, there was the habit gained of constructing English sentences upon any given subject, readily and correctly. Thirdly, with respect to Latin itself, the practice was highly useful. By being accustomed to translate idiomatically, a boy, when turning his own thoughts into Latin, was enabled to render his own natural English into the appropriate expressions in Latin. Having been always accustomed, for instance, to translate ‘*quum venisset*’ by the particle ‘having come,’ he naturally, when he wishes to translate ‘having come,’ into Latin, remembers what expression in Latin is equivalent to it. Whereas, if he has been taught to construe literally ‘when he had come,’ he never has occasion to use the English participle in his translations from Latin ; and when, in his own Latin compositions, he wishes to express it, he is at a loss how to do it, and not unfrequently from the construing notion that a participle in one language must be a participle in another, renders it by the Latin participle passive ; a fault which all who have had any experience in boys’ compositions must have frequently noticed.

“But as a boy advances in scholarship, he ascends from the idiomatic translation of particular expressions to a similar rendering of an entire sentence. He may be taught that the order of the words in the original is to be preserved as nearly as possible in the translation ; and the problem is how to effect this without violating the idiom of his own language. There are simple sentences, such as ‘*Ardeam Rutuli habebant*,’ in which nothing more is required than to change the Latin accusative into the English nominative, and the active verb into one passive or neuter : ‘*Ardea* belonged to the Rutulians.’ And in the same way the other objective cases, the genitive and the dative, when they occur at the beginning of a sentence, may be often translated by the nominative in English, making a corresponding change in the voice of the verb following. But in many instances also the nominative expresses so completely the principal subject of the sentence, that it is unnatural to put it into any other case than the nominative in the translation. ‘*Om-nium primum avidum novæ libertatis populum, ne postmodum flecti*

precibus aut donis regiis posset, jurejurando adegit [Brutus] neminem Roma passuros regnare.' It will not do here to translate 'adegit' by a passive verb, and to make Brutus the ablative case, because Brutus is the principal subject of this and the sentences preceding and following it; the historian is engaged in relating his measures. To preserve, therefore, the order of the words, the clause 'avidum novæ libertatis populum' must be translated as a subordinate sentence, by inserting a conjunction and verb. 'First of all, while the people were set so keenly on their new liberty, to prevent the possibility of their ever being moved from it hereafter by the entreaties or bribes of the royal house, Brutus bound them by an oath, that they would never suffer any man to be king at Rome.' Other passages are still more complicated, and require greater taste and command of language to express them properly; and such will often offer no uninteresting trial of skill, not to the pupil only, but even to his instructor.

"Another point may be mentioned, in which the translation of the Greek and Roman writers is most useful in improving a boy's knowledge of his own language. In the choice of his words, and in the style of his sentences, he should be taught to follow the analogy required by the age and character of the writer whom he is translating. For instance, in translating Homer, hardly any words should be employed except Saxon, and the oldest and simplest of those which are of French origin; and the language should consist of a series of simple propositions, connected with one another only by the most inartificial conjunctions. In translating the tragedians, the words should be principally Saxon, but mixed with many of French or foreign origin, like the language of Shakspeare, and the other dramatists of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. The term 'words of French origin' is used purposely, to denote that large portion of our language which, although of Latin derivation, came to us immediately from the French of our Norman conquerors, and thus became a part of the natural spoken language of that mixed people, which grew out of the melting of the Saxon and Norman races into one another. But these are carefully to be distinguished from another class of words equally of Latin derivation, but which have been introduced by learned men at a much later period, directly from Latin books, and have never, properly speak-

ing, formed any part of the genuine national language. These truly foreign words, which Johnson used so largely, are carefully to be shunned in the translation of poetry, as being unnatural, and associated only with the most unpoetical period of our literature, the middle of the eighteenth century.

“So also, in translating the prose writers of Greece and Rome, Herodotus should be rendered in the style and language of the Chroniclers; Thucydides in that of Bacon or Hooker, while Demosthenes, Cicero, Cæsar, and Tacitus, require a style completely modern—the perfection of the English language such as we now speak and write it, varied only to suit the individual differences of the different writers, but in its range of words and in its idioms, substantially the same.

“Thus much has been said on the subject of translation, because the practice of construing has naturally tended to bring the exercise into disrepute: and in the contests for academical honours at both Universities, less and less importance, we have heard, is constantly being attached to the power of *viva voce* translation. We do not wonder at any contempt that is shown towards *construing*, the practice being a mere folly; but it is of some consequence that the value of *translating* should be better understood, and the exercise more carefully attended to. It is a mere chimera to suppose, as many do, that what they call free translation is a convenient cover for inaccurate scholarship. It can only be so through the incompetence or carelessness of the teacher. If the force of every part of the sentence be not fully given, the translation is so far faulty; but idiomatic translation, much more than literal, is an evidence that the translator does see the force of his original; and it should be remembered that the very object of so translating is to preserve the spirit of an author, where it would be lost or weakened by translating literally; but where a literal translation happens to be faithful to the spirit, there of course it should be adopted; and any omission or misrepresentation of any part of the meaning of the original does not preserve its spirit, but, as far as it goes, sacrifices it, and is not to be called ‘*free translation*,’ but rather ‘imperfect,’ ‘blundering,’ or, in a word, ‘bad translation.’”

DR. ARNOLD'S Description of Rugby School,

‘*Journal of Education*,’ vol. vii. pp. 241-5.

The essential difficulty in the process of translation has been well stated by Mr. Newman, in the Preface to his "*Church of the Fathers*:"

"It should be considered that translation in itself is, after all, but a problem, how, two languages being given, the nearest approximation may be made in the second to the expression of ideas already conveyed through the medium of the first. The problem almost starts with the assumption that something must be sacrificed and the chief question is, what is the least sacrifice? In a balance of difficulties, one translator will aim at being critically correct, and will become obscure, cumbrous, and foreign; another will aim at being English, and will appear deficient in scholarship. While grammatical particles are followed out, the spirit evaporates; and while ease is secured, new ideas are intruded, or the point of the original is lost, or the drift of the context broken." p. viii.

On a subject of so much interest in education, I may add a reference to some judicious 'Remarks on Translation' by Mr. R. H. Horne, in the third No. of the '*Classical Museum*,' Decem., 1843. The nature of true and false translation, is also examined and well exemplified, in an article on 'German and English Translators from the Greek,' in the '*Foreign Quarterly Review*,' vol. xxxiii. July, 1844.

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
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